

JÑĀNAPĪṬHA MŪRTIDEVĪ GRANTHAMĀLĀ English Series 4

*Published on the Occasion of the Celebration of the
2500th Nirvāṇa of Bhagavān Mahāvira*

PAÑCĀSTIKAYASĀRA

THE BUILDING OF THE COSMOS

(PRAKRIT TEXT, SANSKRIT CHĀYĀ, ENGLISH COMMENTARY ETC ALONG
WITH PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL INTRODUCTIONS)

By

The Late Prof. A. CHAKRAVARTINAYANAR, M A L T

AND

The Prakrit Text, Sanskrit Chāyā of the same along with the Sanskrit
Commentary of Amṛtacandra and Various Readings
Edited in the Present Form

By

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GENERAL EDITORIAL

The Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha is a preeminent academic Institute of our country. It has achieved, during the last quarter of a century, quite worthy results in the form of learned publications in Sanskrit, Pāli, Prākṛit, Apabhramśa, Tamil and Kannaḍa. Most of them are equipped with critical Introductions embodying original researches which shed abundant light on many a neglected branch of Indian literature. The number of these publications is nearly one hundred and fifty, included in the Mūrtidevī and Māṇikachandra Granthamālās. Most of these works are brought to light for the first time, and thus some of them are rescued from oblivion. It has also published in its Lokodaya and Rāstrabhāratī Granthamālās nearly 350 titles in Hindi comprising almost all the literary forms like novels, poems, short stories, essays, travels, biographies, researches and critical estimates etc. Through these literary pursuits the Jñānapīṭha aims at giving impetus to creative writings in modern Indian languages. By their quality as well as by their appearance the Jñānapīṭha publications have won approbation and appreciation everywhere.

The Jñānapīṭha gives, every year, an award to the outstanding literary work in the various recognised languages of India which is chosen to be the best creative literary writing of the specific period, and its author gets a prize of one lakh of rupees at a festive function.

The Jñānapīṭha, which is so particular about the publication of ancient Indian literature and also in encouraging the progress of modern Indian literature, cannot but take into account the forthcoming 2500th Nīrvāṇa Mahotsava of Bhagavān Mahāvīra, one of the greatest sons of India and one of the outstanding humanists the civilised world has ever produced. Naturally the Jñānapīṭha, among its various plans to celebrate the occasion, has undertaken the publication of important Jaina works, and this *Pañcāstikāya*, edited and translated by the late Prof. A. Chakravartī is one of them.

The General Editors record their sense of gratitude to Shriman Sahu Shanti Prasada and his enlightened wife Smt Rama Jain for the patronage they have extended to the publication of these works which belong to the neglected branches of Indological learning. It is through their patronage that many unpublished works have come to light, and a number of important texts, accompanied by learned Introductions containing valuable research, have been put in the hands of scholars.

Thanks are due to Shri L C Jain who is enthusiastically implementing the publication programme of the Jñānapīṭha.

Vira Nirvana Day
13th Nov 1974

A N Upadhye
Kailashchandra Shastri

PREFACE

The *Pañcāstikāya*, as it is specified by its brief title, is one of the important works of Kundakundācārya who occupies unique position, next only to Mahāvīra and his Gaṇadhara Gautama, in the South Indian Jaina tradition. It deals with Jaina Metaphysics or ontology and Ethics, i.e., exposition of the path leading to liberation. The text is in Prākṛit Gāthās, and it mentions its title in two places, *Pamcatthiya-saṃgaha* (= *Pañcāstikāya-saṃgraha*) in Gāthā No. 103, and elsewhere, in No. 173, —*suttam* (= *sūtram* or *sūktam*) is tacked on to it, and in both the places it is qualified by *pavayanasāram* (= *pravacanasāram*). Though the brief title is more popular, some have used the title in Sanskrit like *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, —*śamayasāra*, —*prābhṛta* and —*saṃgraha*. In this edition they are allowed to remain as they are, inherited from earlier sources.

Plenty of Mss. of the *Pañcāstikāya* are known from public libraries (*Jinaratnakośa*, Poona 1944 p. 231). A number of commentaries in Sanskrit by Amṛtacandra, Brahmadeva, Devajita, Jayasena, Jñānacandra, Malliseṇa and Prabhācandra are known. Those of Amṛtacandra and Jayasena are already printed and well-known. There is a commentary of Bālacandra in Old-Kannāḍa, but, so far, it is not published. Some expositions of this work in Hindi have been composed by Hemarāja (Samvat 1700), Rājamalla (Sam 1716), Hīrācanda (Sam 1718) and Vidyācanda (Sam 1891).

The importance of this work has been all along recognised, and we have a number of editions in print of which the significant ones may be noted here.

(1) The text in Prākṛit, along with short introductory remarks in Sanskrit, taken from Amṛtacandra's commentary, was published in Roman script in *Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana*, Firenze 1901, by P.E. Pavolini under the title *Il Comendio dei*

Cinque Elementi (Pamcatthiya-samgaha-suttam) There is a short informative Introduction by the Editor in Italian. He significantly remarks (of course, that was in 1901) that the texts of the Digambaras are scarcely taken note of and no text entirely edited.

(2) It was published by Pannalal Bakaliwal alongwith Amṛtacandra's Sanskrit Commentary and Hemarāja's Vacanikā (put into modern Hindi) in the Rāyachandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay 1904.

(3) A second edition of the above by Pt. Manoharlal was published with the addition of Jayasena's Sanskrit commentary in the same Granthamālā, Bombay 1914.

As far as I can judge, these last two editions have been the basis, so far as the text and commentaries are concerned, of a number of editions published here and there.

(4) The late Br. Shital Prasada brought out an edition of it giving the Text, Sanskrit Chāyā and Hindi Translation of Jayasena's Sanskrit Commentary, Surat 1926-27.

(5) Then there is quite a good edition *Pañcāstikāya-samgraha* of the Text, Amṛtacandra's Sanskrit Commentary and Hindi Translation by Shri Maganlal Jain and published (2nd ed.) from Songad (Saurashtra), 1964.

Excepting Pavolini none of the Editors has devoted any attention to the critical editing of the Prakrit Text. Jayasena is one of the Sanskrit commentators who has noted some various readings and also given some additional Gāthās not found in Amṛtacandra's text. All the Editors are mostly interested in the exposition of the contents.

Lately, the texts of Śrī Kundakunda's works have been inscribed in marble in the Paramāgamamandira at Songad (Saurashtra) under the enlightening presence of Śrī Kanaji Swami Maharaj whose devotion to Śrī Kundakunda's words is unique and inspiring. The present writer was requested to edit the Prakrit Texts of Kundakunda's works for being inscribed there, and he has done it in his humble way using a few Mss. that were supplied to him. It is high time that the authorities in Songad collect in this Paramāgama Mandira all the known Mss. of Kundakunda's works in original, in photographs, films or photostat copies (as they might be available) so that, with the help of this material, some day a really critical text of all the works of Kundakunda can be presented for future studies. Nothing is more important and sacred than well preserving the words of this great Teacher whose name is remembered with so much of reverence in the annals of Jaina literature.

The *Pañcāstikāya (sāra)* with the Philosophical and Historical Introductions, Trans-

lation, Notes and an original Commentary in English by Prof A Chakravarti-nayanar was published by Kumar Devendra Prasad, The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah, as Vol III, of the Sacred Books of the Jains, in 1920. The learned Introductions of Prof Chakravarti have been a source and guide to eminent authors on Indian philosophy in giving an authoritative exposition of Jaina principles. The copies of this book are no more available, and many scholars felt that a new edition of Prof. Chakravarti's *Pancāstikāya-sāra* was an urgent desideratum.

To mark the great historical event of the 2500th Nirvāṇa Mahotsava of Bhagavān Mahāvira, the authorities of the Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha decided to bring out a new edition of the late Prof Chakravarti's *Pancāstikāya-sāra* in an improved form. And I look upon it a privilege that I was entrusted with this work. I have done it as a duty which I owe to the late Prof Chakravarti in whom I had an elderly colleague and to the Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha which has done so much for the progress of Jainological studies.

In this edition, the contents of Prof Chakravarti's exposition have been kept in tact. But in the English matter diacritical marks are added for Sanskrit terms so that they could be correctly pronounced. Some typographical consistency is also introduced. The Prākṛit text is better presented, taking into account the text edited by Pavolini and that printed in the Rāyachandra Jaina Śāstramālā. The Sanskrit Chāyā is brought immediately below the text from the foot-notes, and it has been added wherever it was not given in the earlier edition. While reading Prof Chakravarti's learned exposition of a number of topics, a specialist often feels like consulting the Sanskrit Commentary of Amṛtacandra used by the Professor. That is how and why the Prākṛit Text as well as the Sanskrit commentary of Amṛtacandra given immediately below it are added afresh in the present edition at the end. It is felt that the utility and the expository value of this edition is increased thereby. This matter is adopted from the Songad edition, noted above. The Prākṛit text is presented with minor changes in spelling etc. As contrasted with this text, important various readings from Pavolini's are noted in footnotes against the siglum P. Initial *n* or *n*, *ya* or *a*, *n* for *anusvāra* and the distinction between *anusvāra* and *anunāsika* or absence of either, are all ignored while recording the various readings. In presenting the Chāyā and the text of the Sanskrit commentary minor orthographical changes are made with a view to maintaining a standard format according to the conventions of the Jñānapīṭha, noted in the Instructions to Editors. Some attempt is made to see that maximum consistency is maintained in the Prākṛit Text which appears in two places in this edition. Of course Prof Chakravarti has included the extra Gāthās found in the commentary of Jayasena. As far as I see, misprints and minor changes apart, the Prākṛit text in both the places goes back to the edition of the *Pancāstikāya* in the Rāyachandra Jaina Śāstramālā. The need of going back to some genuine Mss. and building up a critical text of the Prākṛit Gāthās and of the commentary still remains.

I record my sincere gratitude to Smt. Rama Jain, the President of the Jñānapiṭha, and to Shri Sahu Shanti Prasada, the founder Patron, for their unique generosity in publishing these works which are a significant contribution to the cultural heritage of our land.

I offer my sincere thanks to Shri L C Jain but for whose kindly pressure I would not have been able to edit the present work in this form. Let me also mention that the quiet and congenial atmosphere of the Campus of the University of Mysore, Manasa Gangotri, has enabled me to complete this work much earlier than I had planned

Manasa Gnagotri
Mysore July 24, 1974.

A N. Upadhye

A Biographical Note on the late Prof. A Chakravarti

The late Prof A Chakravarti Nayanar (1880-1960) passed his M A. with distinction, in 1905, from the Christian College, Madras, and took his L T in 1909 from the Teachers' College, Madras. For a year or two he worked as a Teacher in the Wesley Girls' School and as a clerk in the Accountant General's office, Madras. In 1906, he was appointed as Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Presidency College, Madras, and thereafter he worked as such (having become a Professor in 1917) in the Government College at Rajahmundry, Madras and Kumbakonam (of the then Madras Presidency) from where he retired as Principal in 1938. He was conferred upon the title of Rao Bahadur in the same year.

Prof Chakravarti was well-versed in the various schools of western philosophy. He brought his wide learning and deep scholarship to bear upon his study of Jaina philosophy. His Introduction to the *Pancāstikāya* (Arrah 1920) is a valuable exposition of Jaina metaphysics and the path of Moksa. In 1937 he delivered Principal Miller Lectures which are published under the title '*Humanism and Indian Thought*'. He was a stalwart Jaina Śrāvaka of his times in Tamil Nadu. He was specially interested in '*Jaina Tamil literature*' on which he was written a monograph in English (Arrah 1941). He has edited a number of Tamil works by Jaina authors with their commentaries and, in some cases, with his learned exposition in English. For instance, *Neelakesi*, the text and the commentary of Samaya Divākara Muni, along with his elaborate Introduction in English (Madras 1936), *Thirukkural* by Thevar, along with the Tamil commentary by Kaviraja Pandithar (Bharatiya Jnanapitha Tamil Series, No. 1, with an English Introduction, (Madras 1949), *Tirukkural*, with English Translation and Commentary and an exhaustive Introduction. He has also edited the *Merumandarapurānam* in Tamil. His exposition (described by M S H Thompson, in the J R A Society, London 1955, as 'an indispensable aid to the

study of *Tirukkural*') of the *Tirukkural* has been hailed both in India and outside as a learned and liberal exposition of the *Kural*, the Tamil Bible. His '*Religion of Ahimsa*' is published by Shri Ratanchand Hirachand, Bombay (1957). It is a learned exposition in English of some aspects of Jainism.

Prof Chakravarti, as an authority on his subject, contributed a number of essays and articles on Jainism, Ahimsa and contemporary thought to various publications such as *Cultural Heritage of India*, *Philosophy of the East and West*, *Jama Gazette*, *Aryan Path*, *Tamil Academy*. He wrote both in English and Tamil. Some of his papers are reprinted in the *Yesterday and Today*, Madras 1946. He was a member of a number of Associations and Institution in Madras.

As a pious Jaina and a deep scholar of Jainism, he wrote a commentary in English on the *Samayasāra* of Kundakunda. He mainly follows the Sanskrit commentary of Amrtacandra. Still his exposition of the *Samayasāra* and his evaluation of its contents clearly demonstrate how ably he has expounded the principles of Kundakunda to make them intelligible to the modern world. This was published by the Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha, and a second edition of it is lately issued.

The late Prof Chakravarti was a well-wisher of the Jñānapīṭha, and he gave two of his works, as noted above, for publication in the Jnanapitha Series. We are thankful to Thiru V. Jaya Vijayan, B.E. (33, Pudupet Garden street, Royapettah, Madras-14), for the bio-date of Prof Chakravarti. He is the grand-son of the late Professor from his daughter Smt. V.C. Jothimalai (a n u).

INTRODUCTION

THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

THE AGE OF KUNDAKUNDA OR ELĀCĀRYA

Śrī Kundakundācārya, the author of our work, was a very famous Jaina philosopher and theologian. He was also a great organiser of Religious institutions. His name is held in great veneration especially by the Digambara Section of the Jainas. Many great religious teachers claimed it an honour to trace their lineage from the great teacher Kundakunda. Several inscriptions that are found in South India and Mysore relating to Jaina teachers begin with *Kundakundānvaya*—of the line of Kundakunda. Students of Jaina literature are familiar with such phrases as the following —

Śrī-Kundakunda-gurupaṭṭa-paramparāyām ,

Śrī-Kundakunda-santānam,

Śrī-Kundakundākhyā-munīndra-vamśa

These are some of the phrases claimed by Jaina writers such as Sakalabhūṣaṇa author of *Upadesaratnamālā*, Vasunandī author of *Upāsakādhyāyanam*, Brahmanemīdatta of *Āiāadhanā-Kathākośa*. Instances may be multiplied without number, for showing the important place occupied by our author in the hierarchy of Jaina teachers.

Some of the epithets employed to characterise him are also significant of his great importance. Munīndra—the Indra among the ascetics, Muncakravartī—the emperor among the Munis, Kaundeśa—Lord Kuṇḍa, are familiar designations of the great teacher.

The personality of this great teacher, as is generally the case with world famous individuals, is lost in obscurity and shrouded with traditions. We have to depend upon so many written and oral traditions to have a glimpse of this great person. The early history of India is but a string of speculations and even as such there are very many gaps. Under these circumstances, we have to be very cautious about the history of our author.

The one great landmark in the chronology of India is Candragupta Maurya. This great emperor of Magadha is not only referred to in the various literary works of India but is also mentioned by foreign historians especially the Greeks. This emperor Candragupta especially is of peculiar interest to the students of the early history of the Jainas.

Lewis Rice and Dr F W Thomas have done considerable service to Indian History by cautiously interpreting several available facts, archaeological and epigraphical, relating to that period. The early faith of Aśoka and the migration of Bhadrabāhu with Candragupta are now accepted facts of history. The tendency among European scholars to post date the historical events and persons relating to India is a just antidote to the phantastic and legendary notions of indigenous writers who generally measure time by milleniums. Nevertheless we have to point out that the orientalist have sometimes overreached their work. They generally proceed on the assumption that writing is a late acquisition in Indian civilization. The learned arguments put forward on Pāṇini by GOLDSTUCKER to undermine this assumption have been before the learned public for some decades. The excavations of Jaina Stūpas at Mathura and Mr K P JAYASWAL's discovery of Koṇika's Statue with the inscriptions try to set back the pendulam of Indian chronology to an earlier period. Speaking about the Jaina Stūpas Sir Vincent SMITH writes as follows —

“The assumption has generally been made that all edifices in this Stūpa form are Buddhist. When the inscription under discussion was executed not later than 157 A D, the Vodva stupa of the Jainas at Mathura was already so ancient that it was regarded as the work of the gods. It was probably therefore erected several centuries before the Christian era.”

Again says he,

“Assuming the ordinarily received date B C 527 for the death of Mahāvīra to be correct the attainment of perfection by that saint may be placed about B C 550. The restoration of the Stūpa may be dated about 1300 years later or A D 150. Its original erection in brick in the time of Pārsavanātha, the predecessor of Mahāvīra, would fall at a date not later than B C 600 considering the significance of the phrase in the inscription “built by the gods” as indicating that the building at about the beginning of the Christian era was believed to date from a period of mythical antiquity, the date B C 600 for its erection is not too early. Probably therefore this Stūpa of which Dr FUHRER exposed the foundations is the oldest known buildings in India.”

When we take these historic discoveries with the Jaina traditions that a number of Tirthankaras preceded Lord Mahāvīra we may not be altogether wrong in supposing that adherents of Jaina faith in some form or other must have existed even anterior to Mahāvīra and that Mahāvīra himself was more a reformer than the founder of the faith. If there were Jains influential enough to build Stūpas in honour of their saints even anterior to 600 B C, will it be too much to suppose that the followers of this religion might have existed in South India even before Bhadrabāhu's migration to the south? In fact it stands to reason to suppose that a large body of ascetics on account of a terrible famine in the north migrated to a country where they would be welcomed by their devoted coreligionists. If the south were instead of a friendly territory waiting to receive the Sangha of learned ascetics a land populated with strangers and of alien faith,

Bhadrabāhu would not have ventured to take with him into strange land a large body of ascetics who would depend entirely upon the generosity of the people. The Jaina tradition that the Pāndya King of the South was a Jaina from very early times and that Bhadrabāhu expected his hospitality might have some historical background.

Up to the time of Bhadrabāhu's migration there was no split in the Jaina fold. That the schism of the Śvetāmbaras arose about the time of Bhadrabāhu-I on account of the hardships of the famine is more than probable. This fact is evidenced by the complete absence of Śvetāmbaras in the Deccan and South India. The Jainas in the South and Mysore always claim to be of Mūlasangha, the original congregation.

One other interesting fact is the migration of the Digambaras from the south to the north for the purpose of religious propagandism. "One point of agreement comes out clearly and is note-worthy, i.e. the direction of the Digambara migration." It was from the south to the north from Bhadalpur to Delhi and Jaipur. This agrees with the opinion that the Digambara separation originally took place as a result of the migration southwards under Bhadrabāhu in consequence of a severe famine in Bihar the original home of the undivided Jaina Community" (Prof. A. F. Rudolf HOERNLE *Ind. Ant.* Vol. XXI. Three further Prttāvalis of the Digambaras, pp. 60 and 61.)

Professor HOERNLE says that he has not been able to identify Bhadalpur. It is no other than Pātaliputra or Pātalipura which is the old name of Thiruppappuliyur or modern Cuddalore (*Reports on the Archæological Survey of India*, Vol. 1906-07—Article on the Pallavas by V. VENKAYYA) suggests that it is not the above place and identifies it with Tiruvadi a place near Panruti with many Jaina antiquities and remains. This is only a matter of detail. But still the reason given by V. VENKAYYA is not quite sound. The fact that Pathiripuliyur is mentioned in *Devaram* as sacred to God Śiva will not conflict with its being also the centre of the Jainas.

Now this Bhadalpur or Patalipura is associated with our author Śrī Kundakunda as we shall show later on.

Before we proceed further, let us make sure about the age in which he lived and worked. For this we have clear evidence furnished in the several Pattāvalis preserved by the Jainas both Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras. After Mahāvīra there had been a succession of teachers as shown below —

		Years
I — Kevalins	Gautama	12
	Sudharmā	12
	Jambū	38
II — Śruta-Kevalins,	Viṣṇukumāra	14
	Nandimitra	16
	Aparājita	22
	Govardhana	19
	Bhadrabāhu-I	29

		Years
III Ten-Pūrvins	Viśākha	10
	Proṣṭhila	15
	Nakṣatra	17
	Nāgasena	18
	Jayasena	21
	Sidhārtha	17
	Dhṛtiṣena	18
	Vijaya	13
	Buddhalinga	20
	Deva, I	14
	Dharasena	14
IV —Eleven Angins	Naksatra	18
	Jayapālaka	20
	Pāndava	39
	Dhruvasena	14
	Kamsa	32
Total		468
		Years
V —Minor-Angins	Subhadra	6
	Yaśobhadra	18
	Bhadrabāhu, II	

In the year 2 after the Ācārya Subhadra's (accession to the pontificate), the birth of Vikrama took place, and in the year 4 of Vikrama's reign Bhadrabāhu II took his seat on the pontifical chair. Further succession will be evident from the following table —
 INDIAN ANTIQUARY Vols XX and XXI The several Pattāvalis examined by R. HOERNLE

THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

v

Kundakunda line according to the Digambara Paṭṭāvalis as worked out by Professor HOERNLE

Serial number	Names	Dates of accession		Householder			Monk			Pontiff			Intercalary days	Total			Remarks
		Samvat	Christian	Years	Months	Days	Years	Months	Days	Years	Months	Days		Years	Months	Days	
1	Bhadrabāhu, II	4 Ch S 14	B C 53	24			30			22	10	27	3	76	11		He was a Brahman by caste
2	Guptigupta	26 Ph S 14	31	22			34			9	6	25	5	65	7		A Panwār by caste
3	Māghanandin, I	36 A S 14	21	20			44			4	4	26	4	46	8	5	A Sāh by caste
4	Jinacandra, I	40 Ph S 14	17	24	9		32	3		8	9	6	3	65	9	9	
5	Kundakunda	49 P V 8	8	11			33			51	10	10	5	95	10	15	He had four other names āhva viz, Padmanandin, Vakragriva Grdhrapiccha, Elācārya

If we take this date 8 B C as the reliable date of his accession to the pontifical chair then the date of his birth would be about 52 B C For, only in his forty-fourth year he became pontiff or an Ācārya

What is his birthplace and scene of his activities? With regard to his birthplace we have no better evidence Here also we have to depend upon tradition—oral and written Let us see whether we can have any useful information from these traditions In a work called *Punyāsravakathā* Śrī Kundakundācārya's life is cited as an example for *śāstradāna* or gift of *śāstras* The account is as follows —In Bharata Khaṇḍa in Dakṣiṇadesa there was a district called Pīḍatha Nādu In a town called Kurumara in this district there lived a wealthy Vaiśya by name Karamuṇḍa His wife was Śrīmatī They had a cowherd who tended their cattle His name was Mativaran One day, when he was driving

his cattle to an adjoining forest, he saw, to his great surprise, that the whole forest was consumed by forest fire except a few trees in the centre, which retained the luxuriant green foliage. This roused his curiosity, and he went and inspected that place. There he found the dwelling place of some great Muni and also a box containing the *āgamas* or the Jaina Scriptures. Illiterate as he was, he attributed the safety of the spot to the presence of the *āgamas* which he carried home with great awe and reverence. He put up the *āgamas* in a sanctified place of his master's house and continued to worship the same daily.

Sometime after, a religious monk visited their house. He was offered *bhiksā* with great veneration by that wealthy Vaisya. Just then this cow-herd also offered the *āgamas* to the great *ṛṣi*. On account of these gifts—food from the Master, and the Scripture from the servant—the *ṛṣi* was very much pleased and blessed them both. The Master of the house since he had no children was to have an intelligent son, and the old and faithful servant would be born as the promised son of the house. The happy event came to pass and the son born to the family became a great philosopher and religious teacher. This was our author, Śrī Kundakunda.

The story further turns upon his religious tours. The mention of his name as the wisest of mortals in the *samavasarana* of Śrīmandharasvāmī in Pūrvavideha, the visit of the two *cāranas* to verify the fact, his supposed irreverence to them on account of his concentration, the return of the *cāranas* in disgust, the explanation of the misunderstood event, the reconciliation between the *cāranas* and Śrī Kundakunda and the latter's visit to the *samavasarana* with the *cāranas* are all incidents mentioned in detail. Further as the fruit of his previous gift of *śāstra* he became a great leader of thought and organiser of institutions. Finally he secured the throne of Ācārya and thus spent his life in usefulness and glory.

There is another account of his life given in *Kundakundācāryacaritra*, a pamphlet published in Dīgambara Jaina office, Surat. According to this, his birth-place is in the country of Malwa. His parents are mentioned as Kundaśreṣṭhī and Kundalatā. The young boy Kundakunda was apprenticed to religious teacher for the purpose of education. Early in life he showed an ascetic disposition and therefore he was ordained as a monk and admitted into the Sangha. The latter part of the story is almost identical with that of the previous one.

Both these versions appear to be quite legendary. The latter judged from the names of the parents is evidently a later construction by some imaginative mind based upon the name of the hero Kundakunda. The places mentioned in the former story are not easily identifiable. The only reliable information there perhaps is that the author belongs to Dakṣiṇa Deśa. Waiving these two stories as of no material use we have to depend more upon circumstantial evidence. Emphasis must be laid upon the fact that Śrī Kundakunda belonged to Drāviḍa Sangha.

“La communauté digambara portait le nom de mula sangha Un synonyme de ce terme paraît Être Drāvila Sangha, qui ne signifie sans doute rien de plus que” communauté “des pays dravidiens” Le mula sangha comptait plusieurs sectes dont la plus importante Était le Kunda Kunda anvaya” (—p 42 Introduction, *Reportaire Epigraphie Jaina*)

This suggestion of GUERINOT's based upon circumstantial evidence is a useful clue for our purpose

We have to collect further evidence if possible to corroborate the theory that our author belonged to the Dravidian country

(1) In an unpublished manuscript treating about *Mantra-laksana* we have the following śloka —

Dakṣiṇa-deśa-malaye Hemagrāme munir mahātmāsīt
Elācāryo nāmnā drāvilaganādhiśo dhīmān

This śloka is interesting to us The work treats about a female disciple of Elācārya, who was possessed of a Brahma Rāksasa This possessed disciple was no doubt well-versed in Śāstras but would get up on the summit of a small hill called Nīlagiri by the side of the village, Hemagrāma in which Elācārya lived, and would laugh and weep alternately with all hysterical violence She is said to have been cured by Elācārya with the help of Jvālāmālīnī Mantra Fortunately we are able to identify all the places mentioned in the above śloka

Malaya is the name of that part of the Madras Presidency comprised by portions of North Arcot and South Arcot traversed by the Eastern ghats The Taluks of Kalla Kurichi, Tiruvannamali and Wandewash perhaps form the central tract of this Malaya Hemagrāma which is the Sanskritised form of Ponnūr which is a village near Wandewash Close to this village there is a hillock by the name Nīlagiri On the top of this hillock on a rock there are even now the foot prints of Elācārya who is said to have performed his *tapas* thereon Even now pilgrims frequent this village once in a year, to perform *pūjā* to the foot prints Further the śloka mentions Elācārya to be Drāviḍaganādhiśa We know very well that Elācārya, is another well-known name for Kundakunda

Now this Elācārya is, according to Jaina tradition, the author of the great Tamil classic *Thirukkural* This is written in the old indigenous Venba metre of Tamil language According to the Jaina tradition, this work was composed by Elācārya and given away to his disciple Thiruvalluvar who introduced it to the Madura Sangha This version is not altogether improbable Because even the non-Jaina tradition about the author of *Thirukkural* appears to be merely another version of this one The Hindu tradition makes Thiruvalluvar himself the author of the work He is claimed to be a Śaivite by faith and Valluva by birth His birth place is said to be Thirumayalai or Mylapur or the modern Mylapore the southern part of the city of Madras The work was composed

under the patronage of one Elāla Singh, who was evidently the literary patron of Thiruvalluvar

This Elāla Singh of the Hindu Tradition may be merely a variation of Elācārya Thiruvalluvar figures in both the traditions, in the one as author and in the other the introducer before the Sangha. That Mylapurī had a famous Jain temple dedicated to Neminātha (Vide Tamil work *Tirunur ruanthathi*) and that it was a seat of Jaina culture is well evidenced by literary remains and antiquarian facts preserved in South India. Though the work is claimed by different religionists Śivaites, Buddhists and Jains, though there is no authentic record as to the exact faith of the author, still an unbiassed study of the work itself with the special view as to the technical terms employed in the couplets and the doctrines, religious and moral, embodied in the work will constrain one to conclude that it is a treatise evidently based upon the moral principle of Vītarāga, the corner stone of Jainism. The praise of Agriculture as the noblest occupation is consistent with the traditions of the Vellalas, the landed aristocracy of South India, who were evidently the earliest adherents to Jaina faith in this part of the country.

This identification of Elācārya, the author of *Kural*, with Elācārya or Kundakunda would place the Tamil work in the 1st century of the Christian era. This is not altogether improbable. Dr G U POPE would bring it down to a period later than the 8th century. There is no sufficient historic evidence for his belief. He is actuated by his personal bias that such a sublime work embodying highest moral ideals could not be due to the indigenous Dravidian culture alone, but must have been influenced by Christianity brought here by the early Christian Missionaries. The tradition about St Thomas lends weight to the supposition. There is nothing to show from the internal evidence that the author of the work was aware of Christianity. The doctrines treated therein are found widely scattered in Tamil literature especially in those works composed by Jainas such as *Nālaḍiyar*, *Aranericharam*, *Pazamozi Elathi*, etc. One who is acquainted with Tamil literature will not grudge the authorship of *Kural* to purely Dravidian scholars and moralists who are uninfluenced by foreign culture. Hence we may believe with very great probability that Elācārya, the author of *Kural*, was identical with Kundakunda, the author of *Prābhrtatraya*, and that he lived about the beginning of the 1st century A D.

This identification of Elācārya, the author of *Kural*, with Kundakunda brings in another important point of historical interest. It is an acknowledged fact that *Kural* is anterior to *Śilappadikāram* and *Manimekhalai*. The former was, written by Ilangovaligol the younger brother of Singuttuman Seran, the Chera King of Vangi. The latter work which is merely the continuation of the story of *Śilappadikāram* was written by "Kulavanikan Sattanar" a contemporary and friend of Ilangovali. During the *pratiṣṭhā* of Devī temple (*Śilappadikāram*) Gajabāhu I of Ceylon was present, according to *Mahāvamsa*, he reigned about 113 A D. The *Kural* therefore must be anterior to this date, so this also goes to corroborate the age of Elācārya or Kundakunda.

All these scattered facts of traditions and literary remains produce cumulative evidence to establish that our author was of Dravidian origin, that he was the leader of the Dravidian Sangha, and that he was evidently highly cultured in more than one language. This use of the word *Drāviḍa* in the *Drāviḍa Sangha* must have a specific reference to the Jainas of South India, the Vellalas of the ancient Tamil literature, who strictly followed Kollavratam or Ahimsā-dharma, and it is further evidenced by the popular use of the word in the compound. *Drāviḍa-Brahmins* who are strict vegetarians as contrasted with Gauda-Brahmins. It is a well-known fact that the strict vegetarianism in daily life of South Indian Brahmins who nevertheless perform *yāgas* involving animal sacrifice is a heritage from early Jaina culture in South India.

The early kingdoms of South India were the Cheras, the Cholas and the Pāṇḍyas. It is a well-known historical fact pertaining to South India that Pāṇḍyas were Jainas and were patrons of Jainism. They changed their faith only during the Śivaitic revival effected by Appār and Sundarar about the 8th century. That the Cheras were also Jainas can be inferred from *Silappadikāra* another great Tamil classic written by a Jaina scholar the younger brother of the Chera king (who was a contemporary of Gajabāhu of Ceylon). The Cholas were also off and on the Patrons of Jainas though in later days they were associated with Śivaitism. These three kingdoms were known about the time of Aśoka. The court language in all the three was probably Tamil. Can we suppose that Śrī Kundakunda belonged to any one of these kingdoms. Our above discussion would lead us to such a supposition and yet there is an important stumbling block in our way.

The work that is translated here is in Prākṛit. Further all the commentators of *Prābhṛtatrāya*, *Pañcāstikāya*, *Pravacanasāra*, and *Samayasāra*, mention the fact that these works were written by Kundakundācārya for the benefit of his royal disciple Śivakumāra Mahārāja. Who this Śivakumāra Mahārāja was and over what kingdom he ruled the commentators are silent about. We are once again compelled to have recourse to hypothesis. This Śivakumāra Mahārāja must have been a follower of Jaina faith and must have had Prākṛit as his court language. Further he must have been somewhere in the south in order to have Śrī Kundakunda as his religious teacher. This name does not occur in the dynastic geneology of the three Tamil Kingdoms—the Cheras, the Cholas and the Pāṇḍyas. Further there is no evidence that any prince of these dynasties had Prākṛit as his court language.

Before we proceed to state our theory we have to dispose of the theory proposed by K B PATHAK as to the identification of Śivakumāra Mahārāja (*The Indian Antiquary*, Vol XIV, 1885, page 15). Kundakunda was one of the most celebrated Jaina authors. The works attributed to him are the *Prābhṛtasāra* [?], the *Pravacanasāra*, the *Samayasāra*, the *Rayanasāra* and the *Dvādaśanuprekṣā*.

These are all written in Jaina Prākṛit. Bālacandra, the commentator, who lived before Abhinava Pampa says in his introductory remarks on the *Prābhṛtasāra* [?], that

Kundakundācārya was also called Padmanandi and was the preceptor of Śiva Kumāra Mahārāja. I would identify the king with the early Kadamba King Śrī Vijaya Śiva Mṛgeśa Mahārāja. For in his time, the Jainas had already been divided into the Nir-granthas and the Śvetapatas, and Kundakunda attacks the Śvetapata sect when he says, in the *Pravacanasāra* that women are allowed to wear clothes because they are incapable of attaining Nirvāṇa

“cittē cintā māyā tamhā tāsīm na nivvāṇam

चित्ते चिन्ता माया तम्हा तासि न निव्वान ।

Another interesting fact that we learn from his works is that, in the time of this author Jainism had not spread far and wide in these parts and that the body of this people worshipped Viṣṇu for he tells us in the *Samayasāra*

लोकसमजाणमेय सिद्धंत पडि न विस्सदि बित्तिसो ।

लोकस्स कुणदि बिण्हू समजाणं अप्पओ कुणदि ॥

So no difference appears between the people and the Śramaṇas in respect of the Siddhānta, (in the opinion) of the people, Viṣṇu makes (every thing), (in the opinion) of the Śramaṇas the Soul makes (every thing). On these circumstances, as well as on the place assigned to him in Jaina Pattāvalis and on the fact that his writings are considered by Jaina scholars, both in Dharwar and Maisur, to be the most ancient Jaina works now extant I base my opinion that Kundakundācārya was a contemporary of the early Kadamba King, Śiva Mṛgeśa Mahārāja.

The reasons cited by K. P. PATHAK are all right. Kundakunda is later than the Śvetāmbara Schism which is believed to have taken place about the time of Bhadrabahu, I. And perhaps at the time of Kundakunda the ordinary masses followed the Vedāntic form of Vaiṣṇava cult. But still these facts do not form a cogent reason for identifying Śivakumāra Mahārāja with the Kadamba King Śiva Mṛgeśa Varma (*Mysore and Coorg* by Lewis RICE, page 21) “The Kadambas were rulers of the west of Mysore from the 3rd to the 6th century.” And Śiva Mṛgeśa Varma ruled about the 5th century A.D. But the pontificate of Śrī Khndakunda began in B.C. 8 (The early dynasties by J.F. FLEET, page 288 of the *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. I) “and this is altogether too ancient, a period for the early Kadambas.” Further we do not know whether the Kadambas were acquainted with Prākṛit language. Under these circumstances we have to seek elsewhere as to the whereabouts of Śiva Kumāra Mahārāja, the disciple of Śrī Kundakunda.

Conjeevuram was the capital of the Pallava kingdom. The Pallavas ruled over Thonda Mandalam and also over a part of the Telugu country up to the river Krishna. Thonda Mandalam or Thondainādu was the name given to the land along the east coast between the two Pennars, South Pennars in South Arcot and North Pennar in Nellor and to east of the ghats. This land was divided into several Nāḍu and each Nāḍu into several Koṭtams. It was the land of the learned. Several great Dravidian scholars such as the

author of the *Kural*, the great Tamil poetess Avvai, the Sweet Puhazanthi the author of *Nalavenba*, all belong to Thondimandalam. Throughout the Tamil literature there are references to the literary merits and the culture of the inhabitants of Thondinadu. Conjeevuram the capital of Thondinadu must have been a great centre of learning in the south. Students from different parts of the country went to Conjeevuram for purposes of study. Scholars thronged there for the purpose of being recognised at the Pallava Court. Mayūra śarma, one of the early founders of the Kadamba dynasty, went to the Pallava capital for the purpose of completing his education in the Sacred lore. It was there that he quarrelled with the master of the horses who was a Kṣatriya. Mayūra Śarma, a Brahmin by birth, vowed that even a Brahmin could handle the weapons of warfare with skill and could found a kingdom. Thus arose the Kadamba dynasty. Thus the glory of Conjeevuram, the Pallava capital, must have wide spread about the 2nd century A.D. The kings of Conjeevuram as patrons of learning must have encouraged philosophical discussion among the representatives of the different religious sects the Hindus, Buddhists and Jainas. Taking part in such religio-philosophical discussions must necessarily have a reaction on the personal faith of the kings. In the early centuries of the Christian era, proselytising was a common factor among the rival religionists. Great religious leaders of different denominations went about from country to country converting kings and people. Thus we hear from Jaina History that Samantabhadrasvāmī visited Conjeevuram and converted Śivakoṭi Mahārāja who became Śivakoṭi Muni, the disciple and successor of Samantabhadra. Still later towards the 8th century Akalaṅka visited the capital, defeated the Buddhists in open philosophical contests and converted Himasītala the then Buddhist king. It is not improbable therefore that the Pallava kings at Conjeevuram during the 1st century of this era were patrons of Jaina Religion or were themselves Jainas by faith.

We also know from several epigraphical records that they had Prākṛit as their court language. What is known as the Mayīdavolu grant is an important document for South Indian History. It is in Prākṛit with the exception of the last verse, which is the closing *mangala* in Sanskrit. The body of the grant is in a Prākṛitic dialect which comes close to the literary Pālī, but shows also a number of peculiarities and divergent forms (Dr BUHLER, *Epī Indica* Vol I, p 2) which come nearer to the usage of the Jaina Mahāraṣṭrī dialect than to that of the Pālī and older inscriptions. It is issued by the Pallava King Śiva Skandavarma of Conjeevuram. Further it may be pointed out that the grant resembles in many particulars the Jaina inscriptions from Mathura. The use of the word Siddham in the beginning of the grant as well as in the Mathura inscriptions is very suggestive of Jaina origin. The most important point for us is the name of the King Śivaskanda which is merely another form of Śiva Kumāra. No doubt the same name occurs in the Andhra line. M J G Dubreuil tries to connect the two dynasties by matrimonial alliance. He suggests that the Śivaskandavarma (Yuvamahārāja) of the Pallava dynasty is the grandson of Śivaskanda Śāta Karṇi by the daughter and received

the name of the Andhra king who was his grandfather. Whether the name was so inherited or was independently adopted by the Pallava kings it is not quite material to decide here. It is enough to notice the fact that there was a Pallava king by name Śivaskanda or Śivakumāra Mahārāja. He also figures as Yuva-mahārāja in another grant. This name is also curiously identical with Kumāra Mahārāja. It is quite possible therefore that this Śivaskanda of Conjeevuram or one of the predecessor of the same name was the contemporary and disciple of Śrī Kundakunda. This would well fit in with several facts known about Kundakunda. Kundakunda or Elācārya must have been in Thondimandalam. So also was Pātaliputra, the seat of Dravida Sangha, a town in Thondimandalam.

In this connection we have to reject two theories about Pallavas as unfounded and improbable. The Pallavas are generally supposed to be foreigners from Persia. They are identified with Pahlavas, (*Mysore and Coorg* by L. RICE, page 53) which is the Pīṭṭik form of the Pārthava meaning Parthians, here especially the 'Arsacidian Parthians'. RICE further builds upon this theory another fantastic one that Chaulkyans who were sometimes the enemies of the Pallavas were by origin Salenkaians. V. VENKIYIA adopts the same theory though it is based upon purely etymological grounds. The hypothesis that is based upon mere similarity of names has no great historical importance unless it is corroborated by independent evidence. This theory unfortunately lacks such a corroboration. Hence it leaves unchallenged the other hypothesis which is perhaps more probable that the Pallavas were a section of the Hindu race in the south.

Another hypothesis deserves notice before dismissal. It is the identification of the Pallavas with some aboriginal tribes as the Kurumbas. This again is based upon the use of the word 'Kāḍavar' to designate the later Pallavas. No doubt the term 'Kāḍavar' means "the men of the forest". But there is no other ground to show that this 'Kāḍavars' were of the "forest tribe". In Tamil literature it refers to a highly civilised and cultured race. There must be some other reason therefore for the application of the name to the Pallavas. It may be merely a contraction of Palakkadavar, a people of the Palakkada, another seat of Pallava government.

Waiving these two hypotheses as improbable may we not suppose a much closer alliance between the people of the Thondimandalam and Andhras or the Andhrabhrityas who succeeded the Mauryas. The term Thondu in Tamil means 'Service'. 'Thondar' may simply mean 'those who serve' and may be taken as the Tamil Translation of Āndhrabhrityas. The Pallavas or the Thonders therefore may merely be a section of the Āndhras, settled in the south who inherited that portion of the Andhra kingdom either by matrimony or by right. This theory that the Pallavas were an indigenous race with a very high culture and civilization and related to Āndhrabhrityas is highly probable and is corroborated by other circumstantial evidence.

This digression into the history of the Pallavas we have had because such a political environment is required for our author Śrī Kundakunda Ācārya according to the available data about his life. We may therefore conclude that Śrī Kundakunda Ācārya wrote his *Prābhṛta-Traya* for one Śiva Kumāra Mahārāja who was most probably the same as Śiva Skanda Varma of the Pallava dynasty

Several works are attributed to Śrī Kundakunda Ācārya.

- 1 *Prābhṛta-traya* (The three *Prābhṛtas*)
- 2 *Ṣaṭpāhuḍam*
- 3 *Niyamasāra* etc

Of these the first three, *Pañcāstikāya*, *Pravacanasāra* and *Samayasāra* are the best known and most important. The work that is offered in translation here is the first of these three *Pañcāstikāya Prābhṛta* which treats about the five cosmic constituents

A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

JAINISM—A DYNAMIC REALISM

When the European scholars first began to study Indian Philosophy and Indian Literature they were peculiarly sympathetic towards the idealistic systems of India. These scholars were brought up in the tradition of Kant and Hegel. Kant in constructing his critical philosophy emphasised the phenomenality of our experience in general. The external world including "the starry heavens above" was merely a fictitious creation of the human mind according to its own forms and categories.

Roused from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, Kant began to inquire as to the possibility of a true metaphysics. Hume's analysis of experience ended in throwing overboard the fundamental conceptions of experience. The reality of the Self, the objective world and even the certain law of causation were all said to be fictitious concepts based upon psychological habits but having no rational foundation. From such a sceptical shipwreck Kant attempted to save metaphysics. Waiving the earlier methods as dogmatic he introduced his own critical philosophy. The main characteristic of this system is the activity of the mind as opposed to the passive *tabula rasa* of the Lockean system. Nature is due to the co-operation of sense materials and the activity of mind. Forms of space and time and the categories of the understanding from the *a priori* constitutive elements of experience. Knowledge is confined to such an experience which is phenomenal. This phenomenal world or the world of appearance is but an island surrounded by the unknown ocean of *noumenal* reality. This may be taken to be the foundation of modern idealism.

No doubt Kant strongly repudiated the suggestion that his system was idealistic. It is true that he posited the existence of the thing in itself. But this realm of *noumenal* reality remained unknown and unknowable. It was preserved only because of Kant's personal predilection, hence it was the very first thing to be rejected by his successors.

Through the influence of Hegel the German idealism secured an inordinate potency. Peculiarly gifted with genius for system-building Hegel wrought out his system of idealism based on Kantian traditions. *The thing-in-itself* was got rid of as an empty abstraction. Reality was identified with concrete experience. Thus the metaphysical dualism of Kant was converted into an idealistic monism. According to this Hegelian conception reality is equal to the Absolute consciousness. All finite things and persons are reduced

to merely adjectives or qualities of this Absolute which is of the nature of the spirit. It is this spirit that is the reality of which all other things of our ordinary experience are mere appearances.

Besides this idealistic monism of Germany there was another important aspect of thought that determined the trend of modern ideas. Herbert Spencer worked out a scheme of cosmic evolution in his synthetic system. This Spencerian philosophy also in its own way contributed to metaphysical monism and phenomenality of experience, hence the philosophy of the 19th century, especially towards the last quarter, had a predominant note of monism. This general proneness towards a monistic interpretation in western thought must have determined the attitude of the West towards Indian thought. Naturally were European scholars like Max Muller and Deussen sympathetically attracted by the metaphysical flights of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. The uncompromising monism of Vedānta was admired as the fruit of oriental culture.

The philosophical attitude is never constant. It has always been undulating between idealism and realism. In the West there is observed a distinct set-back to idealism. The English philosophers like Bradley and Bosanquet who inherited the traditions of Hegel and who practically ruled the philosophical world are now openly challenged. This revolt against idealistic influence has manifested through different channels. Pragmatism championed by James and Dewey has exposed the hollowness of a barren Intellectualism.

The Hegelian doctrine of the identity between Thought and Reality and the consequent criterion of Truth in the form of self-coherence and self-consistency are openly condemned as pernicious metaphysics. "The will to believe" is recognised as an important factor in Knowledge. Experimental verification of thought which is the method followed in Science is hailed as the true model for philosophy. Thought is studied in its true concrete setting. In as much as it is merely an instrument to secure greater efficiency of life, its value is entirely determined by its utility. Even Scientists like Mach and Poincare acknowledge this instrumentality of thought. Concepts are only convenient fictions to comprehend Nature.

From within Oxford University itself there has sprung up a philosophical schism which boldly questions the pretensions of the Absolute. Schiller and Rashdall, Strutt and others attack the Hegelian stronghold. The Absolute is condemned because it neither satisfies the philosophical curiosity nor appeals to religious consciousness.

From France and Italy we hear a similar protest from Bergson and Croce. The former repudiating the Hegelian Absolute builds up a theory of the Universe based upon evolutionism. He too condemns intellect as inadequate to apprehend the inner nature of reality. His antagonism to Intellectualism is carried to an uncompromising revolt against even scientific and philosophical constructions in general. He appeals to intuition as the only means of getting at Reality. Similarly Croce tries to separate what is living from what is dead, in Hegel. Thus on all sides this German Idealism is being

assaulted But the most dangerous opponent of Idealism is come in the form of New Realism

From an unexpected source there has come opposition The Science of Mathematics whose alleged weakness was the strength of Kantian Idealism has asserted its own right to challenge metaphysics The mathematical discoveries of Cantor, Peano and Frege have once for all reclaimed certain fundamental Mathematical notions such as the concepts of infinity and continuity from the unwarranted criticisms of metaphysicians As Mr B Russell clearly points out, modern Idealism must once for all relinquish its Kantian basis It can no more depend upon the so called demonstration offered by Kant as to the impossibility of real space and time

This wave of realism is further intensified by the fact that it is intimately associated with modern Science The traditional Hegelian idealism of the West has been peculiarly adverse to the interest of Science It may be safely asserted that a system of metaphysics which does not take into consideration the method and achievement of modern Science is so far self-condemned Nobody can be blind to the claim of Science to be a safe means for revealing truth Its claim is so wonderfully substantiated by its achievements, that we may say that modern life and modern thought are mainly the result of modern Science So much so any system of Metaphysics which aspires to secure the open sesame to unlock the secrets of reality must not openly conflict with modern Science The new realism therefore is in noble company

When we are aware of this changed attitude in modern thought we are naturally stimulated to examine similar philosophical attitudes in the past

What is placed before the students of philosophy herein is due to such a sympathetic scrutiny of the past The Jaina system of thought is so peculiarly consistent with modern realism and modern science, that one may be tempted to question its antiquity Still it is a fact, that such a system flourished in India several centuries before the Christian era

The author of the work which is translated in the following pages lived in the 1st century B C Hence it is one of the earliest treatises on Jaina Thought But the author was not the originator of this system. The *anekāntavāda* of the Jainas must be certainly older than Mahāvira who is believed to have revived Jainism

The realistic tendency in oriental philosophy is not peculiar to Jainism From the very early days, we find this principle of interpreting life and the Universe running side by side with the idealistic one During the Vedic period we find nothing but gross form of Realism The Vedic Gods were but magnified human beings sharing all the weaknesses and foibles peculiar to mankind When sacrifices were offered to Indra or Agni or Vāyu or Varuṇa with chanting of hymns, there could be no trace of any suspicion as to the reality of the world around Not only the world of Nature was taken to be real but many of its elements were imaged after man No doubt we find a unifying tendency as

an undercurrent of the Vedic thought. No doubt the Vedic Devas were subordinated to the one creative principle of the Universe, Prajāpati.

But this wonderful period of primitive culture is followed by a barren age of sheer ceremonialism. The period of the Brāhmaṇas is marked by sacrificial technique. Elaborate formulæ were invented for the conduct of sacrifices. Ceremonialism took the place of Poetic effusions. This led to the ascendancy of the priestly class. The sacrificial master or Yajamāna has to engage his priests, paying heavy fees or *dakṣiṇās*. Religious devotion during this period degenerated into petty commercialism. But this state of things did not last long. While the priests were further elaborating the ceremonial formulæ the work of investigating the true nature reality was taken up by another band of thinkers. By this time the homogenous Aryan tribe split up into different castes. Of these sects the Kṣatriyas or the warrior class have learned the secrets of Reality. They have introduced a new philosophical cult known as Brahmadvidyā. The Brahmadvidyā must have originally referred to certain spiritual intuitions obtained through introspection. Man discovered himself for the first time. The inner spiritual principle, the Ātman is taken to be the Reality. It is neither the body nor the senses. It is something behind and beyond the corporeal frame. It is that which hears but is not heard. It is that which sees but is not seen. It is that which makes the operation of the senses possible while itself is beyond sense-apprehension. This spiritual principle was indifferently called Ātman or Brahman. Like the Pythagorians of Greece, the Indian thinkers kept their metaphysical cult as a secret. The Kṣatriyas who were the discoverers and custodians of the New Thought imparted it only to the deserving few. This *upanishadic* cult, for so was it named, soon replaced the earlier ceremonialism. The Jñāna-kāṇḍa superseded the Karma-kāṇḍa as the path to Self-realisation. Even the priests, discounting their ceremonial technique, flocked to the Royal courts to be initiated into the new mysteries. Thus the age was one of intense discussion, research and self-introspection. During this period again, we have the seeds of the different philosophical systems constructed in the succeeding period. No doubt Yājñavalkya is a towering personality of the Upanishadic age. No doubt he attempted reconciliation between the old and the new. In his hands the new wisdom appeared as distinctly monistic. But that current which is evidently the source of the later Vedāntic stream was only one of the many currents of the Upanishadic wisdom. This is very well substantiated by the different systems constructed subsequent to the age. The philosophical systems in India are mainly of two classes, the orthodox and the heretic. The six Darśanas Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, Uttara-mīmāṃsā or Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika constitute the orthodox systems. The heretical systems are Buddhism, Jainism, the philosophy of the Cārvakas and Bārhaspatyas. Of course this classification does not mean anything but that it was made by Brahminical scholars. 'Orthodox' and 'heretical' are terms mainly based upon the attitude towards the Vedas. Kapila's Sāṅkhya is *nirīśvara* and is allied to Jainism and Buddhism in its opposition to Vedic sacrifices. Pūrva-mīmāṃsā [?] or Vedānta rejects

the creator and creation as Vyavahāric and hence the result of *māyā*. There is a good deal of truth in the statement that it is merely Buddhism in disguise. Hence the traditional classification is justified neither by philosophical nor religious criterion.

Of these different systems which represent the post-Upanishadic thought the Vedānta alone has become prominent. But students who study impartially the other systems will realise the importance of their contributions to Indian thought and culture.

The supremacy of Vedānta over the systems, which are to a very great extent realistic, is not a thing to congratulate ourselves. For, Realism is generally allied to science and many of the scientific theories pertaining to the constitution of the physical world are associated with these realistic schools, e.g., the atomic theory of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. Idealism even in the West either openly or covertly has been antagonistic to the interests of Science. Hence any attempt to escape from the hypnotic illusion of a powerful Idealism is to be welcomed by impartial students of Science and Philosophy.

It is not possible for us to examine in detail the several realistic schools of Indian Thought. Hence we shall confine ourselves to Jaina Philosophy which is generally neglected by many and misunderstood by the few who attempt to speak on it.

JAINA PHYSICS

We have referred to the contribution to Indian Wisdom by the Warriors. By their plam living and high thinking they led to the emancipation of human intellect from the thralldom of barren ritualism. While the priest-craft was engaged in devising sacrifice after sacrifice their minds were dominated by a passionate desire for solving the riddle of the Universe and for understanding the nature of the Eternal One behind the world of appearance. This dominant phase of monism centres round the court of Janaka. But there must have been other schools of new Kṣatriya thought. This group of thinkers could not compromise with the traditional thought of the Vedic period. They show a strong bias towards Dualism and Pluralism. They represent the liberal tendency in the new thought itself. Whenever they encountered a conflict between their ideals and the Vedas they did not hesitate to repudiate the authority of the latter. To this left wing of the pioneers of thought we owe the Systems of philosophy such as the Sāṅkhya, the Jaina and the Buddhistic schools. It is worthy of notice here, by the way, "that the greatest intellectual performances or rather almost all the performances of significance for mankind in India have been achieved by men of the warrior caste"*

The Sāṅkhya system presupposes two kinds of existences, Physical and Spiritual, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*—rather an infinite number of *puruṣas*. Salvation according to Sāṅkhya consists in the differentiation between the two, matter and spirit. The individual *Puruṣa* secures emancipation by recognising its own intrinsic qualities as being

* *Philosophy of Ancient India* by Richard GARBE

distinct from the Prakritic transformations which go to constitute the cosmic evolution. Not only the genuine physical changes but also the psychological facts such as will, desire and intellect are credited to *prakṛti* while the *puruṣas* remain passive spectators of the whole drama, having nothing to do with moral responsibility.

Evidently following the same dualistic tendencies but differing in the last point of moral responsibility the Jainas and the Buddhists worked out their respective systems with a deep religious colour. The Buddhists seem to have overshot their mark. Equipped with the logic of Kṣāṇikavāda they reduced the whole world of reality, physical and spiritual, to mere concatenation of sense-qualities having only a momentary existence—a result independently reached after several centuries by Hume. Neither this sensational nihilism of Śākya Muni nor the monistic interpretation is favoured by the Jainas. They steer clear of the two extremes. They accept the Puruṣas of the Sāṅkhyas, but in their hands these Puruṣas cease to be passive spectators. They are active architects of their own destiny and through their own effort obtain final freedom bearing all the while full moral responsibility for conduct. The *prakṛti* is also similarly elaborately reconstructed. It is made more definite. It is denied many of its psychological implications. It is identified with Matter in modern scientific sense and it is also given an atomic constitution. It appears under a new name—*pudgala*. The term *pudgala* means matter. The Physical object which has the several sense qualities and which occupies space is also called *mūrti* and *rūpa*, object. In speaking about Pudgala or matter the Jaina thinkers clearly analyse the qualities apprehended by sense perception. The qualities of touch, taste, smell, colour, and sound are generally associated with Pudgala.

But the Physical bodies that are apprehended by sense perception are constituted by atoms or *paramāṇus*. It is this atomic structure of the Universe that is the interesting part of Jaina Physics*. The *paramāṇu* or atom is defined quite in terms of modern physics. Though modern physics revolutionised the concept of Atom still it has not completely annihilated it. No doubt an atom is a cluster of electrons as complex perhaps as the solar system itself. But the discovery of radio-activity has not interfered with the laws of Physics and Chemistry based upon atomic conception. The only change that modern Physics has introduced is that Atom is no more simple and basic but complex and perhaps secondary. In spite of this complex nature it does maintain its individuality. No modern physicist will deny that it is the fundamental foundation of the structure of the Physical Universe. It is such an atom or *paramāṇu* that is the basis of Physical structure.

The *Paramāṇu* is neither created nor can be destroyed. It is the permanent basis of the Physical Universe. The several kinds of Physical objects are all constituted by the same class of primordial atom. The *Paramāṇu* cannot be an object of sense percep-

* This doctrine of atomic structure is also prominent in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Schools.

tion. It is in itself transcending the sense experience and as such it is practically *mūrtā* though it is the basic constituent of all *mūrtā*, objects.

This primary atom or the material point has an intrinsic attraction to similar atoms. Thus molecular aggregates are formed by the combination of atoms. These molecular aggregates are called *skandhas**. These *skandhas* are again of infinite variety, you may have a molecule constituted by two atoms or three and so on up to infinite number of atoms. Thus every perceivable object is a *skandha* and even the whole physical universe is sometimes spoken of as *mahāskandha* or the Great aggregate. The physical objects being aggregates of atoms or *skandhas* their changes are entirely due to atomic distintegration or aggregation.

THE CONCEPTION OF MOTION

Having accepted the reality of physical object the Jainas naturally accepted the possibility of real motion.

Motion has always been an unintelligible perplexity to the Idealist. Both in the East and the West Idealistic thinkers have fought shy of this by taking refuge in the conception of *māyā* or appearance. It is in the western System of thought that the conception figures prominently. Zeno trying to defend the unchangeable adamant Absolute of Parmenides introduced four invincible arguments against the reality of motion. These arguments were accepted as invincible for several centuries. They figure in some form or other in Kantian antinomies and Hegelian dialectic. Even Bradley draws upon Zeno's wisdom in his attempt to condemn the realities of concrete world to the limbo of appearances. As Mr B Russell points out the arguments are no more irrefutable in the light of modern Mathematics. Hence Realism need not approach the problem with any misgivings. Reality of motion has thus obtained a standing ground in the field of modern philosophy.

What is more important than this is the part played by this concept in Science. For Science the world of reality is a system of energies. This dynamic conception of science has given a new dignity to the concept of motion. In spite of the unwarranted caution exhibited by Physicists like E. Mach and Karl Pearson modern Physics has once again emphasised the importance and the reality of motion in understanding the mystery of Nature. Always looked upon with suspicion by idealistic metaphysics the doctrine of Reality of motion has been welcomed by Realistic and scientific systems of thought.

But in order to accept the reality of motion of Physical objects the reality of space must be postulated. Thus motion in Jaina doctrine is intimately associated with space and two other Categories with peculiar nomenclature, of *dharma* and *adharma*. We shall examine the Jaina account of these three Categories.

Reality of space is also a crucial doctrine to determine whether metaphysics is idea-

* This term also occurs in Buddhist philosophy but with a different meaning.

listic or realistic. Curiously the non-Jaina Indian systems of thought do not pay any prominent attention to the problem of space. In fact the more influential Indian system of Philosophy, the Vedānta uses the term *ākāśa* indifferently to denote space and ether. It is the latter meaning that is more prominent. It is to the credit of the ancient Jaina thinkers that they took a bold attempt to attack the problem and that with very great success. This fact is perhaps due to their special interest in Mathematics. An adequate solution of the problem of space and time is intimately connected with Mathematical Philosophy. It is modern Mathematics that has successfully reclaimed once again space and time from the destructive dialectic of the idealistic metaphysics. Space is indispensable to Science and Realistic metaphysics. The wonders of modern science are all associated with the reality of Space and what is contained therein. Hence to "the Indian Realism" space cannot but be real. *Ākāśa* is infinite extension. It accommodates all other real existences. On account of this accommodating function it has a portion which is filled with the other real objects. This portion is called *lokākāśa* the world-space because it is co-extensive with the world or *Loka*. Beyond that there is the infinite empty space which is *buddha ananta ākāśa*.

The interesting fact about this conception of space is the doctrine that space also is constituted by simple elements known as *ākāśānu* or spacial point. This *ākāśānu* is to space what *pudgala-paramānu* is to matter. And each *ākāśānu* is related to each *pudgalānu*. To borrow a convenient modern expression the class of space points and the class of material points are "similar having one to one relation".

The Jaina thinkers elaborately describe the nature of space carefully distinguishing it from matter. It is devoid of the several physical qualities and as such it is mere extension. It should not be confounded with extended objects.

Matter and space do not exhaust the Physical conception. The Jaina thinker pertinently asks the question why the atoms should be kept together constituting the world of *mahā skandha*? Why should they not get dissipated throughout *anantākāśa* or infinite space? Then there would be no world. The very fact that the structure of the world is permanent, that the world is a cosmos and not a chaos implies the existence of another principle which guarantees the permanency of the world's structure and the world form. This principle has the function of binding the flying atoms to the world's centre. Its function then is distinctly inhibitive to arrest the flying atom. This Physical principle is called *adharma* or rest. But if *adharma* alone were to function in the Universe, there would be absolute rest and universal cosmic paralysis, hence the necessity of a counteracting force *dharma*. The function of this is to guarantee free movement for the objects that move of their own accord or otherwise. This principle of *dharma* or motion then is merely to relieve the universal inhibition that would otherwise result.

These two principle, *dharma* and *adharma*, of motion and rest are described in terms that are applicable to the modern conception of *ether*. Both *dharma* and *adharma* pervade through space up to the world limit. They are absolutely non-Physical in nature.

and non-atomic and non-discrete in structure. The qualities of *pudgala* are not found therein. Nor have they the structure of space which is constituted by space points. These two Physical principle are perfectly simple. Therefore they may be spoken of as one or as many. There are spacial, and yet are non-spacial. They are *amūrta* and *arūpa*. They are neither light nor heavy. They are not objects of sense perception. Their existence is inferred only through their function. Such are the characteristics of these two principles which are distinctly peculiar to Jaina Physics.

The movement of physical objects and of organic beings is due entirely to other causal agency. Organic beings are capable of spontaneous movement and physical objects move because of impact received from other physical moving objects. Movement of these things should not be causally traced to the agency of *dharma*. Similarly when the moving objects come to rest, rest should not be interpreted as the result of the agency of *adharma*. *dharma* and *adharma* are devoid of any kind of direct causal potency. Their function is purely external and indirect. Their neutrality is so much emphasised by the Jaina thinkers that there could be no mistake about their meaning. These are in short the necessary physical postulates without posting which the structure and form of physical Universe will be quite unintelligible.

JAINA METAPHYSICS

There are two important concepts in Jaina Metaphysics which are preplexing to students of Jainism, the *astikāyas* and the *dravya*. The term *astikāya* is a compound name made up of *asti* and *kāya* which respectively mean existing and extensive magnitude, *astikāya* therefore means a real that has extensive magnitude. The other term *dravya* means the real that is fluent or changing. We shall try to explain these two concept in detail.

The *astikāya* are five in number, *jīva* (soul), *pudgala* (matter), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest) and *ākāśa* (space). These five build up the Cosmos. Space and matter are distinctly extended reals. *dharma* and *adharma* are indirectly related to space. Their operation is in space and is limited by *lokākāśa*. Thus they may also be considered as related to space. Lastly, Life is generally associated with body, the organic body constituted by *pudgala* or matter. Jiva is operative in and conditioned by such a physical medium. In a way therefore Jiva also is related to space. These five existences which have spatiality either directly or indirectly are the five *astikāyas*. These are the constituent elements of the universe or the world.

KĀLA

Kāla or time though not an element of the physical universe may be mentioned here. Since change and motion are admitted to be real, time also must be considered real. The real are absolute time as contrasted with the relative time is constituted by simple elements known as *kālānus* or instants. Instants, points and atoms are the characteristic

conceptions of Jaina thought and in this respect it has a wonderful corroboration from the field of modern mathematics

The Jaina thinkers in distinguishing time from the five *astikāyas* made use of an important idea *astikāya* is spatiality or extensive magnitude. This extensive magnitude is denoted by a technical name, *tiryak-pracaya* or horizontal extension.

When the simple elements, say, the points are so arranged in a series where each term is an item also in another series we must have the two dimensional series which will correspond to surface or extension. Wherever there is such a *tiryak-pracaya* we have *astikāya*. But time or *kāla* has only *ūrdhva-pracaya*. The elements are in a forward direction. The series is *mono-dimensional* or linear order. Therefore *kāla* has no extension either directly or indirectly. Hence it is not an *astikāya*. Though it is not an *astikāya* it is distinctly a real entity which accounts for changes in other things.

Such are the characteristics of real time. This should not be confounded with *vyavahāra kāla* or relative time which is measured by some conventional units of either long or short duration. These conventional distinctions would have no meaning if they are not co-ordinated in a single real time series.

THE SIX DRAVYAS

The term Dravya denotes any existence which has the important characteristic of persistence through change. Jaina conception of reality excludes both a permanent and unchanging real of the Permenidion type and also the mere eternal flux of Heraclites. An unchanging permanent and mere change without substratum are unreal, or impossible abstractions. Jaina system admits only the dynamic reality or *dravya*. Dravya then is that which has a permanent substantiality which manifests through change of appearing and disappearing. *Uipāda*—Origin, *vyaya*—decay and *dhrauvya*—permanency form the triple nature of the Real. To emphasise the underlying identity alone would end Vedāntic conception of this Real as Brahman. To emphasise the change alone would result in the *Kṣanika-vāda* of the Buddhist, the reality as a stream of discrete and momentary elements. The Concept of *dravya* reconciles both these aspects and combines them into an organic unity. It is an identity expressing through difference, a permanency continuing through change. It corresponds to the modern conception of organic development rather in its Hegelian aspect. It has duration, it is movement, it is the *Élan Vital*. The five *astikāyas* and *kāla* or time are the six *dravyas* or the real existences.

DRAVYA, GUNA AND PARYĀYA

or

SUBSTANCE, QUALITIES AND MODES

Having introduced the Jaina conception of the real let us examine the distinctions in the realm of the reals. The dynamic substance or *dravya* is always associated with certain intrinsic and inalienable qualities called *gunas*. Thus the yellow colour, malleability, etc.,

will be the qualities or *guna* of the *dravya* gold. The Dravyas with its inalienable qualities must exist in some state or form. This is its mode of existence or *paryāya*. This mode or *paryāya* is subject to change. It may be destroyed and a new mode may appear. But this creation and destruction are relevant only to *Paryāyas* or modes and not to Dravyas, the constitutive substance. That can neither be destroyed nor created. That is eternal.

The approximate parallel conceptions in the western thought will be Spinoza's substance, qualities and modes. Of course, for Spinoza, there was only one substance whereas here we have six distinct substances or Dravyas. The term 'attribute' is used in a technical sense by Spinoza whereas it means merely the qualities in Jaina Metaphysics. Each Dravya or the real has its own appropriate attributes. Matter has the sense qualities of touch, taste, etc., soul has *cetanā* consciousness, and so with the other Dravyas. What is the relation between *dravya* and *guna*? The reals and their qualities? This is an important problem even in modern metaphysics. There have been two distinct answers proposed by philosophers. One answer always emphasises the permanent basis as the real and the other the changing qualities. The former condemns change as mere appearance or *māyā*, whereas the latter condemns the permanent substance as a mere figment of imagination. The former school generally ends in agnosticism and maintains that the real is unknown and unknowable. The latter generally ends in scepticism and sweeps away in a flood of doubt the fundamental concepts of life and world, of morality and religion. In India we have Advaita Vedānta as an example of the former and Buddhism, of the latter. In the West, the philosophers like Locke and Kant may be mentioned as representatives of the former school and Hume may be taken as a type of the latter.

The problem is once again taken by Bradley who after an acute analysis condemns it to be insoluble. Hence according to his own dialectic the thing with its qualities is self-contradictory and therefore an appearance. This is a conclusion which goes clean against science and common sense. Thing-hood is not after all a self-contradictory notion. For the Jainas it is a fundamental concept. The thing or Dravya as it is a dynamic entity is always flowing. It has no existence apart from its qualities which in their turn are not really distinct from the Dravya. The thing-in-itself apart from all the qualities is merely an empty abstraction. The qualities themselves are not merely momentary fleeting sensations. The thing exists in and through its qualities and the qualities related and organised constitute the thing. The difference between the two is only a difference of reference and not difference of existence, in the technical language of Jaina metaphysics, the *anyatva* between *dravya* and *guna* is only *vyapadeśa-mātra*. They do not have *pradeśa prthaktva*. Hence they are one in reality though having distinct nomenclature and reference.

Paryāya is another technical term demanding careful understanding. *Paryāya* means mode of existence. This again is viewed from two different aspects, *artha-paryāya* and *vyāñjana-paryāya*. We have already mentioned that *dravya* is but an entity that is conti-

nally changing. This triple nature of reality that is permanency through births and deaths, through creation and destruction gives to *dravya* a characteristic mode of existence every moment. This continuous flow of the real is parallel to the continuous flow of the duration of time. This intrinsic change of *dravya* is known as *artha-paryāya*. All the six *dravyas* have this *artha-paryāya*. What is *vyāñjana-paryāya*? It is not merely the cross-section in the continuous flow of *dravya*. *Vyāñjana-paryāya* has a pretty fixed duration of existence. Besides the molecular aggregation and disintegration that take place every moment in a physical object, the object may have a particular mode of existence as a pot, for example for a certain duration of time. This *paryāya* of pot is *vyāñjana-paryāya* of *pudgala*. Similarly for Jīva. The continuous change that takes place in consciousness is Jīva's *artha-paryāya*. Its existence as a particular organism as a man or a *deva* with determinate age is the *vyāñjana-paryāya* of Jīvāś. Thus Jīva and Pudgala have both the kinds of *paryāyas* whereas the other four *dravyas*, have got only *artha-paryāya* alone. The reals are thus exhausted by the six *dravyas* with their respective *gunas* and *paryāyas*.

Since these Dravyas are reals they have *sattā* or *astitva* or existence as their common characteristic. From this point of view of *sattā*, all the Dravyas may be brought under one class. Though from the class-point of view all the *dravyas* are one, still the *sattā*, their common characteristic, should not be abstracted and postulated as the unitary substance of which the other Dravyas may be taken as *paryāyas*. The *ekānta* view is condemned as unwarranted and erroneous. The six Dravyas, in spite of their common characteristic of *sattā*, are fundamental and irreducible one to another.

One more point and we may leave this topic. A thing in concrete world is therefore a *paryāya* of anyone of the *dravyas*. It is also otherwise called *artha*. An *artha* or a thing is a corporate unity of an infinite number of qualities, just as the Cosmos is a system of infinite number of *arthas*. The one is extensive and the other is intensive, but both are infinite wholes. According to Jaina Philosophy therefore, we require an infinite thought to apprehend them completely. He who cannot know a thing completely cannot know the world completely and conversely he who cannot know the world completely cannot know even a single thing really and completely. This particular attitude of the Jaina thinkers reminds us of Tennyson's lines in, "*A flower in the crannied wall*" "If I could know the root and all I could know what God and man is."

Having spoken of the Dravyas in general, let us try to explain Jīva-dravya a little more in detail.

JAINA BIOLOGY

Perhaps it is inaccurate to speak of biology in the system before us. The science of biology as such is peculiar to modern age, hence we are not quite justified in expecting such a scientific conception in a work of pre-Christian era and which is perhaps of the same age as of Plato and Aristotle. Naturally therefore, the ideas about the organic world are curiously intermixed with various mythic and fantastic conception relating to being of

Hell and Svarga Eliminating all these as irrelevant we still have considerable material to enable us to have an insight into the ancient ideas about life and living beings.

One important conception that would strike the reader in the very beginning is the organic unity of the plant and the animal world Vegetable kingdom is distinctly organic Its nature was accurately observed and carefully described The whole plant world is included in the class of organisms having one sense, i.e. the sense of contact Then the world of animals and insects is classified according to the same principle of sense organs The animal world beginning with such insects as earthworm and ending with man is brought under four main groups, organisms, with two, three, four, and five senses

PRĀÑAS

Associated with organisms there is the Conception of *prāṇas* or the essential characteristics of living beings These are mainly four, *bala-prāṇa*, *indriya-prāṇa*, *āyuh-prāṇa*, and *ucchvāsa-nihśvāsa prāṇa* Every organism implies certain capacity of spontaneous activity This capacity for action is *Balaprāṇa* or life potency Every organism must possess some kind of sense awareness This implies the possession of a sense organ and the capacity to apprehend the environment through that sense The number of sense organs is different according to stages of organic development Next is *Āyuh-prāṇa* or duration of life Every living organism has a limited duration of life This organic capacity to persist through a certain duration is *āyuh-prāṇa* And lastly respiration There is no organism without this *Prāṇa* of *Ucchvāsa-nihśvāsa* These four main *Prāṇas* are the essential attributes of organic beings

DIFFERENT KINDS OF BIRTHS

One other interesting point is the enumeration of the different means of birth of organisms Young ones may be produced from *garbha* These are *garbhajas*, young ones produced from the womb Then the *andajas*, the young one produced from eggs Thirdly *sammūrchana* or spontaneous generation This refers to minute organisms And lastly, they speak of *upapādikas* in the case of *Devas* and *Nārakas*. The last one of course we may treat as beyond scientific pale The recognition of spontaneous generation is a point deserving special emphasis

MICROSCOPIC BEINGS

Another fact deserving notice is the early recognition of the existence of microscopic organisms. These are called *sūkṣma ekendriya jīvas* or microscopic organisms having only one sense These are said to fill the earth, air, water and fire The possibility of microscopic organisms in fire seems a little too fantastic * But in the case of the other

*For the verification of this, one must look to the result of further scientific investigation

three we need have no hesitation as they are fully established by modern Science

In this connection it is necessary to point out that H JACOBI's conjecture that Jainism is very ancient though historically true rests on an unwarranted assumption as to this *jīvanikāyas*. He interprets (vide his translation of *Tattvārthadhigama*) these *jīvas* in earth, air, water and fire in such a way as to suggest that Jainism is or was once at least, a kind of Indian fetishism which believed in the souls of earth, air, etc. Then what is the purpose of calling these *sūkṣma ekendriya jīvas*? What is the meaning of this distinction between *jīva* and *ajīva*, *cetana* and *acetana*?

The different organisms mentioned above are *jīvas* or souls in association with matter or *pudgala*. If you look at the system of metaphysics as a whole, you have the picture of an infinite number of *jīvas* caught in the vortex of matter, souls surrounded by a soulless environment. This picture is extremely analogous to the cosmic picture of the Sāṅkhyas. An infinite number of Puruṣas submerged in an ocean of Prakṛti and drifting along the current of Prakṛtic evolution. But here instead of one homogeneous Prakṛti constituting the environment of the Puruṣas we have the five *ajīva-dravyas* forming the appropriate stage for the enactment of the spiritual drama of souls. The primary characters are Jīva and Pudgala. The others make the things go. The whole cosmic evolution is due to the interaction between soul and matter. According to Jaina thought this entanglement of Jīva in the vortex of matter is Samsāra. How could *acetna pudgala* bring about such a calamitous result. Pudgala or matter in a very subtle and fine form fills the cosmic space. This form of *pudgala* is spoken of as *karma-prāyogya-pudgala*—matter fit to manifest as Karma. In this cosmic space are also the Jīvas. Jīvas by their impurity of heart led to formation of subtle material cocoon of Karmic bodies which retard and obstruct the intrinsic spiritual radiance of the soul. When once this subtle deposit of matter is begun, the grosser encrustation of matter and the formation of organic bodies is inevitable according to psycho-physical laws. Here we have to notice one important point. Even such a great oriental scholar like Hermann G JACOBI makes the ambiguous and misleading statement that Karma according to Jains is purely material and he further suggests that since they speak of a combination between Jīva and Karma, Jainas assume that soul is of some subtle matter thus making the combination between the two possible. This is extremely misleading and far from the truth. There is neither combination nor direct causal relation between soul and matter. Jainas speak of *bhāva-kārmās* as distinct from *dravya-kārmās*. The former psychological *karma* is immediate to *jīva*. The latter material is mainly concerned with the building up of the bodies. No doubt the two are associated together, yet the two are distinct and separate. *Jīva* is *cetana* and *śarīra* is *acetana*.

This conjoint existence or *samsāra* is *anādi*, without beginning. Through its congenital impurity of the heart soul is thrown into impure environments from time immemorial, though there can be end to the state of existence. This end consists in securing spiritual

freedom and perfection through obtaining the purity of the heart which in its turn leads to the destruction of the material encasement. Thus the life of the soul in *samsāra* is an infinite series without beginning but with an end which is *mokṣa*.

JAINA PSYCHOLOGY

Jīva is the central conception of Jaina system. Its nature is *cetanā* or consciousness. *Jīva* and *cetanā*, life and consciousness, are co-extensive. Wherever there is life there is consciousness. Even in the lowest class of organisms we have to posit existence of consciousness. But this does not imply that in every living organism there is explicit consciousness. In very many cases consciousness may be latent and implicit. In the lower organisms it is mainly implicit and latent, in man generally explicit and in certain exceptional cases of men having higher spiritual development consciousness may be supernormal.

Jīva with its characteristic of *cetanā* is entirely distinct from *pudgala* or matter. It cannot be apprehended by sense-perception, hence it is *amūrta*. The qualities which are generally associated with matter such as colour, taste, etc., have no relevancy in the case of *cetanā*.

Jaina Psychology is thus based upon the metaphysical assumption of Jīva which is of the nature of *cetanā*. It is not a "Psychology without a soul." The general nature of *cetanā* or consciousness manifests in two ways, *darsana* and *jñāna*, Perception and Understanding. These two modes of consciousness are mainly cognitive or thought elements. Consciousness includes also emotion and will. The effective and conative elements are also recognised by Jaina system. Affective states or emotions are the general characteristics of *samsāri jīva* or living beings in our ordinary sense. Conduct or behaviour is also assumed to be the natural manifestation of life, *cāritra* or conduct is also associated with all *Samsāri Jivas*. Thus from the point of view of modern Psychology consciousness has a threefold function and this is also assumed in Jaina system.

This tripartite division of consciousness is expressed in another way also. In describing the characteristics of Jīva its *cetanā* character is said to manifest not only in *jñāna*, *darsana* understanding and perception but also in *Karma-cetanā* and *Karmaphala-cetanā* awareness of action and awareness of pleasure-pain. The recognition of the threefold aspect of consciousness may be illustrated even from the conception of a perfect being. The characteristics of a perfect being are *anantajñāna*, *anantadarsana*, *anantavīrya*, and *anantaṭkha*—Infinite knowledge, Infinite perception, Infinite power and Infinite Bliss. The other characteristics are irrelevant to our purpose. The first two of the enumerated qualities Infinite knowledge and Infinite perception are distinctly cognitive. Infinite power implies activity or conation and infinite bliss the hedonic experience. Thus throughout the Jaina account of life the three aspects of consciousness are assumed.

SOUL AND BODY

Every organism or a *samsārī jīva* is an organic unity of two distinct entities, Jīva and Pudgala, soul and body. Naturally therefore there crops up the problem of the relation between the two. Soul is *ceṭanā* (consciousness), *amūrta* (non-corporeal), *arūpa* (non-sentient) whereas body has the opposite qualities in each case. One may be said to be the contradiction of other. The Dualism is so emphatically expressed here as in Cartesianism.

The term body implies two different things. The gross body that we actually perceive through our senses. This is constituted and nourished by matter taken in the form of food, etc. This body is every moment changing and will be given up by the soul after a certain period. Besides this gross body there is for every Jīva a subtle body known as *kārmāṇā śarīra*. This body is constituted by subtle material molecules known as *karma-pudgala*. This subtle body may also be changing. But still it is a necessary and inalienable appendage of *samsārī jīva*. This is transcended only in the perfect state. In discussing the relation between the states of this *karma śarīra* and the states of Jīva, Jainism makes an important distinction between *upādāna kartā* and *nimitta kartā*, substantial cause and external cause. Mental states are the modifications of the mind and Physical states are the modifications of matter. Mind is the Upādāna Kartā of psychical states and matter is the Upādāna Kartā of physical changes and yet physical states and psychical states may be mutually external conditions. The causal activity contemplated here is a bit obscure. One Psychical State is due to the immediately antecedent psychical state and similarly one physical state is the result of its own antecedent. Thus mental series in a way is independent of physical series. But still mental change may be externally determined by a physical change and the physical conversely by the mental change. The relation between the physical and the mental is purely external. In the technical language of the system one is the Nimitta Kartā of the other. So far as we are able to make out, the meaning seems to be this: a mental change is due to two conditions, one an Upādāna Kartā a mental antecedent and another Nimitta Kartā a physical antecedent. The mental change is the result of both these antecedent conditions physical and mental. Similarly a change in the body is to be traced to two conditions: an Upādāna condition a physical antecedent in this case and a Nimitta condition a mental antecedent. The system emphasises the causal interrelation between mind and matter even though the interrelation is one of external condition. The reason given for accepting this interrelation is the reality of moral responsibility. If there is no causal interrelation between mind and matter why should a person be taken responsible for his conduct? If moral responsibility is real, if moral evaluation of conduct is genuine then conduct must be the intimate expression of the personality.

Though the discussion is between Jīva and its *Kārmāṇa Śarīra* the discussion and its conclusion may very well be taken as relevant to our problem of the relation between

soul and body The whole discussion may be taken as expressing the views in regard to the wider problem. Soul and body are capable of causal interrelation and a change in one always involves two antecedents, one physical and the other psychical. If causal interrelation is not admitted certainly ethical value will remain unexplained and unintelligible.

SENSATIONS AND SENSE ORGANS

The sense organs recognised in the system are the usual five. But sometimes *manas* or mind is also spoken of as an *indriya*. Indriyas in general are of two kinds, *dravya indriya* or the physical sense organ and *bhāva indriya* the psychical counterpart. Sensory awareness is the result of the contact between *Dravya Indriya* and the physical object sensed. It is assumed of course that only physical objects or *Pudgala* that can be apprehended by sensation. This contact may be direct or indirect. In the case of sight the contact is indirect. The object perceived by vision is not brought in contact with the eyes. The objects in space are revealed to us by light or *jyoti*. It is through being illuminated they are apprehended by vision. The exact operation of light on the eyes is not further explained. In the case of the other senses we have direct contact. But the direct contact may be *sthūla* or *sūkṣma*, gross or subtle. In the case of contact and taste we have the direct contact with the gross object. But in the case of smell we have contact with minute particles of the object smelt. In the case of sound also we have *sūkṣma* contact. But in this case what the ears come in contact with is merely a kind of motion. Unlike the other Indian system of thought which associate sound with *ākāśa*, Jaina system explains the sound as due to the violent contact of one physical object with the other. It is said to be generated by one *skandha* knocking against another *skandha*. Sound is the agitation set up by this knock. It is on account of this theory of sound the system speaks of an atom or *paramānu* as unsounding by itself. Thus in all these cases the environmental stimulus is either directly or indirectly a physical object. Sense perception is the result of the contact between two physical things, *Dravyendriya* on the one hand and the stimulus from the object on the other hand.

ANALYSIS OF SENSATIONS

The next interesting point is the analysis of the different sensations obtained through different sense organs. Through the eyes we have the apprehension of five colours. Visual sensations consist of the five elements or *pañca varna*. But we have to note here that sensation of white is also included as one of the colours. In this respect the term *varna* or colour is used in its popular sense and not in the scientific sense. Similarly taste is of five kinds, pungent, bitter, sweet, sour and saline. These five tastes are obtained through the tongue which is *rasanendriya*. Skin is *sparsanendriya* and through it the following eight kinds of cutaneous sensations are obtained—light and heavy, soft and

hard, rough and smooth, and cold and hot sensations, four pairs of opposite senses. These cutaneous sensations include sensations of temperature, contact, pressure and muscular or kinaesthetic sensations. Sensation of smell is only of two kinds, *sugandha* and *durgandha*. Sound sensations are of infinite variety. The different kinds of sounds natural and artificial, purposive and non-purposive, articulate and inarticulate, musical and non-musical are spoken of

SENSE PERCEPTION

What we directly apprehend through a sense organ is not merely particular sensation but the object. Sense perception is known as *darśana*. *Darśana* is the preception of a physical object. *Darśana* may be *cakṣu darśana* and *acakṣu darśana*. *Cakṣu Darśana* means perception of an object through visual sensation. *Acakṣu Darśana* means perception through the other senses. *Darśana* or sense perception not only implies the passive receptivity of the mind but also the active interpretation of the received stimulus, i.e. *darśana* means the complication between the datum and mental construction. This is implied in the description given of "knowledge by acquaintance" or *matī*, *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* are different stages of sense perception. *avagraha* refers to roughly the datum. But the datum does not mean anything. It is merely the understood patch of colour, e.g., in the case of visual sensations. At the presentation of this visual patch there is the questioning attitude of mind which is represented by the term *īhā*. As a result of this examination we may interpret the object. This interpretation is *avāya*. In the case of visual perception these three different stages may not be clearly distinguishable. But in the case of auditory perception we may clearly recognise the different stages. *Darśana* then includes all these three stages, then only is the thing known to us.

[These three stages together with *Darśana* [*Dhāraṇā* ?] or recollection constitute the different forms of *Matī Jñāna*. But recollection is connected with memory and need not be brought under sense perception.]

In this connection we have to notice one important point. The term *darśana* is not confined to sense perception. It is a general term including the sense perception as well as the supernormal perception of other kinds. Two kinds of supernormal perception are generally mentioned by Jaina thinkers, (1) *avadhi darśana* (2) *kevala darśana*. *Avadhi Darśana* refers to the peculiar kind of clairvoyant capacity which is able to perceive things and events in distant places and also in distant times either past or future. Objects and events not evident to the normal sense perception are obvious to *Avadhi Darśana*. But the objects of *Avadhi* perception appear as if they are perceived normally close at hand. It is said that *Avadhi Darśana* is concerned with only *rūpi dravyas* or perceptual objects. The other *Darśana* known as *Kevala Darśana* is perception *par excellence*. It is associated with perfect consciousness. This faculty is acquired only

after complete emancipation from *kārmic* bondage To this perfect perception the whole reality is obvious In short it refers to the all perceiving faculty of Paramātman. What we are justified in speaking of in connection with Jaina psychology are the normal sense perception (*cakṣu darśana* and *acakṣu darśana*) and the supernormal clairvoyant perception (or *avadhī darśana*)

JÑĀNA OR KNOWLEDGE

Jaina account of cognition is also interesting Jñāna or understanding is said to be of different kinds according to means employed in cognition (1) *matī jñāna*, is knowledge obtained through the normal means of sense perception and memory based upon the same This is the common inheritance of all persons (2) *sruta jñāna* is knowledge obtained through testimony of books This corresponds to knowledge by description It is acquired by study Therefore it is possessed by only the learned men Besides these two means of knowledge there are three other supernormal means of understanding These are *avadhī-jñāna*, *manahparyaya-jñāna*, and *kevala-jñāna* Avadhī Jñāna is the understanding of the nature of the objects obvious to Avadhī Darśana Manahparyāya Jñāna refers to a peculiar kind of telepathic knowledge acquired by persons of certain stage of spiritual development It is a means by which knowledge of alien minds is obtained The last one of course refers to the perfect understanding or the omniscience of the Perfect Being or *Puruṣottama* Treating this as the metaphysical ideal we have to recognise the other four kinds of cognition as relevant to our psychological interest

AFFECTION

Affective consciousness plays a very important part in Jaina metaphysics The whole religious discipline is directly secured by a stoic freedom from the affective influence of environmental objects Experience of pleasure, pain, is assumed to be the specific characteristic of organised beings or Samsārī Jivas In one of the descriptions given of Jīva it is mentioned that Jīva has the tendency to continue beneficial activity from which pleasure results and to discontinue the harmful activity from which pain results This is so very analogous to biological description of the instinct of self-preservation Jīva equipped with this quality naturally desires pleasant things and avoids unpleasant things

Since the psychological analysis is subordinate to the metaphysical system several facts of psychological interest are thrown into the background of the philosophical scheme. Nevertheless there is no mistake about the striking psychological analysis exhibited by Jaina thinkers Experience of pleasure and pain, is generally referred to as *karmaphala-cetanā* or consciousness of the fruits of action. Pleasure and pain are always viewed in relation to action

Bhāva or affective consciousness is of three kinds, *subha-bhāva*, *aśubha-bhāva*, and

śuddha-bhāva. Feeling of pleasant nature, feeling of an unpleasant nature, and feeling of pure nature. The last one refers to the enjoyment of Self by Self. As such it may be taken to mean the spiritual experience of the pure Self. The other two kinds of the feeling are relevant to the point. These are corresponding to the normal feelings generally recognised by students of psychology. These feelings are generally related to certain objects in the environment to which there may be attraction or aversion in the Jīva. Thus on the one hand feelings manifest as the result of Karma or action and on the other hands they are determined by objects in the environment.

A very interesting classification of emotions is given in connection with the conditions of Karmic bondage. These emotions are generally divided into two main-classes *sakavāya* and *akavāya*, those that have the tendency to colour or stain the purity of the soul and those that have not that tendency. The *sakavāya* ones are *krodha* or anger, *māna* or pride, *māyā* or deceitfulness or dissembling and *lobha* or greed. The *akavāya* emotions are

hāsyā—laughter, *rati*—feeling of attraction, *arati*—feeling of repulsion, *śoka*—sorrow, *bhaya*—fear, *jugupsā*—feeling of disgust which may manifest in hiding ones own weaknesses, *strīveda*—peculiar sex feeling of women, *pumveda*—peculiar sex feeling of men, and *napumsaka-veda*—the corrupt sex feeling of eunuchs.

Again certain instinctive tendencies are also referred to as *samyñās*. These are *āhāra bhava*, *manthana*, and *parigraha*—hunger, fear, sexual appetite and acquisitive instincts. There are corresponding feelings to the instinctive appetities which may colour the consciousness of a Jīva.

The feeling aspect of sensations is implied in the very classification of the sense elements. The feeling aspect is predominant in the case of smell and taste whereas it is indirectly associated with auditory and visual sensations. The rest of the references to feeling of pleasure pain are purely metaphysical and therefore they are more of religious interest than of scientific interest.

CONATION OR THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ACTION

Ātman is not only *Jñānī* and *bhoktā*, the knower and the enjoyer, but is also a *kartā* or the agent. This may be considered as the central idea of Jaina system. Soul by its own activity is able to make or mar its own destiny. The Theory of Karma is intimately associated with the causal agency of *Ātman*. As the result of this metaphysical assumption we have several facts of psychological importance mentioned in the System. Even in the lowest organism there is the tendency to continue pleasurable activity and to discontinue painful activity. This primitive tendency of life or Jīva is just the conative activity which develops into conscious choice of an end or purpose which is the characteristic of volitional activity. In human beings this conative tendency is naturally associated with *rāga* and *dveṣa*, desire and aversion.

Conative activity in general is denoted by the term *karmacetanā*. This Karma-cetanā or consciousness of activity is to be associated with the Zoological Kingdom—*trasa jīvas*. The plant world or the world of *ekendriya sthāvāra jīvas* is devoid of this Karma-cetanā. They have Karma-phala-cetanā alone whereas the other Jīvas have both and also Jñāna Cetanā to boot. The importance of volitional activity is clearly testified by the part it plays in the Jaina System of ethics. The psychology of will is also connected with another doctrine of psychological importance. Mohaniya Karma which is considered to be the root of all evil has two aspects cognitive and conative. What is known as Draśana Mohaniya interferes with the faculty of perception and belief. Cāritra Mohaniya is a sort of corruption of the will, it misleads the will and thus leads the *Jīva* towards evil. We shall consider the relation between Karman and Ātman when we go to consider the ethical aspect of Jaina system. In the meanwhile let us see what Jaina logic is.

JAINA LOGIC

Under this head we have to consider the following three points —

- 1 *Pramāna*
- 2 *Naya*
- 3 *Saptabangī*

Pramāna and *Naya* refer to understanding, (*pramāna-nayair-adhigamah*) Knowledge is through *pramāna* and *naya*. *Pramāna* refers to the apprehension of reality or valid knowledge. *naya* refers to the different aspects of considering things. These are the two means of enriching knowledge. *Saptabangī* refers to the theory of predication which is peculiar to Jaina System.

Pramāna is of two kinds, *pratyakṣa-pramāna* and *parokṣapramāna*. Immediate Apprehension of reality and Mediate Apprehension of reality. Ordinarily the term *Pratyakṣa* refers to sense perception. This ordinary meaning of the word is considered secondary and subordinate by Jaina thinkers. They call it *vyāvahārika pratyakṣa*. The real *Pratyakṣa* is known as *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* or that which is apprehended by Ātman immediately and directly. According to this view sense perception is indirect and mediate, for the sensory object is apprehended by Ātman only through the medium of sense organs.

Pramānas in general are five: *matī*, *srutī*, *avadhī*, *manahparyāya*, and *kevala*. These five are already explained in connection with cognition. Of these *Matī* and *Śruta* are considered *parokṣa pramānas*. The other three are considered to be *pratyakṣa pramānas*. There is one interesting fact about these *Pramānas*. The standard of reality is distinctly experienced in its normal and super-normal aspects. The normal experience would be *Matī Jñāna*, the super-normal experience would include *Avadhī*, *Manahparyāya* and *Kevala*. These four would constitute direct knowledge by the Self, but our experience is also enriched by the testimony of others. Therefore the testimony of others transmitted through literature is also considered as one of the *Pramānas*. This is *Śruta Jñāna*. This is not given the supereminent place which it has in the other Hindu systems of thought. The Vedas form the ultimate *Pramāṇa* for the Brahmanical systems. Every other principle of knowledge is subordinated to the Vedic revelation which itself must be implicitly accepted. But the Jainas recognise *Śruta Jñāna* as only one of the *Pramānas* and even then it is only subordinate. Direct and Immediate Apprehension is the ultimate standard of truth.

The Pramānas are all distinctly human and they are not considered to be eternal. It is this humanistic element in the system that is specially interesting. Three of these five Pramānas have the possibility of being corrupted by adverse psychological conditions. Thus they will become misleading or corrupt Pramānas or *pramānābhāsas*. Thus Matī Jñāna may become *kumati*. This evidently refers to illusory and hallucinatory perceptions and erroneous inferences. Śruti may become *kusruti*. This would be feeding ones intellect with fictitious philosophy and unreliable literature. False and misleading clairvoyance is the corrupt form of Avadhī which is technically called *vibhanga jñāna*, hence right *pramānas* would exclude these three corrupt forms of Kumati, Kusruti, and Vibhanga. But in the case of the other two Pramānas there is no such possibility of falsification. Manahparyāya is the supernormal faculty acquired after great spiritual development, and Kevala is the ideal reached after complete emancipation. Hence in these two cases there is no chance of extraneous interference. The right forms of the former together with the latter two constitute the Pramānas.

From the short enumeration of the Pramānas given above it is clear that the Jaina doctrine of Pramānas is slightly different from that of the Hindu Systems in general. The Pramānas such as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, etc. which are variously stated by the various systems of Hindu Philosophy are all comprehended by Matī Jñāna and Śruti Jñāna. Even in these two cases objective corroboration seems to be the most important criterion of the true Pramānas. In addition to these two normal sources of Knowledge they recognise the other three supernormal sources. Thus they recognised not merely the intellect but also the higher intuition which Bergson emphasises. Bergson is no doubt right in placing intuition over intellect. Intellect is the analytic process of understanding things. Hence it shares the artificial nature of the process of analysis. It is no doubt incapable of accounting for the vision of artist or the poet. The Daemon of Socrates and the Christ of St. Paul are quite beyond the pale of intellectual analysis. The Reality like the Proteus of ancient myth slips out from the grip of intellect but is quite evident to the supernormal intuition. The existence of such a supernormal faculty in man we have an inkling of, through the lifting of the veil by recent psychic research. The normal personality is but a fraction of the total personality which is more of the subconscious nature. It is the sub-conscious self that seems to be the storehouse of spiritual power and wisdom. One who has learnt to tap the resources of this hidden self, becomes a genius in the field of art or morality. To him is given the open *sesame* to unlock the secrets of the universe. A philosophy of knowledge, therefore, must necessarily take cognisance of such a supernormal intuition.

But to recognise this is not to deprecate the intellect altogether. According to Bergson what is revealed by the intellect is quite untrustworthy. Such a summary condemnation of the intellect would be an unwarranted impeachment of modern Science. Intuition apotheosised at such a cost would be no more than a Philosophical fetish. A

more reasonable attitude would be to recognise both the intellect and intuition as adequate means of apprehending the nature of reality so long as they have corroboration by objective evidence. Rationalism which could not accomodate any supernormal faculty and mysticism which could not stand the glare of Reason, both are inadequate representation of the full nature of human personality whose powers are inexhaustible and whose depths are unfathomable. The Jaina doctrine of Pramāṇas is able to accomodate both from the lowest to the highest in the order of gradation.

JÑĀNA AND JÑEYA

KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

The recognition of the distinction between the Pramāṇas and Pramāṇābhāṣas implies an important philosophical principle—The existence of an objective reality which is beyond and beside knowledge. Knowledge is not the only form of reality. If that be the case Jaina philosophy would not be different from Advaita. Its whole philosophical claim as an independent system of thought rests on the admission of the independent existence of the objective universe besides consciousness. The world of objective reality is apprehended by perception or *darśana* and understood by intellect or *jñāna* which two are but the manifestations of *cetanā*, the intrinsic nature of the soul. Nowhere in the Jaina system is it even casually implied that the object of Knowledge is in any way modified or interfered with by the process of Knowing. In order that *darśana* may reveal the form and *jñāna* may discover the nature there must be an object postulated, an object which is logically prior to the intellectual process. This postulating of an independent object of Knowledge should not be interpreted to imply the passivity of the intellect. The continuous activity of the Jīva or soul is the central doctrine of Jaina thought. Hence the intellect is an active manifestation of consciousness but this activity has the power of revealing its own nature as well as *non-cetana* objects beyond. Thus the term Jñeya or the object of Knowledge includes both the self and the non-self, mental facts as well as physical facts. The example of a light is very often brought in to illustrate the nature of Knowledge. Just as light reveals itself as well as other objects which are illuminated so also Jñāna reveals the *tattvas* both Jīva and Ajīva. Hence it would be quite inconsistent to interpret the relation between *jñāna* and *jñeya*, Knowledge and its object, in any other way that would make both inseparable elements of any higher unity. No doubt as far as Jīva or soul is concerned the relation between Jñāna and Jñeya is very intimate. The soul is *jñānin*, the possessor of *jñāna* or knowledge. There can be no Jīva without *jñāna* for without it he would be *acetana* and indistinguishable from other *ajīva dravyas*, and there could be no knowledge without Jīva for being foundationless and off its moorings from life it will cease to have connection even with consciousness. Thus Jñāna and Jñānin, knowledge and self, are absolutely inseparable though distinguishable by name. But this very name Jñānin may also become *jñeya-padārtha*, the object of knowledge to his own *jñāna*. The, *Jñānin*, *Jñāna* and *Jñeya*, the self, knowledge,

and the self as object of knowledge all become different aspects of a single concrete unity

But Knowledge or Jñāna is also related to *ajīva padārthas* that is, physical objects can also be *jñeya padārthas*.—When physical objects are the objects of Knowledge the relation of Knowledge to its object is not the same as in the previous case that between Knowledge and self as object of Knowledge. Jñāna is distinctly alien to *ajīva padārthas* though these become as Jñeya related to Jñāna or Knowledge. The function of Jñāna or knowledge here is to reveal the *ajīva padārthas* in their true nature as *acetana* or physical. How could *cetana* reveal the nature of *acetana* things? This question is rejected as unreasonable for the simple reason that it is unanswerable for the question means why Jñāna should have its Jñāna nature. That Jñāna though alien to the nature of physical object—these latter being *acetana* can still be related to them and reveal their nature to Jñānin or the knowing self—is taken as the fundamental postulate of Jaina Epistemology.

Thus the close study of the philosophical foundation of Jaina Epistemology reveals the following two facts

- (1) The relation between knowledge and its objects, *jñāna* and *jñeya*, as far as *ajīva padārthas* are concerned is purely one of external relation
- (2) As a corollary of the first we have the independent existence of *jñeya padārtha* or objects of knowledge of course with the exception of self, which has an internal relation to Jñāna or Knowledge

The distinction between internal relation and external relation requires explanation. The Russell-Bradley controversy as to the nature of relations is an interesting though an intricate topic of modern philosophy. But here we cannot deal with it in detail. It is enough to indicate what the terms mean. Bradley-Bosanquet school of modern idealism following the traditions of Hegel assume that all relations are grounded in the nature of the terms related. That is, the terms apart from the relations and the relation apart from the terms will not be the same. A and B having a relation R cannot be the same A and B if they cease to have that relation R. Change or cessation of a particular relation will lead to change or the nullification of the terms so related. A blind faith in this metaphysical doctrine has constrained the Hegelian Idealist to subscribe to many an absurd doctrine. The terms related to one another since their nature is tyrannically controlled by this relation are to be interpreted as members or elements of a higher organic unity. The members of a family therefore are the elements of the unity of family. Society itself is an organic unity like plant or an animal body having as its elements the different human personalities who constitute the society. Nay, even the whole universe is conceived as an organic unity or system having as its members both things and persons. The logical result of this doctrine is the complete subordination of human personality to this fetish of a higher unity beside which there is nothing real. Every

thing is degraded to the level of appearance and unreality. The political and moral consequences of such a metaphysical doctrine need not be portrayed in detail. It is enough to say that the catastrophe which destroyed the European civilisation is the necessary consequence of the culture and social organisation inspired by the philosophy of the Absolute.

But we have a healthy change introduced into modern thought by the invaluable contributions from B Russell. He the upholder of the opposite doctrine of external relations sufficiently exposed the inadequacy and the falsity of the rival doctrine. According to him two terms A and B may have a relation R and yet the nature of the terms may not be affected by the change of the relations. To exhibit the truth of the controversy we may cite the following illustration which is very useful to the reader though crude. You may have for example a chair by the side of a table. The two are in a certain spatial relations say the chair is to the south of the table. If the relation is changed, (i.e.) if the chair is placed to the north of the table then according to the doctrine of internal relations both the terms the chair and the table must undergo change in their nature because of a change in the relations. This seems absurd to the unsophisticated observer. In this case he knows fully well that there is no change in the things themselves except the change of position. To persist in the belief that the things do change in consequence of the change of position is merely to surrender one's own reason to the false gods of philosophy. Russell holding the doctrine of external relations maintains that the things do not change their nature inspite of the change of position. This has an important and refreshing consequence. You may have a society of human beings without degrading the personalities to fractions of a unity or to appearance of a reality. And the one consequence that is relevant to us in this connection is that the relation of Knowledge to its object need not amount to the postulating of a higher unity of which these two are aspects. If that were the case this alleged higher unity must have as its members both persons and things *cetana* and *acetana dravyas*. The fundamental doctrine of Jainism like that of the Sāmkhya is the distinction and the alienability between Jīva and Ajīva.

This short digression into modern European thought we had for the following reason. The authors of an *Epitome of Jainism* in trying to expound the doctrine of Syādvāda attempt to make out that Jainism is a bold Idealistic interpretation of the universe as a set-off against the Realistic method. We are not going to quarrel about a name. Jainism may be characterised idealistic or realistic according to one's own tastes so long as the terms are clearly defined. But what we are concerned with is just the exposition of the doctrine of Syādvāda. Speaking of the ordinary way of thinking of *ajīvas*, the authors say

"They are continually betraying the phenomenal changes when brought into relation with other existences around them. How, then, can we think of them as individual things

in spite of the changes? The answer often unhesitatingly forwarded by philosophers is that we can combine diversity with unity in our conception of things by thinking them as individual entities each endowed with manifold qualities. They are substances according to philosophers, which possess various properties such as extension, solidity, weight, colour etc. Or they are substances or subjects to whom belong the capacities of sensation, feeling and perception etc. But a careful observation will show that such a device obviously fails to give us any real apprehension of existence—even though it may be the simplest individual existence, because in trying to give unity to a member of unconnected determinations by ascribing them to a common substance what we really do is to add to these determinations another determination, equally isolated and unconnected with the rest. Take away the other determinations, what will be left of your substance? It is impossible to explain the known by the unknown. So to apprehend the real unity of different qualities or to put in other words, to think them as one, what mind demands is, that we should think or have a rational notion of the relation of each to each and that we should discern how the existence of any one involves the existence of all the rest and how all are so connected with the particular quality would not exist except in and through the whole to which it belongs. To catch hold of such substance and not *substratum* as Locke had meant we must discern the principle from which this manifoldness of parts and properties necessarily arises and which has its very existence and being in them and linking together in thought differences which spring out of it. Such unity of substance is really a *unity in difference* which manifests itself and realises in these differences.

“In the realm of mind or in the spiritual life of conscious beings also, there are undoubtedly infinite multiplicity and diversity, but we must not overlook the fact that it is a multiplicity or diversity which is no longer of parts divided from each other but each of which exists and can be conceived of by itself in isolation or segregation from the rest or in purely external relations to them. Here on the contrary, the multiplicity or diversity is that of parts or elements each of which exists in and through the rest and has its individual being and significance only in its relation to the rest or each of which can be known only when it is seen in a sense to be the rest. We cannot, for example, take the combination of two external independent things in space and employ it as a representation of the relation of mind and its objects, for though thought be distinguishable from the object, it is not divisible from it. *The thinker and the object thought of are nothing apart from each other. They are twain and yet one. The object is only object for the subject, the subject for the object. They have no meaning or existence take individually and in their union they are not two separate things stuck together but two that have lost or dissolved their duality in a higher unity.*” (*An Epitome of Jainism*, pages 106-109)

The subject and the object merging into a higher unity sounds more like idealistic rhetoric than philosophical logic. Here we have an echo of Bradley and Bosanquet. The

authors have drunk deep of Hegel but they have not discerned what is living and which is dead in Hegel. No doubt the Jaina Conception of Dravya is closely allied to the Hegelian dialectic but the Jaina metaphysics does not contemplate the Hegelian absolute. The Authors who do not spare the Indian Absolutist, Śāṅkara, for his misunderstanding of Syādvāda do not hesitate to make obeisance to his western counterpart. This inconsistency is quite glaring and the misrepresentation of Jaina doctrine is all the more surprising as it apparently proceeds from a Jaina writer. A more careful study of their own system and a little less of that hypnotic illusion by and the blind adoration to the German Idealism would have enabled our authors to see that the System they expound is a bold and masterly refutation of the philosophical Absolutism of ancient India.

NAYAS

The next topic relating to Jaina Logic is about *nayas*. This is the second means of understanding things, the first being *pramānas*. All concrete things are extremely complex, they have innumerable qualities and relations. The Reals being such complex entities, they may be examined from different aspects. This apprehension of a thing from a particular point of view is known as *naya*—an opinion or an assertion from some one aspect. Every aspect of a thing in its own way reveals the nature of that thing. Hence *Naya* is a means of insight into the nature of Reality. Theoretically the possible *Nayas* are infinite in number since the Reals have infinite qualities and relations. But writers on Jaina Logic generally speak of seven (7) different *Nayas*. These are *Naigama*, *Samgraha*, *Vyavahāra*, *Rjusūtra*, *Śabda*, *Samabhirūdhā* and *Evambhūta*. Let us try to explain these in order.

(1) **NAIGAMA NAYA** This *Naya* seems to be somewhat obscure and is therefore differently interpreted by the Scholars. Pūjyapāda in his commentary on Sūtra 33 of Bk 1 *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, explains the *Naya* thus. *Naigama* is that which relates to the purpose or end of a course of activity. The illustrations given are —

(1) You see a person carrying water, firewood and other necessities for cooking meals and ask him “what are you doing?” “I am cooking meals” he replies. This answer refers to the purpose or end of a series of activity. The person is not actually in the act of cooking at the time of the answer.

(2) The Second illustration refers to a person who goes with an axe. When he is asked what he is about, he replies “I am to bring a wooden measure (*prastha*)”. He is to cut a piece of bamboo perhaps and make a *prastha* out of it. Here again this measure is only the purpose or end to be realised.

(3) In each of the two examples *odana* and *prastha* ‘food’ and ‘measure’, there is a central purpose which gives meaning to a course of conduct of some duration. The course of conduct is represented by different modes of activity at different stages. In spite of the difference, the whole series and also every individual item tend towards the ideal aimed at. So far therefore the general purpose or aim may be said to be present in all the different stages of the course of conduct. It is the general purpose that gives meaning to the different items of the series and connects them into a whole. This emphasis on the teleological element which is immanent in a course of purposive activity seems to be *Naigama Naya* point of view.

The same interpretation, with the same two illustrations of 'cooking' and making a 'measure' is adopted by Śrutasāgara, the authors of a *Vṛtti* on *Tattvārtha* called after him *Śrutasāgarīyam*. The same illustrations are again found in *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, a treatise on Logic.

This Naigama Naya is further sub-divided into three according to the true relations of the teleological and interpreting idea. The two illustrations refer to some present course, hence they come under—

(1) Vartamāna Naigama. But there may be looking back to a past event. On the morning of Dipāvalī day, you may say "To-day is the *parinirvāṇa-kāla* of Lord Mahāvira." But Lord Mahāvira does not attain Nirvāṇa on that day which you are actually speaking about. The event took place several centuries ago. Yet it was on a corresponding day of that year. Because of this correspondence an event true of the day centuries ago is also associated with all such corresponding days of the subsequent years. Thus we speak of the King's birth-day, the Darbar day every year. The assertion has meaning only because of a past event. This characteristic attribute of the present—the genuinely belonging to the past yet transferred to the present, because of an identical relation between the two is pertaining to

(2) Bhūta Naigama, (Past Naigama). Instead of looking back to the past you may look forward to a remote future. Instead of detecting in the concrete present some element which was once associated with it, you may discover in it something which is *yet to be*. At the sight of a prince you may hail, "Here comes His Royal Highness," The Prince is but Lion of the Royal family. He is not yet King, but is going to be one. Similarly you may speak of every Bhavya Jiva a good soul as Siddha Jiva, a perfect soul. For somehow in the far off future Perfection will be the goal of all, for every one is God in the germ.

Such an assertion is true according to (3) *Bhāvi Naigama*—future Naigama.

The other way of interpreting this Naigama Naya is associated with Siddhasena who is quoted by Hermann JACOBI under his translation of the *Sūtra* 33 (referred to above) of Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha*. Śrī Devasūri who is quoted by Mallisena in his *Syādvāda-Mañjarī* also adopts this second view. But curiously, this is not so very prominent in Umāsvāti's own *Bhāṣya*, any how this method of interpreting the Naya starts with the examination of the relation between the universal and the particular, *Sāmānya* and *Vīśeṣa*. For this *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems are referred to as adopting this Naigama Naya in an *ekānta* manner, (i.e.), these two systems adopt this Naya so far as they go, but push it to an unwarranted length. Śāṅkara and Vedānta deny altogether *vīśeṣas*—particulars. Buddhism denies *sāmānya*—universal outright. Against these two extremes the above systems recognise the importance of both. The universal by itself or the particular by self will not be able to account for a concrete thing. These will be empty abstractions. Again one cannot be derivative from and secondary to the other. The thing is an organic unity of

both Sāmānya and Viśeṣa, universal and particular There can be no (*sāmānya*) universal apart from the particular and no particular (*viśeṣa*) apart from the universal and there can be no real thing apart from either This seems to be the fundamental Jaina view of the Real

The very same view is said to be adopted by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas Therefore both the Jainas and the others adopt the Naigama point of view But wherein the Jainas differ from the others? It is there, no doubt Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas adopt the Naigama view by maintaining that the concrete thing is the complex made up of the universal and the particular (*Sāmānyas* and *Viśesas*) No doubt they maintain that these two are different and therefore distinguishable No doubt they believe each is in itself primary and not derivative So far they agree with the Jainas But, while the Jainas believe that the distinction between *Sāmānya*—universal and *Viśesa*—particular, is true only in a relative way, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas maintain that it is absolutely true *Sāmānya* is quite different and distinct from *Viśesa* It is because of this absolute difference between the two that in their hands the Naya becomes Naigamābhāsa They are *kathañci bhinnah* and not *atyanta bhinnah*

After explaining thus Naigama Naya, Śrī Devasūri enumerates three species of this Naigama distinction

1 —Differentiating two qualities one from the other, e g, existence and thought are in soul *sat caitanyam ātmani* Here Thought is differentiated from Existence

2 — Differentiating two substances, e g Dravya is that which manifests through things and their modes *vastu-paryāyah dravyam*

3 —Differentiating a thing from its attribute, e g a sensual person has only a momentary pleasure *ksanaikam sukhī viśayāsaktajīvaḥ*

Thus (1) existence is spoken to be separate from thought, (2) a thing from its mode and (3) a person as different from his pleasure Contrast in all these cases is true only in a relative way As we saw above the very same illustrations are reproduced by H JACOBI in his translation

But when we attend to Malliṣeṇa we find evidently both the interpretations given in his *Syādvāda-Mañjarī* He begins by explaining Naigama Naya in the same way as Devasūri or Siddhasena does He refers the readers to an earlier portion of his book, where there is a discussion of the relation between *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa* Hence he does not want to add anything further under this Naya and ends the passage by mentioning two well-known examples given in *pravacana*, the Divine word What are the two examples? He just mentions two names, and they appear to be cryptic But this need not be altogether helpless His words are *pravacana-prasiddha-Nīlayana-Prastha-dṛṣṭāntadvaya*, etc, *Nīlayana* and *Prastha* are the words here In Pūjyapāda we have *Odana* and *Prastha* Instead of *food* and a *measure* we have *a house* and *a measure* The rest is quite clear The illustrations leave us in no doubt as to the meaning of the Naya

House-building or making a measure refers to the purpose or the ideal. It relates to *samkalpa-mātra* as Pūjyapāda says

The next question we have to face is "How does Malliṣeṇa manage to give one explanation and to bring in the illustrations pertaining to the other interpretation? Here we must confess we are driven to conjecture. We do not know wherefrom he is quoting the examples. It may refer to another from whom both Pūjyapāda and Malliṣeṇa draw their inspiration. What justification is there for Malliṣeṇa's attempt to bring the two views together? The teleological element or purpose may be taken to be the common basis for both the views. In the case of house-building or measure-constructing the thing which is to be the Goal is indicated by the purpose of the individual. This purpose embodies the ideal nature of the thing which is the concrete realisation of the same. Similarly the distinction between the universal and particular is purely teleological. What is particular from one point of view may be universal from another. In fact the particular is drawn out of the universal. It is through the medium of the particular that the universal expresses its nature. If you remember this point then it is clear to us that the distinction entirely depends upon the purpose in view. It is this purposive nature that brings the two views together. What are apparently divergent have this common foundation. Perhaps Malliṣeṇa had this in his mind when he interpreted the Naigama one way and illustrated it in the other way. This compromise is offered as a provisional suggestion.

(ii) SAMGRAHA NAYA. The next Naya is the class point of view. The nature of things as understood by the Jaina System is such that there is a similarity and identity among a number of individuals.

These individuals naturally fall into appropriate classes. When we consider them as individuals belonging to a class, our attention is directed to the underlying similarity to the exclusion of their individual and proper characteristics. From this underlying principle of classification we may consider the individuals as a whole and a Unity. Here again the unity is only relatively true. The unity here rests on the underlying similarity among the number of individuals brought under the same class. But there is a great danger in forgetting the elementary fact of this class point of view. The individuals forming the class though spoken of as a whole and unitary class are really distinct from one another and may be really differentiated by not only their intrinsic natures but also by intervals of Space and Times. To emphasise the unity at the cost of the plurality and difference would be a distinct metaphysical error. It is this erroneous application of Samgraha Naya that accounts for the system of Advaita Vedānta. Too much emphasis on the unity and the complete ignoring of the diversity is the characteristic of this system. A similar mistake is found in its western counterpart of Hegelian Idealism. Both agree in condemning the differences as appearances and Naya and in accepting the ultimate absolute as the one reality.

But Jaina thinkers noticed very early both the utility as well as the danger of this Samgraha Naya. This class point of view is quite useful and rational in its own way. It contributes to economy of thought by enabling us to deal with a number of things as one.

This is not merely justified by practical convenience but also by the philosophical principle of the common nature. The common nature by itself is but an abstraction. Hence to set it up as the reality and the only reality is doubly erroneous. So long as its relative nature is remembered the Naya has its own uses. But in the hands of the Sāmkhyas and Mimāṃsakas it becomes absolute and thus a Nayābhāsa.

This Samgraha Naya is of two kinds: *para-samgraha* or the ultimate class-view and *apara-samgraha* or the inferior class-view. Every existing thing partakes of the nature of Reality. Hence we may speak of all things as one in the Ultimate Reality or Existence. But the different classes of things, living and non-living, included in this ultimate Reality may themselves be spoken of as different classes. This is *apara-samgraha* or the inferior class view.

(iii) VYAVAHĀRA. Vyavahāra Naya means the popular and conventional point of view, which rests on sense-perception of the concrete present. This is the basis of the ancient materialistic systems of the Cārvākas and Bārhaspatyas. The whole Criterion of Reality is the Concrete present. The forgotten past and the far off future are unwarranted myths not justified by the only *pramāṇa* of sense-perception. Looking back into the past through memory and keeping into the future through ideal forecast are philosophical uncertainties. The same applies to the categories obtained by Intellectual analysis such as *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, Universal and Particular.

Sense-perception reveals to us a tree or a stone or a pot or a cloth. These are the real things supported by the *Pramāṇas* and sanctioned by Vyavahāra or convention. Whoever has perceived at any time either *Sāmānya* or *Viśeṣa*. Why should philosophers trouble themselves about these metaphysical abstractions. The concrete reality of things is sufficient for our practical life and what is justified by this pragmatic criterion is so far theoretically true.

Here again the Jaina thinker recognises the partial truth of the principle. The tree in the compound, the stone on the path way, the pot with water and the cloth you wear are all real things. They are not appearances or illusions of *Māyā*. Their reality is corroborated by our concrete experience. To say this much is certainly acceptable and true. But to go beyond to condemn everything that is not included in the concrete present, to deny the past and the future, to reject the philosophical categories *in toto* and to surrender reason to sense-perception is the apotheosis of convention. Hence Jaina thought rightly rejects the unwarranted exaggeration of this Vyavahāra Naya though it recognises in it the soul of goodness, and an element of partial truth.

(iv) RĪJUSŪTRA. This Rjūsūtra is the extreme opposite of the Samgraha Naya. The latter denies all difference whereas Rjūsūtra denies all continuity and identity.

Reality is concentrated to mathematical present, It is purely momentary. In this respect it is still narrower than the Vyavahāric present. At least for Vyavahāra view there is a tolerable duration, for, the present and the conventional things are real so far. But according to this Rjusūtra Naya a thing is what it is in the present mathematical moment. To speak of duration of a thing is rejected by this view as an unwarranted assumption. What we are absolutely sure of is just the present moment. The past moment is no more and the next moment is not yet. Hence a thing as being in the no more or in the not yet is sheer contradiction. If it is real at all it must be in the present moment. We at once recognise the identity between this Rjusūtra view and Buddhistic metaphysics. Its aim is as that of Buddhism to expose the pretensions of an unchanging metaphysical substratum of things. As a corrective to such a conception of changeless substratum, Buddhist metaphysics adopts Rjusūtra view and brings the centre of gravity to the present moment. Thus it enables to secure the balance between change and permanence. Change partakes of the nature of time duration. It shares with it the ephemerality. There is some truth in maintaining the reality of change and in concentrating it to one moment. To over emphasise the neglected element of change as a set off against Vedānta and to secure a habitation for it in the camp of Reality is certainly a commendable metaphysical venture. But to identify reality with mathematical moment, to emphasise change as the only real and to make it live in a metaphysical void is to overshoot one's mark. It is this erroneous and uncalled for accent on change to the detriment of the relating and the unifying principle of Reality without which, change will have no meaning. It is this Rjusūtrābhāsa that the Jaina system asks us to beware of. If this principle is the sole criterion of Reality, then reality would end itself by committing suicide to employ a suggestive phrase of Bradley.

(v) ŚABDA-NAYA or the implication of Terms or names. The name has the function of calling to our mind the particular object which is referred to or implied by the name. Of course the implication need not necessarily be an individual object. An attribute, a relation and action may be referred to by appropriate words in the language. Thus the grammatical distinction of terms into parts of speech has an underlying logical foundation. The particular kind of meaning is associated with a particular part of speech. Thus the difference in meaning corresponds to the difference among the terms. Thus a sort of intimate relation exists between a term and its meaning. Variation in the term may introduce a corresponding variation in the meaning. Thus not only the difference of the parts of speech implies a broad difference among the meanings but also the inflexional variations in the same part of speech may be said to have corresponding variations, however, slight they be. This principle of correspondence between the terms and their meanings is the foundation of the science of grammar. We have already mentioned that there is a relation to logic implicitly present in this grammatical principle. Indian grammarians in their discussion of verbal implications very often pass beyond

their legitimate sphere and enter into logical and quasi-metaphysical discussions. Such an exaggerated notion about the verbal implication would be not only illogical but also conflicting with common sense and convention. Jaina logicians therefore raise a note of warning against such an unwarranted application of this principle and point out the logical danger in that one-sided emphasis of the relation between *śabda* and *śārtha*.

Their contention is this. No doubt generally speaking the grammatical principle or *śabda Naya* adopted by the Vaiyākaranas is sanctioned by usage. But to assume it to be an universal principle without an exception would be neglecting the difference between the relative and the absolute and identifying the partial truth with the whole and the complete one. Ordinarily each name has its own meaning. The term 'cow' is different from 'king' not merely in word but also in meaning. But this is also true. Words which are different in nature and origin may nevertheless refer to the same identical object. Exaggerated and universal application of the *Śabda Naya* of the grammarians cannot conveniently accommodate synonyms in the vocabulary. That there are synonyms and that they are distinct from one another literally no grammarian can afford to deny. Yet unswerving loyalty to his principle of *Śabda Naya* would constrain him to accept such an absurdity. The only way out of the difficulty is to accept the Jaina interpretation of *śabda-naya*, according to which the relation between terms and meanings is a relative principle. The illustrations generally offered are the synonyms, Indra, Śakra and Purandara, names referring to the one and the same individual, the Lord of the Devas. Similarly terms differing not merely in origin as the above but also in number, gender, person, case, etc., may still refer to the same individual fact. Thus *puṣya* (masculine) *tārā* (feminine), *nakṣatram* (neuter), in spite of difference of gender do refer to the same object i.e. Star. Again in a sentence, terms referring to the same individual object may appear in different cases, and a verb, in different sense and person may refer to the same activity. This subordination of grammatical differences of inflexion to the logical implication of terms seems to be the essential principle of *śabda-naya* as understood by the Jainas. It is not necessary to repeat that the *Naya* in the hands of the grammarians because of *ekānta* application degenerates into false *Naya*—(*śabdābhāsa*).

(vi) SAMABHIRŪḌA NAYA—The derivative difference of names. This Samabhirūḍha *Naya* is the differentiation of terms according to their roots. Thus it is only a special application of *Śabda-naya*. In becoming specialised it becomes narrower and more exaggerated than the above *Naya*. As a general rule the terms in a language have their own special radical signification. This radical signification is the reason for the particular nomenclature. The first appearance of the word was evidently suggested by such an implication of the root. Of course this does not mean the connotation of the name. Connotation is the ground of the application of the name whereas the significance of the root accounts for the origin of the name. The former is logical and universal whereas the latter may be purely subjective and even accidental. The science of history of

language may discover various principles subserving the origin of names in a vocabulary To the historian of language this is certainly an important principle To detect radical difference in the vocabulary and to trace the history of different terms from this original seed-difference is certainly a commendable pursuit But this nuclear difference interesting to the historian of language is not so very important as to swallow up all the other grammatical and logical principles of implication Here again the Naya is discovered to be a relative one by Jaina Logic which enjoins a necessary circumscription to the above claims put forward by the historian of language For example, it is true that the terms *gau* (cow) is different from *indra* This difference can be traced to their respective roots Hence the difference in the roots must mean a corresponding difference in the terms and therefore in their meanings Accurately speaking, says this Naya, the terms *Indra*, *Śakra* and *Purandara* respectively imply the 'all prosperous', 'the all powerful' and 'the destroyer of enemies' These are the direct and legitimate signification sanctioned by their origin To emphasise the original and the radical implication of a term is one thing and to suggest that the term in its ordinary application must necessarily and always mean the same original radical sense is quite a different thing The passage from the radical and immediate difference to the current application and the general accepted sense is an unwarranted jump taken by this Naya

(vii) EVAMBHŪTA NAYA—The last of the Nayas is a further specialisation of the previous one This is merely the historical principle run mad According to this principle the radical sense in general is not the appropriate implication of a term Even the root signification must have different gradations and aspects Of these various aspects and gradations in the manifestation of the thing, only one particular aspect is contemplated by the root of a term, and it is this contemplated aspect that is the legitimate meaning of the term, in its current usage The very same thing in a different attitude must be designated by a different term altogether Thus for example, the term *gau* implies an animal in motion That which moves is a *gau* or 'cow' The same term therefore should not be applied when the animal is at rest or lying down Movement is fundamentally different from lying down and therefore the same term 'cow' should not be applied to an animal at two such fundamentally different attitudes Fundamental difference in the logical implication must necessarily be indicated by literal difference on the terms This is the contention of Evambhūta Naya The term must just designate the particular aspect or attitude in the object referred to If the term goes beyond that it will be a source of confusion and ambiguity Language instead of revealing things as they are would only conceal them

This grammatico-logical contention may be conceded partially In a perfect vocabulary this ought to be the principle but the language that we use is not so evolved under the guidance of such a rigorous logical principle Hence it would be an egregious blunder to identify, what actually exists, with what ought to be, logically Therefore

this Evambhūta Naya interpreted without reference to concrete usage and conventional meaning would only end in meaningless verbiage

These are the Seven Nayas referred to in Jaina logic. The first four are called *artha-nayas* inasmuch as they deal with objects of knowledge, whereas the other three are called *śabda-nayas* inasmuch as they pertain to terms and their meanings. The same seven are sometimes otherwise grouped. The first three come under *dravya-naya* whereas the other four come under *pariāya-naya*. The former means the substantive aspect whereas the latter means the aspect of change or manifestation.

These Nayas have an important place in the Anekānta Vāda of the Jaina system. All human descriptions and predications are relative and circumscribed inasmuch as they issue forth from the limited and partial nature of the intellect. Not only in our every day speech but also in the language of the metaphysical statements (if they) have their own context and relation universalising their meaning apart from their setting in the background, (they) would result in practical inconvenience and philosophical confusion. Jaina thinkers recognising the extreme complexity of reality are never wearied of emphasising the *anekānta* aspect. Multifaced reality may lead to 'multitude of descriptions'. Every one of them may be partially true but not one of them is really true. Philosophy is but the fable of the seven blind men and the elephant. Each one perceives a certain aspect of the real and congratulates himself that that is the only reality. When reality would not fit in with his own petty framework then there is the ruthless pruning and chopping to make it convenient. Then there is the denial of certain inconvenient things as appearance and illusion. System building in philosophy has always been the process of providing reality with a procrustean bed. But one who knows, smiles at the simplicity of human philosophising. The critical caution that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy was sounded several centuries before the Christian era by the Anekāntavādins.

Our account of the Nayas will be incomplete without a mention of the six Nayas which are generally employed in the examination of the nature of souls. According to Jaina Metaphysics Jīva or soul has the nature of consciousness or *cetanā*. When it is viewed in its pure state unlimited by extraneous conditions, it has its thought characteristics fully and perfectly developed. This state of its existence represents the Ideal of Perfection or Siddhahood. But even in this ideal state, the nature of the self does not lose its complexity. Even in its infinite radiance, the self does not lose its Dravya nature or dynamic constitution. It is not distinct and separable from its own infinite qualities. It is the richness of content that marks the Jaina conception of Perfection as against the nihilistic attitude of Vedānta which speaks of quality-less existence as the ultimate Reality. Existence apart from qualities would be an empty abstraction and is therefore all the more unfit to stand for the ultimate reality. It is this unalienable unity that exists between the Real and its qualities that may be said to be the central doctrine of the Jaina metaphysics.

This pure and perfect state of the self is a thing to be achieved. Ordinarily the existence of the self is *somewhat different*. Its infinitude is limited, its glory abated and radiance dimmed by alien conditions and limitations. By its own general weakness and disposition it weaves round itself material sheaths, some subtle and some gross. These material sheaths form the encumbrances and limitations which make the cycle of births and deaths possible for the Jivas. In this state Jiva is generally an embodied consciousness or an organism. In its normal state it may be evident to the senses through its gross organic body. In its subtle state of interval from death to another birth even though it casts off its grosser sheath it is still endowed with a subtle Kāimic body which serves as the nucleus for building up its appropriate body of the next generation. Jiva in these states is said to be the conditional one, *Sopādhi jīva* as differentiated from the unconditioned perfect self, *Nirupādhi jīva*.

Jiva in its Samsāric state is not only associated with a body of its own but with several other things living and non-living. The environment in which it lives, moves and has its being is generally wider than its own corporeal frame. Even in the case of animals and birds there is such a wider interest than the mere instinct of self-preservation. The parental instinct of helping and preserving the young ones and filial instinct of falling back upon the support of the parents from the prehuman biological foundation of the institution of family among human beings. When we come to human society this widening of the environmental horizon of the self becomes all the more marked. Several economical and social institutions such as owning property or belonging to a particular social order or a nation all these contribute to extending the personality so as to coincide with its environments. There is a personal pride and pleasure in extending one's own property. There is a sympathetic feeling of joy or sorrow with the prosperity or adversity of the family or the nation to which the individual belongs. The nature of the personality therefore is determined by the extent and diversity of interest. We feel offended when any injury is done to our possessions. We feel it a personal insult if any one who is near and dear to us is unfairly treated. The self which is by its own intrinsic nature a complex entity becomes all the more complex by identifying itself through its interest with its environment of things and persons. Under such circumstances it is an extremely difficult problem to define the exact nature of the soul and to point out its own appropriate boundary. Hence the necessity of the application of Nayas or points of view. These Nayas as already mentioned are specially designed for the purpose of explaining the nature and defining the limits of the self.

To start with there are two main aspects or Nayas. Niscaya and Vyavahāra. The former represents the true and complete point of view. There is no distinction between *dravya* and its *gunas*. The self is looked at as a whole with all the wealth of its attributes. The latter represents the partial point of view. The complex nature of the self is analysed into its diverse qualities, and our attention may be directed to any particular attribute with which the self may be identified at the moment. Further the former

Nīścaya Naya is divided into Śuddha Nīścaya and Aśuddha Nīścaya Naya. Śuddha Nīścaya Naya holds the self in its pure and unconditioned *nirupādhi* state. Disentangled from all its material environment and limitation the self radiates in its pristine glory through all its wealth of infinite qualities. This aspect where the self is in its qualities and its qualities are pure and unalloyed expression of the nature of this self is the topic of Śuddha Nīścaya Naya. The second Aśuddha Nīścaya Naya contemplates the self as caught in the meshes of the material environment, the *sopādhi* state. The presence of *upādhi* makes it impure or *asūddha*. Its intrinsic glory is dimmed but still it is viewed as a whole with its complete nature as expressed in its attributes though somewhat warped by alien influences. This is the self according to Aśuddha Nīścaya Naya.

Similarly the *Vyavahāra* point of view is divided into two main heads *Sadbhūta Vyavahāra* and *Asadbhūta Vyavahāra*. The term *sadbhūta* implies the intrinsic nature of the thing. Here the question is not about the purity or the impurity of the thing. The term *Vyavahāra* as already explained implies the analysis and differentiation of attributes from the underlying *dravya*. *Jñāna* or thought is certainly an attribute of the self. To speak of *jñāna* as identical with self is to adopt *Sadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. The Term *asadbhūta* implies the importation of alien qualities into the self. Some of the organic instincts and emotions are distinctly due to the physical constitution. Nevertheless such instincts and emotions are associated with the self from the point of view of *Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. Similarly the Karmic constituents which are intrinsically physical may be said to belong to the self and modify its manifestations.

Each of these two again is divided into two other minor kinds *upacarita* and *anupacarita*. *Upacarita* is usage sanctified by convention but having no other intrinsic justification. It is a sort of metaphorical application, whereas *Anupacarita* is just the opposite of the above. It stands on its own intrinsic merit and has no metaphorical and transferred import. Thus finally we have 4 kinds of *Vyavahāra Naya*. 1 *anupacarita-sadbhūta-vyavahāra-naya*, 2 *upacarita-sadbhūta-vyavahāra-naya*, 3 *anupacarita-asadbhūta-vyavahāra-naya* and 4 *upacarita-asadbhūta-vyavahāra-naya*.

Now the first is mainly *vyavahāra* inasmuch as it analyses the attributes from the thing is *sadbhūta* inasmuch as it emphasises the genuine and intrinsic attributes and is *anupacarita* inasmuch as it is free from figurative and transferred implication. The illustration of this is the self is of the nature of *jñāna* or knowledge. The second Naya is *vyavahāra* for the reason stated above and *sadbhūta* for the same and *upacarita* because the epithet is figurative and transferred. When we speak of *Jñāna* or knowledge as *Pramāna* or the criterion of truth we are thinking of the objects of knowledge or *artha*. *Artha* itself may be spoken of as a manifestation of knowledge or *Jñāna-vikalpa*. To speak of *artha* or the object as a modification of knowledge is only figuratively true in the case of external objects. These being physical in nature are *acetana* and yet as object of knowledge may be spoken of as modification of *jñāna*. What intrinsically belongs to the self is transferred to its object because of the relation brought about by

the process of knowledge. The third Naya is Anupacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra. The only term that demands explanation is *asadbhūta* here. It refers to the identification of the Self with some alien properties. For example to consider one's own body as oneself which is generally done in ordinary life is Asadbhūta Vyavahāra. This is not merely figurative as the statement is sanctioned by the intimate interrelation that exists between the soul and the body. Hence 'this body is mine,' or 'I am this,' pointing to the body is a statement which is justified according to Anupacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya. The last Naya is the *upacarita* form of the same. Here the alien quality or the thing with which the self is identified lack that intimate relation that exists between the soul and its own body. To call the ornaments as one's own, to claim certain individuals as one's relating, to possess certain things as one's own property, in short to identify one's personality with alien things and persons is possible only in a figurative sense. Each personality is distinct from and alien to the others though all by co-existing together may partake of common environment and enter into definite relations. Still from the metaphysical point of view one's destiny is in one's own hands. Therefore the popular identification of the self with the other things said to be owned by it is a figurative and transferred predication or Upacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya. These four kinds of Vyavahāra Naya together with the two Niscaya Nayas constitute the six *Nayas* which are specially employed to fathom the depth of human personality.

The object of these Nayas generally of the former seven and specially of the latter six is to reveal the intrinsic nature of personality in its comic environment. It is not merely a matter of theoretical interest that underlies these Nayas. Apprehension and understanding of the nature of reality must be a useful means in the hands of the self to reach the safe haven of Beatitude from which there is no return. But besides this practical aspect there is another aspect to the question. The truth that is apprehended by the Pramānas and the Nayas must be available for the general public, ever growing under the weight of sorrow and yearning to have that *Bliss* which they know only by faith and hope. Hence is the necessity for expressing the truth through Scripture. This Revelation of the truth through language is the Word or Syādvāda. This pertains to the principle of conditional predication which is *sevenfold*. This seven-fold predication is known as Saptabhangī.

SAPTABHANGĪ

SAPTABHANGĪ OR THE SEVEN MODES OF PREDICATIONS

The Dialectic of Syādvāda is no less puzzling to Indian students of philosophy both old and new, than the Hegelian dialectic is to the European philosophers. Syādvāda and its counterpart appear at first sight self-conflicting and unwarranted. But they have an important principle, — nay the fundamental principle of reality as their substratum and justification. Closer examination reveals in them a clear grasp of truth. Every other theory of knowledge is fading into insignificance before the principle of conditional predication.

Everything existing from the bespangled heavens above to the inmost core of human personality is in a process of change and modification. If we trust ourselves to the imagination of the astronomer which enables him to look back through eons of the past cosmic history or to have a glimpse of the far off future we see the universe as a motion picture on the screen of existence. What is a twinkling star at present was once upon a time gigantic nebulous mass of several million miles diameter. Then by process of aggregation and condensing there is the formation of a denser nucleus which becomes larger and larger by the same process which in its turn leads to the evolution of an enormous quantity of heat. This leads to the formation of the fiery orb which by the same laws of motion gives birth to a number of incandescent masses. These held to the parent by the laws of gravitation form the planetary system. Thus our Sun itself is but a star among the starry systems.

Side by side with this evolution of a sun with its planetary system we have the converse drama enacted. Either due to a mysterious explosion or due to a clash of star with star there bursts into existence a new mass of nebula. The telescope reveals to human view not only the nursery of distant solar systems but also the decay and dissolution of the decrepit and defunct starry systems. The starry heavens are but the cosmic alphabet which spell the three sublime words birth, growth and decay.

Turn now to our own earth which is but a tiny speck in space when compared to the Sun and the Stars. Here also the same process. The formation of the crust of the earth is after terrible volcanic convulsions which had taken place in the early history of the earth. The geological changes are followed by the appearance of life on the surface, then the wonderful evolution of the plant and animal kingdoms are all indelibly written

on the different strata of the earth. This also repeats the same story. Then life itself is a mysterious though subtle process of combined building up and breaking up. Turn where you will you see the same thing. Reality is a complex process of change and everything in it is partaking of the same process.

Nothing is merely permanent, nothing is merely changing. The acorn grows to the oak, the seed is in the plant and the tree and yet it is not there as the seed. Everything lives by the process of death. The very loss leads to gain. This message of the organic reality is an important contribution to philosophy.

Hegel founded his metaphysics on Logic—nay identified both. But his Logic is not the mere scholastic logic on which his predecessor Kant built his system. Hegel's logic came as a disturber of peace to the then philosophic thought, but it ultimately led to the emancipation of thought from scholastic thralldom. He proclaimed boldly to the world that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity 'is' and 'is not' are really identical and same, for they are but the aspects of the same reality. To one who is familiar with this dialectical process of thesis and antithesis reconciling in a higher synthesis, the following presentation of *saptabhangī* will lose its paradoxical nature and discover the underlying truth.

Long ago the Jainas recognised this complexity of existence. Any particular object which as the topic of assertion can very well take in two assertions—affirmative and negative. How can there be two apparently contradictory statements both true of a single fact? The nature of the fact is such is the answer. Every concrete assertion presupposes a question as to the exact nature of the object. This interrogation again rests on the desire to determine the thing from a particular point of view. Since the thing has several aspects and relations there may be several determinations. Hence is the possibility of apparently conflicting attributes inhering in the same and exhibited by the process of predication. Is that statue of marble or of plaster of Paris? If it is one, it is not the other. Is that the same gold bangle which you had last year? No, it is newly made though the same gold is used. Was Socrates a Greek or Roman? He was Greek and not Roman. What is the Kaiser now? He is and yet is not the Kaiser. These are familiar questions and answers. All these exhibit the possibility of predicating affirmation and negation of the same thing. *Is* and *is not*, can significantly refer to the same subject. The only thing we have to remember is that the point of view is different in each case. There is nothing mysterious, nothing incredible. When the same subject can have two such predicates no one predicate can monopolise the subject to itself. There will always be some aspect of the subject left out by this predicate, and this left out aspect can very well be expressed by the rival predicate. This implies that under no circumstances can we have a predication which is the only true predication about the subject. There can be no judgment absolutely true and excluding every other judgment about the same topic. Hence we have recourse to qualified assertions as the only avail-

able ones under the circumstances These qualified or conditional assertions are primarily two affirmation and negation

- (1) Perhaps X is
- (2) Perhaps X is not

These two aspects are inherent in the same thing, hence we can say

(3) Perhaps X is and *is not*, here we are contemplating the whole thing in its two aspects which are kept apart and attended to severally But these two aspects are inherent in and expressive of one single identity Hence they may be considered together jointly as expressing the single identity In that case there is no chance of asserting two conjointly by a single predicate, for the simple reason that there can be no such predicate Therefore we have to confess our inability to and proclaim the bankruptcy of vocabulary for having such an assertion This fact becomes the fourth mode of predication

- (4) Perhaps X *is* indescribable

Remembering this helpless nature of our tongue, we may still qualify this by each of the first three predicates Thus we have the last three modes of predications which are

- (5) Perhaps X *is* though indescribable
- (6) Perhaps X *is not* though indescribable
- (7) Perhaps X *is* and *is not* though indescribable

In their traditional form these are —

- (1) *Syādasti*
- (2) *Syānnāsti*
- (3) *Syādasti nāsti ca*
- (4) *Syādvaktavyah*
- (5) *Syādasti avaktavyah*
- (6) *Syānnāsti avaktavyah*
- (7) *Syādasti nāsti avaktavyah*

These seven modes of predication are usually illustrated with reference to some object such as a *jar* or *ghata* Whether it is to have an affirmative predicate or negative one depends respectively on four aspects its own form, matter, place and time leading to affirmation and alien form, matter, place and time bringing in negation to the jar A jar is real or is affirmed with reference to *svarūpa*, *svadṛavya*, *svaksetra*, *svakāla* and is unreal or is denied from the point of view of *pararūpa*, *paradravya*, *paraksetra* and *parakāla* When we have affirmation and negation for their reasons, the subsidiary modes are derived from these two

1 Then what is the *svarūpa* or intrinsic form of a Jar ? And what is its *pararūpa*? When we hear the word *jar* uttered, the term invariably implies a certain definite group of attributes through which a particular object is designated by the term These essential

attributes connoted by the term *Jar* will be its *svarūpa*. The attributes of any other object implied by any other term will be its *pararūpa*—will be alien to the *Jar*. Existence rests on *svarūpa* and non-existence on *pararūpa*. If existence is predicated of the *Jar* both from its own form as well as that of an alien thing like cloth (*paṭa*) then the *jar* will lose its distinctive character and become one with cloth. If on the other hand non-existence is predicated from its own form as from alien nature then there will be no *jar* at all. Neither of these results stand to reason.

Again confining ourselves to the class of vessels we still find that a *jar* is different from a kettle. Is that vessel a *jar* or kettle? The *jar-form* is its *svarūpa* and the kettle form is its *pararūpa*. From the former the *jar* is, from the latter, it is not.

Again we may be concerned with jars alone. One individual *jar* has its individuality as *svarūpa*, and every other *jar* will be *pararūpa*. *Jar A* exists on account of *svarūpa* and does not on account of *pararūpa*. If non existence is associated with *svarūpa* then there will be no *jar* at all, if existence follows from *pararūpa* then all *jars* will become one without distinction and there will be no separate individual ones.

Then *ghaṭa-jar* is made by the potter. The mass of clay on the potter's wheel is not yet a *jar*. It is only the finished product that is a *jar*. This-finished for is its *svarūpa*, any other stage in its formation is its *pararūpa*. The former leads to affirmation the latter leads to negation.

2 What is its own matter? Clay is *svadṛavya*, and gold is *paraḍṛavya*. The *Jar* is of clay and is *not of gold*. *svadṛavyena asti, paraḍṛavyena nāsti*.

3 What is its own place or *svakṣetra*? The ground where the *Jar* is, is its *svakṣetra* and every other place is its *parakṣetra*. The *Taj* is in *Agra (svakṣetra)* and is not in *Delhi (parakṣetra)*. If the *Jar* exists in *parakṣetra* also then there will be no place without a *Jar*. In the case of the *Taj* every place will have a *Taj Mahal*. If the thing is not even in its own place then there will be no *Jar* anywhere in the world. Either result will be unsatisfactory.

4 What is its own time or *svakāla*? The *Jar's* *svakāla* is the duration of the present in which it is intact. Its past when it was a mass of clay on the potter's wheel and its future when it will be a heap of broken shells will be its *parakāla*. Its existence in its own time and non-existence in other times will be quite evident. So also with every other object. Socrates existed at a particular age of Athenian History and is not existing now. If a thing exists in *parakāla* also as in *svakāla* then it will be eternal, if it does not exist in *svakāla*, as in *parakāla* then it will be nothing, for existence implies a relation to its time or duration.

Thus a thing is affirmed in its four-fold self-relation, form, matter, place and time, and is denied in its four-fold alien relation.

Now the *svarūpa*, etc., are determined with reference to the four-fold other-relation of *pararūpa*, etc. The self-relation apart from the other relation has no meaning. But

how are we to determine the four kinds of relation —*pararūpa*, *paradravya*, etc. These must depend on their environmental relations and these latter again on others. Thus we pass on from our environment to others still wider without having any clear grasp of the self-relation. The distinction between a thing and its other rests on the sandy foundation of a vicious indefinite regress. Hence the affirmation and negation also fall to the ground.

This objection rests on misapprehension. The distinction between the fourfold self-relation and other-relation does not rest on an indefinite regress. The essential nature of a thing not only implies its *svarūpa* but differentiates itself from *pararūpa*. In experience we not only perceive a thing, but perceive it as distinct from other things. A *Jar* is seen not merely as a *Jar* but as a thing distinct from cloth by its side. Without this distinction there can be no perception of the *Jar* at all. The very process of self-assertion implies differentiation from non-self. Hence the charge of indefinite regress is quite unwarranted.

Now, according to this theory *asti* and *nāsti* (is and is not) may be predicated of *prameya*, the objective aspect of knowledge or the process of apprehending an object. This dual predication must rest on *svarūpa* and *pararūpa* of *prameya*. What is its *svarūpa* and what is its *pararūpa*? *pararūpa* of *prameya* means *non-prameya* anything other than *prameya* we have no means of knowing. Hence the theory must fail in this case.

No, says the Logician. The state of being apprehended by knowledge, *prameyatva* is the *svarūpa* of *prameya*. This implies in general the relation of object to the knower anything besides this relation, even the object will be distinct from *prameyatva* and hence will be the *pararūpa* in this context. Now this theory must be applicable to the ultimate existence or *mahāsattā*. If *is* and *is not* are to be predicated of this *Summum Genus*, what are its *svarūpa* and *pararūpa*? For the latter cannot be, as there can be no other form or matter or place or time not included in this. The *pararūpa* of *mahāsattā* need not imply the existence of other things besides itself, that would be self-contradictory. But still we can speak of its *pararūpa* when we contemplate something which falls short of the all-comprehensive universal. Any of its parts will be so far the negation of whole—its *pararūpa*.

Now *asti*, affirmation depends on self, *nāsti* negation, on other things. *asti* which is conditioned by self can very well belong to a thing. But if *nāsti* which is conditioned by other than the *Jar* e.g. is also predicated of the *Jar*. Then it would imply that the *Jar* participates in the nature of its other—say cloth. This will lead to mere confusion.

This objection also is based on a misapprehension. Affirmation no doubt rests on the nature of the self the *Jar*. The negation resting on another thing—*paśa* (cloth) does not mean that the *Jar* also has the nature of a cloth. That would be absurd. The clear-cut boundary between things will vanish and with it all knowledge, *asti*—implies self assertion, *nāsti* implies alien-exclusion. A thing not only asserts its own individuality,

but also repulses anything alien to it. It is this element of repulsion that everything must have in order to be real that entitles it to have the negative predicate. Instead of leading to a confusion this element of differentiation is the only basis for self-assertion of a thing, *astī* and *nāstī*—assertion and exclusion are inalienably present in the same thing. Wherever there is *astī*, there is *nāstī* and wherever there is *nāstī*, there is *astī* also.

Now this association of this two *astī* and *nāstī*—in the same thing appears quite unwarranted. For on the one hand when we perceive a *Jar* we see mere *astī* without *nāstī* and on the other hand in the case of certain impossible and unreal concepts such as ass's horns, sky-flower there is mere *nāstī* without *astī*.

This is not quite correct. In the case of any perceived object *nāstī* does not mean that the thing should not exist as such and yet be perceived. That would be meaningless. *Nāstī* means nothing more than that element of repulsion and differentiation which isolates a thing from its background and gives it a determinate and positive nature. In this sense *nāstī* is inseparable from *astī* and it is the sense in which it is used. As to the other case of impossible and unreal concepts where is the positive foundation, If sky-flower is quite real, nay if it has a slight positive basis it will cease to mean an unreal and an impossible thing. Its nature seems to be pure negation and nothing less than that. This cannot be, answers our Logician. How can there be any negation without any significance? A significant negation must have some positive basis, otherwise it will be mere nonsense. The elements constituting the concept are by themselves real and are justified by the canons of experience. We have seen horns in a cow, we have seen an ass or a horse. These are existing and real. But the fanciful combination of an ass with horns or a flower with sky is unreal. But for the experience of horns on the head of a cow or flower in a tree there can be no talk of an ass with horns or a flower in the sky. Without this positive basis of experience there will be no elements to make up even a fanciful complex. Thus even the fanciful ideas of *unicorn* and centaur must have some foundation in our experience. Again in the proposition *syādaṣṭī jīvaḥ*, the terms *astī* and *jīva* (life) must mean identically the same thing or different things. If the meanings are of the same nature then one cannot be predicated of the other as a pot cannot be the predicate of a Jar both being co-ordinate. Further *astī* or existence is predicable of everything real. If *astī* is identical with *jīva* then *jīva* also must be predicated of everything. But if *jīva* is different from *astī* then there is no chance of predicating *astī* of *jīva* for they are entirely different from each other. Further *jīva* being different from *astī* and *astī* being the predicate of everything, *jīva* cannot be related to anything real, (i.e.) *Jīva* would become unreal. You cannot maintain that *jīva* though different from *astī* can be said to have the predicate by a process of combination with it, for combination is impossible in the case of repelling elements.

The horns of this dilemma are blunted by *syādvāda*. These results need not frighten

the Logician to whom *astī* and *jīva* are identical from the *dravyārtha* view and different from *paryāyārtha* view. They are different and yet identical. But for this dual nature there can be no predication at all *

The primary modes of predication are three—*syādasti*, *syānnāsti*, *syādavaktavyah*. The other four are obtained by combining these three. Now according to Sāṅkhya philosophy everything is real and therefore exists. According to Buddhism everything is momentary and unreal. Both these views are rejected by the Jainas as extremes. The former is true according to the principle of *dravyārthika* point of view, the latter is true according to *paryāyārthika* point of view. Hence each is true in its own way and is not true absolutely. Again reality is indescribable according to the Vedāntins who emphasise the *nirvacanīva* aspect of reality. Even this is only partially true, for otherwise even this predication “that Reality is indescribable” will be impossible.

The same seven modes of predication may be obtained in the case of following pairs of attributes, eternal and changing, one and many, universal and particular, etc. These pairs of opposites can very well be predicated of reality and these may yield the other derivative modes of predication. Thus practically every attribute by being affirmed and denied according to different aspects may bring about seven fundamental propositions true of real subject.

It may be said that after all this principle of *saptabhangī* is a wanton indulgence in meaningless self-contradiction. This objection has been sufficiently answered above. This is not a case of wanton paradox or purposeless pun. If the words are wantonly misinterpreted or understood in an unwarranted sense then it may be charged with wanton quibbling, for example in the statement that this person has a new woollen shawl (*nava-kambala*) the term *nava* may be taken to mean also *nine*. Though the word is capable of such an interpretation still in this statement it does not mean that. In spite of the context if a person retorts that assertion by saying ‘this person cannot have nine shawls as he is very poor,’ it would be wanton quibbling. There is no such wanton quibbling underlying *saptabhangī*.

It is not wanton quibbling it must merely be an expression of doubt. To say a thing may be as well as may not be is to exhibit one’s own doubt and ignorance. At the best therefore the doctrine is a mode of scepticism. This charge of scepticism is certainly unfounded. Doubt expresses absence of determinate knowledge. If the *prima facie* appearance of a thing leads you to two different interpretations of which alternatives we cannot choose the right one then there is doubt as to its nature. Since its exact nature is unknown scepticism may be the result. But in the case of the contradictory propositions forming the basis of *saptabhangī* we have two different aspects each serving as the

*[This discussion from *Saptabhangītaranginī* reminds us of Bradley’s discussion of the theory of Predication—in appearance and Reality.]

basis of one of the propositions. Hence there is neither doubt nor confusion in this case. Each assertion is definite and clear.

ŚANKARA AND SYĀDVĀDA

THIBAUT'S TRANSLATION OF THE BHĀṢYA

"This doctrine we meet as follows —Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing'. That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing, just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such, the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such are not such' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non exclusive nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative predications 'somehow it is' 'somehow it is not' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion, partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthankara (Jīva) teach with any claim to authority and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman. Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five, from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described - but, as a matter of fact they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite, you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person. If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is employed in such statement will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And moreover it follows from your doctrine that sou,l

non-soul and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indetermination. As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories—being excluding non-being and *vice versa* non-being excluding being— the doctrine of the Arhat must be rejected”

RĀMĀNUJA AND SAPTABHANGĪ

THIBAUT'S TRANSLATION — With the help of this they prove that all things—which they declare to consist of substance (*dravya*) and *pariyāya* to be existing one and permanent in so far as they are substances, and the opposite is so far as they are *pariyāyas*. By *pariyāya* they understand the particular states of substances, and as those are of the nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence and so on. With regard to this the *sūtra* remarks that no such proof is possible. ‘Not so, on account of the impossibility in one, i.e. because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Jainas) called *pariyāya*—are different things (*padārtha*) one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by the particular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i.e. non-existence. The non-permanency, further of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction, how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (*bhinnatva*) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes, non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal. But (the Jaina may here be supposed to ask the Vedāntin) how can you maintain that Brahman, although on only yet at the same time is the self of all? Because we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the supreme person, omniscient, omnipotent and so on. And that the body and the Person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally different nature (so that Brahman is not touched by the defects of this body), we have explained like wise. Moreover, as your six substances, soul and so on are not one substance and one *pariyāya*, then being one substance and so on, cannot be used to prove them being one and also not one and so on. And if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz. one and several, and so on) each owing to its own *pariyāya* and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything being an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be identical. Hence the theory of the Jainas is not reasonable.

These two passages are quoted from the two great Hindu Commentators of *Vedānta Sūtras*, Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja. The Sūtra that is commented on नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात् (Ch. 1, Pāda 2, sū 33)

The author of the *Vedānta Sūtras* as well as the commentators reject the *saptabhangī-naya* on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes inhering in the same thing

All that is said above by way of exposition and discussion would vindicate the claim of *saptabhangī* against the charges brought against it by these scholars. Our account would be incomplete if these charges are not examined in this connection

Now the author of the Sūtras does not give any detailed reasons besides the one contained in the Sūtra itself—that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes *Asti* and *nāsti* being and non-being or affirmation and negation being contradictory epithets cannot be referred to the same thing. Hence the doctrine of such a predication is futile. This reasoning though short is interesting and suggestive. We have already pointed out the philosophical attitude adopted by the Jainas. A thing being of complex nature, having *dravya* and *pariyāya* must be an identity in difference. Instead of rejecting the doctrine of reality for the reason given they seem to claim that the real is real only because of such a capacity to comprehend and reconcile the differences in itself. Here we are reminded of Bradley's polemic against 'the nature of things'. Though he admits the Hegelian doctrine of identity in difference he cannot forget the scholastic traditions about identity and difference. Every concrete thing or person is according to Bradley a Unity in diversity, and identity in difference a constant which is varying also. Now Bradley argues that such a nature implies self-contradiction and internal conflict. This is so because it is not possible for us to know how the difference could be derived from and related to an identity. Hence he condemns such things to the limbo of appearances.

We have been suggesting the similarity between the Hegelian doctrine of identity and the Jaina doctrine of *asti-nāsti*. But we must raise a note of warning that the Jaina doctrine does not accept wholesale Hegelian metaphysics. Unlike Bradley the greatest living representative of Hegelian absolutism the Jainas emphasize this important aspect of reality. The reason which is employed by Bradley to condemn a thing to be appearance is the very reason which serves the Jaina thinkers to proclaim the reality of the same.

The commentators deserve special attention. Hence we shall examine their criticism in detail. Śāṅkara's criticism is of three main stages. First, he tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of this doctrine. Second, its practical futility. Third, its conflict with many other Jaina doctrines. Being and non-being cannot be predicated of the same thing just as it is impossible to predicate hot and cold of the same. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together of the same thing at the same

time This objection appears to be unanswerable but if we remember the two different aspect of self-relation and other relation we can very easily see that the objection does not hold good Very often even in ordinary experience we have examples of co-existing attributes which are in the abstract self-contradictory The branches of a tree may be in motion, but the tree as a whole may not budge an inch Here the tree is moving and yet is not moving The same individual person may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y In this case we cannot reasonably ask how can the same individual be both father and son The two conflicting attributes of fatherhood and sonhood are quite intelligible in the same individual Similarly a class which is a genus with reference to its own species may itself be a species in relation to its own higher genus We need not multiply instances It would be quite idle to maintain the impossibility of incompatible attributes in one and the same thing It is a matter of surprise to us modern readers how such an acute thinker like Śāṅkara should go without observing the particular aspect from which the rival presents his case

After appealing to experience to substantiate his point Śāṅkara brings in the charge of indefiniteness against the doctrine of Saptabhaṅgī On a previous occasion we replied to this charge of indefiniteness It is enough here to show that if by definiteness Śāṅkara means unconditional and absolute assertion indefiniteness instead of being a defect would be certainly a meritorious point to the credit of Syādvāda In the course of the discussion the critic indulges in certain epithets which we should now call "unparliamentary" We may pass it without notice partly because of its irrelevancy to the main argument and partly because of the fact that in his days such an intermixture of Logic and Rhetoric was perhaps accepted as a justifiable weapon of debate

As to his second point the practical futility of the doctrine we have to say a word His argument comes to this Every theoretical doctrine has a practical bearing This is all the more so in the case of Indian thinkers All Indian philosophers in spite of their doctrinal differences accept this as the fundamental truth of philosophy that metaphysical research is the handmaid of ethico-religious ideal of securing the *summum bonum* of life Hence any doctrine that is indefinite and ambiguous in its message is condemned by this pragmatic test Since we have not accepted the theoretical charge of ambiguity, we need not tarry long at this practical consequence

Next let us go to the application of Saptabhaṅgī to the other Jaina doctrines Such as the five categories and the final release with the consequent heavenly bliss Śāṅkara points out that according to this logic the five *astikāyas* may be five and may not be five This result will not certainly non-pluss the Jaina logician If they are severally referred to they are five If they are referred to as an aggregate and a class they are one If they are classified according to a different principle they may be two, living and non-living Hence there is no fixed numerical characterisation of these categories Variation in the number that may be used to designate these categories instead of implying self-contradiction

tion indicates only a variation in the point of view from which they are examined. As the climax of his criticism Śāṅkara asks his rival to say what would become of the heavenly world if it both exists and does not, both eternal and non-eternal. His rival will only answer as the author of *Saptabhaṅgī-taranginī* does—in the following manner. If as you say it must be one of those and not both you have the following difficulty. If the final release and heavenly bliss is eternal and existing where is the chance for *samsāra* and the attempt to obtain *mokṣa*. If the other alternative is the only truth what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is altogether impossible. “Man partly is and wholly hopes to be” is not mere poetry. It is genuine philosophy. Inasmuch as the final release is the goal towards which the whole creation moves it is true and real and inasmuch as it is *the goal* and is not yet an actualised fact it is not real and true. Why should this doctrine be so vehemently attacked passes our understanding.

When we go to Rāmānuja we have got a different method of argument altogether. He seems to accept the rival doctrine all the while protesting. He clearly sees the distinction between *dravya* and *paryāya*, substance and mode. He also perceives that *paryāya* means change and *dravya* permanency. He also correctly points out that the doctrine of Syādvāda is based upon these two different aspects *dravya* and *paryāya*. The proper course for the critic having gone so far would be to accept the doctrine. Or if he wants to reject he must show that things do not have both these aspects *dravya* and *paryāya*. Instead of doing either Rāmānuja attempts to defend the *sūtra* on a principle which is quite indefensible and unwarranted. What he proves is that *asti* and *nāsti* cannot be predicated of a thing from the *dravya* point alone. According to him the same substance cannot have both predicates. Certainly, it cannot have. Jaina Logic too proclaims the same thing. But if you take the thing in both its aspects—and it must be so taken to avoid empty abstractions—then it can and must have both the predicates.

Attempting to reject this doctrine of identity in difference Rāmānuja has the insight to perceive how his own doctrine of Vedānta is affected. In one sense the Vedāntic metaphysics is the doctrine of the one and the many. If reality could be one and the many at the same time Vedāntism would be sufficient argument in favour of Syādvāda. But unlike Śāṅkara who dismisses the Many as *māyā*, Rāmānuja as constrained by his metaphysical attitude accepts the reality of the many also. Then what becomes of the one in the many. He proposes the *pūrva-pakṣa* for the Jaina, “But how can you maintain that Brahma although one only yet at the same time is the self of all,” He answers the *pūrva-pakṣa* thus—“The whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person and that the body and the person are of totally different nature.” This is extremely dubious victory. If the body constituted by finite things and persons is really the manifestation or *parināma* of the Brahman and this what Rāmānuja believes, then his refuge is quite unsafe. For, his rival would be justified in asking whether the *parināma* or the body is real or illusory. If the latter, his commen-

tary becomes an unnecessary reduplication of Śankara's and if the former he is bound to admit the Syādvāda point of view that the real is one from the point of view of the Person and many from the point of view of *parināma* or his body

For a fuller discussion of the same we refer the reader to the excellent work *Saptabhangītaranginī* from which we have freely drawn in this essay

One other point and we may take leave of this topic Bertrand Russell in his American lectures "On Logical atomism" develops Menrong's Theory of objective fact a very suggestive way According to Menrong every proposition either true or false has an objective fact as the basis For in order that there may be an intelligent assertion apart from its truth value there must be some objective basis This doctrine implies two sets of objective facts, one for true propositions and other for false ones Both being objective, what is the destined mark of each so that one stand for truth and the other for error? Thus the question of truth is pushed further without being answered and we have to admit objective facts which are false and erroneous In order to avoid this result Russell proposes a modification in the doctrine

He distinguishes between the meaning of a name and the fact implied by a proposition Any individual object may be designated by a name The name is a symbol referring to some particular object This is a bare fact There is no meaning in calling this true or false It simply is Truth or falsity refers to a proposition, a proposition becomes true or false because of an *objective fact* The term *objective fact* is used in the sense of that which is other than the proposition that makes for its truth or falsity Every objective fact may have two propositions of which one is true because it corresponds to the fact and the other is false because it has no corresponding fact This theory of correspondence works well in the case of a true affirmative proposition (i.e.) of the pair of propositions based on each fact if the true one is affirmative, it is so because there is a corresponding fact The negative proposition which is not corresponding to that fact is so far falsified by the fact But take the following pair Socrates is living and Socrates is not living Here it is the negative proposition that is true and affirmative one is false According to Russell's theory the negative proposition which is true must have a corresponding fact, otherwise it cannot be true But what is the objective fact that is corresponding to this proposition—'*Socrates is not living*' There seems to be none and yet there must be one Therefore Russell brings in the theory of "*negative fact*" This suggestion raised a lot of discussion among the audience But Russell himself leaves it undeveloped He emphasises the fact that negative facts must be accepted as a fundamental postulate if the correspondence theory is to work

Now what have we in the above doctrine of Saptabhangī? Each thing is capable of having seven modes of predication and primarily two affirmative and negative The affirmative proposition is determined by self form, matter, place and time The negative proposition rests on non-self relation of the same four, form, matter, place and time In

this case both the propositions are true. A negative proposition in the case of self-relation and affirmative proposition in the case of non-self-relation would both be false. The proposition relating Socrates to his own time is true, the one relating him to any other time is false. To say that he is living now is such a false proposition. We are entitled to say only this that he is not living now.

Thus we have something like this. A thing in its *svarūpa* (self-form), *svadṛavya*, (matter) *svakṣetra*, (place) *svakāla* (time) is the positive fact enabling the truth of an affirmative proposition. The thing in its *pararūpa* (non-self-form), *para-dravya*, *parakṣetra*, *parakāla* will constitute the negative fact. This will justify the negative proposition. This so offered only by way of suggestion for a possible explanation of what Russell calls 'negative fact'. Neither do we propose to develop Russell's theory nor do we want to imply that he was anticipated by Indian logicians of old. Any how the comparison is interesting and suggestive.

This Saptabhaṅgī is a powerful organ in the hands of Syādvāda and avoided the Nihilism of the Buddhists as well as the absolute monism of the Vedāntists, steering clear of the shallow of the Cārvākas and the ludicrous idealism of the Nayavādins.

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THE WORKS BY ŚRĪ KUNDAKUNDA-ĀCĀRYA

Prābhṛta-traya or Nātaka-traya, i e , the trilogy of

Pañcāstikāyasāra,

Pravacanasāra, and

Samayasāra or Samayasāra Prābhṛta

Also Niyamasāra

Ṣaṭ-prābhṛta or Ṣaṭpāhuda, consisting of Darsana Pāhuda, Sutta, Cāritta, Bodha, Bhāva, and Mokṣa Pāhūḍas Rayanasāra, Bāraha Aṇuvekkhā,

(All these books have been printed)

He is said to have written 84 Pāhudas Some names are given below — They are not as yet found in any library

Jonisāra, Kriyāsāra, Ārāhanāsāra, Ksapanasāra Bamdhasāra, Tattvasāra, Amgasāra, Davvasāra, Karma Pāhuda, Paya Pāhuda, Vidyā Pāhuda, Ughāta Pāhuda, Dṛṣṭi Pāhuda, Siddhānta Pāhuda, Samavāya Pāhuda, Naya Pāhuda, Prakṛti Pāhuda, Cūrṇi Pāhuda, Pamcavagga Pāhuda Karma Vipāka Pāhuda, Vastu Pāhuda, Payodhara Pāhuda, Utpāda Pāhuda, Divva Pāhuda, Sikkhā Pāhuda, Jiva Pāhuda, Ācāra Pāhuda Sahāva Pāhuda, Ālāpa Pāhuda, Cuti Pāhuda, Ṣaṭ Darsana Pāhuda, Nokamma Pāhuda, Samthāna Pāhuda, Nitya Pāhuda, Eyamta Pāhuda, Vihāya Pāhuda, Sālamī Pāhuda

All the works of Śrī Kundakunda are in Prakṛit verse But it is easy and beautiful His *nāṭaka-traya* or Trilogy has been commented upon in Sanskrit by Śrī Amṛta Candra Ācārya and also by Śrī Jayasena Ācārya There is also a commentary on *Niyamasāra* by Śrī Padmaprabha Maladhārī Deva There is an excellent printed Hindi edition of this work by Jaina Dharma Bhūshana Brahmachārī Sital Prasadji

श्रीः
पञ्चास्तिकाय-समयसारः ।
PAÑCĀSTIKĀYA SAMAYASĀRA.

1

इंसदवदियाणं तिहुअणहिदमधुरविसदवक्काणं ।
अंतातीदगुणाण णमो जिणाण जिदभवाण ॥१॥
[इन्द्रशतवन्धितेभ्यस्त्रिमुवनहितमधुरविशदवाक्येभ्य ।
अन्तातीतगुणेभ्यो णमो जिनेभ्यो जितमवेभ्य ॥१॥]

1 Obeisance to Jinas, possessed of attributes infinite, the conquerors who are beyond the influences of transmigration, worshipped by the hundred Indras, revealers of the clear, sweet, and three-world-beneficial Word

COMMENTARY—The three Lokas are Ūrdhva (upper), Madhyama (middle), and Adhah (lower) The Word is called beneficial, because it enables the people of the three worlds to realise their pure and perfect self It is sweet because it draws towards itself the hearts of the faithful and the wise It is called clear because it is free from defects such as, doubt, or self-contradiction etc The hundred Indras are —40 of the Bhavana Devas, 32 of the Vyantara Devas, 24 of the Kalpavāsīs, 2 of the Joytiṣka Devas, Sun and Moon, 1 of the Human beings, and 1 of the Animals

One who is worshipped by such Indras in the *samavasarana* is certainly deserving of worship by the ordinary mortals The reference shows the glory of Jina

2

Next, salutation to the Jināgama

समणमुहुगदमहुं चतुर्गदिनिवारणं सणिज्जाणं ।
एतो पणमिय सिरसा समयमिय मुण्ह बोच्छामि ॥२॥
[अमणमुहोदमतार्थं चतुर्गतिनिवारणं सनिर्वाणम् ।
एष प्रणम्य सिरसा समयमिय श्रुजुत वक्ष्यामि ॥२॥]

2 I bow to the Śāstra that is revealed by Jinas, is the means of liberation from the four Gatis and leads to Nirvāna Listen ! I describe that same truth is this work.

COMMENTARY—Samaya means system It is of three kinds —1) Śabda Samaya, the system of philosophy or scripture 2) Arthasamaya, the system of reality, and 3) Jñānasamaya, the system of knowledge

Saluting the Śabdasamaya or the scripture, the author goes to describe Arthasamaya, the facts of reality in order to attain true knowledge of the Jñānasamaya

The four Gatis are —1 Naraka the Hell, 2 Tiryak the plant and the animal world 3 Manusya Man, 4 Deva the Gods These four Gatis constitute Samsāra

The Āgama is saluted because of two great reasons Its origin and its fruit It is the word of God It is revealed by Sarvajña Its fruit is that it saves the soul from the four Gatis of Samsāra and leads it to Nirvāna, the unconditioned state of perfection where the self is completely realised

3

Then he mentions the three Samayas Śabda, Artha, and Jñāna in the first half of the Gāthā, and the distinction between the Loka (the world) and the Aloka (the beyond) in the second half of the Gāthā

समवाधो पञ्चह समओ ति जिणुत्तमेहि पणत्त ।

सो चेव हवदि लोओ तत्तो अमिओ अलोओ ख ॥३॥

[समवाय पञ्चाना समय इति जिनोत्तमं प्रणतम् ।

स एव च भवति लोकस्ततोऽमितोऽलोक खम् ॥३॥]

3 It is said by Jina that the group of five categories constitutes the system of reality, the same is the world And beyond that, is the immeasurable and infinite space (called Aloka)

Arthasamaya or the system of reality is two-fold Loka and Aloka Loka is constituted by the five Astikāyas, or existences Beyond that is the great and the infinite Aloka which is co-extensive with pure Space or Anantākāsa

4

Here the author enumerates the five existences He describes the number of each and the general and special characteristics of the different Astikāyas

जीवा पुगलकाया धम्माधम्मा तहेव आयास ।

अत्यत्तमिह य जियदा अणणमइया अणुमहंता ॥४॥

[जीवा. पुद्गलकाया धर्माधर्मो तथैव आकाशम् ।

अस्तित्वे च नियता अनन्यमया अणुमहान्तः ॥४॥]

4. Jivas or souls, Pudgalas or non-souls, Dharma and Adharma, the principles of rest and motion, and finally Space—these are the Astikāyas They are eternal, uncreated

and of huge magnitude

COMMENTARY—Since the atom or the material point is the unit of space, the spatial point is also called *anu* or Atom. Since the five entities, such as Jivas, etc., mentioned above are capable of occupying space, they are called Kāyas (corporeals), the term Kāya implies relation to many spatial points. Existences that can be so related to space are called by the Jainas, Astikāyas. It is evident that material objects constituted by physical molecules have such space quality. Jiva or soul is also considered to be an Astikāya because of its organic nature. Jiva exists as an organism and as such it is related to body and hence the spatial quality. Dharma and Adharma are the peculiar principles recognised by Jainas as corporeal. These are also Astikāyas. One is the principle of motion, the other is the principle of rest. They are pervading space and as such are Astikāyas. It is not necessary to point out that space is a multidimensional existence. Jainas have recognised the reality of space. They do not think that it is possible to reduce space to a “form of the mind” as the Idealists of Europe and India have done.

Since Time has neither potentially nor really the possibility of such space relations it is denied the name Astikāya. It is purely an entity of monodimensional series. Though it is not Astikāya it does not cease to be a real entity. Here also the Jainas differ from the Idealistic thinkers of the world in their attitude towards Time. Time is a reality and not a form of experience. Their views are more or less akin to the ideas of the Realism which is associated in England with thinkers like B. Russell.

5

Then the Astikāyas are described

जेस अत्थिसहाओ गुणेहि सह पज्जएहि विविहेहि ।
ते होति अत्थिकाया निप्पणं जेहि तइलोक ॥५॥

[येषामस्तिस्वभावाद् गुणैः सह पर्ययेविविधैः ।
ते अवलम्बस्तिकायाः निष्पन्न येस्त्वैलोक्यम् ॥५॥]

5 Whatever things have the essential nature of manifesting themselves severally through their numerous qualities and modes are the Astikāyas. These fill the three worlds—they being the constituent parts of the world.

COMMENTARY—Since these are real, they are *asti*. Since they constitute the world or Loka they have the space quality, hence they are *kāyas*. *Astikāya* then implies existential nature as well as space quality.

6

Next the description of the six Dravyas. The above five Astikāyas together with the Time (Kāla) form the six Dravyas.

ते चेवं अस्थिकाया तेषकालियभावपरिणदा णिच्छा ।

गच्छन्ति द्रव्यभावं परियदृणलिगसंजुता ॥६॥

[ते चेवास्तिकायाः त्रैकालिकभावपरिणता नित्याः ।

गच्छन्ति द्रव्यभावं परिवर्तनलिङ्गसंयुक्ताः ॥६॥]

6 These five Astikāyas which though manifesting themselves diversely, maintain their permanency, constitute together with Kāla or time which has the quality of permanence in change, the Dravyas

COMMENTARY—These five entities are being and becoming They undergo change and yet maintain their identity Thus they have the three characteristics of coming into existence, ceasing to exist, and also remaining permanent in spite of both Creation, destruction, and yet continuity—these are the main qualities of Dravya Kāla or time also has these three qualities, hence the Dravyas are six in number

Dravya is fundamentally an organic unity This view takes reality not merely in its aspect of change nor of permanency It is permanency in change Hegel is responsible for introducing such a conception of reality in modern thought Jainas in their conception of Dravya have anticipated such a modern idea, several centuries in advance Of course the concept was not fully worked out because of other limitations peculiar to their age

7

These six Dravyas can move in the same place They can also occupy the same space because of their mutual accommodating nature Though they get thus interpenetrated still each preserves its own proper nature

अण्णोण्णं पविसंता वेत्ता ओगासमण्णमण्णस्स ।

सेलंता वि य णिच्छं सगं सभाव ण विजहंति ॥७॥

[अन्योन्यं प्रविशन्ति द्रव्यवकाशमन्योन्यस्य ।

मिलन्त्यपि च नित्यं स्वक स्वभावं न विजहति ॥७॥]

7 These six Dravyas though mutually interpenetrating, and accommodating one another, and though getting mixed up in view of occupying the same space, yet they always maintain their identical nature without losing their respective qualities, general as well as special

COMMENTARY—The six Dravyas are classified into three kinds —1) *sakriya* 2) *sakriyanīṣkriya*, 3) *nīṣkriya* Sakriya Dravyas are those that can be efficient causes They can move about from place to place They have the capacity of *āgamana* or motion Such are Pudgala, or matter and Jiva or soul Sakriyanīṣkriya Dravyas are those that condition movements, without themselves undergoing change or motion These have

merely Avagāhana The physical principles of Dharma and Adharma correspond to this description Lastly, Niskriya Dravya is one which is capable of being neither the direct nor the indirect condition of change Such is Space which has pure *avasīhāna*.

8

After describing the general nature of Astikāyas in Gāthā No 5, *jesim attisahāo* etc, the author proceeds to describe their distinctive characteristics and examines them from different points or Nayas

सत्ता सम्बन्धयत्था सविस्सरूपा अणतपज्जाया ।

भगुप्पादधुवत्ता सप्पडिवक्खा ह्वदि एक्का ॥८॥

[सत्ता सर्वपदार्था सविस्वरूपा अनन्तपर्याया ।

भङ्गोत्पादघ्नोव्यात्मिका सप्रतिपक्षा सवत्येका ॥८॥]

8 Substance is one (as a class) It is the inherent essence of all things It manifests itself through diverse forms It undergoes infinite modifications It has the triple characteristics of creation, destruction and permanence It also has the antithetical qualities, that is, it may be described by the opposites

COMMENTARY—The antithesis referred to is due to the fact that the substance may be described in each case by the opposite attribute It is described as one from the class point It may be described as many from the individual point So with every adjective, *sarvapaḍastha* may have antithesis *ekapaḍastha*, *visvarūpa* against *ekarūpa*, *anantaparyāya*, against *ekaparyāya*, etc Such a description of the same thing by opposite attributes may be incompatible with the false position taken up by Ekānta philosophy, that, is, the philosophical attitude which insists on a single point of view with reference to the extremely complex fact of reality But such complex facts can be described by opposites without involving violent self-contradiction according to the Anekānta philosophy—philosophy of manifold aspects Complex reality naturally claims complex attitude of the understanding Any attempt to provide life and its problems with a simple ready-made framework must certainly end in failure, for conceptual analysis always implies selection and abstraction The reality which is described by a concept will certainly be richer in content than the content of the idea Hence is the possibility of describing the same fact of Life by distinct and sometimes diverse conceptual symbols This means that life is always greater than Logic It is this aspect that is expressed in the Jaina attitude of Anekānta This *prima facie* contradiction suggested by the term Anekānta is in no way different from the Hegelian dialectic which could embrace contradictions When the Jaina philosopher speaks of describing the same thing by opposite attributes, his view need not be assumed to be more violently shocking to the common sense attitude than Hegel's assertion that affirmation and negation are identical Both the views in short are *apparently* inconsistent, but both emphasize an important aspect of reality

While describing the nature of Dravya the author goes to mention the qualified identity between Sattā and Dravya These are the same from one aspect

द्वियदि गच्छति ताहं ताह् सवभाव-पञ्जयाहं ज ।

द्वियं तं भण्णते अण्णणभूदं तु सत्तादो ॥६॥

[द्वयति गच्छति तास्तान् सद्भावपर्यायान् यत् ।

द्रव्यं तद् भणन्ति अण्णणभूतं तु सत्तातः ॥६॥]

9 What flows, or maintains its identity through its several qualities and modifications, and what is not different from Sattā or Substance, that is called Dravya by the All knowing

COMMENTARY—Here Sattā or substance is distinguished from Dravya Dravya means that which flows or changes While changing through its different qualities and modifications its essential nature persists This kind of progressive development is associated with Dravya But such development is also the characteristic of substance Hence according to Jaina attitude Dravya is not entirely different from Sattā or substance Therefore the opposite qualities mentioned above with reference to Sattā or substance are also applicable to Dravya which is not different in meaning

According to this view there is no unchanging substance or Sattā in Jaina system Such adamant existence cannot be identified with Dravya which is extremely volatile Here also the similarity between Hegelian concept of 'thing' and the Jaina concept of Dravya is worth noticing Sattā is not 'a thing in itself' behind Dravya Sattā and Dravya are one and the same as Hegel mentioned Thing in itself and experience are not absolutely distinct Dravya refers to facts of experience Sattā refers to existence or reality One may be abstracted from the other but it is not different from the other as a fact

Then he speaks of the other characteristics of Dravya

दठ्वं सत्त्वक्षणयं उत्पादव्ययधुवत्तसजुत्त ।

गुणपञ्जयासय वा ज त भण्णति सव्वण्ह ॥१०॥

[द्रव्यं सत्त्वक्षणकं उत्पादव्ययधुवत्त्वसयुक्तम् ।

गुणपर्यायावय वा यस्तद्भणन्ति सर्वज्ञाः ॥१०॥]

10 Whatever has substantiality, has the dialectical triad of birth, death and permanence, and is the substratum of qualities and modes, is Dravya So say the All-knowing

COMMENTARY—Here the three characteristics of Dravya are described. First Dravya has the quality of *sat* or existence. Secondly, it has the quality of permanence through birth and death. Thirdly, it is the substratum of attributes and conditions. The quality of *sat* emphasises the substantial reality of Dravya. It is not merely the form of the intellect. It has an existence in *Rerum Natura*. The triple quality of dialectical change is the second attribute. *utpāda* is appearance, i.e., assuming new modification. This does not mean creation out of nothing. Creating by the fiat of a Will is not recognised by the Jainas. *Utpāda* therefore means that phase of the process of the development when a new form is assumed. *Vyaya* is losing the previous form. Here also it is different from absolute disappearance. It only means that phase in the process of development where the earlier form is replaced by the succeeding one. *Dhruva* refers to the persistence of the essential nature of Dravya which undergoes development and which makes both *Utpāda* and *Vyaya* simultaneously possible. In fact the process of development includes all the three phases. This fact is not only recognised by the scientists like Darwin and Spencer, but by the great French philosopher, Bergson, who raised it to an important philosophical principle. Lastly, Dravya is the substratum of qualities and modes. Attributes and modifications will have no basis if they do not rest on something real. This does not mean that Dravya is merely a prop, supporting an alien fact, the attribute. The attribute is the thing and the thing has the attribute. The attribute is the thing and the thing has the attribute, but still the Jainas do not admit that the attributes alone are sufficient to constitute a reality. For them *esse* is not *percipi*. Attributes in order to be objective and not merely psychical do require an objective basis. Such a basis Dravya is. Finally it is to be noted that these three characteristics are inseparable from one another. *Sattā* pre-supposes *Utpāda*, *Vyaya*, *Dhruvatva*, and also is the substratum. Similarly process of development implies *Sattā*, which again cannot be existing apart from qualities and modes. Neither of the three can exist apart from the other two. In short the three characteristics express the same essential nature of Dravya in three different ways.

11

Then Dravya is examined from two points of view

1) *Dravyārthika Naya*, the aspect of substance, and 2) *Paryāyārthika Naya*, the aspect of change or development

उत्पत्तीव विनाशो द्रव्यस्य य एतत्थि अतथि सङ्भावो ।

विगमुत्पाद-ध्रुवत्तं करेति तस्सेव पञ्जाया ॥११॥

[उत्पत्तिर्वा विनाशो द्रव्यस्य य नास्त्यस्ति सङ्भावः ।

विगमोत्पादध्रुवत्वं कुर्वन्ति तस्यैव पञ्चायाः ॥११॥]

11. Dravya in its reality can neither be created nor destroyed, it has only permanent substantiality But through its modes, it secures the triple qualities of permanence, appearance and disappearance

COMMENTARY—According to Dravyārthika Naya, Dravya, e g , gold can neither be created nor destroyed It exists and that is all But the ornaments and other things made of gold are the Paryāyas or modes These may change, one ornament may be melted and a new one be made The disappearance of the previous ornament is Vyaya and the appearance of the new ornament is Utpāda, and yet all the while there is the same gold Dhruva Dravya then has both the qualities, permanence and change, it is permanent as Dravya and changing as Paryāya

12.

Then it is pointed out that there is no fundamental difference between Dravya and Paryāya, substance and its mode

पञ्जयविजुदं दृक् दृक्विजुता य पञ्जया णत्थि ।

दोण्ह अणणभूवं भावं समणा परूवेति ॥१२॥

[पर्ययवियुत द्रव्य द्रव्यवियुक्ताश्च पर्याया न सन्ति ।

द्वयोरनन्यभूत भाव असणा. प्ररूपयन्ति ॥१२॥]

12 There is neither substance without mode nor mode without substance The one cannot be without the other, so say the Śramanas

COMMENTARY—Though there is a difference between substance and its mode from the points of significance, quality and utility, yet the one cannot exist apart from the other as the difference is not fundamental For example, an ornament which is the Paryāya of gold is different from gold in Samjñā or significance, in Laksana or attribute, and in Prayojana or utility But still there can be no ornament apart from gold and gold apart from some form or mode of it The relation between Dravya and Paryāya is the same as the relation between matter and form No matter without form and no form without matter

13

Next he establishes the identity of substance and qualities

दृक्वेण विणा ण गुणा गुणेहिं दृक्वं विणा ण संभवदि ।

अद्वदिरित्तो भावो दृक्वगुणाण हवदि तम्हा ॥१३॥

[द्रव्येण विना न गुणा गुणैर्द्रव्यं विना न सम्भवति ।

अव्यतिरिक्तो भावो द्रव्यगुणानां भवति तस्मात् ॥१३॥]

13 There is neither quality without substance nor substance without quality, hence

these two are not incompatible in their nature

COMMENTARY—Though the quality and the qualified are different in appellation, they are not really different in nature, as both refer to the same real fact

14

Then he describes the Pramāna Sapta | bhaṅgi the seven forms of Predication about Reality

सिय अत्थि णत्थि उहयं अद्वत्तत्वं पुणो य तत्तिदयं ।

द्वत्वं खलु सत्तभंगं आदेसवसेण सभवदि ॥१४॥

[स्यादस्ति नास्त्युभयमवतव्य पुनश्च तस्मिन् ।

द्रव्यं खलु सप्तभङ्गमादेशवशेन सभवति ॥१४॥]

14 According as Dravya is viewed from different aspects of reasoning it may be described by the following propositions --1) Perhaps it is , 2) Perhaps it is not , 3) Perhaps it is both (is and is not) , 4) Perhaps it is indefinable , 5) Perhaps it is and is indefinable , and 6) Perhaps it is not and is indefinable , and 7) Perhaps it is and is not and is indefinable

COMMENTARY—Sapta-bhaṅgi or the seven-aspected logical predication is an important doctrine of Jaina logic. The same object may be described by seven distinct propositions. These are the seven possible ways of a *priori* description. We cannot have another proposition about an object which cannot be brought under any one of the seven propositions. The complex nature of a real object or Dravya is amenable to description by the above seven and only seven propositions. To have a complete description then, the thing must be taken in all the seven ways. In each case it is the same fact that is the subject of the propositions which are certainly diverse in nature. That only means that different and apparently conflicting ideas may be predicated of the same subject. This is possible only in Anekānta philosophy.

The different propositions are all beginning with the term *syāt* which means *perhaps*. The proposition aims, at the most, only at probable truth. Jaina logicians were evidently extremely cautious. With the consciousness of seven possible predications they would never assert anything categorically about anything. Absolute categorical assertion may be justified in Ekānta philosophy. But the Jaina thinker in his dread of such absolutist attitude never hesitated to emphasize his relativistic philosophy even at the cost of verbal redundancy.

The prefix *syāt* therefore saves the proposition from becoming an absolute assertion. The quality predicated is probably or perhaps true. The predication is accepted provisionally with the full recognition that the same may be denied and that other ideas may be affirmed of the subject.

1 The proposition *Syādaṣṭi Dravya* means that existence is affirmed of a thing

from the point of view of its own *dravya* or essence. Essential characteristic may be safely affirmed of a thing. The affirmation has meaning with reference to its own *kṣetra* or place, *i e*, you can say that "a thing is" when you refer to its place of existence. Similarly the proposition is significant with reference to its own *kāla*. You can affirm the existence of a being during its life-time. Again affirmation is significant if reference is to its *bhāva* or quality. The quality of a thing can be safely predicated of the thing. Hence the proposition *Syādaṣṭi Dravya* is an affirmation about the *Dravya* with reference to its own *Dravya*, (substance), *Kṣetra* (place), *Kāla* (time) and *Bhāva* (quality).

2 *Syānnāṣṭi Dravya* (perhaps the thing is not). This proposition is a negation about a thing from the point of view of *para-dravya* (alien substance), *para-kṣetra* (alien place), *para-kāla* (alien time) and *para-bhāva* (alien quality), *i e*, you can have a negative proposition of a thing in the following manner —

- 1 X is not Y (Para-Dravya)
- 2 X is not in Y (Para-Kṣetra)
- 3 X is not now (Para-Kāla) *i e*, it ceased to exist or it is not yet born
- 4 X has not the quality Y, *i e*, (Para-Bhāva)

3 *Syādaṣṭi Dravya* (perhaps the thing is and is not). Both the conflicting predicates may be applied to the same subject, provided the following condition is satisfied. The affirmed predicate must refer to *sva-dravya* (its own substance), *sva-kṣetra* (its own place), *sva-kāla* (its own time) and *sva-bhāva* (its own quality.) And the predicate denied must refer to *para-dravya* (other substance), *para-kṣetra* (other place), *para-kāla* (other time) and *para-bhāva* (other quality).

4 *Syādavaktavyam Dravya* (perhaps the thing is beyond description). There is no word which would bring out the implication of both the affirmation and negation of a thing at the same time. *Avaktavya* should not be interpreted to be absolutely indescribable for then *avaktavya* itself would become meaningless. It only refers to the impossibility of finding an idea which would include both the thesis and the antithesis at the same time.

5 *Syādaṣṭi-avaktavya* (perhaps the thing is and is beyond description). When reference is made to *sva-dravya*, *sva-kṣetra* etc., the thing exists and hence the affirmation, and when reference is made at the same time to *sva-para-dravyas*, *sva-para-kṣetra* etc., the thing becomes beyond description and when attention is directed to both the above-mentioned aspects, affirmation and indefinability will be the fifth *bhāṅga*, namely — perhaps a thing is and is beyond description.

6 *Syānnāṣṭi-avaktavya* (perhaps a thing is not and is indefinable). Here the first reference is negation from the point of *para-dravya*, *para-kṣetra*, etc. Secondly, the reference is to the indescribability and when both these characteristics, denial and indefinability are associated with the thing at the same time then the proposition "perhaps that it is not and is beyond description" becomes significant.

7 *Syād-aṣṭi-nāṣṭi-avaktavya Dravya* (perhaps the thing is, is not and is indefinable).

Affirmation is with reference to *sva-dravya* etc Negation is with reference to *para-dravya* Indefinability when these two are taken at the same time When all the three above characteristics are attended to together then the thing may be said to exist, and yet not to exist, and to be beyond description

The seven principles are divided in the following manner

1 *Pratyeka Bhangas* (single principles)

- (a) Syādasti
- (b) Syānnasti
- (c) Syādavaktavya

2 *Dvīsamyaoga Bhangas* (dual principle)

- (a) Syādestināsti
- (b) Syādasti-avaktavya
- (c) Syānnāsti-avaktavya

3 *Trīsamyaoga Bhangas* (triple principle)

- (a) Syādasti-nāsti-avaktavya

It is already mentioned that the Jainas accept only seven principles Hence the following statement of Kumārila Bhatta is condemned to be absurd

सप्तभङ्गीप्रसादेन शतभङ्ग्यपि जायते ।

“When seven principles are admitted then there may also be hundred ” Jainas believe that the true nature of reality will be understood when it is viewed according to Sapta-Bhanga

15

There can be neither destruction of existing Dravyas nor creation of non-existing ones Concepts of creation and destruction are applicable to substance only because of its qualities and modes In this Gāthā, Dravya is shown to be permanent from Dravyārthika Naya and changing from Paryāyārthika Naya

भावस्स णत्थि नासो णत्थि अभावस्स चेव उप्पादो ।

गुणपज्जयेसु भावा उप्पादवए पकुवन्ति ॥१५॥

[भावस्य नास्ति नासो नास्ति अभावस्य चेव उत्पादः ।

गुणपर्यायेषु भावा उत्पादव्ययान् प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥१५॥]

15 There can be no destruction of things that do exist, nor can there be creation of things out of nothing Coming into existence and ceasing to exist, things do have because of their attributes and modes

COMMENTARY—For example, the atoms of gold that constitute the substance gold are subject to neither creation nor destruction But there may be appearance and disappearance in the different forms and modifications of gold, the original form may be lost, and a new form may be assumed One ornament may be destroyed and another

created What is true of inorganic things is also true of other Dravyas such as Jīva Jīva as such is neither created nor can be destroyed Its essence is eternal, but it may lose its original state of existence and come into a new state of life Life then is continuity of existence through births and deaths Thus Dravya as such is permanent and unchanging But its forms and modes are perpetually changing Hence Dravya may be described by both the attributes permanent and changing according to the respective aspects or Naya

16

Then Dravyas are further distinguished from their qualities and modes

भावा जीवादीया जीवगुणा चेदेषा य उवओगो ।

सुरणरणारयतिरिया जीवस्स य पज्जया बहुगा ॥१६॥

[भावा जीवाद्या जीवगुणाश्चेतना चोपयोग ।

सुरनरनारकतिर्येच्चो जीवस्य च पर्याया बहव ॥१६॥]

16 Jīva and other Dravyas are reals The qualities of Jīva are consciousness and *upayoga*, (perception and knowledge), which are manifold The soul manifests in the following forms as Deva, as man, as a member of the Hell or as a plant or an animal

COMMENTARY—The term *Upayoga* is used to denote Darśana and Jñāna Darśana is perception and Jñāna is knowledge Besides *upayoga* there is the quality of consciousness or thought or *cetanā* Cetanā and *Upayoga* constitute the main qualities of Jīva But according to Jaina thought, Jīva may be pure and perfect or impure and imperfect—Śuddha Jīva and Karma Jīva Karma Jīva is not a distinct kind It is the same Śuddha Jīva soiled by the Karma

Cetanā or thought when associated with Śuddha Jīva would mean perfect thought to which there can be nothing opaque *Upayoga* also will be Śuddha Jñāna—perfect perception and perfect knowledge The whole of reality forms an object of perception to Śuddha Darśana and at the same time the whole reality is known to Śuddha Jñāna Śuddha Cetanā and Śuddha *Upayoga*, consciousness, perfection, and understanding all perfect and pure, constitute the Svabhāva Guṇa—the intrinsic qualities of Jīva These Svabhāva Guṇas are potentially present in all Jīvas and explicitly manifest in Siddha Jīva or the Realised Self

They very same Svabhāva-Guṇas get corrupt because of the interference of Karma Then they become Vibhāva Guṇas of Jīva or the extrinsic qualities of Jīva Cetanā and *Upayoga* become Aśuddha The imperfect and the impure consciousness of man and other Samsāra states of Jīva is Aśuddha Cetanā It is the Vibhāva Guṇa which must be got rid off before the self attains purity and regains its intrinsic Śuddha Cetanā Similarly Śuddha Darśana and Śuddha Jñāna become Aśuddha in Samsāri Jīvas Sense, perception or Indriya Darśana and knowing or Aśuddha Jñāna are the forms of *Upayoga*

which is corrupt This again is the Vibhāva Jñāna of Jīva The Vibhāva Guṇas accordingly are present in all Samsārī Jīvas, whereas the Svabhāva Guṇas are in the germ

In a similar way Jīva has two main Paryāyas, Svabhāva or Śuddha Paryāya, Vibhāva or Aśuddha Paryāya The Siddha state, the state of purity and perfection, is the Svabhāva Paryāya, whereas all Samsāra states are Vibhāva Paryāyas

The distinction between qualities and modifications or states of existence may also be illustrated with reference to other Dravyas

17

Next it is pointed out again that though things have origin and decay from the point of forms or modes, they have no change in essence

मणुसत्तणेण णट्ठो देही देवो हवेदि इवरो वा ।

उभयत्थ जीवभावो ण णस्सदि ण जायदे अण्णो ॥१७॥

[मनुष्यत्वेन नष्टो देही देवो भवतीतरो वा ।

उभयत्र जीवभावो न नश्यति न जायतेऽन्य ॥१७॥]

17 If a soul departs from the human state it becomes either a Deva or some other living being In either case (during death or birth), it does not lose its intrinsic nature

COMMENTARY—When the original form is lost, the soul does not lose its own nature with the passing form and when it puts on a new form it does not get a new nature with its coming form In spite of origin and decay of forms the soul maintains its nature and identity

This view of soul rejects the two false views, Ksanika Ekānta and Nitya Ekānta. The former maintains that there is a different self at every moment as the Buddhist believes The Jaina view rejects this as untenable because it recognises the change with Paryāya or Guna and not with Dravya Nitya Ekānta view maintains that the self is absolutely permanent and unchanging, and that all changes are illusory This view also is rejected by the Jainas For them Jīva maintains its identity through the changes of Guna and Paryāya

18

The same fact is again explained from the point of Nayas or principles of understanding

सो चेव जादि मरण जादि ण णट्ठो ण चेव उत्पण्णो ।

- उत्पण्णो य विणट्ठो देवो मणुसो त्ति पज्जाओ ॥१८॥

[स एव याति मरणं याति न नष्टो न चंबोत्पन्न ।

उत्पन्नश्च विनष्टो देवो मनुष्य इति पर्यायः ॥१८॥]

18 Though the soul experiences both birth and death, yet it is neither really destroyed nor created. Origin and decay refer respectively to the disappearing Deva state or the appearing human state and these are only its Paryāyas or modes.

COMMENTARY—From the Dravyārthika principle there is neither birth nor death for the Jiva has an indestructible essence which cannot be annihilated even by the hand of Time. Origin and decay are applied to Jiva only from the point of Paryāyārthika Naya.

19

Then the different states of existence and their time limits are described

एवं सदो विनासो असदो जीवस्स णत्थि उप्पादो ।
तावदिओ जीवाण देवो मणुसो त्ति गदिणामो ॥१६॥

[एव सतो विनाशोऽसतो जीवस्य नास्त्युत्पादः ।
तावज्जीवानां देवो मनुष्य इति गतिनाम ॥१६॥]

19 Thus neither an existing thing is liable to death or destruction, nor a non-existing one can come into being. The Jiva has the Deva state or human state as the effect of the Gatīnāma-karma and the duration of each state is conditioned by its own Nāma-karma.

COMMENTARY—The Ātmā in itself has neither beginning nor end, and yet it will take infinite forms. Each form of existence will be of a particular Gatī. Gatī is a general class of beings. Four such classes are recognised by the Jainas, Manuṣya, Deva, Nāraka, and Tiryak Gatīs. The birth of Ātmā into any one of these forms is entirely conditioned by a particular kind of Karma. This Karma which leads the soul to take forms according to the different Gatīs is called Gatīnāma-karma. The form and the duration of life are dependent upon the quality and the strength of this Nāma-karma.

When the particular Nāma-karma exhausts its efficiency, the particular form of life brought about by that Karma ceases to exist, and the soul puts on another form, that is, enters into another Gatī, as determined by the new Nāma-karma acquired during the previous life. Thus Ātmā is like an actor who takes several parts on the stage. Forms are put off and put on while the actor is one and the same. Through all the changing forms the soul maintains its identity and nature for which there is neither birth nor death. And finally when the Ātmā gets liberated from the Karmas it still maintains its everlasting nature, of course, pure and perfect.

20

It is pointed out that the soul which by liberation from Karma attains Mokṣa is not absolutely distinct from the soul which was in Samsāra.

For a gem purified is not fundamentally different from its own state before purifi-

cation The gem is the same though free from dirt

ज्ञानावरणाद्या भावा जीवेण सुदृढं अणुबद्धा ।

तेसिमभाव किञ्चा अभूत्पुण्यो हवदि सिद्धो ॥२०॥

[ज्ञानावरणाद्या भावा जीवेन सुदृढं अणुबद्धा ।

तेषामभावं कृत्वाभूतपूर्वो भवति सिद्ध ॥२०॥]

20 Jiva on account of his Bhāva Karma or an impure emotional state may get utterly bound by the Karmas such as Jñānāvaraniya (the knowledge-clouding Karma) (Then he becomes a Samsāri Jiva) But he may (through the realisation of his own nature) completely liberate himself from that bondage and then attains a state unknown to him before the state of perfection

COMMENTARY—Though gold, may be different from brass, yet it is mixed with it In the same way Jiva pure in itself gets bound by Karmas The initial condition is its own impure heart called Bhāva Karma On account of this psychological state, the Dravya Karmas, or the different kinds of Karmic matter, are attracted and get deposited on the Jiva, thereby shrouding its light and glory

When the Jiva is so bound by Karmas it undergoes a series of manifestations But finally by realising its true nature it may liberate itself from Karmic shackles and get Nirvāna When once this stage is reached there is no fear of coming back to Samsāra. Jainas do not assume the doctrine of the *fall of man* Every Jiva to begin with is a Karma-Jiva and Nirvāna is a unique state to be acquired anew and for the first time. The state of nature is not a state of freedom It is a state of bondage Jiva finds itself in chains, and by its own exertion secures freedom

21

Then it is stated that the Ātmā with the manifestation of Guna and Paryāya (attributes and modes) will lose its existing nature and assume a new state of existence according to the Paryāyārthika Naya

एव भावमभाव भावाभाव अभावभाव च ।

गुणपञ्जयेहि सहिदो ससरमाणो कुणदि जीवो ॥२१॥

[एव भावमभाव भावाभावमभावभाव च ।

गुणपर्ययं सहित ससरन् करोति जीवः ॥२१॥]

21 Thus the Jiva with its attributes and modes, roaming in Samsāra, may lose its particular form and assume a new one Again this form may be lost and the original regained

COMMENTARY—Dravya or substance has the quality of identity and difference It is permanent while changing Jiva Dravya is capable of taking different forms or Paryāyas,

This process of Paryāyic change is Samsāra. In the series of Samsāra with reference to a particular Jīva there is the passing away of old forms and the coming in of new ones. These changes of forms do not pre-suppose the loss of identity of the Jīva. The very same Jīva as an individual survives after each change thus maintaining its self identity. Samsāra for the Jaina is not the manifestation of a single self as the Vedāntin would have it. Infinite number of Jīvas each having its own Paryāyas constitute the total of Samsāra. At any particular moment the simultaneous and co existing forms of different Jīvas will make up the Samsāra of that moment which means the organic world, the mankind and the Devas and the Nārakas and animals and plants of that moment.

22

After describing the Dravyas in general by way of introduction the author is going to speak about Kāla or time which is indispensably related to the five Astikāyas. Before going to the description of time, the author re-capitulates the five existences or Astikāyas in relation to which only time has relevancy and meaning.

जीवा पुद्गलकाया आयास अत्यिकाइया सेसा ।

अमया अत्यित्तमया कारणभूदा हि लोगस्स ॥२२॥

[जीवा पुद्गलकाया आकाशमस्तिकायो शेषौ ।

अमया अस्तित्वमया कारणभूता हि लोकस्य ॥२२॥]

22 The souls, the material bodies, space, together with the remaining two, Dharma and Adharma, are the uncreated existences that constitute the world. These are the Astikāyas.

COMMENTARY—The infinite number of souls, the infinite number of physical bodies, space and the two physical principles of (Dharma and Adharma) of motion and rest — these are the constitutive elements of the world. These are uncreated and eternal. Jainas recognise the reality of space. To complete the world they also pre-suppose the two principles of motion and rest called by them Dharma and Adharma.

23

Then Time is described. It is the instrument of change in the above five Astikāyas. This is real Time or absolute Time. From these changes we have the perception of duration and intervals which corresponds to relative or Vyavahārika Time. Real Time is also a matter of inference from the changes in the above Astikāyas.

सम्भावसम्भावाणं जीवाणं तह य पोगलानं च ।

परियट्ठणसम्भूदो कालो नियमेण पण्णत्तो ॥२३॥

[सम्भावस्वभावानां जीवानां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।

परिवर्तनसम्भूत कालो नियमेन प्रज्ञप्तः ॥२३॥]

23 That on account of which these existences, the Jivas, material bodies, the Dharma and Adharma undergo changes is called real time or Kāla-Dravya

COMMENTARY—Time is of two kinds, real and relative Birth, growth and decay of things are possible only because of the former absolute time The relative Time is made up of conventional periods measured by unit based upon those changes This is merely an aspect of real time which is constituted by Instants This is unconditional and absolute

First of all the distinction between absolute and relative time reminds one of Newton's distinction The idealist for whom the world of concrete experience is illusory may speak of time as a form of experience But one who accepts the reality of the concrete world and its changes, must also admit the reality of Time Jainas being realists do recognise the reality of time If change is real, again, Time must also be real It is the instrument of creative evolution as Bergson would say And lastly the absolute or real time is constituted by instants which correspond to the points of space and particles of matter In fact, these three classes of elements, points, instants, and particles have important function in the Jaina System of Philosophy It is also worth noticing that modern realist led by the Mathematical Philosophers admits the doctrine that space is real and is made up of points Time is real and is made up of Instants or moments, and the physical world is real and is made of particles And these doctrines form the fundamental concepts of the Jaina view of the world

24

Next the account of real time of which the conventional time is a form or mode.

ववगदपणवणरसो ववगददोगधअट्टफासो य ।

अगुरुलहुगो अमुत्तो वट्टणलक्खो य कालो त्ति ॥२४॥

[व्यपगतपञ्चवर्णरसो व्यपगतद्विगन्धाष्टस्पर्शश्च ।

अगुरुलघुकोऽमूर्तो वर्तमानभणश्च काल इति ॥२४॥]

24 What is without the five colours, and the five tastes, without the two smells, and eight contacts, what is neither heavy nor light and has the character of introducing changes in other things is time

COMMENTARY—Time has meaning for and existence in the world It is made up of Instants or *kālānus* The Instants have neither colour, taste, nor touch The qualities associated with physical objects cannot be applied to it These constitute a 'continuous compact series' The time series formed by Instants is one dimensional in the language of the Mathematicians, that is why Time is denied *Kāyatva* by the Jaina Philosopher Time which is so constituted by Instants is called *Mukhyakāla* or absolute time It is also described by the following terms—*Paramārthakāla*, the great unconditioned time, *Niscayakāla*, true time, *Dravyakāla*, real time It is one of the six *Dravyas* or the *Realis*

25

Then the account of relative Time which is measured by changes in the physical object or in the Jivas This conventional Time is merely a Paryāya of real time and is conditioned by the above changes

समओ णिमिसो कट्ठा कला य णाली तदो दिवारत्तो ।

मासोदुअयणसवच्छरो त्ति कालो परायत्तो ॥२५॥

[समयो निमिषः काष्ठा कला च नाली ततो दिवारात्रम् ।

मासर्बयनसवत्सरमिति कालः परायत्तः ॥२५॥]

25 Samaya, Nimisa, Kāṣṭha, Kalā, Nālī, then (Muhūrta), day, month, season, Ayana, and, Samvatsara and other periods of Time are all Vyavahāra or conventional time These are determined by other objects

Samaya or moment (which is the manifestation of infinite number of ultimate distants)

Nimisa which is made up of innumerable such moments

Kāṣṭha which is equal to fifteen *Nimisas*

Kalā which is equal to thirty *Kāṣṭhas*

Nālī which is a little over twenty *Kalās*

Muhūrta which is equal to two *Nālīs*

Day and Night, equal to thirty *Muhūrtas*

Month which is equal to thirty days

Season which is equal to two months

Ayana Half year equal to three seasons

Samvatsara year which is equal to two *Ayanas*

COMMENTARY—The different periods enumerated in this Gāthā are the conventional periods measured by different units These are artificial distinctions introduced into the continuous time series of real time The units which determine the conventional distinctions are generally the changes in the objects of the physical world or of the organic world Winking of the eyelid, the diurnal motion of the sun across the heavens (which is only apparent according to modern Astronomy) and the motion of the moon round the earth are some of the important changes of physical objects which have been traditionally associated with conventional period of measurements Because of these conventional distinctions, relative Time is said to be *parāyatta* 'dependent on other things,' but still it is merely a form of real time which is an unconditioned *Dravya* Vyavahāra *Kāla* is said to be conditioned in a way It is called *kathancit parāyatta*, somewhat conditioned.

26

Then is explained what is meant by somewhat conditioned in the case of relative Time

नत्थि चिरं वा खिप्प मत्तारहिदं तु सा वि खलु मत्ता ।

पोगलदब्बेण विणा तम्हा कालो पडुच्चभवो ॥२६॥

[नास्ति चिरं वा क्षिप्रं मात्रारहितं तु सापि खलु मात्रा ।

पुद्गलद्वयेण विना तस्मात् कालः प्रतीत्यस्य ॥२६॥]

26. Duration of time either long or short is impossible apart from a standard of measurement. The standard of measurement also has no meaning apart from material objects. Hence conventional or relative time is brought about by extraneous conditions.

COMMENTARY—Vyavahāra Kāla or conventional time consists of periods of duration which may be either short or long. This distinction of length of periods is not intrinsic. It is entirely due to external conditions such as the moments of the physical bodies. Therefore though time as such is unconditioned Vyavahāra-kāla is certainly conditioned by alien objects. Thus Time as such is the instrument of change or Paripāma in the five existences of the world, while itself has the Vyāvahārika Paryāyas measured by the changes of the other objects.

Here ends the Introductory Chapter of the Pañcāstikāya Prābharta

CHAPTER I

27

After describing the Dravyas in general the author examines them in detail. He takes up Jiva Dravya first, for that is the most important.

जीवो ति हवदि चेदा उवओगविसेसिदो प्ह कत्ता ।

भोत्ता य वेहमत्तो ण हि मुत्तो कम्मसंजुत्तो ॥२७॥

[जीव इति भवति चेतयितोपयोगविशेषितः प्रभुः कर्ता ।

भोक्ता च वेहमात्रो न हि मूर्तः कर्मसंयुक्तः ॥२७॥]

27. The soul has the following attributes. It has Life, Consciousness, Upayoga, (knowledge and perception) and is Potent, performs actions, and is affected by their results, is conditioned by his own body, is incorporeal and is ordinarily found with Karma.

COMMENTARY—The author enumerates nine attributes. These attributes are true not only of Sopādhī Jivas, but also of Nirupādhī Jivas. The enumerated attributes refer to Sopādhī Jiva—the Jiva that has Upādhī or limitations. Of course the author implies also

the correlative nine attributes of the Nirupādhi Jiva or the liberated soul

The attributes relating to Sopādhi Jiva are —

1) *Life, i.e.*, living with Daśa-prānas or ten life principles
 2) *Cetanā* or consciousness, *i.e.*, the ordinary finite consciousness which is associated with will and emotion, *viz.*, acting and enjoying

3) *Upayoga* Upayoga is the manifestation of *Cetanā* in the act of understanding. *Jñāna* and *Darsana* are the two Upayogas, Knowledge and Perception. These two modes of the understanding are intimately related to Karmic changes. The relation may be said to be in inverse *ratio*. They decrease in intensity and quality as the Karmic veil becomes thicker and stronger. If the Karmas decay or disappear then the Upayogas have the chance of fuller manifestation.

4) *Lordship* or the capacity to assume different states of existence in *Samsāra*. He is the architect of his own life.

5) *Kartā* He is the doer of his own Karmas—both *Dravya* and *Bhāva* (Physical and mental Karmas).

6) *Bhoktā* He is the enjoyer of the fruits of his own Karmas.

7) *Dehamātra* Being embodied he may be said to be of the same dimensions as the body.

8) *Amūrta* is incorporeal, being spiritual by nature.

9) *Karma-samyuktah* is born with Karmas, being a *Samsārī* Jiva.

Similarly we have the nine corresponding attributes of the Nirupādhi Jiva or the liberated soul —

1) Living the life of pure and perfect existence.

2) Having the consciousness which is infinite in contentment.

3) *Śuddha Upayoga* He has the pure modes of *Kevala Jñāna* and *Kevala Darsana*, perfect knowledge and perfect perception.

4) *Lord* He is the true Lord because of the freedom acquired by annihilation of Karmas.

5) *He is the true Kartā* or Doer, being independent of and undetermined by extraneous conditions, Self-determined.

6) *Is the enjoyer* of the eternal and infinite bliss begotten of the complete realisation of self.

7) *Is the approximate size* of the body possessed by him last.

8) *And yet is without form*, being spiritual and being free from all Karmas or physical qualities.

9) *And is Karma-nirmukta* is absolutely free from the bondage of Karma.

Thus the author in a single *gāthā* describes the two kinds of Jivas, each with the nine qualities.

28

कम्ममलविप्पमुक्को उद्धं लोगस्स अंतमधिगंता ।
 सो सव्वणाणदरसी लहदि सुहमणिदियमणत्त ॥२८॥
 [कर्ममलविप्रमुक्त ऊर्ध्वं लोकस्यान्तमधिगम्य ।
 स सर्वज्ञानदर्शी लभते सुखमनिन्द्रियमनन्तम् ॥२८॥]

28 Ātmā which is free from the defect of Karma gets to the highest point of the universe, knows all and perceives all, and obtains the transcendental bliss everlasting

COMMENTARY—Of the nine attributes the attribute of lordship is taken first for explanation It is known by experience and by the study of scriptures that Soul is the lord of his own attributes and states of existence Impurity of the heart or false faith may lead him into Samsāra The Lordship should not therefore be interpreted only with the reference to the fall from a high estate Even when he is in the right path, the path that takes him to the never-before-experienced bliss, everlasting, he is the Lord of his own destiny He is not to be imagined merely as a drift wood carried up and down by the waves in the Ocean of Samsāra That would make him helpless in the hands of extrinsic Karmic forces No He is the Creator, the Karmas themselves owe their existence to his will Hence he is his own Lord whether he walks the path of righteousness or chooses the other one Ātmā is his own maker and Lord

Jaina philosophy is peculiarly associated with its own cosmogony Heavens and hells are arranged in an order The soul that gets liberation quits the place, rises up to the summit of Loka where he retains his abode This Dogma is referred to in the Gāthā As the natural and inevitable result of self-realisation the true Lordship of the soul consists in inheriting the abode of bliss at the summit of the world

29

Then it is mentioned that this everlasting heavenly bliss is secured by Ātmā by his own efforts without any extraneous help

जादो सय स चेदा सवण्ह सव्वलोगदरसी य ।
 पप्पोदि सुहमणत्त अब्बाबाध सगममुत्त ॥२९॥
 [जात स्वय स चेतयिता सर्वज्ञ सर्वलोकदर्शी य ।
 प्राप्नोति सुखमनन्तमव्याबाध स्वकमसूतम् ॥२९॥]

29. Thus Ātmā becoming omniscient and all perceiving through its own effort obtains the infinite bliss which transcends sense experience which is free from any imperfection, which is spiritual and self-determined

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā goes with the previous one and states that infinite bliss is

an acquisition of the self through its own exertions This brings out the quality of Prabhutva or lordship, over one's own destiny

30

After the description of the attribute Prabhutva we have an account of Jivatva or Life characteristic Here the author adopts the Vyāvahārika point of view and describes the characteristics of organic beings in Samsāra

पार्णेहं चतुर्हि जीवदि जीवस्सदि जो हु जीवदो पुव्वं ।

सो जीवो पाणा पुण बलमिदियमाउ उस्सासो ॥३०॥

[पार्णश्चतुर्भिर्जीवति जीवष्यति य खलु जीवति पूर्वम् ।

स जीव प्राणाः पुनर्बलमिन्द्रियमायुरुच्छ्वास ॥३०॥]

30 Whatever thing manifesting through four Prānas (or principles of organism) is living at present, will continue to live in the future, and was living in the past, that same is Jiva Again the Prānas are Bala, or strength, Indriya or the senses, Āyuh, or the age and Ucchvāsa or respiration

A living organism must have these four Prānas or life principles You cannot think of a living being devoid of these characteristics Hence the author trying to describe the nature of life as we know it, enumerates the four fundamental characteristics of organic life These are —

- 1 Balaprāna or strength which consists of
 - (a) Manobala or strength of mind
 - (b) Vāgbala or strength of speech
 - (c) Kāyabala or strength of body
- 2 Indriya-prānas are the senses
 - (a) Sparsa or contact sense through skin
 - (b) Rasa or taste through tongue
 - (c) Ghrāna or smell through nose
 - (d) Śabda or sound through ears
 - (e) Caksu or vision through eyes

Thus the Indriyas are five
- 3 Āyuh Prāna which is the duration or age of life and it is one
- 4 Ucchvāsa or respiration is one

Thus the four Prānas become ten Prāṇas when details are taken into consideration These Prāṇas need not all of them with all the details be present together in an organism, i.e., there may be an organism which has not all the five Indriyas But there must be the four main characteristics These Prānas are generated by the respective Karmas. The number and quality of the Prāṇas will be determined by the Karmic differences These are considered to be the characteristics of soul, only from Vyāvahārika point The

particular Vyavahāra point adopted here is called by the Jaina Philosopher, *anupacarita-asadbhūta-vyavahāranaya* i.e., non-conventional and relative aspect of attending to the unessential nature of a thing, i.e., these characteristics do not belong to Ātmā according to the principle of absolute reality or Śuddha Nisṣayanaya

31-32.

Next he enumerates the general and special characteristics of Jiva, the characteristics both manifested and unmanifested

अगुरुलघुगा अणता तेहि अणतेहि परिणदा सव्वे ।
 वेसेहि असखावा सियलोगं सव्वमावण्णा ॥३१॥
 केचित्तु अणावण्णा मिच्छादसणकसायजोगजुदा ।
 विजुदा य तेहि बहुगा सिद्धा संसारिणो जीवा ॥३२॥
 [अगुरुलघुका अनन्तास्तेरनन्ते परिणता. सब्बे ।
 देशोरसख्याता स्याल्लोक सर्वमापन्ना ॥३१॥]
 [केचित्तु अनापन्ना मिथ्यादर्शनकषाययोगयुता ।
 वियुताश्च तैर्बहव. सिद्धा संसारिणो जीवा ॥३२॥]

31-32 The spiritual qualities of Jiva are infinite Jivas assume different forms through the manifestation of these infinite attributes Taking the point of world-space some souls through their complete manifestation may fill the whole world Others are not so fully manifested These are filled with false faith-blinding emotions, erroneous knowledge and perception The former class of souls are free from these defects and are called the perfect ones And the latter are the Samsāri, Jivas or the imperfect ones Each class contains infinite number of individuals

COMMENTARY—That spiritual principle on account of which the Jiva Dravyas continue to manifest through all their different forms is called Agurulaghutva-guṇa On account of the explicit manifestations of these attributes Jivas have the chance of becoming complete and perfect The number of Jivas is infinite They have their abode only in the Lokākāśa A soul developed to perfection is called Siddha That stage represents absolute freedom from Karmas The other class consists of Samsāri Jivas According to Jainas each class contains infinite number of individuals

If we employ the terminology of modern philosophy we have to characterise the system as pluralistic The souls are not only different and distinct in their Samsāric state but also in the perfect state A soul may become perfect, may acquire by self-manifestation infinite number of qualities and still it preserves its own individuality Individuality and perfection are not incompatible Hence according to the Jaina system realisation of Paramātmā does not mean absolute nullification of self-identity That means several Paramātmās or perfect souls may co-exist

This attitude of uncompromising pluralism is evidently due to the extraordinary emphasis laid on individual conduct by the Jaina system. Bhakti and Jñāna are inadequate either severally or jointly to lead the soul to Mokṣa. Cāritra or conduct is the indispensable third to constitute Mokṣamārga. If individuality is merely phenomenal appearance, moral value will also become purely relative. Ultimate reality may be complete without conserving moral value which becomes merely an unessential characteristic confined to the world of appearance. Any system that attaches great importance to moral value, that believes that reality would be incomplete without the conservation of values, cannot afford to play with individuality and must necessarily be pluralistic explicitly or implicitly.

33

Next he explains the characteristic that soul is of the same dimensions as its own body which is acquired through Karmas. He explains it by analogy.

जह पडमरायरयण खित्त खीरे पभासयदि खीर ।

तह देही देहत्थो सबेहेमेत्तं पभासयदि ॥३३॥

[यथा पद्मरागरत्न क्षित्त खीरे प्रभासयति खीरम् ।

तथा देही देहस्य सबेहेमात्रं प्रभासयति ॥३३॥]

33 Just as the lotus-hued ruby when placed in a cup of milk imparts its lustre to the milk, so Ātmā residing in its own body imports its lustre or intelligence to the whole body.

COMMENTARY—Ātmā is in itself non-spatial hence it is not accurate to ask “Where does it reside in its body?” It pervades through the whole body. If it is located in any particular part of the body, the parts away from its residence will have to be somehow related to consciousness. The Jaina system avoids the whole difficulty by considering the soul to be completely pervading in its own body. This pervading is not to be interpreted as a sort of physical expansion. It is merely spiritual manifestation still the relation of consciousness is intimate with its own body which is physical and spatial. Ātmā is considered to be a Kāya. But this Kāyatva would not make it physical. It is distinctly defined to be spiritual.

34.

This characteristic of co-extensiveness with the body is true in its present as well as its past and future states or forms. Then the author mentions the substantiality of the soul, its distinctness from the body and the reason of its different states of existence.

सखत्थ अत्थि जीवो ण य एक्को एक्ककाए एक्कट्ठो ।

अज्झवसाणविसिट्ठो चेद्वदि मलिणो रजमलेहि ॥३४॥

[सर्वत्रास्ति जीवो न चैक एकाकाये ऐक्यस्य ।

अभ्यवसानविशिष्टश्चेष्टते मलिनो रजोमलं ॥३४॥]

34 Jiva pervades the whole body Still he is not one with the body though when functioning, he is identical with it Impelled by gross emotions, stained by Karmas he puts on different forms in the cycle of Samsāra

COMMENTARY—The term *sarvatra* is again interpreted to mean all the different bodies taken up by a soul during different births Then the Gāthā will be interpreted slightly differently The very same soul exists in all its different bodies It is one with its body and yet distinct from them and so on Again *sarvatra* may mean in all parts of the world Then the interpretation will have to be as follows —

sarvathā In all parts of the world

atthi Jiva exists

There are Jivas everywhere, i.e., in all parts of the world

The Jivas *na ekko* are not identical as they are distinct entities *ekko* and yet they are one and identical, *ekkaṭṭho* as they are substantially similar to one another, etc, i.e., they are one, from the generic point of view but different from the specific point of view Though the Ātmā has continued to exist, and has an embodied existence from time immemorial, it is in its spiritual nature entirely distinct from its corporeal habitation It puts on a body because of Karmas and thus it roams in the world of Samsāra

35

Next, the characteristic of *amūrta* or incorporeality This quality is real absolutely in the case of a Siddha Jiva who is free from all taint of matter, karmic and non-karmic, whereas the other Jivas, though in themselves *amūrtas*, are ordinarily associated with Mūrta Dravyas or physical characteristics

जेति जीवसह्यावो णत्थि अभावो य सव्वहा तस्स ।

ते होति भिण्णदेहा सिद्धा वच्चिगोयरमदीदा ॥३५॥

[येषा जीवस्वभावा नस्त्यभावाश्च सर्वथा तस्य ।

ते भवन्ति भिन्नदेहा सिद्धा वागोचरमतीता. ॥३५॥]

35 Those Jivas which have not the life principles (Dravya Prānas or the sense organs) and yet are not altogether devoid of them (as the Bhāva Prānas are intact) are the ones that are free from corporeal limitation and they are the perfect ones beyond description.

COMMENTARY—The body is the limiting condition of Ātma Pradeśa or the dimension of Ātmā The size of the perfected soul is said to be little less than that of its last body for it is free from the *yoga*, the principle which brings about contraction and expansion or shrinking and diffusing It may be said to be merely an assemblage of pure

knowledge and other qualities of perfection

36

That Siddha state is shown to be neither the cause nor the effect of the Samsāra series. It being absolutely unconditioned cannot be an item of the conditioned series of causation

ण कुदोच्चि वि उप्पण्णो जम्हा कज्ज ण तेण सो सिद्धो ।
उप्पादेदि ण किच्चि वि कारणमवि तेण ण स होदि ॥३६॥
[न कुतश्चिदप्युत्पन्नो यस्मात् कार्यं न तेन स सिद्धः ।
उत्पादयति न किञ्चिदपि कारणमपि तेन न स भवति ॥३६॥]

36 The Siddha is not to be born again at any time in Samsāra Hence he is not to be an effect (he is not to be causally determined by anything else) Nor is he to bring about a change in anything else, therefore he is not a cause either

COMMENTARY—Siddha has secured the absolute Amūrta State, the state of perfect spirituality and is incapable of maintaining causal relation with the Samsāra series The latter is determined by Karmic conditions The former is not so conditioned The causal category which is true of the conditioned series is not to be applied to the unconditioned reality The argument is the same as that employed by Kant with the reference to the Thing in itself What is true of the experience need not necessarily be true of the *metaempirical* The Siddha state then is transcendental Self

37

Then he states that the soul maintains its intrinsic nature and is real even in its Siddha or perfect state Thus the Buddhistic view of Nirvāna as the annihilation of self is condemned and rejected

सस्सदमथ उच्छेद भवमभव च सुणमिदर च ।
विण्णाणमविण्णाणं ण वि जुज्जदि असदि सबभावे ॥३७॥
[साश्वतमयोच्छेदो भव्यमभव्य च शून्यमितरश्च ।
विज्ञानमविज्ञानं नापि युज्यते असति सद्भावे ॥३७॥]

37 That he is infinite in perfection and yet finite with reference to temporal life, that he is born into perfection and yet dead from Samsāra, that he is the negation of all extrinsic qualities and still the affirmation of his own intrinsic nature, that he has knowledge perfect and yet devoid of knowledge imperfect, these eight attributes will not be associated with him if 'Nirvāna' is interpreted nihilistically

COMMENTARY—As we said above, this Gāthā defends the Jaina view of Self against the nihilistic interpretation of the Buddhists Even in Siddha state the self does not lose

its '*sadbhāva*', substantial reality

It is only perfection of the already existing true nature which is in the germ in the finite self. Complete evolution is no annihilation. There must be more of its real nature and not less.

With this ends the Amūrta characteristic of Jiva

38

Next the characteristic of *cetanā*. The author notices the three forms of *cetanā* or consciousness

कम्माणं फलमेवको एवको कज्ज तु णाणमध एवको ।

चेदयदि जीवरासी चेदगभावेण त्रिविहेण ॥३८॥

[कर्मणां फलमेक एक कार्यं तु ज्ञानमथैक ।

चेतयति जीवराशिश्चेतकभावेन त्रिविधेन ॥३८॥]

38 One kind of Jiva experiences merely the fruits of Karma, pleasure-pain. Another experiences conative activity as well, still another has pure and perfect knowledge. Thus consciousness is manifested in three-fold awareness.

COMMENTARY—The first two states of experience are related to Samsāri Jiva, for they have reference to Karma, whereas the third has reference to pure *cetanā* Svabhāva, and hence is associated with the perfect one. The implicit recognition by the author of the three different aspects of consciousness feeling, activity, and knowledge, is worth noticing from the point of modern Psychology.

39.

Then he specifies the Jivas according to the three aspects of consciousness noticed above.

सव्वे खलु कम्मफल थावरकाया तसा हि कज्जजुद ।

पाणित्तमदिवक्कता णाण विदंति ते जीवा ॥३९॥

[सर्वे खलु कर्मफल स्थावरकायास्त्रसा हि कार्ययुतम् ।

प्राणित्वमतिक्रान्ता ज्ञान विद्वन्ति ते जीवा ॥३९॥]

39 Indeed all fixed organisms like plants experience merely feeling, but the moving ones, the animals have besides feeling, conative experience. Whereas those that transcend the organic conditions or Prānas experience pure knowledge.

COMMENTARY—Plants are fixed and incapable of movement, and can therefore only suffer the environmental changes. They can only feel the mechanical and climatic stimuli around. The moving organisms because of their movement are capable of experiencing their own activity. In their experience then there is besides feeling, the consciousness of

activity, whereas to experience pure thought, there must be complete absence of physical and organic conditions. Such a being is certainly the Mukta Jiva.

After the wonderful discoveries of Dr. Bose with reference to plant life, it is not necessary to defend the proposition that plants are capable of feeling. Western science, though it recognised the organic nature of plants, was very much reluctant to admit the correlative organic characteristic of feeling in plants. This is only another phase of the Cartesian prejudice with reference to plants and animals. Descartes was responsible for the view that animals were skilfully created automata or machines. Darwin gave a death blow to this philosophical superstition, and Bose did the same service to the plant world and thereby distinctly established the fundamental unity of the organic world, and this is the thesis presupposed in the above Gāthā.

Thus ends the discussion of Cetanā characteristic of Jiva.

40

Then the quality of Upayoga or the instrument of knowledge Jñāna and Darśana—understanding and perception.

उबओगो खलु दुविहो जाणेण य दसणेण संजुत्तो ।

जीवस्स सव्वकाल अणणभूद विद्याणीहि ॥४०॥

[उपयोग खलु द्विविधो ज्ञानेन, च दर्शनेन संयुक्त ।

जीवस्य सर्वकालमनन्यभूत विज्ञानीहि ॥४०॥]

40 Upayoga the instrument or means of knowledge is twofold—Jñāna or understanding and Darśana or perception. It is inseparable from and always present in Jiva. So do thou learn its nature.

COMMENTARY—One of the commentators says that this Gāthā is addressed to a disciple who is a Naiyāyika. Perception and understanding are essentially related to Jiva. There can be no Jiva which has not perception and understanding, similarly the faculties cannot exist apart from the self. This is the view of the author. He rejects the view that the faculties are adventitious and acquired.

41

Then the author describes the different species of Jñāna which is one of the Upayogas referred to in the previous Gāthā.

आभिणिमुदोधिमणकेवलानि जाणानि पञ्चभेद्यानि ।

कुमदिसुदविभगाणि य तिणिण वि जाणेहि सजुत्ते ॥४१॥

[आभिनिबोधिकभूतावधिमान पर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानानि पञ्चभेदाणि ।

कुमतिभूतविभङ्गानि च त्रीण्यपि ज्ञानं, संयुक्तानि ॥४१॥]

41 Ābhinibodha (knowledge obtained by congenital mental capacity), Śruta (knowledge obtained by study), Avadhī (a kind of clairvoyant knowledge of events in different places and in different times), Manah Paryāya (telepathic knowledge of another's mind), and Kevala Jñānā (the perfect knowledge) These are the five kinds of right Knowledge. But, when the first three are associated with the error or Ajñāna, they form three kinds of erroneous knowledge, Kumati, Kusruti, Vibhanga Avadhī, and are included in the forms of knowledge

COMMENTARY—Matī Jñāna refers to sense perception and the inferential knowledge based upon it. Śruta Jñāna is knowledge based upon testimony obtained mainly through books. Avadhī Jñāna is an abnormal faculty of perception, but the perception is not conditioned by sense organs. It is supposed to comprehend things and events of different places and of different times. The faculty is able to project itself either to the past or to the future. This form of awareness is quite analogous to sense perception. This in a way corresponds to the clairvoyant capacity possessed by certain "mediums." Manah Paryāya is the capacity of knowing the ideas in another's mind. This corresponds in a way to telepathy of modern psychology. This gives an insight into mental facts of persons at a limited distance—the distance limit being conditioned by the strength and the quality of the faculty. This should not be confounded with inferential knowledge obtained from facial expression. And lastly Kevala Jñāna is the perfect knowledge which is associated with the Siddha State. The first two are distinctly conditioned by sense perception, whereas the other three transcend sense limitations. The last is absolutely free from any kind of physical conditions, whereas the other four are still associated with corporeal existence. Avadhī and Manah Paryāya are the super-normal faculties acquired under peculiar psycho-physical conditions. The normal and super-normal cognitive faculties which correspond to the revelations of modern psychic research are not facts to be passed over without notice.

41*1

Then the five Jñānas are described in detail. First Matī Jñāna is taken

मदिणाण पुण तिबिहं उवलद्धी भावणं च उवओगो ।

तह चेव चतुवियप्पं दसनपुब्ब हववि णाण ॥४१*१॥

[मतिज्ञान पुनस्त्रिविध उपलब्धिर्भावना च उपयोगः ।

तथैव चतुर्विकल्प दर्शनपूर्वं भवति ज्ञानम् ॥]

41*1 Matijñāna is of three kinds—Upalabdhī or perception, Bhāvanā or memory, Upayoga or understanding. It is also said to be of four kinds. This Jñāna is always preceded by sense presentation or Darśana.

COMMENTARY—This Matijñāna is certainly consequent upon sense perception. It includes as the Śūtra says apprehension of the object, memory, and understanding, i.e.,

all that is given to us through sense perception and all that we elaborate out of these sense-elements in memory and imagination. Though it is mainly of three kinds it is also considered to be of four different forms. For example the author of *Tattvārthasūtra* speaks of *avagrahevāya-dhāranāh*. This four-fold division is not fundamentally different from the previous division. *Avagraha* implies the sense datum, e.g., Perceiving a thing to be white through the eyes is *Avagraha*. To attempt to determine what that white object is, is *ihā*. This *ihā* refers to the indecisive mental attitude where several alternative determinations are possible. Finally when the thing is determined, i.e., out of several alternatives when one is chosen because of certain special characteristics perceived in the white object then we have *avāya*. This implies the inferential element in all perception. This should not be confounded with mediate inference about other things through sense perception. The very same act of perception involves all these three stages. And lastly whenever we remember these things after sometimes it is called *dhāranā*. This *Matijñāna* consists of 336 forms when viewed according to different principles of Division.

41*2

Then *Śrutajñāna*, knowledge by testimony and not by acquaintance. The objects of this knowledge may be *Mūrta* and *Amūrta*, Physical and non-physical.

सुब्रह्मण पुण जाणी भणति लब्धी य भावणा चेव ।

उपयोगयवियत्पं जाणेण य वत्थु अत्थस्स ॥४१*२॥

[श्रुतज्ञान पुनर् ज्ञानिन भणन्ति लब्धिश्च भावना चैव ।

उपयोगयविकल्प ज्ञानेन च वस्तु अर्थस्य ॥]

41*2 The wise say that *Śruta Jñāna* is of four kinds—*Labdhi*, or association, *Bhāvanā* or attention, *Upayoga* or understanding of things and *Naya* or the aspects of their meaning.

COMMENTARY—Of these four forms of *Śrutajñāna* or knowledge by testimony, the first is *Labdhi*. This corresponds to association of ideas. *Labdhi* is defined to be the process of getting the meaning of one idea through its associated idea. *Bhāvanā* is the direction of attention to one idea with a view to get at the associated idea. *Upayoga* is the process of understanding the meaning of ideas consequent upon *Bhāvanā*. *Naya* is viewing the meaning from different relations. The first three are concerned with the psychic process of acquiring knowledge through the ideas contained in books. The last is the way of understanding things from different aspects. This *Naya* plays a very important part in Jain system of thought. This and the *Sapta Bhaṅgi* mentioned above are the two pillars of Jain Logic. The *Nayas* also are of seven different kinds. In order to distinguish the seven *Nayas* these are called *Naya Sapta Bhaṅgi* as contrasted with *Pramāṇa Sapta Bhaṅgi*. *Naya* is defined in *Naya-Vivaraṇa* thus

नीयते गम्यते येन श्रुताधीनः स नो नयः ।

That by which the various aspects of the meaning of the scripture are understood is for us the Naya or principle. This Naya or principle of interpretation is mainly of two kinds: 1. Dravyārthikanaya, that pertaining to Dravya or substance, 2. Paryāyārthika Naya, that pertaining to modifications. Again Dravyārthikanaya is further sub-divided into three kinds: 1. Naigama, 2. Samgraha, 3. Vyavahāra. The Paryāyārthika Naya is sub-divided into four kinds: 1. Rjusūtra, 2. Śabda, 3. Samabhirūḍha, 4. Evambhūta. These seven may be explained in detail,

1 Naigamanaya

Nigamaḥ or Samkalpah or purpose. That which pertains to *nigamaḥ* or purpose is Naigama-naya. It may be said to be the Teleological aspect of a continuous activity. When the purpose of the activity is taken to represent the whole series then it is Naigama-naya. It is defined in the Sūtra

अभिनिवृत्तार्थ सकल्पसाध्याही नैगम ॥

Thus when a person who is drawing water or who is busy carrying firewood is questioned 'What are you doing?' He answers 'I am cooking.' Here he is not actually cooking but it is the purpose which accounts for his action of carrying firewood or drawing water, vide Pūjyapāda's Commentary, *Sarvārthasiddhi*, Sūtra 33 of Ch I. This Naya is misunderstood by M D Desai (*Nayakarnikā*) and by S C Vidyabhusana (*Nyāyavātāra*)*

These passages give an entirely different interpretation of this *naya*. It is very clearly explained and illustrated by Pūjyapāda in his *Sarvārthasiddhi*—Sūtra 33 of the first chapter. The same explanation and also the same illustrations are adopted by another commentator of the same Sūtra, Śrutasaṅgāra, the author of *Śrutasaṅgāriyam*, an unpublished commentary on *Tattvārthādihgama*. My own explanation is based upon these authorities and also on the great work on Logic, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*. I consulted *Syādvādamāñjarī* also of the Benares Edition, page 166 and Bombay Edition of Rāyachandra Jaina Granthmālā, page 198. Here also the same interpretation is found. If in a series of qualities or action any part is taken as the representative of the whole, this representative aspect is Naigama. The derivation given by Mr Desai may also mean the same *naiko gamo yasyeti*—*Naigama*. "The particular that is not restricted to itself, but goes beyond itself to unify and represent the whole."

This representative character is of course not to be identified with either the mere universal or particular. It is different from both. When a person is making preparations to start on journey, we say 'He starts.' At the moment of the statement he is not starting, but is going to start. Similarly 'He dwells here,' need not mean that the person must be actually be in the residence at the moment,

2 Samgraha

स्वजात्यविरोधेनैकत्वमुपनीय पर्यायानाकान्तभेदानविशेषेण समस्तग्रहणात्संग्रह — (तत्त्वायं सूत्र)

स्वजात्यविरोधेनैकत्वमुपनीयार्थानाकान्तभेदान्समस्तग्रहणात्संग्रहः ।

**Naigama Naya* (vide) *Nayakarnikā* pages 7, 8 of introduction and 43

Also *Nyāyavātāra* pages 27 and 47

Samgraha is the class view When several things which are similar in essence and which are not incompatible with one another are brought together under one class concept we have **Samgraha Naya** Thus the name pot refers to the whole class of individual objects which go by that name Similarly the idea of **Dravya** From the point of **Dravya** characteristic (Permanency through change) the term **Dravya** refers to several entities, living and non-living, which are all taken as one class

3 Vyavahāra

समग्रहयाम्पित्तानामर्थानां विधिपूर्वकमवहरणं व्यवहारः ॥

(Tatvārtha)

समग्रहीतार्थानां विधिपूर्वकमवहरणं विमर्जनं भेदेन प्ररूपणं व्यवहारः ॥

(Prameya)

Vyavahāra is the process of examining the objects which are brought together under one class according to the different rules of Logic This would specially enquire into the several species which constitute the whole genus Examination of the specific **Dravyas**, **Jiva Dravya** and **Ajiva Dravya**, which both belong to **Dravya** genus would be an illustration for **Vyavahāra Naya**

4 Rjusūtra

ऋजुं प्रगुणं सूत्रयति तन्त्रयति इति ऋजुसूत्रं ॥

(Tatvārtha)

ऋजुं प्राञ्जलं (व्यक्तं) वर्तमानक्षणमात्रं सूत्रयति (बोधयति) इति ऋजुसूत्रं ॥

(Prameya)

That which clearly expresses a momentary state is **Rjusūtra Naya** This would take into consideration only the present state of a thing 'It is very pleasant now' This proposition predicates something which is true of the subject only at the moment of the predication Such an aspect of a thing is **Rjusūtra Naya**

5 Śabda Naya

लिङ्गसत्त्वसाधनादिव्यभिचारनिवृत्तिपरं शब्दनयः ।

(Tatvārtha)

कालकारकलिङ्गसत्त्वसाधनोपग्रहभेदादभिन्नमथ शपतीति शब्दो नयः शब्दप्रधानत्वात् ॥

(Prameya)

Words though differing in tense, voice, gender, number and instruments may point to the same thing i.e. refer to the same meaning This aspect of the identity of meaning in spite of differences noted above is **Śabda Naya**

6 Samabhūdhā

नानार्थसमभिरोहणात् समभिच्छब्दः ॥

This refers to merely synonyms which though interpreted according to their derivation may refer to the same identical thing

7 Evambhūta

That which describes a particular action or capacity of a thing Though the thing has not that particular aspect at the time of judging, the name obtained because of that action is still applicable to the thing, according to this principle

Again the **Nayas** are divided into six kinds Thus we have **Saḍ nayas** **Dravyārthika Naya** is also called **Niscaya Naya** or the real aspect **Paryāyārthika Naya** is called

Vyavahāra Naya or the relative aspect The former is further sub-divided into *Śuddha* and *Asuddha* Thus we have *Śuddha Niscaya Naya* and *Aśuddha Niscaya Naya* *Vyavahāra Naya* is divided into *Sadbhūta* and *Asadbhūta* Each again determined as *Upacarita* and *Anupacarita* Thus we have four kinds of *Vyavahāra Naya* —

(1) *Upacarita Sadbhūta*, (2) *Anupacarita Sadbhūta* (3) *Upacarita Asadbhūta* (4) *Anupacarita Asadbhūta* The term *Vyavahāra* is added to each at the end These six *Nayas* are specially employed in the examination of the characteristics of *Ātman*

(1) *Śuddhamāścava Naya* That the soul is identically the same whether in *Samsāra* or in *Mokṣa* because of its intrinsic characteristics of *Jñāna* and *Darśana* is a statement according to this *Naya*

(2) *Asuddha Niscaya Naya* to believe that the soul is characterised by gross emotions in its *Samsāric* state is true according to *Asuddha Niscaya Naya*

(3) *Upacarita Sadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya* The opinion that the soul has the *cetanā* modification of *Matijñāna* etc., is true because of the *Upacarita Sadbhūta Vyavahāra* That the soul has *Matijñāna*, is relative and figurative though pertaining to a quality which is in a way real

(4) *Anupacarita Sadbhūta Vyavahāra* That the soul has the modification of *Kevala Jñāna*

(5) *Anupacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya* This corresponds to the inseparable accident of the scholastic logic, for example, this is my body Body is identified with self according to this particular *Naya*

(6) *Upacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya* This corresponds to the separable accident of scholastic logic, for example, this is my house House is identified with the self according to *Upacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*

These *Nayas* refer to the different relations that the several attributes have to the self The soul owns these several attributes according to these several *Nayas* That special aspect of possessing is different in different cases and the different *Nayas* define the several relations which may be real or relative, which may be pure or impure, which may be separable or inseparable and so on

41*3

Then *Avadhī* is described in detail

ओहिं तहेव घेप्पदु देस परमं च ओहिसव्व च ।

तिणिण्णि वि गुणेण नियमा भवेण देस तथा नियमं ॥४१*३॥

[अवधिं तथैव गृह्यतां देश परमं च अवधिसर्वं च ।

त्रयोऽपि गुणेन नियमात् भवेन देश तथा नियतम् ॥]

41*3 Thus *Avadhī* also is of three kinds *Desāvadhi*, *Paramāvadhi* and *Sarvāvadhi*

All the three are conditioned by Psychic qualities. But Desāvadhi is also conditioned by birth in the case of Deva and Nāraka.

COMMENTARY—Desāvadhi is the very limited faculty of perceiving things beyond sense perception. It is able to apprehend only a limited number of things within a limited space and within a limited time. Paramāvadhi is the higher Avadhi Jñāna which is free from such limitations. But the last, Sarvāvadhi is the perfect faculty which perceives all reality. This is associated with the perfect self. These three faculties are respectively acquired by psychic development, i.e., as long as certain Psychic qualities are present these metemperical faculties spontaneously manifest themselves. But in the case of the last, when once it is acquired it becomes permanent and everlasting. Whereas the first is also present as a matter of birth right in Devas and Nārakas, i.e. they need not acquire it by special Psychological effort and development. But in the case of man and some higher animals it is to be acquired by developing the psychical nature.

Thus Desāvadhi is said to be of two kinds, Gunapratyaya and Bhavapratyaya, conditioned by Gunas or Psychic qualities and by Bhava or Birth. Gunapratyaya Desāvadhi is associated with man and animals and Bhavapratyaya with Deva and Nāraka.

Gunapratyaya is again divided into six kinds —

- 1 *Anugāmī* (the following)
- 2 *Ananugāmī* (not following)
- 3 *Vardhamāna* (the growing)
- 4 *Hīyamāna* (decaying or decreasing)
- 5 *Avasthita* (limited or bounded)
- 6 *Anavasthita* (unlimited or indefinite)

The first is that which enlightens the things while marching as the sun does.

The second is that which sticks to one and the same thing as the fixed idea of an insane person. In the first attention is continually flowing from things to things whereas in the second it is rivetted to the very same thing.

The third is that which begins like a spark of light and grows into a huge flame gradually lighting up a number of objects.

The fourth implies the opposite tendency in the faculty. Here the faculty gradually decreases like fire going out.

The fifth is the faculty that neither increases nor decreases but is limited and definite because of the *samyak* qualities of the soul.

The sixth is the opposite of the fifth. It is unlimited and indefinite. It is wavering hither and thither like a column of fire or water that is subject to heavy gust of wind.

Then the description of Manahparyāya

विउलमदी पुण णाण अज्जवणाण च दुविह मणणां ।

एदे संजमलद्धी उवओगे अप्पमत्तस्स ॥४१*४॥

[विपुलमति पुनर् ज्ञानमार्जवज्ञान च द्विविध मनोज्ञानाम् ।

एतौ सयमलब्धी उपयोगे अप्रमत्तस्य ॥]

41*4 Manahpariyaya is of two Kinds Rjumati and Vipulamati, telepathy which manifests straight and direct and telepathy that manifests crooked or in undulations. These appear only in a person of *Appramatta Gunasthāna* who acquired *Samyama labdhi* i.e., a person who acquired complete harmony or steadiness of the spirit by thorough renunciation.

COMMENTARY—Rjvi means straight, that which manifests straight or direct is Rjumati. This apprehends straight and direct the ideas in another's mind. Vipula means crooked or zigzag. When the process of knowing the ideas in other's mind manifests in a zigzag way it is Vipula Mati. These are the two kinds of Manahpariyaya-jñāna. This capacity is distinctly an acquired one. It is associated only with a person who has risen pretty high in the ladder of spiritual evolution. That particular stage at which this faculty appears is known as Apramatta-gunasthāna.

The stages in spiritual evolution are fourteen. They are called Gunasthānas. These are—

- 1 मिथ्यादृष्टि ॥
- 2 सासादनसम्यग्दृष्टि ॥
- 3 सम्यग्मिथ्यादृष्टि ॥
- 4 असयतसम्यग्दृष्टि ॥
- 5 सयतासयत ॥
- 6 प्रमत्तसयत ॥
- 7 अप्रमत्तसयत ॥
- 8 अपूर्वकरणस्थाने उपशमक क्षपक ॥
- 9 अनिवृत्तिबाह्यसाम्परायस्थाने उपशमक क्षपक ॥
- 10 सूक्ष्मसाम्परायस्थाने उपशमक क्षपक ॥
- 11 उपशान्तकषायवीतरागछद्मस्थ ॥
12. क्षीणकषायवीतरागछद्मस्थ ॥
- 13 सयोगकेवली ॥
- 14 अयोगकेवली चेति ॥

1 The first is the stage which represents spiritual blindness. A person in this stage is incapable of either perception of or belief in true reality. This is the lowest stage of spiritual existence where thought is without the value of truth and conduct without the

value of goodness

2 The second stage is the stage of retrogression. A person may advance in the path of evolution and become a *Samyagdr̥ṣṭī* (the fourth *Gunasthāna*). This stage is the opposite of the first. It is only from this stage (the fourth) onwards that a person is capable of having either truth or goodness. But sometimes a soul, after reaching the fourth stage which is really the next step from the first, may have the misfortune of spiritual degeneration. He may slip down to the bottom of the ladder. This process of slipping down is the stage of *Sāsādana*.

It is only a transition period. The person will very soon settle down in the first stage. Hence the second stage does not really mean the next slip from the first. So also the third stage is the spiritual oscillation between first and fourth. It is also a transition stage.

3 The third stage represents the mixed quality. The characteristics of the first and of the fourth stage get inextricably mixed together. The spiritual character is indeterminate. A person cannot be brought under either the first class or the fourth class. Hence it is called *Misragunasthāna*.

4 The fourth stage represents the beginning of the spiritual well being. Here is the possibility of truth and goodness. But still there is not active effort to elicit true thought and good conduct. The absence of this effort is associated with the right spiritual disposition. The ladder is called *Samyaktva*. A person who is in this stage and who is without the effort to exhibit the innate powers is *Asamyata Samyagdr̥ṣṭī*.

5 The fifth stage represents partial effort to draw out the spiritual powers. In this stage a person has not only the desirable spiritual disposition but also makes some effort towards further development. He is called a *Desavratī*.

6 The sixth stage represents whole-hearted effort. Complete and possible control over self is associated with the true bent of the spirit. But still the whole-hearted good will is not yet free from tempting desires and impulses. There is the chance of these impulses getting the mastery for there is not yet complete renunciation. Hence this stage is *Pramatta Samyata*.

7 The seventh stage is called *Apramatta Samvata*. In this stage the tendency to be attached by the outer things is thoroughly overcome. Spiritual strength is firmly established. Spirit has conquered the body. This stage is the critical stage in the spiritual evolution. From here begins the double path of higher spiritual evolution. One path leads to absolute perfection. And the other relative perfection. The former is associated with the annihilation of Karmas. The latter with the suppression of them. The former is called *Kṣapaka Śrenī* the ladder of annihilation, the latter is called *Upasama Śrenī*—the ladder of pacification of Karmas.

Manahpariyaya-Jñāna appears only in a person who has reached this critical stage of higher spiritual evolution.

Hence it must be considered as an extraordinary psychic quality acquired only after reaching a high stage of spiritual evolution. Before proceeding to describe the characteristics of the other stages of evolution let us note the further qualities of Manahparyaya. This psychic capacity is peculiarly limited by time and space. Though it is higher than ordinary mental faculty though it is supernormal still it should not be considered even as approaching Kevala Jñāna. Of the two kinds of mind-knowing Vipula Matī is considered to be greatly superior to the other. The limitations given are as follow —

Rjumati Manahparyaya from the point of time has a lower limit as well as a higher limit. In its lower limit it may apprehend the thoughts of another individual during his lifetime or it may extend to two or three Bhavas or births before and after. The upper limit is upto seven or eight Bhavas or births before and after. From the point of view of space its lower limit is to the radius of a *Gayūti* or about two leagues and the upper limit is the radius of one *yojana*. The second, *Vipulumati* has the lower time limit of seven or eight births whereas the higher is innumerable. Its lower distance limit is round a radius of one *yojana* and its higher distance limit is upto *Mānuṣottara* mountain and not beyond that. This *Mānuṣottara Śaila* is according to Jaina Geography the limit of human habitation.

When we examine the limitations described above it is clear to us that the latter Vipula Matī is decidedly the higher supernormal faculty. Therefore the commentator's interpretation of *vipula* as *kuṭila* or crooked really means Rythmic or undulatory manifestation. Whereas the former is straight and direct. The rythmic manifestation is naturally capable of greater efficiency. This is illustrated by several rythmic movements in Nature, as in the heartbeat. This Psychic faculty evidently through this rythmic or undulatory manifestation is able to achieve better and higher results than those of Rjumati.

8 The eighth stage represents the acquisition of a spiritual weapon called the first *Śukla Dhyāna*. This is an instrument by help of which Karmas are to be destroyed. This is a unique Psychic force never before experienced by the Self. Hence it is *Apūrva Karana*. This stage is represented in both the ladders of development. *Upaśamaka* and *Kṣapaka*, i.e., self in this stage may be in the path of annihilation or in that of pacification of Karmas.

9 The ninth stage represents spiritual warfare. Equipped with the weapon of *Śukla Dhyāna*, Self—the warrior, destroys the grosser desires. This spiritual warfare is also associated with both the paths of development.

Bādara Sampārāya *Sampārāya* means warfare. *Bādara* means gross warfare or conflict with gross desires and impulses of this soul.

10 The tenth stage is the stage of the same spiritual warfare when the subtle impulses of the soul get destroyed. This stage also has representatives in either ladder, i.e., as the result of the spiritual struggle the gross and subtle desires may either be rooted out or suppressed. One who roots them out is *Kṣapaka* and one who suppresses them is *Upaśamaka*.

Sūksma Samparāya Conflict with subtler impulses

11 The eleventh stage is the stage where spiritual peace is secured, but here peace is the result of suppression. Hence it may not be quite secure. The spiritual harmony may yet be disturbed. If it gets disturbed then there may be the misfortune of slipping down again. But the fall will be to the Apramatta Gunasthāna from which the two Śrenis branched off.

12 The twelfth stage represents the corresponding step in the ladder of annihilation, i.e. after the destruction of subtle and gross desires with the help of Śukla Dhyāna the self may pass on to *Kṣīna-kasāyasthāna* which is the twelfth. This is just below the stage of perfection.

13 This stage is certainly the stage of Perfect Emancipation. Kevala Jñāna is reached but there is still *yoga* (*manavacanākā*, a or mind, speech and body). Hence this stage is called Sayogakevali, the Kevali who has still *yoga*.

14 The last is the stage where even this *yoga* disappears. The stage immediately after the disappearance of *yoga* is called Avogakevali. The Siddha state is considered to be a transcendental stage. Therefore it is considered to be beyond this classification of Gunasthānas. It is purely metemperical and therefore description by difference of degree will have no meaning with reference to this transcendental Ego.

41*5.

Then the Kevala-jñāna—the ideal knowledge. This is the result of the destruction of the four Ghātiya Karmas, co-existence with infinite qualities such as infinite bliss, the desire of all the faithful and the pure and that which makes even a Devendra discontented in his own glory.

ज्ञान ज्ञेयनिमित्त केवलज्ञान न होदि सुदृष्टान् ।

ज्ञेय केवलज्ञान ज्ञानाज्ञान च नास्ति केवलिनो ॥४१*५॥

[ज्ञान ज्ञेयनिमित्त केवलज्ञान न भवति श्रुतज्ञानम् ।

ज्ञेय केवलज्ञान ज्ञानाज्ञान च नास्ति केवलिन ॥]

41*5 Kevala Jñāna is knowledge par excellence. It is not conditioned by objects of knowledge. It is not even Śrutajñāna which is consequent upon study. To the person who has acquired perfect knowledge there is no diversity of knowledge. So let it be known.

COMMENTARY—Kevala Jñāna completely comprehends all Dravyas and all their modifications. The author of *Tattvārtha Sūtra* says *sarva-dravya-paryāyesu kevalasya*. The infinite number of Jiva Dravyas, the infinite number of Physical bodies, the two physical principles of rest and motion and infinite space and time all become transparent to Kevala Jñāna. There can be nothing which is not comprehended by this knowledge.

The contents of this knowledge constitute the whole of reality. This is not conditioned by objects. It is absolutely self-determined. Therefore all the Dravyas and the Paryāyas are at the same time evident to Kevala Jñāna. This unconditioned simultaneous comprehension of reality makes it fundamentally distinct from Mati Jñāna or Śruta Jñāna and also from the other two. The other four jñānas are limited in efficiency and extent. And Kevala Jñāna knows no such limitations. Again Mati, Śruta, and Avadhī, are subject to degeneration and corruption. But Manahparyaya and Kevala do not have any such tendency. But the capacity of Kevala Jñāna is infinitely higher than even Manahparyaya. In short it is the absolute and unconditioned wisdom.

41*6

After describing the five kinds of right knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*), the author mentions the three Ajñānas or the kinds of wrong knowledge.

मिच्छता अण्णाण अविरदिभावो य भावआवरणा ।

जेय पडुच्च काले तह दुण्णय दुप्पमाण च ॥४१*६॥

[मिथ्यात्वाद् अज्ञानम् अविरतिभाव च भावावरणात् ।

ज्ञेय प्रतीत्य काले तथा दुर्नय दुष्प्रमाण च ॥]

41*6 If Mithyātva which veils the faculty of perception of and faith in reality appears, then knowledge gets vitiated and becomes Ajñāna and the regulative principle of conduct also becomes corrupt. Again during the process of investigating reality the standard of truth and the methods of reaching it all become misleading and untrustworthy.

COMMENTARY—Mithyātva is the condition of Ajñāna. Its presence in a soul is responsible for several undesirable consequences. This Mithyātva may be innate or acquired. In the case of persons who have congenital Mithyātva their faculty of understanding is also corrupt from birth. They have innate Ajñāna. Kumati and Kusruti. But in the case of persons who acquired this Mithyātva after losing Samyaktva, their right knowledge turns into erroneous one. The effect of Mithyātva is not confined to corrupting the faculty of understanding. It indirectly affects conduct also, such a person because of his Ajñāna is incapable of choosing the right path. Evil becomes his good. And lastly, even if there is any effort after truth, it ends in mere illusion so long as there is the primary source of evil, Mithyātva, intact.

42

After describing Jñānopayoga he goes on to speak about Darśanopayoga, the faculty of perception.

दसणमवि चक्खुजुदं अक्खुजुदमवि य ओहिणा सहिय ।

अणिअणमणंतविसय केवलिय चावि पणत्त ॥४२॥

[दर्शनमपि चक्षुर्गुणमपि चावधिना सहितम् ।

अनिधनमनन्तविषय केवल्य चापि प्रज्ञप्तम् ॥४२॥]

42 Perception or Darsana is of four kinds Perception through visual sensations, perception through non-visual senses, again that through the faculty of Avadhi, or clairvoyance, and lastly through Kevala or infinite perception, which is unlimited and apprehends all reality Thus is it described

COMMENTARY—Darsana or perception implies merely the awareness that a thing exists It corresponds to knowledge by acquaintance Understanding the reality thus apprehended is Jñāna In a rough way, Darsana and Jñāna may be said to correspond to the sensibility and understanding of Kant's system Thus understanding and perception apprehend things gradually one after the other But in the case of Kevalis the two faculties are co-extensive with the complete reality The whole existence is perceived and understood at the same time, and as there is no reality beyond such faculty, it is not necessary for such a person to attend to things one after the other

43

After describing Jñāna and Darsana the author, in order to clear the doubt of a Naiyāyika student for whom substance and quality are absolutely distinct, explains that the distinction is only relative, and he also mentions the diversity of Jñāna

ण वियप्पदि णाणादो णाणी णाणाणि होति जेगाणि ।

तम्हा दु विस्सरुव भणिय दविय ति णाणीहि ॥४३॥

[न विकल्प्यते ज्ञानात् ज्ञानी ज्ञानानि भवन्त्यनेकानि ।

तस्मात्तु विश्वरूप मणित द्रव्यमिति ज्ञानिभि ॥४३॥]

43 The soul is not distinct from its attribute of Jñāna or knowledge, and because the ways of knowledge are diverse the world of reality or the universe is also said to be multiverse by the wise

COMMENTARY—There can be no knowledge apart from the knower Self and its knowledge are inseparable Again knowledge is also intimately related to the objects known There are diverse forms of knowledge This implies that the objects of knowledge are also diverse Hence from the point of view of objects, they are both one and many one because of the common Dravyatva and many because of the different ways of apprehending objects The proposition that the reality is one and also many is not self-contradictory according to the Jaina system, hence the statement that reality is uni-

verse is not incompatible with 'the reality is a multiverse' The point emphasized in the gāthā is mainly the inalienability of the attribute from the thing

44

Then he points out the absurdity of the view that substance and the attribute are entirely distinct

जदि ह्वदि दव्वमण्ण गुणदो य गुणा य दव्वदो अण्णे ।

दव्वाणत्तियमधवा दव्वाभाव पकुव्वन्ति ॥४४॥

[यदि भवति द्रव्यमन्यद् गुणतश्च गुणाश्च द्रव्यतोऽन्ये ।

द्रव्यानन्त्यमथवा द्रव्याभाव प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥४४॥]

44 If the substance is entirely separate and distinct from its qualities, then it may change into infinite other substances or again if the qualities can exist separate from their substance, there will be no necessity for a substance at all (In either way the result would be absurd)

COMMENTARY—The relation of substance and its qualities is an extremely difficult problem for a metaphysician

Some would emphasize the qualities to the detriment of substance and some would emphasize the substance at the cost of qualities In either case the result would be absurd because of the false emphasis

We may have the world of unchanging reality of Parmenides or a world of eternal flux of Heraclites, but both these worlds are so far removed from the world of our concrete experience In our world of concrete experience things and qualities are of equal importance In fact the distinction is not absolute

There can be no qualities apart from substance nor substance without qualities If substance is deprived of all its qualities and if it is still the possible substratum of qualities then different groups of qualities may get associated with that substratum, i.e., the same substance has the chance of becoming infinite other substances

This is a manifest absurdity Or again if the attributes can float themselves without any fixing substratum then they would by their own combination constitute a thing and the category of substance is no more necessary To think of reality as identical with qualities apart from the qualified thing is also equally absurd On account of internal contradiction the view that qualities may be different from substance is condemned The argument adopted by the author reminds us of Burkley and Hume

Burkley's argument against Locke's doctrine of substance similarly emphasizes the absurdity of an unknown 'x' which is substance for Locke This unknown 'x' may get several determinations and thus may become several distinct things But Burkley's main argument is slightly different from the author's His attack on substance is based upon

the absurdity of abstract ideas Again Hume after reducing the world to a group of sense-presented ideas points out the absurdity referred to in the latter half of the Gāthā by his doctrine that anything may be the cause of anything else

Similar tendencies are not altogether absent in Indian thought You have the one sided emphasis both in Vedantism and Buddhism The idea of Nirguna reality and the principle of Kṣanika Vāda are the two rival doctrines, and both are condemned by the author, qualityless reality and the qualities bringing about a new reality every moment are both untenable according to the author

45

Next the author rejects the following views —

- 1 That substance and qualities are absolutely identical
- 2 That they are absolutely different
- 3 That they are absolutely identical and different at the same time

Then he establishes their conditional or relative identity and relative difference

अविभक्तमणणत्त दब्बगुणाण विभक्तमणणत्त ।

णेच्छति णिच्चयण्ह तत्त्विवरीद हि व तेसि ॥४५॥

[अविभक्तमन्यत्वे द्रव्यगुणानां विभक्तमन्यत्वम् ।

नेच्छन्ति निश्चयज्ञास्तद्विपरीतं हि वा तेषाम् ॥४५॥]

45 Those that know the truth do not recognise any of the following views as to the relation of substance and quality that they are absolutely identical and inseparable, that they are distinct and separate in every way, and lastly that they are both distinct and identical at the same time

COMMENTARY—The doctrine maintained by the author is that substance and quality are not distinct and separable in *rarum-natura*, but only in thought, and there too, the distinction is only relative, i.e., the quality cannot be thought of as absolutely independent of substance Still it can be attended to as distinct from the thing Hence it is that the three views mentioned in the Gāthā are rejected

46

From the point of view of Vyapadesa etc., substance and quality are in an aspect distinct

व्यपदेशा संठाणा सखा विसया य होति ते बहुगा ।

ते तेसिमणणत्ते अणत्ते चापि विज्जते ॥४६॥

[व्यपदेशा संस्थानानि सख्या विषयाश्च भवन्ति ते बहुका ।

ते तेषामन्यत्वे अन्यत्वे चापि विद्यन्ते ॥४६॥]

46 The difference between Dravya and Guṇa, substance and attribute, may be determined by appellation, form, number, or locality. These determinants are various. They hold good among things and their attributes whether these are considered different or identical.

COMMENTARY—These differences hold good not only among different things but also in the case of a single complex thing which is capable of internal distinction.

(1) The difference due to Vyapadeśa or name is of two kinds.

1 *Ṣaṣṭhī Vyapadeśa* This is the relation of the sixth case or the possessive relation.

2 *Kāraka Vyapadeśa* due to causal relation.

(1) Each of these may be true of different things or of the same thing. The Possessive relation among different things is illustrated thus 'Devadatta's cow'. The same relation is illustrated by a single complex thing 'The branch of a tree' or 'Jinas' attributes'. Here the possessive relation is distinctly internal in the very same thing.

(2) *Kāraka* or causal relation. This is also *Vyapadeśa* difference, i.e. difference due to Nomenclature or appellation. *Kāraka-samjñā* also holds good between two different things or in the same identical complex thing. *Kāraka* or causal relation is recognised to be of six forms, i.e. in a complete causal relation six elements are implied—

- 1 Kartā or agent or subject
- 2 Karma, the object or effect
- 3 Karana, the instrument
- 4 Nimitta, the purpose
- 5 Sakāśa, the place from which the effect issues
- 6 Adhikarana, the place in which the cause operates

The illustration given below implies all these six elements.

(a) Causal relation among different things. See the following sentence —

देवदत्त = Devadatta (Kartā or subject or agent)

फलम् = a fruit (Karma or object)

अकुशेन = with the hook (Karana or instrument)

धनदत्ताय = for Dhanadatta (Nimitta or purpose)

वृक्षात् = from the tree (Sakāśa or the place of issue)

वाटिकायाम् = from the orchard (Adhikarana or the place of operation)

अवचिनोति = plucks down

This sentence illustrates the different aspects of causal relation that may exist among different things. The proposition "Devadatta plucks a fruit for Dhanadatta from a tree in his orchard with a hook" relates several independent things. Whereas the next illustration shows how the same causal relation with the six elements may exist in an identical thing.

तदेव आत्मा (कर्ता) आत्मान् कर्मतापन्नम् आत्मना (करणभूतेन) आत्मने निमित्तम् आत्मन सकाशात् आत्मनि अधिकरणभूते ध्यायति ।

“Ātmā about himself with his self-reflection for his own purpose drawing out of himself and yet reposing in himself contemplates’ Here the causal relation is with reference to the same complex thing

(2) Samsthāna—the difference of figure or form This determinant also is illustrated with the different things and with the same thing

(a) Tall Devadutta’s tall cow The Samsthāna determinant is applied to two different things

(b) The tall branch of a tall tree Here the determinant is applied to the branch and the tree which are not two separate things *mūrtadīvyasa mūrtaguna* Here also the determinant Mūrta or visual form refers to Dravya and Guna which are not separate and distinct

(3) Samkhyā or number

(a) Devadatta’s 10 cows The quantitative difference here is between two distinct things—Devadatta and Cows

(b) But the quantitative difference may exist internally in the same thing as the 10 branches of the tree or the infinite attributes of Dravya

(4) Visaya or locative difference

(a) ‘In the cowshed is the cow Here the Visaya or the locality is external or Bheda-Visaya

(b) Abheda-Visaya or the internal locative relation ‘In the substance are the qualities’

Thus the difference due to Vyapadeśa Samsthāna, etc., is seen among different things or in the same thing which is internally differentiated Hence when one kind of relation is implied it need not be confounded with the other If substance and attributes are said to be different, this difference need not be interpreted to make the two distinct and separate Hence the relation between substance and attribute can certainly be from one aspect a relation of difference and still the two need not be absolutely distinct In short the relation between substance and attribute may be one of identity and difference That this relation of identity in difference is not self contradictory is supported by analogy The illustrations of the same thing internally differentiated given above justify the attitude of the author

Again he speaks of the relation of ownership or possession This relation may exist between two different things or in the same thing internally differentiated Hence by analogy he brings out the Ekatva—Nānātva aspect of the relation

गाण धण च कुर्वदि धणिण जह् गाणिण च दुविधेहि ।

भणति तह पुधत्त एयत्त चावि तच्चण्ह ॥४७॥

[ज्ञानं धनं च करोति धनिं यथा ज्ञानिनं च द्विविधाभ्याम् ।
अणन्ति तथा पृथक्त्वमेकत्वं चापि तत्त्वज्ञा ॥४७॥]

47 Just as Dhana and Jñāna (wealth and wisdom) make the owners Dhani and Jñāni (the rich and the wise) thus expressing two ways of relationship (unity and diversity) so also the relation between substance and qualities implies both the aspects of identity and difference. Thus say those that know the truth.

COMMENTARY—One who owns Dhana or wealth becomes on account of that ownership a Dhani—the rich. Here too, different things because of the relation of possession are brought together, *i.e.*, because of possession there is union and again because of possession the things uniting must be different. Things may exist as separate and distinct when the relation may unite them or there may be single thing which because of the relation may get differentiated. The illustration of Dhana, Dhani is of the former kind. The illustration for the latter is Jñāna, Jñāni. The person to start with is one, but on account of this relation of possession the single entity gets differentiated. In order to be called Jñāni one who possesses Jñāna or wisdom the possessed thing must be differentiated from the owner. Otherwise the relation of ownership will have no meaning. Hence we have to admit that the relation of ownership implies both unity and diversity whether the things related are different or identical in themselves. Thus the author concludes that the relation between substance and its qualities exhibits both these characteristics. It is not incoherent to associate both the characteristics with the relation.

48

Then he points out the absurdity that would result if Jñāna and Jñāni (the knower and knowledge) are taken to be entirely distinct and separate.

जाणी जाणं च सदा अत्यन्तरिदा तु अण्णमण्णस्स ।
दोण्हं अचेदणत्तं पसज्जदि सम्मं जिणावमदं ॥४८॥
[ज्ञानी ज्ञानं च सदार्थान्तरिते त्वन्योन्यस्य ।
द्वयोरचेतनत्वं प्रसजति सम्यग् जिनावमतम् ॥४८॥]

48 If self and its knowledge are always substantially distinct one from the other, then each will become non-conscious or non-spiritual entity. That view being self-contradictory would undoubtedly conflict with the truth revealed by Jina.

COMMENTARY—Soul and knowledge are called spiritual or conscious entities only because of their identity. If the two are entirely absolute and distinct they would cease to be spiritual. Soul would be deprived of thought and hence will cease to be a conscious being and knowledge or thought *per-se* would have no association with the thinker and hence will become again non-spiritual. Thinker without thought would

be blind and thought without thinker would be chimerical. The person who maintains such a view would contradict himself because of his own thought. The Jaina view is free from such a contradiction.

Here we have to notice one important thing. "Jināvamataṃ" is not to be taken as the reason for rejecting the opposite view.

The real standard of truth or Pramāṇa is not the principle of revelation. Though no doubt the Jaina system of thought is very often referred to as revealed by Jina, the system is acknowledged to be true not because it is revealed by a great spiritual being but because the revelation is borne out by the nature of Reality.

Jaina thinkers therefore attach more importance to absence of self-contradiction than to revelation.

A doctrine must not contradict any previously accepted truth.

"Pūrvāpara-virodha" is the main thing that is dreaded by the Jaina thinker. Hence the author's rejection of the opposite view because it is inconsistent with Jaina thought is really based upon the internal self-contradiction involved in the rejected view. If it is interpreted otherwise then the Jaina position would become self-contradictory. When the Jaina rejects the Vedas of Brahmanic thought, though they are claimed to be revelation from the divine being, on the ground that they involve internal inconsistency, he cannot have recourse to the very same method of depending upon revelation. For according to his principle even revelation must stand on logical evidence.

49

If Self and thought be really distinct then the two would never be able to constitute a single spiritual being even by the process of combination.

न हि सो समवायादो अत्थदरिदो दु णाणदो णाणी ।

अण्णाणि त्ति य वयण एगत्तपसाधग होवि ॥४६॥

[न हि स समवायादर्पान्तरितस्तु ज्ञानतो ज्ञानी ।

अज्ञानीति च वचनमेकत्वप्रसाधक भवति ॥४६॥]

49 If the Self is entirely distinct in nature from thought then he cannot become, even by combination with thought, Jñāni or the thinker. 'Unthinking thing' will still be the name denoting the identity brought about by the combination of substance and quality which are in themselves unthinking things.

COMMENTARY—If Self and thought are in themselves unthinking things then by combination they would still be unthinking. Consciousness is not to be derived from nonconscious elements existing severally or in combination. If thought is an adventitious characteristic of the self then before the acquisition of thought he must have been either Jñāni or Ajñāni (thinking or unthinking). If he is thinking then the combination with Jñāna is un-

necessary and useless But if he be unthinking then, is that attribute "unthinking" again innate or adventitious? If it is adventitious, then the self cannot acquire thought for this attribute is incompatible with his former acquisition If the unthinking quality is innate than the thinking quality may as well be taken to be innate Thought then is not an adventitious attribute of the self Self is Jñāni not as a result of combination of self and thought Even the perfect knowledge Kevala Jñāna is innate in the soul, though it is veiled for the time being by the Karmas

50

Then since there is no other relation than identity between substance and quality the explanation by the principle of combination is shown to be unwarranted and absurd.

समवायी समवायो अपृथग्भूदो य अजुदसिद्धो य ।
तम्हा द्रव्यगुणानं अजुदा सिद्धि ति निदिष्टा ॥५०॥
[समवर्तित्व समवाय अपृथग्भूतत्वमयुतसिद्धत्व च ।
तस्माद्द्रव्यगुणाना मयुता सिद्धिरिति निदिष्टा ॥५०॥]

50 The relation between substance and quality is one of co-eval identity, unity, inseparability, and of essential simplicity That is why the unity of substance and qualities is said to be not the result of union or combination

COMMENTARY—The terms Samavāya implies mainly unity and also union Union implies the existence of independent elements which constitute the unity The elements must be prior to the unity Then unity will be the result of combination The relation between Guna and Gunin is not one of combination

Hence though the author designates the relation by the term Samavāya he strictly excludes the other implication of the term The term means nothing more than oneness or unity Dravya and Guna, substance and quality, are merely the different aspects of the same reality and as such they must exist together without beginning and without end

This eternal co-existence is implied by the term Samavāya This co-existence of Dravya and Guna is termed Samavāya or unity by the author The very same relation implies inseparability of the two though they are different in name Hence is the relation called *apṛthag-bhūtatvam* Again since the unity is not brought about by combination of two independent elements it has *ayuta-siddhantvam* Therefore the relation is one of unity and not of union

51-52.

Then he establishes by analogy that substance and quality though distinguishable in thought are not distinct in nature

वर्णरसगन्धकासा परमाणुपरूषिदा विसेसेहि ।
 दृष्टवादो य अणुणा अणुत्तपगासगा होति ॥५१॥
 वंसणणाणाणि जहा जीवणिबद्धाणि णणभूदाणि ।
 ववदेसदो पुधत्त कुव्वति हि णो सभावादो ॥५२॥
 [वर्णरसगन्धस्पर्श परमाणुप्ररूपिता विशेषे ।
 द्रव्यतत्त्व अनन्या अन्यत्वप्रकाशका भवन्ति ॥५१॥
 दशनज्ञाने तथा जीवनिबद्धे अनन्यभूते ।
 व्यपदेशत पृथक्त्व कुरुत हि नो स्वभावात् ॥५२॥]

51-52 Colour, taste, smell and touch are the qualities of the primary atom They are not said to be really distinct from their material substratum though they are undoubtedly distinguishable from it as regards name, form, etc In the same way perception and understanding are really inseparable from the self and are not distinct from it, though from the point of name, form etc., they may be spoken of as distinct from the substratum Ego In short, though distinguishable in thought the faculties are not really distinct

COMMENTARY—The author establishes the proposition that distinction in thought does not necessarily imply distinctness in nature What may be distinguished by comparison may in reality exist in essential unity This result is obtained by the principle of analogy In the case of matter the qualities are not distinct and separate from the substratum, though they may be referred to by different names, by different forms, and so on Exactly in the same way are the conscious qualities of perception and understanding related to Jiva As attributes they are distinct from the ego and may be distinguished by name, form, number, etc But still they are not really distinct from it

Distinctness necessarily presupposes an underlying identity between the things compared Apart from this identity there can be no comparison and distinction What are distinct must really be identical Hence *distinction* in thought instead of presupposing distinctness in nature, implies identity This view of the author is borne out by modern thought Thus ends the section dealing with the attribute of *upayoga*

53

The next section deals with the three remaining qualities of Jiva *kartr̥va*, *bhoktr̥va*, and *karma-samsuktatva* acting, feeling and being associated with Karmas In the beginning the author describes the nature and number of Jiva Dravya which is the substratum of all the nine attributes

जीवा अणाऽणिहणा सता णता य जीवभावादो ।
 सम्भावदो अणता पच्चग्गुणप्पधाणा य ॥५३॥

[जीवा अनादिनिधना सान्ता अनन्ताश्च जीवभावात् ।

सद्भावतोऽनन्ता. पञ्चाप्रगुणप्रधानाः च ॥५३॥]

53 Jivas according to their characteristics have neither beginning nor end, have beginning and end, have beginning but no end Thus having these five fundamental qualities they are as existences infinite in number

COMMENTARY—Jivas really are the agents, since they bring about different modes with the different names They are described as 1) without beginning or end, 2) with beginning and end 3) and with beginning and no end

1 If we attend to the essential nature of Jivas (*pārināmika bhāva*), i.e., their thought or consciousness then they may be said to have neither beginning nor end, as spiritual existences they are eternal Neither are they created nor can they be destroyed

2 The very same Jivas from the Psychic qualities of Audayika, Aupaśamika, and Kṣāyopasamika have both beginning and end

3 But from the Kṣāyika Bhāva they have beginning but not end It cannot be said in the last case that because there is beginning there must also be an end When they are free from Upādhis then they realise their true nature, then they become Siddhas Jivas that are found with such characteristics are infinite in number Again it cannot be said that in the case of these Jivas which really have neither beginning nor end the other characteristics would be inconsistent The other characteristics are, having both beginning and end and having beginning but no end These characteristics are true of Jivas because of Karmic entanglements The presence of Karma with Jiva is the condition of Samsāric transformations and Jivas in Samsāric cycles have both birth and death But in the last stage towards emancipation from Karmas, Jivas may be said to have only birth but no death For there is spiritual immortality as the result of complete emancipation

The five fundamental characteristics implied in this gāthā are the five Jiva-Bhāvas mentioned in the 62nd gāthā

These are 1) *audayika* 2) *aupasamika* 3) *kṣāyopasamika* 4) *kṣāyika* 5) *pārināmika-bhāvāh*

The last one is the attribute of consciousness This conscious nature is eternal Hence Jiva is *anādi-nidhana* without beginning or end The first three bring about Samsāric changes of birth and death Therefore from their aspect Jiva has both beginning and end The fourth is the characteristic of emancipation The emancipated Self has beginning but no end

54

Though Jivas are truly eternal yet they are born and they die because of accidental conditions of Karmic associations To be eternal and to have births and deaths are not

really conflicting

एवं सदो विनासो असदो जीवस्स होइ उप्पादो ।
इदि जिणवरेहि भणिद अण्णोणविदुमविदुम् ॥५४॥
[एव सतो विनाशोऽसतो जीवस्य भवत्युत्पादः ।
इति जिनवरंभणितमन्योन्यविदुमविदुम् ॥५४॥]

54 Thus Jivas that are, may die and those that are not may be born, thus sayeth the Jina Though the statements (this Sūtra and the 19th) are apparently conflicting they are not really contradictory

COMMENTARY—From Dravvārthika Naya, *i e*, from the aspect of essential nature, Jivas can have neither birth nor death But from Paryāyārthika Naya, from the point of modifications, they have births and deaths The two propositions are quite compatible with one another as they state two different aspects of Jiva The other proposition with which this gāthā appears to conflict is the gāthā 19

एव सदो विनासो असदो जीवस्स नत्थि उप्पादो ।

There is no death for the existing Jivas, nor birth of the non-existing ones

This certainly appears to contradict the present Sūtra and the commentator establishes that the conflict is only apparent and not real

55

Then it is pointed out that the death of Beings that are and the birth of those that are not are the result of Gatīnāmakarma the Karma that brings about for the soul different modes of existence

णेइयतिरियमणुया देवा इदि णामसंजुदा पयडो ।
कुव्वति सदो णास असदो भावस्स उप्पाद ॥५५॥
[नारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्या देवा इति नामसयुता प्रकृतयः ।
कुर्वन्ति सतो नाशमसतो भावस्योत्पादम् ॥५५॥]

55 Life in hell, life as plant or animal, as man or as Deva, these states of being are caused by their respective Nāma Karma Prakṛtis These bring about death to the Jivas that are and birth to those that are not

COMMENTARY—The different states of existence are the different modifications of Jiva brought out by *upādhi* or Karmic conditions Those Karmas that determine the next individual state of Jiva are Nāma Karmas These Nāma Karmas are the real causal conditions that lead the soul to manifest in a particular form These forms appear and disappear Birth and death are characteristics associated with these forms or modes Just as waves may appear and disappear in the surface of ocean as the result of wind, while

the sheet of water is really unaffected, so Jiva remaining eternal and changeless in its real essence is the basis of the different waves of existence appearing and disappearing. And these waves in the ocean of life are brought about by *upādhis* or Karmic conditions. The characteristics of birth and death which are really true of the form of existence are also predicated of Jiva.

56.

After mentioning the Karmas as the condition of Samsāric cycle the author goes to describe their nature. Here he explains the origin of the five Bhāvas, i.e., emotional states of consciousness.

उदयेण उदसमेण य खयेण दुर्हि मिस्तिर्देहि परिणामे ।

जुता ते जीवगुणा बहुषु य अस्थेषु विस्थिण्णा ॥५६॥

[उदयेनोपशमेन च क्षयेन च द्वाभ्यां मिथिताभ्यां परिणामेन ।

युक्तास्ते जीवगुणा बहुषु चार्थेषु विस्तीर्णा ॥५६॥]

56 On account of the rise, suppression, annihilation, mixed suppression and annihilation of Karmas, by the intrinsic nature of self unconditioned by Karmas, Jiva has five Bhāvas or thought characteristics. These are fully described in the Āgamas [*satthesu?*]

COMMENTARY—Karmas are considered to be physical in nature. These physical conditions determine the Psychic characteristics. Five different classes of Karmic conditions are mentioned. Each of these is the causal condition determining its corresponding Bhāva or thought state in Jiva.

These conditions are

- 1 Udaya, or rise of Karmas,
- 2 Upaśama, or suppression of Karmas,
- 3 Kṣaya or eradication,
- 4 Kṣayopāśama, the mixed process of eradication and suppression,
- 5 Parīṇāma, or the unconditioned thought.

These five conditions (four physical and one spiritual) determine respectively the Bhāvas.

And these are

- 1 Audayika Bhāva,
- 2 Aupaśamika Bhāva,
- 3 Kṣāyika Bhāva,
- 4 Kṣāyopāśamika Bhāva,
- 5 Pārīṇāmika Bhāva.

The last one is unconditioned by Karmas. It is Nirupādhi character, whereas the other four are generated by the changes in physical conditions or *upādhis*. The last

Pārīṇāmika Bhāva is not causally connected with Samsāra or Mokṣa It is Niṣkriya Bhāva.

मोक्षं कुर्वन्ति मिथौ पशमिकक्षायिकाभिघा ।
बन्धमोदयिको भावो निष्क्रिय पारिणामिक ॥

57

Next it is pointed out how these Bhāvas or thought states are brought about

कस्म वेदयमाणो जीवो भाव करेदि जारिसय ।
सो तेण तस्स कत्ता हवदि त्ति य सासणे पठिद ॥५७॥
[कर्म वेदयमानो जीवो भाव करोति यावृशकम् ।
स तेन तस्य कर्त्ता भवतीति च शास्त्रे पठितम् ॥५७॥]

57 Being affected by the change in Karmic material Jiva experiences certain emotional states Whatever emotional state thus appears in consciousness is due to the direct causal agency of Jiva Thus say the Scriptures of Jainas

COMMENTARY—Jiva is said to be the direct and immediate cause of the several emotional states brought about by Karmic materials The extrinsic cause is physical matter and the proximate cause is Jiva itself Karmas are alway spoken of as of two kinds Dravya Karma and Bhāva Karma Dravya Karma is distinctly physical A peculiar combination of Paramānus constitutes Karma Pudgala or Karmic matter Matter under such modification has a special attraction towards Jivas ordinarily Jiva in its world state is generally found in association with such Karmic matter Karmic matter and conscious states are mutually determining each other A change in Karmic matter may bring about a corresponding change in consciousness This conscious change has a predominant affective tone It is generally some form of emotion This corresponding emotional state is Bhāva Karma Since it is a psychic event it is immediately determined by mind itself It is this fact that is emphasized by the author in this Gāthā

The author recognises two distinct causal agencies as will be evident later on *nimitta kartā* and *upādāna kartā*, Distant or remote cause and substantial cause Jiva is the substantial cause of all its modifications, and matter may still be an extrinsic cause Then Jiva is the Upādāna Kartā of the Bhāvas while Karmic matter is Nimitta Kartā

58

It is this fact that is mentioned in the next Gāthā That Self is the immediate cause of the emotional state while Karmic matter is the indirect cause

कस्मेण विणा उदय जीवस्स ण विज्जदे उवसमं वा ।
खइय खओवसमिय तम्हा भाव तु कम्मकदं ॥५८॥

[कर्मणा विनोदयो जीवस्य न विद्यत उपशमो वा ।

आयिक आयोपशमिकस्तस्माद्भावस्तु कर्मकृत ॥५८॥]

58 The different forms of Bhāva Karmas such as, the rising, the sinking, the annihilating and partial annihilation and sinking cannot happen in the consciousness of a Jīva without corresponding changes in Dravya Karmas or Karmic matter. Therefore the Bhāvas such as Audayika which are brought about by the Bhāva Karmas may be said to be the effects of Dravya Karmas as well.

COMMENTARY—A change in Dravya Karma or physical Karma immediately brings about a change in Bhāva Karma *i.e.*, a corresponding change pure or impure in consciousness. This Bhāva Karma in its turn brings about its corresponding emotional state or Bhāva. It may be pleasant or unpleasant. The chain of causation is as follows—Dravya Karma, Bhāva Karma and Bhāva Karmic matter, Karmic thought and an affective state. The last affective state or Bhāva which is the immediate result of Karmic thought or Bhāva Karma may also be said to be the effect of Dravya Karma. For there can be no Karmic thought or Bhāva Karma in a Jīva which is not determined by Dravya Karma.

59

The next Gāthā is in the form of *pūrvapakṣa* from the disciple. An objection is raised against the doctrine that Ātmā is the sole and immediate cause of Bhāva Karma.

भावो यदि कर्मकदो अत्ता कम्मरस होवि किध कत्ता ।

ण कुणदि अत्ता किञ्चि वि मुत्ता अण्णं सगं भावं ॥५९॥

[भावो यदि कर्मकृत आत्मा कर्मणो भवति कथं कर्ता ।

न करोत्यात्मा किञ्चिदपि मुक्त्वान्यत् स्वक भावम् ॥५९॥]

59 If these states of emotion or Bhāva are really brought about by Karmic matter how can Ātmā be said to be the cause of these Bhāvas? But the soul's agency is such that while giving up its own state it can effect entirely alien or non-mental changes (*i.e.*, it is the cause of its own mental states which are also indirectly conditioned by Karmic matter).

COMMENTARY—As has been mentioned already Dravya Karma or Karmic matter and the nature of Jīva, both determine the occurrence of a Bhāva or an emotional state. Still Jīva is taken to be the causal agent or Kartā to these emotional states. If the Bhāvas are really due to Dravya Karma or Karmic matter then how can it be consistently held that Jīva is Kartā? But the answer is given thus. Bhāva is Psychic change and as psychic change it can only be brought about by Jīva. Soul cannot have direct causal relation with material and non-mental things. Again if the Bhāvas have no causal relation to

Jīva then there is no reason why it should be bound by Karma. Karmic bondage necessarily presupposes the intimate relation between Jīva and its emotional states. Since there will be no logical ground for bondage in the absence of causal relation then there is no chance for Samsāra which is the result of Karmic bondage. This result contradicts our real experience for there is Samsāra. Therefore our original supposition that the soul is not causal agent for his emotional states is an impossible hypothesis. With this indirect demonstration, the author establishes that soul is the causal agent producing the emotional states which are also indirectly conditioned by Karmic matter.

The disciple who raises the *pūrvapakṣa* is evidently a believer in the Sāmkhya system

अकर्ता निर्गुण शुद्धो नित्यः सर्वगतः क्रियः ।

अमूर्तश्चेतनो मोक्षता जीवः कथिलशासने ॥

In answering *pūrvapakṣa* the author is really condemning the Sāmkhya view represented by the above śloka

60

The answer is again strengthened by further detailed argument

भावो कम्मणिमित्तो कम्म पुण भावकारणं हवदि ।

ण दु तेसिं खलु कत्ता ण विणा भूदा दु कत्तार ॥६०॥

[भावः कम्मनिमित्तं कर्म पुनर्भावकारणं भवति ।

न तु तेषां खलु कर्ता न विना भूतास्तु कर्तारम् ॥६०॥]

60 Bhāva or emotional states are conditioned by Dravya Karma or matter. And Karma in its turn is indeed conditioned by Karmic thought or Bhāva. Soul is not the essential cause in that case and still without essential cause those changes cannot happen.

COMMENTARY—The author here makes use of the distinction between Upādāna Kartā and Nimitta Kartā. Intrinsic or substantial conditions, extrinsic or alien condition. Soul is the essential cause of Karmic thought, the emotional states of desire etc., Karmic matter is the essential cause of the changes in Karmic matter, i.e., the changes in each case form an independent series and yet the two series are corresponding and interrelated. Bhāva or the emotional states is distinctly a psychic change. As a mental fact it is immediately determined by the nature of consciousness. So is the change in Karmic matter. It is entirely determined by physical conditions. Matter cannot take the form of mental state nor the mind undergo a physical change. The author seems to suggest a kind of psycho-physical parallelism. But this parallelism is not merely the temporal correspondence of the two series. The parallelism is transcended and reconciled by the doctrine of *Nimitta kartā*. The author has in his mind such a sharp distinction between the thinking thing and unthinking thing as is associated with *cartesianism* and yet the two

are related by a peculiar conception of causal relation The unthinking thing may be the *numitta kartā* of the thinking thing and conversely the thinking thing may be the *numitta kartā* of the other, though certainly one cannot be the *upādāna kartā* of the other

61.

The same view is further elaborated

कुब्धं सग सहाव अत्ता कत्ता सगस्स भावस्स ।
 ण हि पोगलकम्माण इदि जिणवयण मुण्येयब्धं ॥६१॥
 [कुर्बन् स्वक स्वभावम् आत्मा कर्ता स्वकस्य भावस्य ।
 न हि पुद्गलकर्मणामिति जिनवचनं ज्ञातव्यम् ॥६१॥]

61 Soul which brings about changes in himself is the Upādāna cause of such mental states But not of changes in Karmic matter which are distinctly physical in nature Let the word of Jina be understood thus

COMMENTARY—The author strengthens his argument by referring to Āgama or Śruta He draws the attention of the reader that this doctrine of causation is the right view upheld by the Scriptures

62.

Then it is explained that Jiva and Karmic matter are related to their respective changes according to the six aspects of causal relation

कम्म पि सग कुब्धदि सेण सहावेण सम्मसम्पाणं ।
 जीवो वि य तारिसओ कम्मसहावेण भावेण ॥६२॥
 [कर्माणि स्वक करोति स्वेन स्वभावेन सम्यगात्मानम् ।
 जीवोऽपि च तावृशक. कर्मस्वभावेन भावेन ॥६२॥]

62 Karmic matter itself through its own essential nature indeed brings about its own changes Jiva too in the same manner through its own impure states of thought that are conditioned by Karma brings about its own thought changes

COMMENTARY—The author here emphasizes the fact that the mental states and the states of Karma form two independent series A change in the Jiva is entirely determined by the antecedent mental change In Karmic matter is determined by antecedent physical change Similarly the mental change in the Jiva is entirely determined by the antecedent mental change In short Jiva is the primary condition of mental changes and Karmic matter of its own changes The physical changes of Karmic matter cannot be attributed to Jiva nor the mental changes of Jiva to matter

The *ṣaṭkāraka* referred to by the commentator has reference to the six aspects of

causal relation already explained These are (1) Kartā (2) Karma (3) Karaṇa (4) Nimitta (5) Sakāśa and (6) Adhikarana Each series of causal changes has by itself these six aspects : *e*, the physical and the mental series are self-sufficient and complete

63

Having heard that the two causal series are independent the student ignorant of the principles of reasoning or the Nayas raises an objection

कर्मं कर्म कुर्वदि यदि सो अप्पा करेदि अप्पाण ।

किध तस्स फलं भुजदि अप्पा कम्म च देदि फल ॥६३॥

[कर्म कर्म करोति यदि स आत्मा करोत्यात्मानम् ।

कथ तस्य फलं भुङ्क्ते आत्मा कर्म च वदाति फलम् ॥६३॥]

63 If Karmic matter effects its own changes and similarly if Jiva brings about his own changes in himself why should he enjoy the results or fruits of Karma for which he is not responsible and how can Karma offer its fruits to him ?

COMMENTARY—If Karmic changes form an independent physical series and if mental changes similarly form an independent psychic series then why should Jiva be affected at all by physical changes and in what manner could the physical changes affect Jiva at all The student asks for the justification why the two really independent series should affect each other at all

64

The *pūrvapakṣa* is answered by the seven following gāthās This one states that the Loka is filled with matter

ओगाढगाढणिच्चिदो पोगलकार्योह सव्वदो लोगो ।

सुहुमेहि बादरेहि य णताणतेहि विविधेहि ॥६४॥

[अवगाढगाढनिचित पुद्गलकार्यं सर्वतो लोक ।

सूक्ष्मैर्बाहिरैश्चानन्तानन्तैर्विविधैः ॥६४॥]

64 With material bodies of form perceptible and imperceptible, infinite of infinites in number, and of multifarious kinds by constitution, the world is in every respect filled without interspaces

COMMENTARY—The author is trying to answer objection by showing first the possibility of connection between Jiva and Karmic matter The world space is throughout filled with material bodies Some of these are minute and some of these are perceptible to the senses Of these minute forms some have the peculiarly necessary constitution which would make them fit to be Karmas These are called Karma-vargaṇās Karma-vargaṇās are physical molecules of a particular constitution which gives them the tendency to be

attracted by Jivas They are otherwise known as Karma-prāyoga-pudgala The world that is filled with such materials also contains Jivas The Jivas and Karma-vargaṇās co-exist and by the mere fact of contiguity Jiva and Karmic matter are brought together The settling of Karmic molecules in Jivas is evidently explained by the author as a necessary result of contiguous co-existence He does not want to assume that Jiva has positive attraction towards Karmic matter If any such active influence on the part of Jiva is presupposed, the author will be forced to acknowledge the inevitable causal interaction between matter and Jiva The author does not want to encourage that view Hence he explains the contact between Jiva and matter as due to local conditions The commentator explains the principle of contiguity as

अञ्जनचूर्णपूर्णसमुद्गकनय, i.e.,

the principle that the casket filled with collyrium powder becomes black by mere contact Thus by analogy the author hopes to explain how two distinct things, Jiva and matter, become related together

65

How is it relevant to say that the world is filled with Karmic matter ? How is it an answer to the above objection ? The author in this gāthā shows the relation between the answer and the objection

अत्ता कुणदि सभाव तत्थ गदा पोगला सभावेहि ।

गच्छति कम्मभाव अण्णण्णोगाहमवगाढा ॥६५॥

[आत्मा करोति स्वभाव तत्र गता पुद्गला स्वभावे ।

गच्छन्ति कर्मभावमन्योन्यावगाहावगाढा ॥६५॥]

65 Jiva as determined by its own nature creates its own changes But existing in the same place there is Karmic matter This Karmic matter gets inseparably bound with Jiva and manifests as modes of Karma such as Jñānāvaraṇīya

COMMENTARY—Here the author emphasizes the fact that Karmic matter is entirely self-determined in its modifications So also is Jiva Jiva according to Jaina belief has Samsāric changes from time immemorial, i.e., the series of Samsāric changes is without beginning In this state it is destined to lose its pure thought and has the gross emotional qualities such as desire, anger, etc While this Jiva is undergoing such emotional states determined by its own intrinsic psychic nature there is in the same place Karmic matter which as conditioned by those mental states undergoes modifications These modifications are really determined by matter itself though externally conditioned by the mental states The mental states of an impure character create a sort of adhesive quality in Jiva The Karmic particles merely by proximity cling to Jiva which has the adhesive quality Jiva gets adulterated with Karmic matters as milk and water But this adulteration is not due

to direct causal action upon Jiva

66

As a concomitant of the psychic state, Karmic matter undergoes modification in its own way

जह पुगलदग्वाण बहुप्पयारेहि खधणिव्वत्ती ।
अकदा परेहि दिट्ठा तह कम्माण वियाणाहि ॥६६॥
[यथा पुद्गलद्रव्याणां बहुप्रकारे स्कन्धनिवृत्तिः ।
अकृता परेदृष्टा तथा कर्मणा विजानीहि ॥६६॥]

66 Just as several molecular arrangements in matter are seen in diverse forms though uncaused by alien agency so also the manifestations in Karmic matter occur undetermined by alien cause So do thou understand

COMMENTARY—The author makes himself clear by the illustration The mere presence of light from the sun or the moon is enough to create the fiery sunset or sunrise or the rainbow or the halo These changes are all due to molecular arrangement in matter The sunlight is not directly interfering with matter in producing changes The changes are the necessary concomitants of the presence of light Similarly the presence of emotional states of desire or aversion in Jiva has as its concomitant, the changes in Karmic matter The rainbow of several iridescent colours is merely the concomitant of light, and the different manifestations of Karmic matter are also the concomitants of mental states as desire and aversion From all these examples it is clear that the author wants to reject direct causal relation between the two series and yet he wants to make out that one series is the concomitant of other

67

The author explains why Jiva should enjoy the fruits of Karma of which he is not the cause essential In answering this point the author employs the principles of Naya

जीवा पुगलकाया अण्णाण्णोगाढगहणपडिबद्धा ।
काले विजुज्जमाणा सुहवुक्ख देति भुजति ॥६७॥
[जीवा पुद्गलकाया अण्वोण्यावगाढग्रहणप्रतिबद्धा ।
काले विमुच्यमाना सुखदुःख ददति भुजन्ति ॥६७॥]

67 Jivas and Karmic materials are bound together strongly But when the time for their separation comes they fall apart Karmas offer their results of pleasure and pain and the Jivas enjoy them

COMMENTARY—Jiva and matter in reality have only one causal function of generating

their own respective modes and yet because of the concomitants they may be said to be interdetermining from the Vyavahāra view Jiva because of its emotional states of desire and hatred develops an inclination towards matter This inclination is only the *nimitta* or an external condition Karmic matter so determined gets bound to Jiva It is to be imagined that the material particles somehow cling to Jiva and cloud its intrinsic radiance Changes may occur in molecules as determined by temporal conditions There may be aggregation or disintegration in them When such changes take place in Dravya Karma, Jiva experiences pleasure or pain These are said to be offered by Karma from a relative point of view though as a matter of fact they are the modifications of Jiva One of the commentators says that just as we experience the activity and the change in our body so also we experience the change in our Karmic body for both of them are physical When we don't question ordinarily our experiencing bodily changes, we need not question the possibility of experiencing the changes of Karmic body Thus ends the quality of *bhoktā*—the enjoyer Jiva is shown to be the enjoyer

68

Then the author has a *resume* of the nature of the relation between causality and affective experience

तस्मात् कम्म कत्ता भावेण हि सज्जुदोध जीवस्स ।

भोक्ता तु हवदि जीवो वेदगभावेण कम्मफल ॥६८॥

[तस्मात्कर्म कर्तुं भावेन हि सयुतमथ जीवस्य ।

भोक्ता तु भवति जीवश्चेतकभावेन कर्मफलम् ॥६८॥]

68 According to Niscaya Naya or real aspect Karmic matter is the cause of its own changes But from Vyavahāra Naya or relative aspect it is, in association with psychic states *audayika*, etc, also the cause of mental changes in Jiva Lo ' from this point Jiva becomes the enjoyer because he is by nature consciousness

COMMENTARY—The author makes a distinction between absolute point and relative point of view Really Karmic matter is the cause of its own molecular changes From the relative point it may also be said to be the cause of mental changes Similarly with Jiva It is its own cause and from the other point it is also the cause of material changes It is by nature conscious Experience presupposes mental changes Jiva may be said to experience directly its own mental states and yet Vyavahārically it experiences or is affected by things desirable and undesirable If the aspects of view are remembered then both the propositions are consistent You may say Jiva enjoys its own state and also that Jiva enjoys physical objects of sense presentation Therefore it may very well be conceded that the proposition that Jiva is the essential cause of its own mental state is compatible with the proposition that Jiva is the enjoyer of Karmic effects He is the

Kartā as well as the Bhoktā, the doer and the enjoyer

69

The author again refers to the Lordship of the soul

एव कर्ता भोक्ता होज्ज अप्पा सगेहि कम्मेहि ।
हिडदि पारमपार ससार मोहसछण्णो ॥६६॥

[एव कर्ता भोक्ता भवन्नात्मा स्वकं कर्मणि ।
हिष्यते पारमपार ससार मोहसछन्न ॥६६॥]

69 The soul which is thus the agent of its own Karma, and the enjoyer of the fruits thereof, as conditioned by its own Karma, gets blinded by the veil of ignorance and roams about in the world of *samsāra* which is limited for the faithful and unlimited for the unfaithful

COMMENTARY—Jiva is the Lord of his own career, because he effects his own Karma, he enjoys the fruits thereof. He may roam about in the world of *Samsāra* as conditioned by his own actions, he may finally liberate himself from the bondage by walking the path of three jewels. Then he becomes free from his *upādhi*. This is the career of the Bhavya Jiva. Throughout the career of the Bhavya Jiva, Jiva has the characteristic of Lordship. Again the Abhavya devoid of the benefits of the Jewels is denied the above career. He is destined to roam about for ever in *Samsāra*. The Abhavya Jiva also in his own way is the Lord of his own career. Thus the career of Jiva is entirely self determined

70

Then it is shown how the soul which obtains the benefit of the three jewels is able to realise its true nature through its Lordship over its own career

उवसतखीणमोहो मग्ग जिणभासिदेण समुवगदो ।
जाणाणुमग्गचारी णिव्वाणपुर वजदि धीरो ॥७०॥

[उपशान्तक्षीणमोहो मार्गं जिनभाषितेन समुपगत ।
ज्ञानामुमार्गचारी निर्वाणपुर व्रजति धीरः ॥७०॥]

70 Suppressing or annihilating the veil of ignorance which clouds the faculties of perception and will, well equipped with the three jewels which constitute the path revealed by Jina, the soul, the undaunted pilgrim that conquered the suffering and pain due to the environment, beckoned by the ideal of self-knowledge, wades through the path and reaches the divine city of perfection

COMMENTARY—Jiva is co-eval with *Samsāra*. Ordinarily Jiva is associated with *Upādhis*. The most important of these is *Mohanīya Karma*. This is a sort of veil

of ignorance whose effect is twofold. It may interfere with the faculty of perception or with the faculty of Will. On account of this interference there may be false knowledge or wrong conduct. In the former case it is called Darśana Mohaniya, in the latter Cāritra Mohaniya. All the other Karmic Upādhis may be ultimately traced to the operation of this fundamental Karma. This Mohaniya or the veil of ignorance may sometimes get thin and transparent or may altogether be annihilated. On account of this happy occurrence Jiva may start on a very desirable career. On account of suppression or annihilation of Darśana Mohaniya, Jiva is able to apprehend the nature of true reality. And thus has faith in the ultimate Tattvas. The faith in and comprehension of Tattvas may lead to clear knowledge of reality. By this suppression and annihilation of Cāritra Mohaniya, Will may be right in its decision, for right volitional choice is the consequence of true knowledge. Right perception and faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct form the true path. These are the three jewels. Soul equipped with these three jewels must further conquer the environment. The suffering and pain due to environmental conditions should not touch Jiva in any way. After conquering the environment Jiva has to pursue the path of righteousness having as the goal complete self-knowledge. This pilgrim in the path of life finally reaches the city of Nirvāna which is the *Summum Bonum* of life according to Jainism.

71-2

Then the author summarises the characteristics of Jivāstikāya

एकको चेव महप्पा सो दुबियप्पो तिलक्खणो होदि ।

चतु-चकमणो भणियो पच्चग्गुणप्पधानो य ॥७१॥

छक्कापक्कमजुत्तो उवउत्तो सत्तभगसब्भावो ।

अट्टासओ णवट्ठो जीवो दसठाणगो भणियो ॥७२॥

[एक एव महत्त्वा स द्विविकल्पस्त्रिलक्षणो भवति ।

चतुरचङ्क्रमणो भणितः पञ्चागुणप्रधानश्च ॥७१॥]

[षट्कापक्रमयुक्त उपयुक्तः सप्तमङ्गसङ्गाव ।

अष्टाध्वो नवार्थो जीवो दशस्थानगो भणितः ॥७२॥]

71-2 The great soul characterised by Upayoga may be said to be essentially identical and one, is again of two kinds, has three fundamental qualities, roams about in four Gatis, is marked by five primary emotional states, moves about in the world along the six directions, is capable of admitting seven-fold predication, has eight qualities, generates the nine Padārthas, manifests in ten states of existence, thus he is said to be

COMMENTARY—The author in the form of a *cūlikā* or summary ingeniously describes Jiva. He employs numerical description from one to ten. When all Jivas are looked at

from their essential characteristics they are substantially one. From the point of Upādhis they may be said to be of two classes the perfect and the imperfect, has three primary qualities. The three characteristics may be the three aspects of consciousness knowledge, will and emotion, or may be the three Jewels Darsana, Jñāna and Cāritra, or may be the three characteristics of Dravya in general permanence through birth and death, or may refer to three forms of existences, *substance*, *qualities* and *modes*. Jiva is again said to be subject to four Gatis. The Gatis are already mentioned. He is marked again by the five primary emotional states which are brought about by the five different changes of Karmic matter. These also have been dealt with above. 'Six' denotes the six directions of the world along which there may be possible movements for Jiva. 'Seven' denotes these seven fold pradiśa applicable to Jiva. These are the seven propositions forming the Sapta-bhaṅgī, 'Eight' denotes the eight characteristics of Jiva. Samsāri Jiva has the eight Karmic characteristics, such as Jñānāvarana, Darsanāvarana, Mohaniya, etc. The perfect Jiva has the eight infinite Gunas such as Ananta Jñāna, Ananta Darsana, Ananta Virya, Ananta Sukha, etc. 'Nine' denotes the nine Padārthas generated by Jiva in conjunction with matter. These are Jiva, Ajiva, Pāpa, Punya, Āsrava, Samvara, Nirjarā, Bandha, and Moksa.

'Ten' denotes the 10 states of existence. The ten states are the (1) liberated and (9) the unliberated nine, which are five Ekendriya Jivas (Prthivīkāyika, Āpkāyika, Tejaskāyika, Vāyukāyika, and Vanaspatikāyika), and Jivas with two, three, four and five sense organs respectively.

73

The perfect and the liberated soul has nothing to gain by going from one place to another. Therefore he may stay in the very same place where he attains Nirvāna. But, according to Jaina view, he goes to the summit of the world. The author explains why he should do so.

पयडिट्टिदिअणुभागप्पदेसबधेहि सक्खदो मुक्को ।

उड्डुं गच्छदि सेसा विदिसावज्ज गदि जंति ॥७३॥

[प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभागप्रदेशबन्धं सर्वतो मुक्त ।

ऊर्ध्वं गच्छति शेषा विदिग्बर्जा गतिं यान्ति ॥७३॥]

73 When Jiva gets liberated from the bonds of Karma which are of different aspects of substance, duration, fertility, and extensity, he reaches the summit of the upper world. Others who are in Samsāra move about in all the directions except the four diagonal corners.

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā refers to a religious dogma. The liberated Jiva or Siddha Jiva has the intrinsic movement upwards. It tends to move vertically upwards till it

comes to a stay at the summit of the Loka For it cannot move beyond, because of the absence of the moving principle of Dharmāstikāya

But Samsāri Jivas after death are said to have movements in six directions They are denied the four diagonal courses Along the cardinal points and up and down they can move These are the *anuśrenīs*, the ladder paths of disembodied Jivas

The disembodied Jiva has still the *kārmana sarīra*—body constituted by Kārmic matter This body is *sūkṣma*—subtle body Is there any electro-magnetic condition which constrains the Karmic body to move only in the six directions? We dont want to speculate

CHAPTER II, ON PUDGALĀSTIKĀYA

74

The author mentions the four different kinds of material objects

खधा य खधदेसा खंधपदेसा य ह्येति परमाणू ।
इति ते चतुर्विधव्या पुद्गलकाया मुण्येव ॥७४॥

[स्कन्धाश्च स्कन्धदेशा स्कन्धप्रदेशाश्च भवन्ति परमाणवः ।
इति ते चतुर्विकल्पा पुद्गलकाया ज्ञातव्या ॥७४॥]

74 These are the four basic modifications out of which the multifarious modes of matter are formed. Be it understood that matter exists in four main modes—*skandhas*, *skandhadesas*, *skandhapradesas* and primary atoms.

COMMENTARY—*Skandhas* are the aggregates of atoms. This class refers to complete molecular constitution. *Skandhadesa* is said to be incomplete. But still it is an aggregate. Similarly *Skandhapradesa*. These three are the differences in molecular constitution. The last class refers to the primary atom which is the unit constituting the other three classes. This is explained in the next Gāthā.

75

The respective characteristics of these four classes are given below

खध सयलसमस्तस्य तस्स दु अद्ध भणति वेसो त्ति ।
अद्धद्ध च पवेसो परमाणू चेव अविभागी ॥७५॥

[स्कन्धः सकलसमस्तस्तस्य त्वर्धं भणन्ति वेसा इति ।
अर्धार्धं च प्रदेशः परमाणुश्चेवाविभागी ॥७५॥]

75 The complete molecule of matter is *skandha*, a half of it is *skandhadesa*, a half of that half is *skandhapradesa*, and what cannot be divided is primary atom thus say (the learned)

COMMENTARY—The complete *skandha* refers to the molecule which has all the physical qualities without any exception. Any physical body perceived by us may be taken as an example of complete *skandha*. If the *process* of bisection is continued to infinity the limit of the series is the *paramānu*—that which cannot be divided further. Conversely starting from the atom an aggregate of two, three, etc., more atoms will generate *skandhas*. An aggregate of infinite number of atoms is the complete *skandha* (Note the atomic basis of Physics)

76

Pudgala ultimately refers to the class of primary atoms. But the name is also applied to the derivative classes of *skandhas*

बादरसुहृमगदानं खधाण पुगलो ति ववहारो ।
ते होति छप्पयारा तेलोक्कं जेहि णिप्पणं ॥७६॥

[बादरसौहृम्यगतानां स्कन्धानां पुद्गल इति व्यवहारः ।
ते सन्ति षट्प्रकारास्त्रैलोक्यं ये निष्पन्नम् ॥७६॥]

76 *Skandhas* are of two kinds. Those that can be perceived by the senses and the minute ones beyond sense perception. These also are called matter conventionally. These manifest themselves in six different modes by which the three worlds are completely filled.

COMMENTARY—The term *pudgala* is specially applicable to the primary atoms. These are the indestructible material basis of the world. The *skandhas* or molecules though derivative and secondary are also called by the same name *pudgala*. These molecules or *skandhas* have the characteristics of touch, taste, smell, sound and colour. They can increase or decrease being aggregates. They can grow or decay. They are minute or large. These *skandhas* or molecular aggregates are of six different kinds which are mentioned in the next *gāthā*. These aggregates or *skandhas* in their six different forms completely fill the three *Lokas*.

76*1

The six different kinds of *Skandhas* are enumerated

पुढवी जलं च छाया चर्त्तरिदियविसयकम्मपाओग्गा ।
कम्मातीदा एवं छब्भेया पोगला होति ॥७६*१॥

[पृथिवी जलं च छाया चतुरिन्द्रियविषयकर्मपायोग्गा ।
कर्मातीता एवं षड्भेदाः पुद्गला सन्ति ॥७६*१॥]

76*1 The *skandhas* or molecular aggregates exist in six different forms — Earth,

water, shadow, the objects of the four senses except sight, and karmic matter, and molecules which are unfit to become karmic matter

COMMENTARY—The six kinds of *skandhas* are otherwise called thus —

- 1 Bādara-bādara—Solid
 - 2 Bādara—Liquid
 - 3 Sūkṣmabādara—Apparently solid like a shadow
 - 4 Bādarasūkṣma—Minute particles evident to the senses
 - 5 Sūkṣma—Minute, not perceptible
 - 6 Sūkṣma-sūkṣma—Very minute
-
- 1 Is that which cannot become combined or one, when broken, like wood or stone
 - 2 Is the one whose parts become one again when broken, as water, etc
 - 3 The larger cannot be broken, or divided or caught as shadow, lightning, darkness
 - 4 Though minute yet evident to the senses as taste, smell, colour, etc
 - 5 Minute and imperceptible as Karmic matter
 - 6 Those below Karmic matters up to Skandhas made up of two atoms

77

Thus after describing the various *skandhas* the author explains the nature of Paramāṇus or primary atoms which are the constituent elements of Skandhas

सर्व्वेसि खधाण जो अतो त वियाण परमाणू ।
सो सस्सदो असदो एक्को अविभागि मुत्तिभवो ॥७७॥

[सर्व्वेसा स्कन्धानां योऽन्यस्त विजानीहि परमाणुम् ।
स शाश्वतोऽशब्द एकोऽविभागी मूर्तिभव ॥७७॥]

77 Do you understand that whatever is the limit of all *skandhas* is the primary atom That same is eternal, unsounding (silent), occupying one space point and of corporeal form

COMMENTARY—The limiting unit of the process of division of molecules is the Paramāṇu or the primary atom Since it cannot be further sub-divided it is called atom Since it occupies a single point of space, it is one Since it is the eternal and inalienable substratum of corporeal things, it is eternal Since it is the constitutive basis of physical objects, it is the generator of physical things Since it cannot by itself bring about sound vibrations, it is non-sounding or silent These are the characteristics of the primary atom

It may be noted here that, according to Jaina thought, matter is indestructible, so

also is Jiva It is not due to the creative fiat of a Will It cannot be destroyed Atoms are the constitutive element of physical bodies Thus according to Jaina view, matter and space are objectively real In this respect the view is quite similar to that of modern science Again it is worth noting that the atom is described as non-sounding Several Indian systems of thought associate sound with Ākāśa, a term which is quite ambiguous It means either space or ether But the Jaina thinkers distinctly explain sound as due to molecular impingement Unless one molecule of matter strikes against another there is no possibility of Sound An atom by itself is incapable of producing sound Hence it is silent Jaina physics of sound is also quite scientific

78

This primary atom is not of four kinds as some people would have such as earth, air, fire and water But it is only one in nature though it is the constitutive basis of the four Dhātus or modes of physical existence The atom has its own essential nature which is distinct from that of the four elements

आदेसमेत्तमुत्तो धातुचतुष्कस्स कारणं जो दु ।

सो जेओ परमाणू परिणामगुणो सयमसहो ॥७८॥

[आदेशमात्रमूर्तं धातुचतुष्कस्य कारणं यस्तु ।

स ज्ञेय परमाणु परिणामगुण स्वयमशब्द ॥७८॥]

78 Whatever thing by its very name implies, perceptual form, is the essential cause of these four elements, is characterised by unthinking [?] *mūrti* nature and is unsounding, that is the atom, so be it understood

COMMENTARY—The author denies the qualitative difference of Paramānus. By the very name an atom implies the division of physical objects having the sense qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour From the point of spaciality it is beginning, middle and end in one From the general principle that substance and quality are inseparable, it follows that the spacial unit of atom is also the spacial unit of contract, or of smell, or of colour, i.e., the unit of space occupied by the atom is also the unit of space accommodating the sense colours If the primary atom through its manifestation were to part with either smell or with the smell and taste or with smell, taste and colour then the very atom would be annihilated Therefore the separability of the quality cannot be associated with the atom Again fire, air, earth and water, have as their constitutive cause the atom Wonderful are the qualities of primary atoms when their potential characteristics are taken into consideration The non-manifested sense qualities become actual in the aggregates or Skandhas But in the case of sound it can't be said that it is present in the atom even in *śakti* or potentiality for sound implies several molecules of several spacial units Therefore such a characteristic cannot consistently belong to an

atom which has only one spacial unit Paramānu is called *mūrta* for another reason also, because it can be a perceptual object for *paramāvadhi*. It is called so not because it is perceived by our senses. It is distinctly transcending the capacity of our senses though it can be perceived by the Kevalin.

Then he describes how sound is actually produced by atoms which are really without sound quality

सहो लघ्वप्यभवो लघ्वो परमाणुसंगसघादो ।

पुट्टे सु तेसु जायदि सहो उत्पादगो नियदो ॥७६॥

[शब्द-स्कन्धप्रभव स्कन्ध परमाणुसंगसघात ।

स्पृष्टेषु तेसु जायते शब्द उत्पादको नियतः ॥७६॥]

79 Sound is generated by Skandhas. Skandhas themselves are the aggregates of atoms. When these aggregates strike one another sound is produced which may be natural or artificial (hence sound may be indirectly associated with atoms also).

COMMENTARY—If the Skandhas constituted by Primary atoms strike one another there is sound. If they strike of their own accord then there is natural or *svābhāvika* sound. If the striking is due to other agencies then it is *prāyogika* or purposeful sound. The illustrations of *svābhāvika* or natural sound are thunder of the clouds and the roar of the sea. *Prāyogika* or purposeful sound is again of two kinds *bhāsātma* or Language and *abhāsātma*, non-language. The language sound again may be *akṣarātma* or *anākṣarātma*, articulate and inarticulate. The articulate sound is made up of alphabetical sounds, the inarticulate is the language of animals.

Non-language sounds are of four kinds

- 1 *Tata*, sound produced by stringed instruments
- 2 *Vitata*, the sound produced by drum
- 3 *Ghana*, sound produced by cymbals, etc
- 4 *Susira*, sound produced by pipes and other wind instrument

Further description of the primary Atom. That it is *ekapradesa* or occupies one spacial point is specially referred to

निष्ठो जाणवकासो ण सावकासो पदेसवो भेत्ता ।

खंधाणं पि य कत्ता पविहत्ता कालसंखाण ॥८०॥

[नित्यो जाणवकासो न सावकास प्रवेशतो भेत्ता ।

स्कन्धानामपि च कर्ता प्रविभक्ता कालसंख्याया ॥८०॥]

80 The primary atom is eternal, is spacial, and yet non-spacial, is the differentiating factor of *skandhas* and is also the cause of their changes. It is also the determinant of time and number.

COMMENTARY—Paramāṇu is associated with one space point. Since it is not capable of disintegration it is indestructible and eternal. Though it occupies only one space point since it is the substratum of colour and other sense qualities, it has spaciality accommodating qualities. But as it has only one space point and as it is without beginning, middle, or end, and as it cannot accommodate another space point, it may also be called non-spacial. Being the constituent element of Skandhas it may be said to be the determinant of the difference of Skandhas. For the same reason it is the substantial cause of Skandhas. By its own change of position it becomes the measure of time. A single instant of time corresponds to a single shift of an atom from one position to the immediately next. It is also the measure of number or quantity. Being the constitutive element of Skandhas it brings about quantitative difference of things (*dravya-samkhyā*). Since its associated space point is the constitutive element of space, it is indirectly the cause of quantitative difference of space (*ksetra-samkhyā*). Since its motion from point to point corresponds to duration of time, it is also the basis of quantitative difference of time (*kāla-samkhyā*). Again because it is the basis of modification of things through aggregation or disintegration it is also the condition of the quantitative difference of modes or (*bhāva-samkhyā*).

Thus according to Jaina view the primary atom is the direct unit of things and the indirect unit of space, time and change. The quantitative difference in these things and also the qualitative difference in physical objects may ultimately be traced to the constitutive of Paramāṇu.

81.

Further description of the qualities of Paramāṇu and its modes

एयरसवर्णगंध दोकासं सद्वकारणमसह ।

लघतरिद्व दन्व परमाणु तं विद्यानेहि ॥८१॥

[एकरसवर्णगन्ध द्विस्पर्शं शब्दकारणमशब्दम् ।

स्कन्धान्तरित द्वयं परमाणु तं विद्यानीहि ॥८१॥]

81 That substance which has a single taste, colour, and smell and two contacts, which is the cause of sound, itself unsounding, which is different from Skandhas though constituting them is the Paramāṇu. So do thou learn.

COMMENTARY—The Primary atom is examined with reference to different sense qualities of physical objects. Five colours are recognised generally in external things of which only one colour can be associated with the Paramāṇu. According to Jaina view a Paramāṇu is an object of perfect *avadhi* perception. Though an atom is metemperical

to a finite individual it is distinctly a Rūpa or Visual object for the super-normal faculty of Avadhī. If the description in the Gāthā is based upon such super-normal perception, unfortunately it cannot be verified by our experience. But still there is a way of imagining the truth. An atom may be associated with a single light wave. If it is not able to obstruct more than a single light wave of a particular wave length then it must manifest itself as having only one colour to a super-normal faculty. Whether it is actually so constituted as to behave in that fashion it is for the physicist to determine. We have here only to notice the uncompromising realistic attitude of Jaina thought.

Of the five different states ordinarily recognised, an atom can have only one. Of the two different smells it may have either. Of the eight contact qualities smooth and rough, heavy and light, are the qualities of Skandhas. These cannot be in the atom. The remaining four qualities may be present in an atom in pairs. The elements constituting the pair must be mutually compatible. *Smigdha* and *sīta*, *rūkṣa* and *usna*, may constitute the consistent pairs, *īśa*, viscosity or adhesiveness may co-exist with cold and hardness and repulsiveness may co-exist with heat.

This description would naturally introduce qualitative difference among atoms and yet according to the author there can be no qualitative difference among atoms as they are identical material units.

It is extremely interesting to notice the elaborate analysis of sense qualities which is even as minute as that of Modern Psychology. But the ancient Psychological analysis of smell is as halting as the modern one. Smell could be analysed only into disagreeable and agreeable. Several attempts made in recent years to go beyond this crude difference merely ended in failure where the modern scientists succeeded there the ancient thinkers also achieved success, *īśa*, in the analysis of the other senses. Another point worth noticing is the analysis of cutaneous sensations into eight elements. This is almost modern in its achievement. This indirect Psychological value is more important than the description based upon super-normal perception which unfortunately cannot be verified by Science in its present state.

82

By way of summary, the author enumerates the different forms of corporeal existence. The description may also be taken as a sort of extensive definition of matter.

उबभोज्जमिदिह य इदियकाया मणो य कम्माणि ।

ज हवदि मुत्तमण्ण त सव्व पुग्गल जाणे ॥८२॥

[उपभोग्यमिन्द्रियैश्चेन्द्रियकाया मनश्च कर्माणि ।

यद्भवति मूर्तमन्यत् तत्सर्वं पुद्गल जानीयात् ॥८२॥]

82 Whatever is perceived by the senses, the sense organs, the various kinds of

śārīras, or bodies of Jivas, the physical *manas* or brain, the Karmas, &c are *mūrta* objects. Understand that all these are Pudgala or matter.

COMMENTARY—The author enumerates the different states of matter. All objects of sense perception are corporeal. An object may be apprehended through any one of the senses. Therefore, anything that has the sense quality of colour, contact, smell, taste, or sound comes under this definition. Not only the objects of sense perception but also the sense organs are physical. Thirdly the different *śārīras* or the bodies of Jivas are also physical. These are five in numbers. Audārika, Vaikṛiyaka, Āhāraka, Taijasa, and Kārmana. The author includes *dravya-manas* or mind under the same class. Evidently it means brain which is no doubt physical. *Dravya-karmas* are also material since they are constituted by physical atoms. And again he implies *no-karma-pudgalas*, organised matter forming part of organism. This *no-karma* matter refers to matter assimilated by the organism through the process of Metabolism. And by the word 'others' he refers to the several atoms and Skandhas not already enumerated. All these are material.

The five *śārīras* referred to in the Gāthā require elucidation.

1 *Audārika-sarīra* *Udārana* means *sthūla* or gross. The *sarīra* is called *audārika* because it is constituted by *sthūla* or gross matter. It is also derived from *udara*, womb, that which is born from the womb is *audārika*. Any way *audārika-sarīra* refers to organic bodies, animal and human.

2 *Vaikṛiyaka-sarīra* Term *vikṛiyā* implies the wonderful bodily transformations that are associated with a *deva* or divine being. A *deva* can take any kind of body he pleases from minute to huge forms. That kind of *śārīras* is called *Vaikṛiyaka-śārīra*.

3 *Āhāraka-śārīra* when a *yogin* during *tapas* has certain difficulties about intricate facts of reality, there shoots forth a kind of subtle body from him. This stretches out so far as to be in communion with another well-informed person, from whom the information sought for is secured by a sort of telepathic response. This shooting body from the *yogin* is *Āhāraka-sarīra*.

4 *Taijasa-sarīra* This refers to the shining body or the light-body.

5 *Kārmana śārīra* This refers to the Karmic body of each Jiva. Every Jiva carries this Karmic body with itself when it roams through the cycle of Samsāra.

The first alone is the object of sense perception, and the others are subtle bodies. The succeeding one is subtler than the preceding one in order. *cf* the *Sūtra, parasparam sūksmam*, for further description of these *śārīras*, we refer the reader to *Taittvārtha-Sūtra* where the author describes the characteristics by several *Sūtras* (*Sūtra* 36 to the end of 2nd chapter).

Thus ends the chapter on matter or Pudgalāstikāya.

CHAPTER III, ON DHARMA AND ADHARMA

83

The author first describes Dharma or the principle of motion

धम्मत्थिकायमरस अवण्णगंधं असहमप्पासं ।
लोगोगाढ पुट्टं पिट्ठलमसखादियपदेस ॥८३॥

[धर्मास्तिकायोऽरसोऽवर्णगन्धोऽशब्दोऽस्पर्श ।
लोकावगाढ स्पृष्ट पृथुलोऽसंख्यातप्रदेश ॥८३॥]

83 Dharmāstikāya is devoid of qualities of taste, colour, smell, sound and contact. It pervades the whole world, it is continuous because of inseparability, has extension because of its co-existensiveness with space. Though in reality of *ekapradesa* yet in *vyavahāra* is of many *pradesas*.

COMMENTARY—The author introduces important principles without which the world would be incomplete. Dharmāstikāya and Adharmāstikāya are distinctly peculiar to Jaina system of thought. The former is the principle of motion and the latter of rest. These terms are used in a technical sense by Jaina writers. Non-Jaina writers, both European and Indian, have many of them misunderstood these technical names. We shall reserve our discussion to the end of this chapter.

In the above Gāthā the author clearly describes the nature of Dharma or the principle of motion. Since it is non-corporeal or *amūṛta* it has no sense qualities which are generally associated with matter. The qualities of contact, colour, taste, smell and sound are not to be associated with Dharma. Therefore it is not physical. Again it is not an aggregate of simple elements as matter is. Therefore Dharma is continuous and non-composite. Its influence is co-extensive with the whole world. Therefore it may be said to be co-extensive with Lokākāśa without any gaps or intervals. It cannot be said to have manifested at any particular time of the World's History much less is it created. It is coeval with the world and co-extensive with space, and because of the latter character, it is an Astikāya.

84

Next Gāthā describes the remaining qualities of Dharmāstikāya

अगुरुलघुगेहिं सया तेहिं अणतेहिं परिणद निच्च ।
गदिकिरियाजुत्ताण कारणभूद सयमकज्ज ॥८४॥

[अगुरुलघुकं सदा तं अनन्तं परिणतं नित्यं ।
गतिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतं स्वयमकार्यं ॥८४॥]

84 Because it has the infinite manifestations of the incorporeal nature *agurulaghu*, and because of its dialectic nature of persistence through appearance and disappearance it is a real existence. Itself being unaffected by movement it conditions the motion of those that can move, matter and life.

COMMENTARY—The author next establishes the substantial reality of Dharmāstikāya. It has the characteristic change and modification of all the primary entities though it is incorporeal. Therefore it is permanent and real. It is the indispensable condition of movement in physical objects as well as in living beings. But itself cannot be moved by any other thing because it is incapable of movement.

85

The author explains by a well-known analogy how it is the condition of motion

उदय जह मच्छाण गमणाणुगहकरं हवदि लोए ।
तह जीवपुग्गलाण धम्म दव्वं वियाणेहि ॥८५॥

[उदय यथा मत्स्यानां गमनानुगहकरं भवति लोके ।
तथा जीवपुद्गलानां धर्मं द्रव्यं विजानीहि ॥८५॥]

85 Just as water itself being indifferent or neutral, is the condition of movement of fishes so Dharma itself non-motive, is the *sine qua non* of motion of Jivas and Pudgalas.

COMMENTARY—The author explains the function of Dharmāstikāya by a very striking example. Water is the indispensable condition for the life of the fish. The fish lives and moves only in water. But water neither moves with the moving fish nor does it stimulate the fish to move. It is practically indifferent towards the moving fish. If the fish moves, it is due to its own intrinsic and spontaneous activity, and not to the causal agency of water. Such is the relation of Dharmāstikāya to objects of the world. If objects move from one place to another, the movement is due to the intrinsic condition of the object. But still Dharmāstikāya is the *sine qua non* of motion of the objects of the world, i.e., in short it is merely the condition, and not the generative cause, of motion.

86.

Next the author describes the Adharmāstikāya or the principle of rest

जह हवदि धम्मदव्वं तह त जाणेह दव्वमधमक्खं ।
ठिदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभूवं तु पुढवीव ॥८६॥

[यथा भवति धर्मद्रव्यं तथा तज्जानीहि द्रव्यमधर्मव्यम् ।
स्थितिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतं तु पृथिवीव ॥८६॥]

86 The nature of Adharma is essentially similar to that of Dharma But it is like the earth (which is the resting place of things) the *sine qua non* of rest for things in motion (both animate and inanimate)

COMMENTARY—Adharma or the principle of rest has all the characteristics associated with Dharma or the principle of motion This is also devoid of sense qualities This is also non-corporeal This is in itself non-spacial and yet it is co extensive with Lokākāśa These characteristics it has in common with the principle of motion But it has its own differentiating quality In this respect it is compared with earth which is the resting place of things Moving things whether animate or inanimate are not arrested and brought to rest by the earth But if there is no earth to support, there will be no possibility of rest for the moving things Similarly the Adharmāstikāya without interfering with motion itself is the condition of rest for the moving things

87

Then the author gives the reason why Dharma and Adharma are considered Astikāyas or existences

जादो अलोगलोगो जेसि सवभावदो य गमणठिदो ।

दो वि य मया विभक्ता अविभक्ता लोयसेत्ता य ॥८७॥

[जातमलोकलोक ययो सद्भावतश्च गमनस्थिति ।

द्वावपि च मतौ विभक्तावविभक्तौ लोकमात्रौ च ॥८७॥]

87 The two things which by their existence bring about the difference between the world and beyond, which are respectively the condition of motion and rest, which are different in function, but same in nature and *pradesa*, are Dharma and Adharma These are uncreated and of the same magnitude as Lokākāśa

COMMENTARY—The existence of these two principles must be postulated as the necessary conditions of the world for without this there will be neither motion nor rest among things There will be neither the world nor beyond If the material particles and Jivas are not kept together as a system, then they will get scattered through the whole place resulting in sheer chaos There will be no definite world There will be neither the beyond or Aloka The difference between Loka and Aloka is entirely due to the coherent system of molecules and Jivas, conditioned by these principles Dharma and Adharma are said to be distinct because of the difference in function The former is the condition of motion, the latter of rest But they are quite similar in nature and are indistinguishable because of their non-exclusive co-existence in space They are in themselves *niskriyadravyas* Non-active and non-functional and yet condition the things living and non-living in their motion and rest For this reason they are limited entirely to the world Their function will not be felt beyond the world for the simple reason that there are no things

beyond

88.

Next the author points out that Dharma and Adharma are in themselves neutral, and indifferent condition respectively of motion and rest in other things

ण य गच्छति धम्मत्थी गमण ण करेदि अण्णदवियस्स ।

हवदि गदिस्स य पसरो जीवाण पुग्गलानां च ॥८८॥

[न च गच्छति धर्मास्तिको गमन न करोत्यन्यद्रव्यस्य ।

भवति गते च प्रसरो जीवानां पुद्गलानां च ॥८८॥]

88 Dharmāstikāya does not move itself nor effect motion in other things But it forms the condition of motion in living and non-living things

COMMENTARY—Then it is determined that Dharma and Adharma being in themselves entirely neutral from the external condition of motion and rest respectively Dharmāstikāya itself is incapable of movement nor can it be an efficient cause of motion in other things such as, physical objects and living beings In what way can it be said to condition motion ? certainly not like the horses that, while themselves running, indirectly cause the motion of persons on their back Dharmāstikāya does not carry things, locomotion of things and persons is not brought about by Dharma for it is a *niskriya dravya* But it behaves like water which by its mere presence is the condition of motion in fishes, *i e*, Dharmāstikāya by its mere existence conditions motion without being the efficient cause of motion Jivas and Padgalas have motion because of their own efficient causes and yet motion in them will be impossible, but for the external condition of Dharmāstikāya

Similarly Adharma being neutral in itself is the external condition of rest It is merely a *bahiranga-hetu* Just as the earth is the standing place for horses and the shadow of a tree, the place of rest for the pilgrims, so Adharma is the non-efficient external condition of things at rest

89

Then the reason why Dharma and Adharma are merely neutral conditions (*udāsīna-hetu*)

विज्जदि जेसिं गमण ठाण पुण तेसिमेव सभवदि ।

ते सगपरणामेहिं दु गमण ठाण च कुव्वति ॥८९॥

[विद्यते येषां गमन स्थान पुनस्तेषामेव सभवति ।

ते स्वकपरिणामेस्तु गमन स्थान च कुर्वन्ति ॥८९॥]

89 To whatever things there is motion to the very same there can be rest, or cessa-

tion of motion, such things of their own spontaneous efficiency effect either motion or rest

COMMENTARY—The author explains why these are called *udāsina-hetu*. He wants to emphasize that Dharma is not the intrinsic condition of motion nor Adharma of rest, i.e., he wants to deny that they are *mukhya-hetu*. What if they are the *mukhya-hetu* for motion and rest, then the things that are in motion must continue to be so for ever and the things that are at rest must remain in the same state for ever. But things do not behave in that fashion. Therefore it is inferred that these are only *udāsina-hetus* or neutral or external conditions. This only means that they are not efficient causes. Ordinarily we perceive that things moving come to rest and things at rest begin to move. That shows that both motion and rest are associated with single things. Since this fact prevails in nature we have to infer that motion and rest are not produced by Dharma and Adharma as *mukhya-hetu*. Motion and rest must be traced to the intrinsic and efficient nature of things themselves. That clearly shows that Dharma and Adharma are merely *bahiranga-hetus*.

NOTE

After taking to task the several writers who misunderstood the technical terms Dharma and Adharma, Mr J L Jaini writes (on p 25 of his *Outlines of Jainism*)

“Matter goes to struggle with the unwary or infatuated soul, time times the conflict, space makes possible the arena, Dharma keeps the combatants to struggle on, and Adharma assists them when they are inclined to rest.” Again on the same page “Dharma and Adharma are the necessary conditions of its continuance in its endless vicissitudes, merit and demerit, high and low, happiness and misery, as far as disturbance and tranquillity. Of course, Dharma and Adharma are in their nature and *modus operandi* the same. It is the same sword in the hand of a devoted soldier or fanatic rebel.”

I am afraid that Mr Jaini is still thinking of Dharma and Adharma as *quasi-moral* instruments in the hands of a Jiva.

The terms should not in the least be associated with any kind of moral struggle and tranquillity. Motion and rest contemplated in this connection on distinctly physico-mathematical. They should not therefore be interpreted even metaphorically to mean anything more than that connotation. We have to remember the following points —

- 1 Dharma and Adharma—are *amūrta-dravyas*. They have no sense qualities of colour, etc
- 2 They are *ajīvas*—non-living
- 3 They have spatial relation though in themselves *eka-pradeśi*
- 4 They are *niskriyas*—non-active.
- 5 They are *bahiraṅga-hetu* or *udāsina-hetu* and not *mukhya-hetu*
- 6 They are non-discrete and continuous

There are some of the important common qualities emphasised by the Jaina Thinkers

Of course that they are *astikāyas* need not be emphasised.

If we ponder over these qualities, then they can never be connected with moral struggle or evolution

The Jaina philosopher recognised, in the world, Matter, Life and Space. But are they enough ? No There would be no world The Atoms and Jivas may be scattered throughout the infinite space Therefore there must be something else besides these three. That something must be able to maintain a coherent system of Jivas and atoms, must have the function of preventing the flying atoms, must limit the boundary of the world of things and persons For the author distinctly says that without Adharma there will be only chaos, there will be no world Therefore the Jaina Thinkers pointed the existence of a fourth entity which binds together things and persons So the hypothesis of Adharma

This is something like Newton's gravitation, but Adharma is slightly different Its main function is to arrest things But then there is this difficulty If there were Adharma alone how could there be motion at all in things ? There would be an eternal paralysis of Reality To remove this difficulty Dharma had to be posited The function of Dharma is to guarantee motion within the limits imposed by Adharma This is the reason for the second hypothesis

But the trouble is not yet over If the two exist within a spatial limit one guaranteeing motion and the other rest, then the things in motion must be in motion for ever, and things at rest must be there for ever But our experience is not of that kind One and the same has motion or rest, it may move or it may come to stay Therefore Dharma and Adharma must be deprived of their causality They can be only *bahiranga-hetu* or *udāsina-hetu*, i.e., they must be indifferent and neutral in themselves and yet must be indispensable to the completion of the world

This seems to be the logical development of the system The most approximate modern conception answering to the description will be *Ether* of the physicist But the Jaina systems require two such entities functionally different, one acting like Newton's *gravitation* (*adharma*) and the other guaranteeing motion within the limits It would not be quite accurate to think of centripetal and centrifugal forces because *dharma* and *adharma* are *niskriyas* Does it mean the duality of electro-magnetic influence of Ether ? The constitution of an atom is supposed to be a system of electrons (positive and negative) Had the Jaina thinkers any such idea about the whole world ? We can only contemplate But of this much we are certain that *dharma* and *adharma* are parts of the physical system They are two different entities without which the system of reality would be impossible and incomplete

Again Dr Seal suggests that Dharma is "answering somewhat to Leibnitz's Pre-established harmony it is the cause (or condition) of the *system of movements*, the fact of an *order* in the movements of Jiva and Pudgala," (Note E at the end of *Dravya Samgraha*, S B J pp LVIII)

As the whole letter is not quoted, I am not in a position to know what Dr Seal has to say about *adharma*. With due deference to the great Philosopher I beg to state that he misses the point. Dharma need not necessarily be associated with simultaneous movements as I pointed out. Adharma seems to be logically prior to Dharma in the construction of the system. Hence I am not able to appreciate this reference to Pre-established Harmony which has a special function in the system of a '*windowless monads*'. There certainly is the idea of corresponding movements. Hence Dharma is not the 'system of movements'. Its meaning is distinctly *subsequent* to that of Adharma. How could Adharma be connected with Leibnitz's System? Then what is the force of that reference?

CHAPTER IV, ON ĀKĀŚA OR SPACE

90

In this Chapter the author describes the nature and characteristics of space The term Ākāśa here means space and not Ether as it is very often interpreted in other systems of Indian philosophy

सर्वेसि जीवाण सेसाण तह य पुग्गलाण च ।

ज देवि विवरमखिल त लोए हवदि आयास ॥६०॥

[सर्वेषां जीवानां शेषाणां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।

यद्वदाति विवरमखिल तल्लोके भवत्याकाशम् ॥६०॥]

90 What contains or accommodates completely all Jivas and Pudgalas and the remaining Dravyas is the world space or Lokākāśa

COMMENTARY—Space is considered to be objectively real in Jaina system Objectively real space is ordinarily considered to be self-contradictory and impossible On the so-called impossibility of space idealism bases its arguments But in recent years Mathematicians have clearly shown that space and time are not really self-contradictory Euclidian space is quite possible and may be real

Philosophical description of space as real is not the characteristic of the other Indian systems of Philosophy The term Ākāśa is used in an ambiguous sense referring to either space or Ether As Doctor Thibaut points out the consistent translation of the word Ākāśa is Ether He invariably translates the term into Ether For according to the Hindu creation theory, Ākāśa is the primeval substance from which the other elements appear. Therefore Ākāśa must mean some subtle form of matter and not the Mathematicians' space But the Jaina thinkers reject the theory of creation Therefore they found it possible to acknowledge the objective existence of space, space therefore is a fundamental element of the system of reality according to the Jaina view

91

The same point is further elaborated

जीवा पुग्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा य लोकाद्वीजणा ।

ततो अण्णमण्ण आयासं अतद्विरिस्स ॥६१॥

[जीवा पुद्गलकायाः धर्माधर्मो च लोकतोऽन्ये ।

ततोऽन्यवन्धवाकाशमन्तव्यतिरिक्तम् ॥६१॥]

91 Life, matter, the principle of motion and that of rest and also Time, these are not distinct from the world But that which is the same as the world, and also distinct

from it, is Ākāśa or space which is infinite

COMMENTARY—The constituent elements of the world are the infinite number of Jivas, and the infinite physical objects, the principles of motion and rest, and space and time. Of these space contains the other five. The space which is co-extensive with these objects is called Lokākāśa. But that is only a part of the real space. Beyond the Loka there is Alokākāśa or Anantākāśa. This Anantākāśa is pure space. There are no objects animate or inanimate in this Infinite Beyond. Not a tiny molecule of matter nor a stray Jiva, would step beyond the limits of Loka. The system of objects is held together by the principles of Dharma and Adharma. And these principles are confined to Lokākāśa.

Thus we have to note that Mathematically pure space is recognised to be possible and real by Jaina thinkers. Arguments against pure space have already been said to be generally fallacious.

92

Ākāśa thus accommodates the other Dravyas. Why should it not be taken also as the condition of motion and rest. The author shows why it cannot be such a condition.

आगासं अबगासं गमणद्विदिकारणेहि देदि जदि ।

उड्डंगदिप्पधाना सिद्धा चिदुंति किध तत्थ ॥६२॥

[आकाशमवकाश गमनस्थितिकारणाभ्यां ददाति यदि ।

उड्गंगतिप्रधाना सिद्धा तिष्ठन्ति कथं तत्र ॥६२॥]

92 If space, in addition to accommodating other things, conditions their motion and rest, then why do these Siddhas whose tendency is to go upwards come to stay at the summit of the world ?

COMMENTARY—The author evidently explains why it is necessary to postulate the existence of Dharma and Adharma. Cannot Ākāśa be credited with the functions of motion and rest in addition to its own function of accommodating things ? According to the author such a Hypothesis would be impossible. It would be conflicting with other facts for if it is also the condition of motion and rest, then wherever there is Ākāśa there should be free chance for motion and rest. But neither a single Jiva or a single atom of matter could step beyond the limit of Lokākāśa though there is Ākāśa beyond. Therefore the author concludes that space is not the condition of either motion or rest. These require independent principles as their condition. Ākāśa cannot be a substitute for Dharma and Adharma. This argument should be considered conjointly with the arguments in the previous Chapter for the necessity of Dharma and Adharma. We have to notice especially that one which points out the difference between Cosmos and Chaos to be based upon principles of state and motion. The Jaina system evidently considers the world incomplete and unreal without the statical and dynamical principles.

93.

The author strengthens the argument by showing that according to Jaina faith the perfected ones come to a stay in the summit of the Loka

जम्हा उवरिट्ठाण सिद्धाण जिणवरेहि पण्णत्त ।
तम्हा गमणट्ठाण आयासे जाण नत्थि त्ति ॥६३॥
[यस्मादुपरिस्थान सिद्धानां जिनवरं प्रपन्तम् ।
तस्माद् गमनस्थानमाकाशे जानीहि नास्तीति ॥६३॥]

93 Because the Siddhas or the perfected ones stay in the summit of the world—So it is revealed by the great Jina Therefore there cannot be in space either the condition of motion or of rest

COMMENTARY—That the Siddhas reside in the summit of the world is one of the religious doctrines of Jainas If space be credited to be the condition of motion and rest it would contradict the scriptures To avoid this internal contradiction space should not be supposed to be the condition of motion and rest The argument *prima facie* is based upon a religious Dogma But really it is another form of the same philosophical argument which maintained that without the principles of Dharma and Adharma there would be no distinction between Loka and Aloka The argument in this Gāthā is merely the converse of the above Since there is a definite Loka or Cosmos, and since there is space beyond, there must be something besides space which maintains the integrity of the system of things and persons For space itself cannot have that function of maintaining the unity of the world

94.

The author shows that the supposition about space is impossible by bringing in a really strong argument

जदि हवदि गमणहेव् आगास ठाणकारण तेसि ।
पसजदि अलोगहाणी लोणस्स य अतपरिवुड्ढी ॥६४॥
[यदि भवति गमनहेतुराकाश स्थानकारण तेषाम् ।
प्रसजत्यलोकहानिलोकस्य चास्तपरिवृद्धिः ॥६४॥]

94 If space be the condition of motion and rest, of life and matter, then there would happen the disappearance of Aloka or the beyond and the destruction and dissipation of Loka or the world

COMMENTARY—As a matter of fact the world is an integral system of things, living, and non-living, existing in space That there is some force or power which holds the

constituent elements of the world together is a necessary pre-supposition even of modern science. It is really wonderful that Jaina thinkers several centuries ago felt the same intellectual necessity as to suppose a physical force which maintains the cosmic unity. The reason given for that Hypothesis is still more interesting. If there is no such power and if things living and non-living were left in space by themselves without a further principle to hold them together there would only be chaos, no systematic world. This argument must be considered very important for it gives us an insight into the scientific ideas of the ancients. The positive science of ancient Indians must have been fairly advanced in order to promulgate such physical theories as are contemplated by the author.

95

If then space cannot be the determining condition of motion and of rest, the latter facts must be due to some other conditions. Therefore Dharma and Adharma must be admitted to be the necessary constituents of the system of reality.

तस्मा धम्माधम्मा गमणट्टिदिकारणाणि जागास ।

इदि जिणवरोहं भणितं लोकासहाव सुणत्ताण ॥६५॥

[तस्माद्धर्माधर्मौ गमनस्थितिकारणे नाकाशम् ।

इति जिनवरं भणितं लोकस्वभावं शृण्वताम् ॥६५॥]

95 Dharma and Adharma alone are the condition of motion and rest respectively, and not Ākāśa or space. So was the nature of the Cosmos revealed by the great Jina to his audience (in Samavasaraṇa).

COMMENTARY—The author summarises his position as to the nature of Loka. He distinctly asserts that the coherence of the world is due to principles of Dharma and Adharma and not to space. The author further states evidently to strengthen his own case in the eyes of the faithful that such was the message delivered by the Jina to his audience, consisting of Ganadharas, and Cakradharas, and several others in Samavasaraṇa. The description of the world is as revealed by the Omniscient to his disciples.

96

The author states that Lokākāśa or World Space, Dharma and Adharma, are all co-extensive and coincident. Hence they may be considered as one conventionally, as they are all incorporeal entities in the same locality. But they are in reality different from one another on account of their functional difference.

धम्माधम्मागासा अपुघबभूवा समानपरिमाणा ।

पुघगुबलद्धिबिसेसा करेति एगत्तमण्णत्त ॥६६॥

[धर्माधर्माकाशान्यपृथक्कृतानि समानपरिमाणानि ।

पृथगुपलब्धिविशेषाणि कुर्वन्त्येकत्वमन्यत्वम् ॥६६॥]

96 Dharma, Adharma and space, are mutually interpenetrating and coincident Hence they are one from the point of locality, they are of the same size and form, and constitute an inseparable unity But from the difference of function they also exhibit their diversity

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā is interesting for this reason that Dharma and Adharma being constitutive elements of the world are said to be confined to Lokākāśa Their influence is not felt beyond the boundary of the world for their influence is fundamentally related to things material and spiritual These two mysterious physical principles are all pervading and co-extensive with the world space Their existence cannot be inferred from their difference of locality There is no such difference But yet they have fundamentally different functions and on account of these differences they are really diverse In short they are one in *pradesa* but different as *vastus* i.e., they have a unity of Locality with diversity of function and nature

This functional difference is emphasized by the author only because these three Dravyas are *amūrta* ones There is no other way of differentiating them unlike physical objects which can be distinguished by sense qualities and unlike Jivas which can be differentiated by conscious qualities Dharma and Adharma have to be determined only by their function in the economy of the physical realm

Thus Ends the Chapter on Space

CŪLIKĀ

97

Then the resume of the five Astikāyas and Dravyas They are described as Mūrta and Amūrta (Physical and non-physical) and Cetana and Acetana (conscious and non-conscious)

आकाशकालजीवा धर्माधर्मा य मूर्तिपरिहीणा ।

मूर्त पुगलद्रव्य जीवो खलु चेतनो तेषु ॥६७॥

[आकाशकालजीवा धर्माधर्मौ च मूर्तिपरिहीणा ।

मूर्तं पुगलद्रव्य जीव खलु चेतनस्तेषु ॥६७॥]

97 Space, Time, Life, Dharma and Adharma these are Amūrta Dravyas and are therefore without sense qualities Matter alone is Mūrta and has these qualities Again of these life alone is conscious

COMMENTARY—In this Gāthā the author classifies the Dravyas according to two

principles According to the first classification, they are grouped into Mūrtas and Amūrtas Mūrta Dravya is one which has the sense qualities of contact, taste, smell, sound and colour That which is devoid of these qualities is Amūrta Here, space, time, Jiva in itself, Dharma and Adharma, are all Amūrtas Matter alone is Mūrta That which has the nature of consciousness is *cetana* and that which is otherwise is *acetana* Space, time and matter, Dharma and Adharma are all *acetanas* Jiva alone is *cetana* Dravya

98

Again the Dravyas are classified into *sakriyas* and *niskriyas*, active and non-active

जीवा पुद्गलकाया सह सक्क्रिया हवति ण य सेसा ।

पुद्गलकरणा जीवा खधा खलु कालकरणा दु ॥६८॥

[जीवा पुद्गलकाया सह सक्क्रिया भवन्ति न च शेषा ।

पुद्गलकरणा जीवा स्कन्धा खलु कालकरणास्तु ॥६८॥]

98 Jivas and physical objects become *sakriya* or causal agents when determined by certain condition The rest are not causally active Jiva is active because of Karmic matter Skandhas or physical bodies are active because of time

COMMENTARY—According to this classification, Dravyas are either *sakriya* or *niskriya* Any causal activity is described to be *sakriya* If there is no such causal activity then it is *niskriya* The activity contemplated here may be merely any change brought about by external conditions Jivas and matter are *sakriya* Dravyas for they become *sakriya* under certain conditions, space, time, Dharma and Adharma are all *niskriyas* or non-active entities The external condition of activity of Jiva is merely the group of Karmas These are material The external condition of the activity of matter is time Temporal succession brings about changes either of aggregation or disintegration in physical objects There can be no change in matter without time as there can be no change in Jiva without Karmic matter, but Jiva in perfect states can be free from Karmic matter In this state the Siddha Jiva is practically *niskriya*, i.e., it is not subjected to causal category But it cannot be so with matter for there is no chance for matter to exist independent of time It must always be subject to change due to time Therefore it is always *sakriya*

One of the commentators relying on the religious dogma that Siddha Jiva gets to the summit of the world, speaks of Siddha also as *sakriya* If at all there is any causal change, it is this initial change of locality But in the perfect state it will be more accurately described as *niskriya* for already Jiva is described to be beyond causal series in its state of perfection To be consistent with that attitude it is better to consider Siddha as *niskriya*

99

The difference between Mūrta and Amūrta is again described in other words

जे खलु इन्द्रियगोचरा विसया जीवेहि हुंति ते मुक्ता ।

सेस हवदि अमुक्त चित्त उभय समादियदि ॥६६॥

[ये खलु इन्द्रियगोचरा विसया जीवेर्भवन्ति ते मूर्ता ।

शेष अव्यक्तचित्त उभय समाददाति ॥६६॥]

99 All those objects that are apprehended or perceived by the senses are Mūrta objects The rest are Amūrtas Mind apprehends both Mūrta and Amūrta objects

COMMENTARY—The author again tries to explain the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual objects All those objects that are objects of the senses are Mūrta Dravyas The term Mūrta, therefore, implies the inherence in the object of the sense qualities of colour, taste, smell, etc Those objects that have not these characteristics are Amūrta Dravyas According to this description Physical objects are distinctly Mūrta Dravyas But Physical objects may exist in different forms There may be of minute molecular constitution and the primary atoms These are certainly not perceived by the senses and yet they also come under Mūrta category for they form the potential basis of the gross or physical objects which are evident to the senses In short all those objects which are *pratyakṣa* to the senses are Mūrta objects and those objects which are known through *parokṣa* are Amūrtas Under the Amūrta category come such facts as Dharma and Adharma and all Psychic states (We have to note here that the term *pratyakṣa* is used in Vyavahāra sense) Mind, which is in itself an Amūrta Dravya is able to know both Mūrta and Amūrta Dravyas Mūrta Dravyas are apprehended *pratyakṣa* and Amūrta *parokṣa* or mediately

Thus ends the *Cūlikā* or *Summary*

100

In the treatment of *Pancāstikāya*, time has only a secondary place Therefore the author gives a subordinate place to time and mentions about it in the summary The section dealing about time, therefore, is merely a part of the *Cūlikā*, and it is not considered as an independent chapter by the author as well as the commentators

कालो परिणामभवो परिणामो दम्बकालसम्बद्धो ।

दोण्ह एस सहावो कालो खणभगुरो नियदो ॥१००॥

[कालः परिणामस्य परिणामो दम्बकालसम्बद्धः ।

द्वयोरेव स्वभावः कालः क्षणभङ्गुरो नियतः ॥१००॥]

100 Relative time is determined by changes or motions in things. These changes themselves are the effect of time absolute. The former time is ephemeral (having beginning and end). The latter is eternal, such are the characteristics of the two.

COMMENTARY—The author differentiates between relative time and absolute time. The different conventional periods from *samaya* or moment onwards are the relative time. The different periods of relative time are measured by changes in other things. Movement of Physical objects is mainly the unit of measuring the different periods of relative time. The changes which measure the periods of relative time are themselves the effect of real or absolute time. The periods of relative time have both beginning and end. But *dravyakāla* or real time is eternal, is without beginning or end.

The author takes up an attitude which is very familiar to common sense and science. The distinction is quite identical with Newtonian distinction between relative and absolute time. According to the author time is a real *Dravya*, it is not merely a form of mental activity. The idealistic thinkers both in the east as well as in the west have treated time as merely an appearance. But the Jaina thinkers evidently form an exception, for them, time is not an appearance but a reality. The main argument against the reality of time is the so-called self-contradiction in the motions of continuity and infinity. Time has these characteristics of continuity and infinity and yet it is also constituted by instants or *dravyakālānus* as the Jaina writers call them. How can there be continuity constituted by primary elements of instants? This difficulty is not peculiar to time. It is common to space, as well as matter. In all these cases Philosophers emphasize the impossibility of obtaining continuity and infinity from simple elements. On account of this impossibility space, time and matter were condemned to be appearances.

But the problem has been taken up by the Mathematicians. The wonderful mathematical discoveries of the continental mathematicians such as Cantor, Peano and Frege have shown clearly the intrinsic fallacy in all the arguments against the reality of time and space. The problem is developed by mathematicians as a special case of 'transitive and continuous series'. To go into further details would be too mathematical. The discussion may very well be reserved to the general introduction. It is enough to note here the wonderful correspondence between the ideas of the author, and those of philosophical Mathematicians of our present day.

Another point worth notice is that time is the cause of changes or modifications in things. The author not only admits the reality of time but also recognises its potency. In this respect one is reminded of the great French Philosopher Bergson. Bergson has revealed to the world that time is a potent factor in the evolution of Cosmos. Changes and modifications in things are absolutely impossible without time, and that is just the view of the author.

101

In order to clear the doubt of the disciple of a different Sangha, who disbelieves the reality of time, the author emphasizes the existential nature of time

कालो स्ति य वचदेसो सग्भावपरुवगो हवदि णिच्छो ।
उप्पण्णप्पद्वसी अवरो दीहतरट्ठाई ॥१०१॥

[काल इति च व्यपदेश सद्भावप्ररूपको भवति नित्य ।
उत्पन्नप्रवृत्त्यपरो दीर्घान्तरस्थायी ॥१०१॥]

101 The name time or Kāla denotes^aan existential fact The thing so denoted— Time is real but the other relative time has from the point of present moment, origin and end almost simultaneously But it may also be of long duration

COMMENTARY—The author differentiates the real time from relative time Real or absolute time is eternal existence But relative time is merely of finite duration But from the aspect of moment it has no duration at all Origin and end are together in a single moment It has *ksanikatva* as its nature as against *nityatva* of the other But the *ksanikatva* may apparently disappear and relative time may have long duration Even then it has both beginning and end and as such it is different from Dravya Kāla or absolute time

102

Then the quantitative appreciation of time and the absence of *kāyatva* or Corpus for the same

एदे कालागासा धम्माधम्मा य पुग्गला जीवा ।
लभति दव्वसण कालस्स तु णत्थि कायस्स ॥१०२॥

[एते कालाकाशे धर्माधर्मौ च पुद्गला जीवा ।
लभन्ते द्रव्यसङ्गां कालस्य तु नास्ति कायत्वम् ॥१०२॥]

102 Time, space, Dharma and Adharma, matter, and Jiva these things are called Dravyas Of these to time alone there is no *Kāyatva*

COMMENTARY—In this Gāthā, the author emphasizes the fact that time has *astitva* or existence but not *kāyatva* spaciality It is one of the six Dravyas The name Dravya is applicable to all those existences which have continuity through origin and decay Time has such a nature Therefore it shares the name Dravya with the other things herein enumerated

But the other Dravyas are also called Astikāyas because they have extension or *bahupradeśa* But time has no such *bahupradeśa* Therefore it is not an Astikāya.

This nature of time is described in mathematical terms by the author elsewhere (*Pravacanasāra*) Time has *ūrdhva-pracaya* whereas the other Dravyas have *tiryak-pracaya* In the language of Modern Mathematics the former term corresponds to mono-dimensional assymetrical series, the latter multi-dimensional series According to Mathematical Philosophy extension is multi-dimensional series *Kāyatva*, therefore, is generated by *tiryak-pracaya* but *ūrdhva-pracaya* cannot be associated with extension since it is unilateral Therefore time is not an *Astikāya* More of this in the general introduction

103

The fruit of contemplating upon these facts—Pañcāstikāya

एव पचयणसार पञ्चस्थित्यसंग्रहं विद्याणिता ।

जो मुयदि रागदोसे सो गाहदि दुखपरिमोक्ष ॥१०३॥

[एव प्रवचनसार पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहं विज्ञाय ।

यो मुञ्चति रागद्वेषौ स गाहते दुःखपरिमोक्षम् ॥१०३॥]

103 Thus one who with the knowledge of, and faith in this short summary of Pañcāstikāya—the essence of the Divine word—gives up desire and aversion (towards worldly things) realises freedom from sorrow

COMMENTARY—Here the author indicates the path to eternal bliss The path consists of the three jewels or *ratna-traya* Right faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct

सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्र्याणि मोक्षमार्गं ।

and *samyag-darsanam* is defined to be *Tattvārtha-sraddhānam* The Tattvas are the existence described in short in Pañcāstikāya or the reality itself may be considered as a system of Pañcāstikāyas One who believes in the nature of reality, one who tries to understand its constituent elements must next try to realise his own true nature When faith and knowledge get the co-operation of effort or *cāritra*, then there is the surity of heavenly bliss

104

Then the manner of obtaining such a freedom

मुणिऊण एतद्वदं तदणुगमणुज्जदो णिह्वमोहो ।

पसमियरागदोसो ह्वदि ह्वपरावरो जीवो ॥१०४॥

[ज्ञात्वैतदर्थं तदनुगमनोद्यतो निहतमोहः ।

प्रशमितरागद्वेषो भवति हृतपरापरो जीवः ॥१०४॥]

104 Whoever knowing this truth (that self is the greatest reality) endeavours to

reach or realise the same gets free from spiritual stupidity or Darśana Mohaniya, and as the result of that, roots out desire and aversion (Cāritra Mohaniya), and finally becomes the conqueror of Saṁsāra

COMMENTARY—He describes the order of events that ends in Mokṣa. The greatest thing mentioned in this SCRIPTURE is the SELF. Whoever understands the glorious nature of self-consciousness cannot but attempt to realise the same. One account of that effort the wall round the faculty of faith or Darśana Mohaniya gets removed. By the removal of this ignorance dawns the knowledge of SELF, through self-knowledge the rooting out of desire and aversion, the destruction of Cāritra Mohaniya or the palsy of the good will, hence the shattering of Karmic shackles, and then with freedom radiates the eternal glory of the Divine Person.

Thus ends the Book I

BOOK II

NINE PADĀRTHAS

105

The six Dravyas and the five Astikāyas are of two kinds, life and non-life. These two things, life and non-life, form the two primary elements among seven Tattvas and nine Padārthas. Besides these two, other Tattvas and Padārthas are derivative. They are due to the combination or separation of these two primary Tattvas, Life and non-life. On account of combination occur the following Padārthas, *Punya* (virtue), *Pāpa* (vice), *Āsrava* (incoming of Karma) and *Bandha* (bondage). These four which lead to *Samsāra*. Originating by their separation the following Padārthas occur *Samvara* (prevention of incoming Karma), *Nirjarā* (withering away of existing Karma) and *Moksa* (emancipation from all Karma or Freedom). Of these Moksa Tattva is the most important, being the *summum Bonum* of life. The path to this goal is described by the author who begins by praying to the last of the Jinās, Lord Mahāvīra who revealed the path.

अभिवदुण शिरसा अपुणभवकारण महावीर ।

तेसि पयत्थमग मग्ग मोक्खस्स वोच्छामि ॥१०५॥

[अभिवदु शिरसा अपुनभवकारण महावीरम् ।

तेषा पयार्थमङ्ग मार्ग मोक्षस्य वक्ष्यामि ॥१०५॥]

105 Bowing my head in reverence to Mahāvīra, the saviour of the world, I describe those two primary Padārthas life and non-life, and the various derivative Padārthas and also the path to Moksa.

COMMENTARY—This *namaskāra-sloka* is *madhya-mangala* (Salutation for the middle of the books). The author worships Vardhmāna Mahāvīra, the last of the Tirthakaras, he is considered to be the revealer of the true path. All Śāstras are traced to Mahāvīra as the originator.

In the second book the author is concerned with the career of life. In the first book, he described in detail the nature of the constitutive elements of the world. In the second book he is going to follow the spiritual evolution. Evolution or development implies a struggle and the primary conditions of struggles are Jiva and Ajiva, life and non-life. Jiva is situated in an environment of Ajiva or non-living things. Of the Ajivas matter is of primary importance. The struggle is mainly between life and matter. According to the Jaina doctrine the struggle is without beginning. The spiritual evolution consists in progressive emancipation of Jiva from physical shackles.

The reality therefore is looked at from a different angle of vision. The different aspects of the struggle and evolution form the Tattvas and the Padārthas. The author is no more concerned with Astikāyas and Dravyas. The very same group appear in another

form. The Mūla-Tattvas or the primary elements, are Jiva and its non-living environment. By the combination and separation of Jiva and Ajiva are generated, the other Tattvas and Padārthas which are derivative and secondary. The central actor in the Drama is Jiva. And the culmination of the development is Mokṣa. The second book therefore is concerned with the career of life from Saṁsāra to Mokṣa.

106.

First the author takes up Mokṣamārga or the path to Liberation as he wants to describe it in short

सम्मत्तणाणजुत्तं चारित्तं रागदोसपरिहीणं ।
मोक्खस्स हवदि मग्गो भव्वाण लब्धबुद्धीणं ॥१०६॥

[सम्यक्त्वज्ञानयुक्तं चारित्र्यं रागद्वेषपरिहीणम् ।
मोक्षस्य भवति मार्गो भव्यानां लब्धबुद्धीनाम् ॥१०६॥]

106 Right conduct uninfluenced by the desire or aversion, together with right faith and right knowledge, forms the path to Liberation to those faithful Jivas who realise self knowledge through the five attainments or Labdhis

COMMENTARY—Here the author indicates the path to Mokṣa or the three jewels. The Gāthā is merely the paraphrase of the very first Sūtra of *Tattvārthādhigama*

Three elements constitute the path. Darśana or belief, Jñāna or knowledge, and Cāritra or conduct. But all the three must be of the right sort. Belief in the true nature of reality is Darśana, which is right. This Samyag Darśana is considered to be the result of suppression or eradication of that particular Karma called Darśana Mohaniya whose function is to blind that faculty of belief or Darśana. The understanding of the nature of these Tattvas, the constitutive categories of reality, is Samyag Jñāna. The term *samyak* implies the absence of doubt and error. Conduct as conditioned by right belief and right knowledge is Samyag Cāritra or right conduct.

These form the indispensable elements of the *mokṣa-mārga*. Unless all the three are present there would be no path.

In this Gāthā the author indicates eight main conditions of the path.

1 The co operation of right belief and right knowledge, without these there would be no path.

2 Conduct is the main constituent element, not any conduct but only right conduct.

3 This implies that there should be no *rāga* or *dveṣa*, Desire or aversion, the presence of these would nullify the Mārga.

4 Conduct of that kind forms the path to Mokṣa or liberation, but does not lead to Bandha or bondage.

5. The path so constituted is the right and the reliable one, and as such it is distinct from several *mithyā-mārgas* or false paths

6. The path is available only to Bhavya Jivas or the good matured ones and not to Abhavyas of intrinsic evil disposition

7. Even among the Bhavyas only to those who secured five attainments or the *pañca labdhis* but not to those who had not those attainments

8. Only those who have eradicated completely all Kaṣāyas or the gross emotions which have the tendency to stain the purity of self, but one in whom such emotions are still present cannot walk the path of righteousness

The three elements constituting the *path* are the three jewels, or *ratnatraya*. This Ratnatraya is spoken to be of two kinds Nīścaya Ratnatraya and Vyavahāra Ratnatraya. The former is from the absolute point of view and the latter is of relative point of view. When the Ratnatraya is distinctly based upon self then it is Nīścaya Ratnatraya. Darsana, Jñāna and Cāritra, all have reference to self and self alone. This Nīścaya Ratnatraya first implies the belief in the ultimate nature and importance of self, i.e., the belief that Paramātmā is nothing but self. Again consequent upon this firm belief there must be knowledge of self. Complete knowledge of self is the next element of the Nīścaya Ratnatraya. The knowledge of all other Tattvas centres round the Personality. Knowledge of the Person therefore is knowledge *par excellence*. And lastly realisation of the Paramātmā or the great Person would be Cāritra *par excellence*.

Vyavahāra Ratnatraya is constituted by Darśana, Jñāna and Cāritra which are based upon *para-tattvas* or objective ideals. Belief in an objective divinity independent of our Self for example, would be Vyavahāra Darśana. Knowledge of such alien entities would be Vyavahāra knowledge and attempting to realise our ideals and aspirations through the help of such alien personalities either thorough sacrifices or propitiations is Vyavahāra Cāritra. These three constitute Vyavahāra Ratnatraya.

The five Labdhis referred to in the Gāthā are, (1) Kṣayopaśama-Labdhī, (2) Deśanā-Labdhī, (3) Prāyogya-Labdhī, (4) Viśuddha-Labdhī, and (5) Karaṇa-Labdhī (*Gommaṣasāra Jivakāṇḍa*, Gāthā 650)

खयउवसमियविसोही देसनपाउगकरणलद्धी य ।

अत्तारि वि सामण्णा करण पुण होवि सम्मत्ते ॥

[आयोपशमिकविद्युद्धि देशनाप्रायोग्यकरणलब्धिश्च ।

अतस्त्रोऽपि सामान्याः करण पुनः भवति सम्यक्त्वे ॥]

To Saṁsāri Jiva there is continuous fruition of old and existing Karmas and combination with novel and incoming Karmas. On account of this Karmic encircling their should be no chance for such a Jiva to realise its pure and perfect form independent of Karmic effects. Then how can we talk of Mokṣa or Emancipation for Saṁsāri Jivas or

the worldly souls ?

By way of reply to this objection from the disciple the Master says "You have seen this in your experience—that a hero watches for an opportunity for vanquishing his enemy Whenever the enemy is in his minimum strength on account of several reasons, the hero without losing the chance carefully prepares for the struggle making use of his mature deliberation and select instruments Thus is the enemy vanquished "

Similarly Samsāri Jiva embarrassed by ancient as well as fresh Karmic enemies patiently waits for an opportune moment As a natural consequence of Karmic matter duration may come to an end, or its intensity and fertility may be declining to minimums At that moment the Bhavya Jiva which is patiently aspiring for spiritual greatness, strikes with vehemence and vanquishes the enemy This suppression of Karmas at their weakest moment is Ksayopasāma Labdhī No 1

After this initial assertion of spiritual independence there may appear a change of disposition in the nature of Jiva which may thereafter be hankering for good This hankering for good may manifest in good and useful conduct (*punya*), and as such it may be the condition for Punya-Karma-Āsrava Nevertheless the declension of the disposition towards good is Visuddha Labdhī No 2

Then with this changed disposition Jiva may have the good fortune to obtain a master who would instruct him in the path This instruction may lead to the removal of ignorance and error and to the acquisition of Jñāna This may guarantee progress for the Jiva along the rungs of spiritual ladder This good fortune of obtaining instruction is Upadesa eśanā Labdhī No 3

The duration and intensity of some Karmas may go on mutually aggravating each other to their maximum After reaching the maximum they have to decline of their own accord This declining stage of Karmas after reaching maximum is another opportunity known as Prāyogyatā Labdhī (co-relative of Karmic glow) No 4.

Again after reaching a certain stage in the spiritual development—*Gunasthānas*, there may appear certain psychic instruments, e g , Śukladhyāna This attainment of spiritual instruments and other supernormal powers is known as Karaṇa Labdhī No 5

These are the Labdhis or attainments which a Jiva by good fortune may secure

These Labdhis are not to be confounded with what are known as Nava Kevala-Labdhis Nine attainments about the time of Kevala Jñāna

At the Kevalī stage of development the following facts happen to the person

1 The all penetrating Kevala Jñāna which is the result of annihilation of the veil of knowledge

2 The all illuminating perception or *kevala darśana* or *kṣāyika darśana*, which is also the concomitant of the destruction of the veil of perception

3 The all-merciful attitude of great spiritual Harmony known as *kṣāyika abhaya-dāna*.

4 Even after relinquishing all kinds of good and nourishment, in order to maintain the *śarīra* for a time there is the incoming or assimilation of subtle physical principles This is *kṣāyika-lābha* gain or income after *kṣāyika* state

5 Then this happy events introduced by Indras such as showing flowers over head is *kṣāyika-bhoga* This is the consequence of complete annihilation of Bhogāntarāya Karma

6 Similarly the introduction of *śimhāsana* (Lion thrones), *chattra*, *cāmara*, etc., (umbrella, etc.,) is *kṣāyika-upabhoga* which is the consequence of destruction of Upabhogāntarāya Karma

7 Then the realisations of Omnipotence, *ananta-vīrya*, which is the result of complete eradication of Viryāntarāya-Karma.

8 Then by this complete destruction of the seven *mūla prakṛtis* (fundamental Karmas) happens *kṣāyika samyaktva*, Absolute Belief in the true nature of Reality

9 And finally *kṣāyika cāritra* This implies the absolutely self-determined thought activity of the pure and perfect person Siddha or Arhat This thought activity is again the consequence of absolute emancipation from all *upādhis*

The former class of Labdhis is always referred to as *pañca labdhis* and the latter as *nava kevala-labdhis* in Śāstras in order to avoid confusion Therefore it is not necessary to emphasise the difference further

It is enough to remember that Pañca Labdhis have reference to Samsārī Jīva, and Nava-kevala-Labdhi to Mukta Jīva

106*1

Then Vyavahāra Samyag Darśana is described

एव जिणपण्णत्ते सद्वहमाणस्स भावदो भावे ।

पुरिसस्साभिणिबोधे दसणसद्वो हवदि जुत्तो ॥१०६*१॥

[एव जिनप्रज्ञप्तान् अध्वत भावत भावान् ।

पुद्गलस्याभिनिबोधे दर्शनशब्द भवति युक्त- ॥१०६*१॥]

106*1 If a person who thus with great interest believes in the Padārthas revealed by Jīva obtains Matī Jñāna Then in his case the term Dārśanika 'he is a believer' has relevancy

COMMENTARY—To believe in the real nature of Ātma and other Padārthas is Vyavahāra Samyaktva, Conventional or relative belief This is the popular means of attaining salvation The real immediate condition of salvation is the suppression or Annihilation of the *sapta prakṛtis* or seven fundamental kinds of Karmic matter

These are

1 Anantānubandhi Krodha

- 2 Anantānubandhi Māna
- 3 Anantānubandhi Māyā
- 4 Anantānubandhi Lobha.
- 5 Samyaktva
- 6 Mithyātva
- 7 Samyak Mithyātva

These seven constitute the *sapta prakrtis* The Prakrtis 1 to 4 are sub-divisions of Chāritra Mohaniya and the other three of Darsana Mohaniya

If these get abated, then there is the chance for Samyag Darsana or right belief

107

Then the description of the nature of the three Jewels or Ratnatraya

सम्मत सदृहण भावाण तेषामधिगमो ज्ञान ।

चारित्त समभावो विसयेषु विरुद्धमग्गाण ॥१०७॥

[सम्यक्त्व अद्वान भावाना तेषामधिगमो ज्ञानम् ।

चारित्त समभावो विषयेषु विरुद्धमग्गिणाम् ॥१०७॥]

107 Belief in the real existences or Tattvas is the right faith Knowledge of their real nature without doubt or error is right knowledge An attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of the external world is right conduct These three are found in those who know the path

COMMENTARY—The Gāthā may be interpreted either as referring to Vyavahāra Ratnatraya or to Niscaya Ratnatraya The description of the three jewels may be consistent with the relative path or with the absolute path

In describing Samyag Darśana and Samyak Jñāna right belief and knowledge, the author indicates the nine Padārthas which are the objects of the said belief and knowledge The Second Book mainly treats of the nine Padārthas, and the description of the Ratnatraya may be considered as an indirect introduction to the Padārthas which are —

- 1 Jiva=life
- 2 Ajiva=non-life
- 3 Pāpa=sin
- 4 Puṇya=virtue
- 5 Āsrava=flow-in of Karmas
- 6 Samvara=the prevention of the incoming Karmas
- 7 Nirjarā=eradication of Karmas
- 8 Bandha=bondage
- 9 Moksa=liberation or emancipation

The first two are the primary Padārthas and the others are derivative

108.

Of the nine Padārthas or categories Mokṣa is the most important, as it is the goal of life. Hence Ratnatraya which is the means to realise the goal was first described. Then the nine categories or Padārthas are enumerated in detail.

जीवाजीवा भावा पुण्यं पापं च आसन्नं तैर्हि ।

सर्वरणिज्जरब्धो मोक्षो य हवति ते अट्टा ॥१०८॥

[जीवाजीवी भावो पुण्य पापं चालवस्तयो ।

सर्वरनिज्जरब्धा मोक्षश्च भवति ते अर्था ॥१०८॥]

108 Life and non-life (Jīva and Ajīva) are the two primary Padārthas. Out of these appear righteousness (Punya), sin (Pāpa), their source or inflow (Āsrava), their prevention (Samvara), their partial annihilation (Nirjarā), Bondage (Bandha) and Salvation (Mokṣa). These are the nine Padārthas.

COMMENTARY—Of these Jīva or life alone has consciousness. Ajīva is so called because of the absence of consciousness. These are the five Dravyas mentioned previously: matter, space, condition of motion and that of rest, and finally time. These five constitute the non-life. Life and non-life are the root Padārthas. Seven other Padārthas enumerated above originate from the different relations of Jīva to Pudgala or matter.

Purity of thought in self is the subjective righteousness or Bhāva Punya. As conditioned by this there is the corresponding objective righteousness of Karmic matter, or Dravya Punya. Similarly evil thought or the impurity of the heart is known as subjective sin or Bhāva Pāpa. As the result of this there is the Karmic matter or Dravya Pāpa, whose nature is vicious. The appearance of lust, desire and aversion, is the subjective influx of Karmas, Bhavāsrava. As the concomitant of these affective states Karmic matter flows in towards the soul, which flowing is Dravyāsrava or the physical current of Karmas. Suppressing the states of lust, desire and aversion by the principle of renunciation is the subjective inhibition or prevention which is Bhāva Samvara. This refers to the closing up of the spring of evil thought as the concomitant of this Psychic inhibition of evil, there appears the withering away of Karmic matter which is Dravya Nirjarā. Moha or spiritual stupor, desire and aversion these bring about a characteristic proneness, towards Karmic matter in the nature of Jīva. This proneness towards the Karmic environment is of the nature of Psychic disposition which spins out a cocoon of evil thoughts enshrouding the self. This is Bhāva Bandha. On account of this disposition there results the settling in of Karmic matter on the Jīva. This is objective bondage or Dravya Bandha. Lastly, realisation of the purest and perfect self after complete emancipation from evil is the subjective salvation or Bhāva Mokṣa. The absolute annihilation of Karmic matter and the liberation of Jīva from the physical shackles is the objective

Mokṣa or Dravya Mokṣa In all these cases the Bhāva aspects refer to Jiva and the Dravya aspects to matter.

109

Then the duality of Jiva, the first of the Padārthas

जीवा संसारस्था निष्वादा चेदणप्पगा दुविहा ।
उपयोगलक्षणा वि य देहादेहप्पवीचारा ॥१०६॥
[जीवा. संसारस्था निर्वृत्ता. चेतनात्मका द्विविधा ।
उपयोगलक्षणा अपि च देहादेहप्रवीचारा. ॥१०६॥]

109 Having the nature of consciousness, characterised by Upayoga—faculties of perception and understanding, Jivas are of two kinds One incarnate of the world, and the other, Liberated of heaven

COMMENTARY—Cetanā or conscious nature and its manifestation through perception and understanding are the intrinsic characteristics of all Jivas which are of two classes, Samsārī Jivas and Mukta Jivas The former has the limitation of Upādhis, Samsārī Jivas are always associated with some kind of body, gross or subtle The Mukta Jiva is free from such bodily limitations, because of complete emancipation from material conditions Karmic and non-Karmic As a result of Upādhis, Cetanā and Upayoga of the former get limited and encircled and as a result of the destruction of Upādhis the very same become perfect and pure in the case of Siddhas

The five kinds of Śarīras have already been mentioned

110.

Samsārī souls are again twofold—fixed ones and the moving ones The fixed ones or the *sthāvara* Jivas are here described

पुढवी य उदगमगणी वाउवणप्फदिजीवससिदा काया ।
वेति खलु मोहबहुलं फासं बहुगा वि ते तेसि ॥११०॥
[पृथिवी चोदकमग्निवायुर्बलंस्पति जीवसंश्रिता. काया ।
वदति खलु मोहबहुलं स्पर्शं बहुका अपि ते तेषाम् ॥११०॥]

110 Vitalised by Jivas are the following bodies —Earth, water, fire, air and also plants These are many in number They yield to their respective Jivas only one kind of feeling, contact, and that too associated with highly intensified stupor of ignorance

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā refers to *ekendriya* Jivas Jivas having only one sense These as a result of their Karmic intensity may degenerate to such an extent as to be associated with the five kinds of physical objects enumerated above Earth, water, fire,

air and plants These kinds of physical objects are used as bodies by these Jivas

There is no difficulty in understanding the organic nature of the plant world Especially after the discoveries of Dr Bose, it is not necessary to elaborately defend that plants are living organisms But the organic nature of the other four kinds, earth, water, fire and air, is somewhat obscure The commentators themselves do not help us in the difficulty, so much so, that some of the European Scholars who have studied Jainism have come to the conclusion that Jainism is very primitive, since it believes in the existence of souls in material and inorganic things This argument of the existence of primitive beliefs in Jaina system is brought forward in favour of the antiquity of Jainism Certainly it is very pleasing to be assured of a hoary past, but it is no compliment to Jainism if its beliefs are identified with the primitive notions of the Hottentot

It is almost incredible to believe that Jaina thinkers with their uncompromising dualistic attitude accepted the doctrine that *acetana* physical objects had souls of their own The definitions of Jiva and Pudgala are clearly unmistakable There is no possibility of any confusion Mutually they are as much contradictory to a Jaina thinker as to a Cartecian philosopher

The clue to the difficulty is supplied by the doctrine that the four kinds of *ekendriya* Jivas associated with fire, air, earth and water are *sūkṣma ekendriya* Jivas, i.e., microscopic organisms having only one sense That the Jainas believed in the existence of microscopic organisms needs no elaborate evidence The rules of conduct prescribed for Jaina Gṛhasthas and Yatis are sufficient testimony Again this interpretation is further strengthened by the following point All the five kinds of Sthāvara Jivas are considered to have four kinds of Prāṇas or life principles

- 1 Feelings of Contact
- 2 *kāyabala-prāṇa* or strength of body
- 3 *uchvāsa-nṛhāvāsa-prāṇa* or respiration
- 4 *āyuh-prāṇa* or duration of life

To suppose that these four Prāṇas are associated with really inorganic bodies would be inconsistent with the other aspects of the system Therefore it is incumbent upon us to emphasize that the Jivas associated with inorganic bodies are mainly *sūkṣma ekendriya* Jivas or microscopic organisms, for it is only with an organism that Prāṇas can be consistently associated

This does not remove all our difficulties Whether there can be organisms associated with fire is still an unintelligible problem We don't want to dogmatise on the matter Evidently for the sake of symmetry fire is added on to the enumeration of the other kinds of physical forms We can only confess that the doctrine for want of sufficient light from the commentators remains a very obscure part of Jaina thought leading to strange conjectures Where there is scope for speculation we beg to offer our own Hypothesis as an alternative interpretation

[Amṛtacandra has an additional Gāthā No 111 here]

112

These have monosensic and non-Psychic vitalism

एते जीवनिकाया पञ्चविधा पुढविकाइयादीया ।
मणपरिणामविरहिता जीवा एगेंदिया भनिया ॥११२॥

[एते जीवनिकाया पञ्चविधा पुढविकाइयादीया ।
मनःपरिणामविरहिता जीवा एकेन्द्रिया भनिया ॥११२॥]

112 These Jivas such as the earth-bodied ones are of five different castes All of them are devoid of mental states They have a single sense So are they described in the scripture

COMMENTARY—The author points out that these Sthāvara Jivas are utterly devoid of Psychic states They have only one kind of feeling of contact This description indicates a difference between the botanical and the zoological realms and the *sūkṣma ekendriyas* or the microscopic organisms of the four kinds also share the nature of the plant world

113

Though devoid of mental states they are not non-conscious in essence Really they are to be considered as unconscious but not non-conscious The author explains by illustration their unconscious nature

अडेसु पवडु ता गढभत्था माणुसा य मुच्छगया ।
जारिसया तारिसया जीवा एगेंदिया जेया ॥११३॥

[अण्डेषु प्रवर्धमाना गर्भस्या मानुषाश्च मूर्च्छां गता ।
यादृशास्तादृशा जीवा एकेन्द्रिया जेयाः ॥११३॥]

113 Just as life or *cetanā* is associated with unconsciousness in the following cases eggs, foetus growing in mother's womb and the man in a trance so also the monosensic organisms are unconscious, though having life or *Cetanā* Thus be it understood

COMMENTARY—The author establishes that these monosensic beings have life and also potential *cetanā* or consciousness It is ordinarily acknowledged that there is life and consciousness in the germ in the case of eggs, foetuses, and in men in trance Here unconsciousness is no objection to the belief of their living nature Similarly these monosensic organisms though devoid of consciousness have life and potency for consciousness

114

Then the author by way of illustration enumerates some of the organisms having two sense organs

सबुक्कमादुवाहा संखा सिप्पी अपावगा य किमी ।

जाणति रसं फास जे ते बेइंदिया जीवा ॥११४॥

[शम्बूकमादुवाहा शङ्खा सुक्तयोऽपावका च कृमयः ।

जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं ये ते द्वीन्द्रिया जीवा ॥११४॥]

114 Sea snail, cowrie shell fish, conch shell fish, mother o'pearl and earth-worm are organisms which have two senses, touch and taste Hence are they bisensic

115

Then author enumerates some of the organisms having three senses

जूगाग्भीमक्कुणपिपीलया विच्छियादिया कीडा ।

जाणति रसं फास गध तेइदिया जीवा ॥११५॥

[यूकाकुम्भीमत्कुणपिपीलिका वृश्चिकादय कीटा ।

जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं गन्धं त्रीन्द्रिया जीवा ॥११५॥]

115 The louse, the bug, the red and ordinary scorpion, the ant and other insects having three senses are triaesthetic

116

Then the author enumerates some of the organisms having four senses

उद्दसमसयमक्खियमधुकरभमरा पतगमादीया ।

रूप रस च गध फास पुण ते विजाणति ॥११६॥

[उद्दशमशकमक्षिकामधुकरीछमरा पतङ्गाद्या ।

रूप रस च गन्धं स्पर्शं पुनस्ते विजानन्ति ॥११६॥]

116 Again, the gadfly, the mosquito, the fly, the bee, the beetle and the dragon fly and the butterfly these organisms experience, touch, taste, smell and sight, hence they are quadraesthetic—have four senses

117

Then the beings with five senses, are enumerated

सुरनरनारयतिरिया कणरसस्फासगंधसहृ ।

जलचरथलचरखचरा बलिया पंचेदिया जीवा ॥११७॥

[सुरनरनारकतियंञ्चो वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दज्ञा ।

जलचरस्थलचरखचरा बलिन पञ्चेन्द्रिया जीवा ॥११७॥]

117 Devas, human beings, hell beings, and higher animals all these have five senses, colour, taste, smell, touch and sound Some of the animals are water animals, some land animals and some birds of the air There are very strong ones also among these

COMMENTARY—The classification of Jiyas according to sense organs is based more upon the behaviour of insects and animals, than on the structure In the case of bisensic insects given in Gāthā 121, the classification seems to be correct Taking the sea snail for example it has touch all over the body and very sensitive in the tentacles on the head. It has no tongue but the base of the respiratory organs determines the kind of water that should enter the respiratory chamber The mobile lips of the snail also act as gustatory organs There is no special auditory organ but there is an organ in the foot, called the otocyst which enables the creature to keep its balance in the water This evidently corresponds to the semicircular canals of the human ear whose function is to determine the positions of our body in space Generally they have some sensitive parts to light also, but this is not considered as an eye by the author Cowrie, conch, and mother of pearl do have similar structures and ordinary earth-worms also have the sense of contact and some kind of gustatory sense In their case also the skin is sensitive to light, but it is treated as insignificant

Next in the case of organisms with three senses the enumeration contains some dubious specimens The louse and the bug have the sense of touch, taste and smell. Ants also have these three senses But some of them have sight also But ordinarily their sense of smell is the most predominant Lord Avebury, Sir John Lubbock, after several years of patient observation comes to the conclusion that ants become aware of objects in the environment only through smell But in the case of caterpillars and scorpions there are eyes But anyhow they are included under this class

In the next class are included the mosquitoes, flies, bees, etc These insects have clearly four senses contact, taste, smell and sight But in the case of some for example, beetle and the bee a peculiar humming sound is produced Naturalists suppose that these insects must respond to sound and they have some organ in the abdomen which is supposed to be responsive to sound vibrations Whether what they experience is sound or some other vague sensation of contact nobody can be certain Therefore we may take the author's description as almost accurate Lastly, many of the higher animals and human beings are included under the next class, five sensed organisms They have also sense of hearing to boot But the distinction between other higher animals and human

beings is that the latter have a well developed consciousness. These are *samanaska pañcendriya* Jivas, whereas the other *pañcendriya* Jivas are devoid of mind. Evidently the distinction implies the presence of self-consciousness in the one class and the absence of the same in the other.

118

Then the author enumerates the several subspecies of the four fundamental kinds of Jivas already differentiated according to the four Gatis

देवा ञ्जुणिकाया मणुया पुन कम्मभोगभूमीया ।

तिरिया बहुप्पयारा णेरइया पुढविभेयगदा ॥११८॥

[देवाञ्जुणिकाया मनुजा पुन कर्मभोगभूमिजा ।

तिरियञ्च बहुप्रकारा नारका पृथिवीभेदगता ॥११८॥]

118 Devas are of four classes. Human beings are of two classes, inhabitants of Karma Bhūmi and those of Bhoga Bhūmi. Animals are of numerous kinds. Hell beings are of seven according to their respective regions.

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā presupposes the peculiar Jaina cosmogony. According to the Jainas, Loka is arranged in three orders: the lower world, the middle world and the upper world. In the upper world there are different regions, one above the other, so also in the lower world. The different regions of the upper world are inhabited by Devas, the different regions of the lower world, one below the other, are inhabited by beings thrown into hell. The conception is something analogous to that of Dante.

This Gāthā classifies Jivas according to the principle of Gati, i.e., the principle of Gatimārganā. But the previous Gāthās had the classification according to the principle of sense organs or Indriya Mārganā.

Devas are said to be of four kinds (*Vide Tattvārtha Sūtra*, Chapter IV) Bhavanavāsis, Vyantaras, Jyotiṣkas, Kalpavāsis, or Vaimānikas. Each class is further subdivided into several species. Each sub-class has its own special characteristics, physical and psychical, and has the characteristic periods of life. It is not possible to enter into the details.

The hell beings are seven, according to the hells inhabited by them. The seven hells are Ratna-prabhā, Śarkarā-prabhā, Vālukā, Pañka, Dhūma, Tamaḥ, and Mahā-tamaḥ. The hell beings again have their respective characteristics of suffering, age, and other Psycho-physical characteristics with graduated intensity. These two classes of beings are only of doctrinal importance to us.

Coming to human beings and animals the principle of classification is much simpler. The animals are recognised to be of numerous species, and human beings again are divided into two classes, those born in Karma Bhūmi and those born in Bhoga Bhūmi. This classification is again only the result of the peculiar geography of the Jaina system.

Geography and cosmogony form an important branch of Jaina Literature. It is one of the four Anuyogas. Jains recognise four main departments of their Scripture: (1) Prathamānuyoga, dealing with the life of the Tirthankaras and the other great personalities; (2) Karanānuyoga, dealing with the structure and constitution of Loka, the cosmos; (3) Caranānuyoga, dealing with principles of conduct prescribed for the householder as well as Sannyāsi; (4) Dravyānuyoga dealing with the metaphysical aspects of reality. Jains, whenever they speak of Jivas and other Dravyas, always assume the special constitution of the world according to their religious dogma. If more detailed knowledge of these things is desired reference must be made to treatises on Lokasvarūpa or the form of the world.

119

Jivas described according to the different Gatī Mārganās, are not to be supposed to maintain that state permanently. Jivas undergo several modifications assuming different states of existence with the different durations of life. Thus do they roam about in Samsāra.

खीणे पुण्वणिबद्धे गदिणामे आजसे य ते वि खलु ।
पापुण्णति य अण्ण गदिमाउस्स सलेसवसा ॥११६॥

[क्षीणे पुनर्वनिबद्धे गतिनाम्नि आयुषि च तेऽपि खलु ।
प्राप्नुवन्ति चान्यां गतिमायुष्कं स्वलेख्यावशात् ॥११६॥]

119 When the existing Karmas determining the Gatī and the age of a Jiva, decay, then that Jiva gets into another Gatī with a different duration of life as determined by its last conative state or aspiration known as Leśyā.

COMMENTARY—The Gatī or state of existence of a particular Jiva is determined by a particular Karma known as Gatīnāmakarma. So is the duration of particular Jiva determined by Āyuh Karma. When these two Karmas exhaust themselves to the very last, then age of the Jiva will come to an end, and Jiva has to change its state of existence; i.e. it will have to enter into another Gatī with a different duration of life. This entrance into the next state is generally determined by Karmas acquired during the lifetime. But the fundamental factor which immediately determines the passage into the other stage must be determined by Gatīnāmakarma and Āyuh Karma of the succeeding stage. Jiva before quitting a particular Gatī acquires these two fresh Karmas determined by the last conative state or leśyā. The term leśyā is used not in its usual sense. In this place it implies merely the particular activity of yoga or *mana*, *vacana*, *kāya* manifesting in the last desire or aspiration of life. This leśyā may be pure or impure according to the ideal aimed at. And according to its value it forms the two Karmas in their pure form or impure form. According to the determining antecedent Karmas the Jiva incarnates in a particular place.

with a particular body and with particular Psycho-physical development Thus he may have a pleasant life or drag on a miserable existence

120

But the Samsāric cycle is not eternal for Jiva On account of *labdhis*, or lucky spiritual attainments, a Jiva may realise the three jewels Then it may free itself from Karmic matter as gold is purified from dross Then it is the pure self

एदे जीवणिकाया देहप्पविचारमस्सिदा भणिदा ।

देहविहणा सिद्धा भव्वा ससारिणो अभव्वा य ॥१२०॥

[एते जीवणिकाया देहप्रबोचारमाधिता भणिता ।

देहविहीना सिद्धा भव्वा ससारिणोऽभव्याश्च ॥१२०॥]

120 These different classes of Jivas are again said to be of two kinds incarnate ones and discarnate ones The latter are Siddhas, whereas (the former) are the Samsāri souls who are again of two species *bhavyas* and *abhavyas*

COMMENTARY—Here the author summarises the nature of Jivas The first principle of division is the possession of a body All the incarnate ones are said to be Samsāri Jivas and all the discarnate ones are Siddha Jivas or pure souls But the former class is again sub-divided, the principle of division being the capacity to become perfect Those Samsāri Jivas which have this capacity under special opportunities are called Bhavyas, whereas those Samsāri Jivas which have no such capacity are called Abhavyas

This distinction of Samsāri Jivas into Bhavyas and Abhavyas corresponds to Drummond's division of souls into organic and inorganic The organic souls, given the proper opportunity, have the capacity to develop and attain spiritual perfection, whereas inorganic ones have no such capacity of spiritual growth This is one of the Jaina religious dogmas whose metaphysical basis is not quite clear Most probably the distinction is as arbitrary as that of Drummond's

121.

The five senses and the six bodies examined above are not essential elements of Jiva

ण हि इन्द्रियाणि जीवा काया पुण छप्पयार पणत्ता ।

ज हवदि तेसु णाणं जीवो स्ति य तं परूवंति ॥१२१॥

[न हीन्द्रियाणि जीवा काया पुन षट्प्रकारा प्रकृप्ताः ।

यद्भवति तेषु ज्ञान जीव इति च तत्प्रकृत्ययन्ति ॥१२१॥]

121 The five senses and the six kinds of bodies mentioned above these are not of

the essence of soul. Whatever in the midst of these manifests as consciousness that they call by the name Jiva

COMMENTARY—The sense organs and the various bodies are associated with Jiva only from the conventional point of view. The very same characteristics are really its accidental adjuncts. Senses such as touch, taste, etc and bodies such as earth body etc, are not Jiva, because they have nothing in common with the thought which is the true nature of Jiva. But in the midst of these sense organs and physical conditions there is the principle of consciousness which sheds light upon itself and other objects, i.e. which manifests as knowledge of the subject and the object. That thinking thing is said to be Jiva or soul.

122.

Then the author mentions the special characteristics of Jiva, characteristics which distinguish Jiva from material and other Dravyas

जाणदि पस्सदि सव्वं इच्छदि सुखं विभेदि दुक्खादो ।

कुव्वदि हिदमहिद वा भुजदि जीवो फलं तेसि ॥१२२॥

[जानाति पश्यति सर्वमिच्छति सौख्यं विभेति दुःखात् ।

करोति हितमहितं वा भुङ्क्ते जीवः फलं तयो ॥१२२॥]

122 What knows and perceives the various objects, desires pleasure and dreads pain, acts beneficially or harmfully and experiences the fruit thereof—that is Jiva

COMMENTARY—In this Gāthā the characteristic behaviour of Jiva is described. What is mentioned to be consciousness in the previous Gāthā is here indicated by several purposeful activities which have meaning only with reference to consciousness. Perception and understanding of objects are the function of Jiva or consciousness. This function cannot be associated with matter. So also is the tendency to desire pleasure and to avoid pain. It is distinctly the nature of life to continue beneficial activity and to discontinue harmful activity. Such conduct can have reference only to Jiva. Inorganic mechanical activity can never exhibit such purposive nature. These various instances of purposeful activity as against mechanical activity clearly mark out Jiva from the other Dravyas. The whole gāthā then may be taken as the definition of Jiva through its behaviour.

123.

The author summarises the characteristics of Jiva Padārtha in the first half of the Gāthā and introduces the other Padārthas in the second half

एवमभिगम्म जीवं अण्णेहिं वि पज्जएहिं बहुणेहिं ।

अभिगच्छवु अज्जीवं णाणतरिदेहिं लिणेहिं ॥१२३॥

[एवमभिगम्य जीवमन्येऽपि पर्यायेर्बहुकं ।

अभिगच्छत्यजीव ज्ञानान्तरितैर्लिङ्गं ॥१२३॥]

123 Thus having seen the nature of Jiva through the numerous and distinct characteristics, well do thou grasp the nature of non-life that is absolutely of non-thinking nature

COMMENTARY—The author generalises the characteristics of Jiva. Jiva and its modifications were studied under different principles of Gunasthāna and Mārganāsthāna. In all these multifarious changes there is the one constant character of Jiva—consciousness or thought. Thought may exist in its impure form in Samsāra and in its pure and perfect form is Mokṣa. Whether pure or impure *cetanā* is the fundamental nature of life. Before introducing the other Padārthas the author emphasizes the fact that consciousness should not be associated with Ajīva or non-life. The absence of consciousness is the mark of Ajīva. Its activity or change is purely mechanical and non-teleological. We are asked to remember this fundamental nature of Ajīva before the author describes the Ajīva Padārtha or non-life.

Thus ends the chapter on Jiva Padārtha

CHAPTER ON AJIVA PADĀRTHA

124

Then the author enumerates the different Ajīva Padārthas, taking absence of consciousness as the mark of Ajīva

आकाशकालपुद्गलधर्माधस्मेसु णत्थि जीवगुणा ।

तेसि अचेदणत्त भणिद जीवस्स चेदणदा ॥१२४॥

[आकाशकालपुद्गलधर्मधर्मेषु न सन्ति जीवगुणा ।

तेषामचेतनत्वं भणितं जीवस्य चेतनता ॥१२४॥]

124 Space, time, matter, the principle of motion and that of rest—these have no life-principle in them. They are absolutely without consciousness. There is thought or consciousness only in Jiva.

COMMENTARY—Consciousness is not the only reality. There are several *acetana* or non-conscious entities which are grouped under Ajīva Padārtha. In this respect Jaina thought is fundamentally distinct from the idealism which admits the reality of only one thing, consciousness. One tendency in philosophic thought tries to reduce everything to consciousness. The other tendency tries to maintain that matter alone is real and everything is unreal and derivative. Both these extremes are avoided by Jaina thought. There are conscious entities as well as non-conscious entities constituting the system of reality.

This Gāthā is said to be the condemnation of the Advaitic view that everything is Brahma

125

In this Gāthā the author explains what *acetanatva* or non-consciousness means

सुहृदुक्त्वजाणया वा हिदपरियम्म च अहिदभीरुत्तं ।
जस्स ण विज्जदि णिच्च त समणा वेति अज्जीव ॥१२५॥
[सुखदुःखज्ञान वा हितपरिकर्म चाहितभीरुत्वम् ।
यस्य न विद्यते नित्यं त श्रमणा भुवन्त्यजीवम् ॥१२५॥]

125 Wherever such attributes of life are never found as the feeling of pleasure and pain, desiring only the beneficial activity and avoiding the harmful activity that the wise ones call Ajiva or non-life

COMMENTARY—What is *acetanatva*, the characteristic of Ajiva Padārthas ? That which has not got the fundamental characteristics of life These characters are feeling pleasure, pain, continuing beneficial activity and avoiding harmful activity Whatever is devoid of these characteristics is Ajivas This may be taken as negative definition

126

Though matter in the form of *karma* and *no-karma* is intimately related to Jiva yet it is quite distinct in nature

सठाणा सधादा वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दाश्च ।
योगलदब्धप्रभवा होति गुणा पज्जया य बहू ॥१२६॥
[सस्थानानि सधाता वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दाश्च ।
पुद्गलद्रव्यप्रभवा भवन्ति गुणा पर्यायाश्च बहव ॥१२६॥]

126 Form, structure, colour, taste, touch, smell and sound, these are associated with matter They are again of various kinds They are either attributes or modes of matter

COMMENTARY—The physical attributes are colour, taste, smell, sound and touch Each of these is again of many kinds Configuration or form is innumerable according to the different forms of physical objects Combination or structure is of infinite kinds The structure of *skandhas* from two atoms onwards is referred to These are modes of matter These modifications may be organic related to life or inorganic Just as the inorganic matter is distinct from life so also this organic matter distinct from it though associated with it.

127.

If form, structure and other characteristics are not to be associated with Jiva, then what is the real nature of Jiva

अरसमरुचमगधमव्यक्तं चेदनागुणमसद् ।

जाण अलिगगहण जीवमणिद्विदृसठाण ॥१२७॥

[अरसमरूपमगन्धमव्यक्तं चेतनागुणमशब्दम् ।

जानीद्वालिङ्गग्रहण जीवमनिद्विष्टसत्त्वानम् ॥१२७॥]

127 Understand that life has no sense qualities of taste, smell, colour, touch and sound It has no form either It has only thought or consciousness

COMMENTARY—The several sense qualities associated with matter are not present in Jiva Jiva or life is not to be apprehended through sense perception Its nature is not to be inferred through any of its sense qualities for it has no such attributes Again it has no form corresponding to that of physical objects Jivas is formless being spiritual Such are the characteristics of life and consciousness

Thus ends the Ajiva Padārtha

128-30

After describing the primary categories of life and non-life, the author goes to seven other derivative Padārthas, originating from either the synthesis or analysis of the two primary ones Jiva and Karmic matter are the primary generating categories for the rest Hence these two are taken up here for examination.

जो खलु संसारत्थो जीवो तत्तो दु होदि परिणामो ।

परिणामादो कम्म कम्मादो होदि गदिसु गदी ॥१२८॥

गदिमधिगदस्स देहो देहादो इदियाणि जायन्ते ।

तेहिं दु विसयगहण तत्तो रागो व दोसो वा ॥१२९॥

जायदि जीवस्सेव भावो ससारचक्रवालम्म ।

इदि जिणवरैहिं भणिदो अणादिणिघणो सणिघणो वा ॥१३०॥

[य खलु संसारत्थो जीवस्तत्तु भवति परिणाम ।

परिणामात्कर्म कर्मणो भवति गतिषु गति ॥१२८॥

गतिमधिगतस्य देहो देहादिन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते ।

तैस्तु विषयग्रहणं ततो रागो वा द्वेषो वा ॥१२९॥

जायते जीवस्यैव भावः ससारचक्रवाले ।

इति जिनवरैर्भणितोऽणादिनिघनः सनिघनो वा ॥१३०॥]

128-30 To a Jiva in Samsāra desire and aversion will naturally occur On account of these states Karmic matter clings to the Jiva The Karmic bondage leads the Jiva through the four Gatis or states of existences Entering into the Gati, Jiva builds up its own appropriate body , being embodied he gets the senses Through the sense, objects of the environment are pursued From perception appears desire or aversion towards those objects and from desire the cycle begins again Thus desire brings Karma, Karma leads to *gati*, *gati* means body, body implies senses, senses lead to perception, and perception again to desire or aversion and so on *ad infinitum* But the cycle ends in the case of Bhavya Jiva whereas it is unending to the Abhavyas But it has no beginning in either case Thus is it taught by the Jina, the conqueror of Samsāra

COMMENTARY—The author describes the causal series that constitute the cycle of Samsāra Jiva according to Jaina doctrine is enshrouded by Karmic conditions from eternity On account of this association with Karmic matter Jiva experiences the emotional states of desire, etc These emotional states are conditioned by the Karmic *upādhis* But these states in their turn bring about the acquisition of fresh Karmic matter The acquisition of Karmic matter means that the Jiva should manifest in any one of the four *gatis* Manifestation means embodied existence Body implies sense organs Sense organs again are the windows for the soul to apprehend the environment Awareness of the objects in the environment generates the affective states in the soul These affective states once again begin the series of the above mentioned causal series

Thus by the mutual interaction between mind and matter there appears the cycle of *samsāra* In the case of the fortunates ones who are capable of spiritual emancipation this whirling comes to an end But in the case of the unfortunate ones who are incapable of spiritual salvation the cycle goes on for ever

CHAPTER ON PUNYA AND PĀPA OR VIRTUE AND VICE

131.

After describing the veil of Samsāra which is the condition of the nine categories or Padārthas the author examines Puṇya and Pāpa and their respective Psychic antecedents.

मोहो रागो दोसो चित्तपसादो य जस्स भावस्मि ।

विज्जदि तस्स सुहो वा असुहो वा होदि परिणामो ॥१३१॥

[मोहो रागो द्वेषश्चित्तप्रसादश्च यस्य भावे ।

विद्यते तस्य सुभो वा अशुभो वा भवति परिणाम ॥१३१॥]

131 Whatever Jiva has in himself Moha, corrupting the faculty of belief, desire and aversion, or the purity of thought is subject to the hedonic state of happiness or misery

COMMENTARY—The Psychological conditions determining virtue and vice are described. *moha* is the mental state brought about by the ripening of Darśana Mohaniya Karma. The Karma that clouds the faculty of perception and belief *rāga* and *dveṣa* desire and aversion, are the result of Chāritra Mohaniya. The Karma that misleads the will, while the former misleads cognition. Thus when cognition and will are determined by the Karmic conditions, they may manifest in Volitional states marked by virtue or vice. If the objects of cognition and will are desirable and good, then the mental state is *śubha parināma*. If it is undesirable and bad then the mental state is *asubha parināma*. In the former case there results happiness to the individual whereas in the latter misery.

132

Next the author describes the subjective states of good and evil, *bhāva punva pāpa* and their corresponding *karmic* conditions or *dravya punya pāpa*.

सुहृपरिणामो पुष्ण असुहो पाव ति हवदि जीवस्स ।
दोण्ह पोगलमेत्तो भावो कम्मत्तण पत्तो ॥१३२॥

[सुहृपरिणाम पुष्णमसुह पापमिति भवति जीवस्य ।
द्वयो पुद्गलभावो भाव कर्मत्व प्राप्त ॥१३२॥]

132 Good will or pure thought is righteousness. Bad will or evil thought is sin. Conditioned by these two mental states of the Jiva, the classes of Karmic molecules which are physical in nature undergo modifications and manifest as Dravya-karmas such as Jñānāvaraniya.

COMMENTARY—Pure thought is Bhāva Punya. This conditions Dravya Punya, the Karmic matter facilitating the purity of the heart. Evil thought is Bhāva Pāpa, sinning in the heart. This conditions the Dravya Pāpa which aggravates the evil disposition of the soul. Thus from the Psychic conditions which are *amūrta* their result the different Karmic modifications which are physical and *mūrta*. Thus the Bhāva Karmas and the Dravya Karmas are mutually interacting.

133

He establishes that *karmic* matter is physical in nature and therefore is *mūrta*.

जम्हा कम्मस्स फलं विसयं फालेहिं भुजदे णियद ।
जीवेण सुह दुक्ख तम्हा कम्माणि सुत्ताणि ॥१३३॥

[यस्मात्कर्मण फल विषय स्पर्शमुच्यते नियतम् ।
जीवेन सुख दुःख तस्मात्कर्माणि मूर्तानि ॥१३३॥]

133 Because the fruits of Karma, the objects of happiness or misery, are experienced

by Jiva through the sensations of touch, etc , therefore the *karmas* are physical and *mūrta*

COMMENTARY—The fruit of Karma is either a desirable or an undesirable object, pleasant or unpleasant to the Jiva This object is experienced through sense perception Senses are physical, objects apprehended through the sense organs are also physical Therefore the Karmic effects are physical and *mūrta* Cause and effect are identical Therefore the author concludes that the Karmas themselves are physical and *mūrta*, since their effects are physical Of course this refers to Dravya Karmas.

134

Karmas past or present are physical and *mūrta* Samsārī Jiva, because of its Karmas, is also physical and *mūrta* Hence there is the chance for fresh accretion of Karmas. Hence the liability to continued bondage

मुक्तो फासदि मुक्त मुक्तो मुक्तेण बंधमणुहवदि ।
जीवो मुक्तिविरहितो गाहदि ते तेहि उगगहदि ॥१३४॥

[मूर्तं स्पृशति मूर्तं मूर्तो मूर्तेन बन्धमनुभवति ।
जीवो मूर्तिविरहितो गाहति तानि तंरवगाहते ॥१३४॥]

134 Past Karma which is physical in nature comes into contact with the present Karma which is also physical in nature

Thus existing Karmic matter enters into combination with incoming Karmic matter Jiva though in itself spiritual and *amūrta* is certainly corporeal (in its *samsāric* state) because of its coeval Karmas Therefore it absorbs the fresh Karmic matter and is absorbed by that (because of mutual attraction of molecules)

COMMENTARY—In this Gāthā the author explains how there could be a contact between Jiva and Karma which are *Amūrta* and *Mūrta* respectively That there is the possibility of combination among physical molecules is accepted by all and it is a fundamental presupposition of Jaina thought that Jiva is in *samsāra* to start with, i e it is from time immemorial associated with Karmic matter Because of this associated Karma, Jiva itself has body and is *Mūrta* Because of this intimate association with Karmic matter there is the chance for fresh bondage and *Samsāra* The Gāthā must be taken as an explanation of the perpetuity of the *Samsāric* cycle Given the initial presupposition that Jiva in its natural state exists in Karmic bondage then we can understand the reason for the *Samsāric* cycle from bondage to *Gatī* and *Gatī* to bondage and so on The series of causality is certainly assumed to be infinite, i e , without beginning, though it may come to an end with the emancipation, An infinite past is not a mathematical impossibility Therefore though it is admitted that the series may come to an end it need not necessarily have a beginning Through the infinite causal interaction therefore, a Jiva may acquire

fresh Karmas though in itself it is spiritual and Amūrta

Thus ends the chapter on Punya Pāpa Padārthas

CHAPTER ON ĀSRAVA PADĀRTHA

135

Āsrava means the fountain source of righteousness or sin First the Punyāsrava or the spring of virtue is taken for description

रागो जस्स पसत्थो अणुक्पाससिदो य परिणामो ।

चिस्से णत्थि कलुस्स पुण्णं जीवस्स आसवदि ॥१३५॥

[रागो यस्य प्रशस्तोऽणुकम्पासधितश्च परिणामः ।

चिस्से नास्ति कालुष्य पुण्य जीवस्यासवति ॥१३५॥]

135 Whatever Jiva has desires high and noble, thoughts based on love and sympathy and in whose mind there are no evil impulses towards the same, the pure Karmic matter flows in as conditioned by the above mentioned springs of righteousness

COMMENTARY—Noble desires and thoughts of charity are the springs of right conduct—Bhāva Punyāsrava, as conditioned by these springs there flows Punya Dravya Karma, pure Karmic matter into the soul noble desires and pure thoughts, those springs of subjective righteousness may be followed by objectively evil deeds if they have not the co-operation of Samyag Darśana or right belief But if those springs are saturated with right belief then there is no conflict between subjective states and subjective conduct The subjectively pure springs of conduct have the chance of being succeeded by series of right conduct till the attainment of heavenly bliss In short subjective purity unaccompanied by right belief will still keep the soul tied to the wheel of life whereas the same in association with the right belief will gradually lead the soul to Nirvāṇa

136

Then the noble desires are illustrated

अरहंतसिद्धसाधुसु भत्ती धम्मस्मि जा या खलु चेद्वा ।

अणुगमणं पि गुरुण पसत्थरागो ति वुच्चति ॥१३६॥

[अर्हत्सिद्धसाधुषु भक्तिर्धर्मो या च खलु चेष्टा ।

अनुगमनमपि गुरुणां प्रशस्तराग इति ब्रुवन्ति ॥१३६॥]

136 Love and devotion towards Arahanta, Siddha and Sādhus, living according to the rules of conduct household and ascetic, and faithfully following the Masters, these are said to be the noble ideals

COMMENTARY—Noble ideals are associated with noble objects deserving of worship and devotion. These are what are known as the *pañca paramēṣṭhis* *Arahantas*, *Siddhas*, *Sādhus*, *Ācaryās* and *Upādhyāyas*. The term *Arahanta* denotes perfected being who is still in the world, i.e., who has still his bodily state. It corresponds to the term *sayogakevali*, the person who attained Kevalajñāna or perfect knowledge and who still has *yoga* or *mana*, *vacana* and *kāya*. The term *Siddha* represents the perfect soul, without the *yoga* or *mana-vacana-kāya*. *Sādhu* represents the great ones who are on the path of perfection. It represents mainly the *yatis* who have attained great spiritual advancement through *tapas*. *Ācārya* represents the organiser of the *Sangha*, the chief of a group of ascetics as well as the householders. The term *Upādhyāya* represents the great religious teachers whose function it is to instruct the people, lay and ascetic, about the chief tenets of religion and also about the rules of conduct. Reverence and devotion to these great ones and a desire to follow the path marked out by them constitute the noble aspiration which leads to *Punya*.

137

Then *anukampā* or charity is described

तिसिद्ध बुभुक्षिद वा दुहिद बट्टू ण जो दु दुहिदमणो ।
पडिबज्जदि त किंयया तस्सेता होदि अणुकंपा ॥१३७॥

[तृषित बुभुक्षितं वा दुःखितं दृष्ट्वा यस्तु दुःखितमना ।
प्रतिपद्यते तं कृपया तस्यैवा भवत्यनुकम्पा ॥१३७॥]

137 If anyone moved at the sight of the thirsty, the hungry and the miserable, offers relief to them, out of pity, then such behaviour of that person is love or charity.

COMMENTARY—This is the second condition generating *punya bhāva* or the good will. The act of charity implies two things. The feeling of sympathy at the sight of the needy and the sufferers, and secondly active relief to them. Mere feeling of sympathy is ineffective. Active relief as the result of the feeling of sympathy is essential to charity. This kind of charity is common to the ordinary mortals and it manifests in only temporary relief. But in the case of the wise ones, *anukampā* or charity manifests in a higher form at the sight of the struggling souls in the ocean of *Samsāra* and they manifest a generous sympathy and help them towards emancipation. Thus *anukampā* is of two kinds, lower and higher according as its result is temporary and superficial or radical and permanent.

138

After describing the ideals and aspirations forming the positive condition of good will, the author describes its negative condition, i.e., the impure emotions that are to be

avoided in every way to secure the purity of the heart or Śubha Parīṇāma.

कोधो व जडा माणो माया लोभो व चित्तमासेज्ज ।

जीवस्स कुणदि खोह कलुसो त्ति य त बुधा वेत्ति ॥१३८॥

[कोधो वा यडा मानो माया लोभो वा चित्तमासाद्य ।

जीवस्य करोति क्षोभं कालुष्यमिति च तं बुधा ब्रुवन्ति ॥१३८॥]

138 Whenever anger, pride, deceit and covetousness, appear in the mind of a Jiva, they create disturbing motion, interfering with calmness of thought. This emotional agitation of thought is called impure thought by the wise.

COMMENTARY—Impurity of thought is explained to be the interference of thought and will by grosser emotions, enumerated in the Gāthā. Freedom from such emotional interference is also a necessary condition of righteousness. Thus noble desires (*prāśasta vāga*), charity (*ānukampā*) and freedom from impurity of the heart (*citta-akāluṣya*) these three constitute the spring of righteousness or Puṇyāsrava.

139.

Then the springs of evil or Pāpāsrava

चरिया पमादबहुला कालुस्स लोलदा य विसयेसु ।

परपरितावपवादो पावस्स य आसव कुणदि ॥१३९॥

[चर्या प्रमादबहुला कालुष्य लोलता च विषयेषु ।

परपरितापापवाद. पापस्य चाल्प्य करोति ॥१३९॥]

139 Inordinate taste for worldly things, impure emotions, hankering for and indulging in sensual pleasures, causing anguish to fellow beings, and slandering them openly or covertly these constitute the springs of evil.

COMMENTARY—The five above mentioned ignoble thoughts constitute the subjective side of the springs of evil (*bhāva-pāpa āsrava*) conditioned by these mental states. Impure Karmic matter flows into the Jiva. And this inflow is the objective side of the evil or *dravya pāpa-āsrava*, i.e., there is the acquisition of undesirable and dark physical conditions by Jiva on account of the above mentioned impurities of thought.

140.

Again the subjective springs of evil are described in detail

सण्णाभो य तिलेस्सा इदियवसदा य अट्टरुद्दणि ।

णाणं च दुप्पउत्तं मोहो पावप्पदा होति ॥१४०॥

[संज्ञाश्च त्रिलेश्या इन्द्रियवशात् चार्तरौद्रे ।

ज्ञानं च दुष्प्रयुक्तं मोहः पापघ्नस्य भवन्ति ॥१४०॥]

140 The different animal instincts, the different soul-soiling emotions, the tempting senses, suffering and wrath, undesirable thoughts and corruption of the faculties of perception and will these constitute the spring of evil

COMMENTARY—*saṃjñā* are the instincts, these are—

āhāra saṃjñā—Preying instinct

bhaya saṃjñā—The instinct of fear

maṃthana saṃjñā—The sexual instinct

parigraha saṃjñā—The acquisitive instinct

These instincts are liable to generate evil Next, *Leśyā* or the soul-soiling tints These are six in number—

kṛṣṇa or the black

nīla or the blue

kāpota or the grey

pīta or the yellow

padma or the lotus-hued

śukla or the white

These *leśyās* or the tints of the soul, perhaps denote a peculiar kind of *aura* of each soul corresponding to its grade of spiritual development and ethical purity Very often these tints are associated with the different emotional states present in *Jiva* Therefore this Psychic *aura* is not a fixed and permanent adjective of a *Jiva* They change and appear as concomitants of Psychic conditions We have to assume that these colours are apprehended only by an occult and supernormal vision It would be simply absurd to associate these colours as the intrinsic colours of the *Jiva* itself for that would make the *Jiva* a *mūrta* and *rūpi dravya*—a material thing That would be quite inconsistent with the Jaina system

Of the six *leśyās* or the tints the first three *kṛṣṇa*, *nīla* and *kāpota*: the black, blue and grey are associated with the darker emotions which constitute the springs of evil.

The next constituent of the spring of evil is yielding to the temptations of the senses. Spiritual development depend upon controlling the senses The soul is very often compared to the charioteer and the sense to restive steed If the charioteer is led away by the horses, that means danger and destruction, because there would be no good in life much less the possibility of spiritual emancipation

ārta or suffering refers to the painful feeling experience when desirable things and persons are lost and when undesirable and unpleasant ones are got This experience is also the fountain of evil *raudra* refers to wrath or misplaced enthusiasm in cruelty, deceit, theft and sensuality Evil thoughts consist in shunning good objects and apprehending and

attending to evil ones And lastly Mohaniya that spirit-paralysing stupor in its dual form corrupts the faculties of perception or will *Draśana Mohaniya* and *Cāritra Mohaniya* In either form it is a source of evil

These are the subjective conditions of evil *Bhāva Pāpa-āsrava*, the inner springs of sin, whereas these bring about the inflow of the dark *karmic* matter

This inflow is the Physical or objective side of evil i.e., the *Dravya-Pāpa-Āsrava* Karmic material of an undesirable kind flows towards the soul as the result of the above mentioned Psychic conditions

Thus ends the chapter on *Āsrava*

CHAPTER ON SAMVARA PADĀRTHA

141

The category that denotes the process of suppressing or blocking, the springs of good and evil treated in the previous chapter, is *samvara* The author considers first *Pāpa Samvara* or the prevention of evil

इन्द्रियकषायसङ्गा निगृहीता जेहि सुदुःसङ्गम् ।

जावत्तावत्तेहि पिहिय पापासवच्छिद् ॥१४१॥

[इन्द्रियकषायसङ्गा निगृहीता ये सुदुःसङ्गम् ।

जावत्तावत्तेषां पिहित पापासवच्छिद् ॥१४१॥]

141 To whatever extent the five senses, the four taints of emotions, the four instinctive appetites, are suppressed by a person, well established in the path or righteousness, to such extent the door way for the entrance of evil is closed for that person

COMMENTARY—The volitional suppression of the above mentioned Psychic tendencies is *Bhāva Samvara* or the subjective inhibition of the evil This condition is the antecedent of the physical arrest of the inflow of the Karmic matter which is *Dravya Samvara* This *Samvara* or the inhibition of the springs of evil is possible only to that person who has the three jewels or *Ratnatraya*, right belief, right knowledge and right conduct One who has not adopted the path cannot succeed in the attempt to block the spring of evil

142

Evil thoughts and sin are the cause of misery as they lead to suffering in the world as well as in hell, hence they ought to be avoided Noble thoughts and the consequent happiness of *Deva* state in *Svarga* or *Devaloka* is also insignificant when compared with heavenly bliss To one whose ideal is self-realisation therefore, the happiness of *Devaloka* is also worthless He should shun that course also Pleasure consequent upon *punya*, and pain of *pāpa* are both imperfect and undesirable by the side of the ultimate

ideal Mokṣa Both the doorways of *punya* and *pāpa* have to be blocked Shunning action that leads to misery is natural But action which leads to pleasure and which stimulates desire is also a hindrance towards self attainment and therefore must be avoided It is this sentiment that is expressed in the next Gāthā

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व सव्वदब्बेसु ।
णासव्वदि सुह असुह समसुहवुक्खस्स भिक्खुस्स ॥१४२॥

[यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा सर्वद्वेषेषु ।
नास्त्विति शुभमसुख समसुखं तस्य भिक्षो ॥१४२॥]

142 If a Bhikṣu looks upon happiness and misery as same, if he is free from desire, aversion, and stupor of perception and will, then Karmas both beneficial and harmful do not approach that being

COMMENTARY—There are three fundamental states of consciousness, *śubha parināma*, *asubha parināma*, *śuddha parināma*, pleasant and beneficial, unpleasant and harmful, and pure and perfect respectively The last alone is the ultimate ideal The other two have to be transcended

143

Next the author describes the mental states conducive to *saṃvara* or the prevention of Karmas

जस्स जदा खलु पुण्णं जोगे पाव च णत्थि विरवस्स ।
सवरण तस्स तदा सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स ॥१४३॥

[यस्य यदा खलु पुण्य योगे पाप च नास्ति विरतस्य ।
सवरण तस्य तदा शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मण ॥१४३॥]

143 As long as a person pure in life, is really free from action conducive to pleasure or pain through either thought, speech or body, so long is he protected from Karmas, beneficial and harmful, that is, they are prevented from approaching him

COMMENTARY—Effective states of desire and aversion, and activity of thought, speech or body are the conditions that attract Karmas good and bad towards the soul When those conditions are removed, there will be Karmas approaching the Jiva, that is complete Samvara—a protective wall round the self shutting out all Karmas is established This Samvara again is twofold Bhāva Samvara and Dravya Samvara The subjective exclusion of thoughts and desires that may lead to bondage, and the objective exclusion of Karmic matter from self Thus ends the Samvara Padārtha.

CHAPTER ON NIRJARĀ PADĀRTHA

144

The author describes the nature of Nirjarā or the withering away of Karmas

सबरजोगेहि जुबो तवेहि जो छिद्रदे बहुबिहेहि ।

कम्माण जिज्जरण बहुमाणं कुणदि सो णियइ ॥१४४॥

[सबरयोगाभ्यां युक्तस्तपोभिर्यश्नेष्टते बहुविधैः ।

कर्मणां निर्वरणं बहुकानां करोति स नियतम् ॥१४४॥]

144 That mighty personality which after closing the springs of Karmas, good and evil, and equipped with the faculty of pure thought, controls its life according to manifold forms of *tapas*, will undoubtedly be able to rid itself of Karmas manifold

COMMENTARY—The faculty of pure thought, protected from all Karmas, associated with twelve kinds of *tapas*, and leading to immortality, to annihilation of all Karmas, is the subjective side of Nirjarā or Bhāva Nirjarā. As a concomitant of this there appears the annihilation of Karmic dust, that clouds the divine beam of pure self

The means for obtaining Nirjarā is *tapas* which is of two main forms, outer and inner. Each of these is again of six different kinds. These are —

(a) Outer *tapas* consisting of—

- (1) *anaśana*
- (2) *avamodarya*
- (3) *vṛtti-parisamkhyāna*
- (4) *rasaparityāga*
- (5) *vivikta-śaṣṭyāśana*
- (6) *kāyakleśa*

(b) Inner *tapas* consisting of—

- (1) *prāyaścitta*
- (2) *vinaya*
- (3) *vaṛyāvṛtya*
- (4) *svādhyāya*
- (5) *vyutsarga*
- (6) *dhyāna*

(1) *anaśana* is abstaining from food. To obtain control over the senses and will, to root out desires and appetites, to destroy Karmas, to facilitate meditation and to study peacefully the scriptures, fasting is the means, and fasting in order to secure such results is *anaśanavrata*

(2) *avamodarya* To sustain control of the will and the senses, to regulate disorders of *vāta*, *pitta*, and *śleṣma*, the humours of the body, to secure self knowledge, and medita-

tion, eating with a limit or a little less than the normal is *avamodarya*

(3) *vṛtti-parisamkhyāna* In order to control the will which would by nature hanker after all the objects of taste, limiting the number of items of Dharma, or in the case of Bhikṣus, resolving in one self to accept food only from a particular house is *vṛtti-parisamkhyāna* or numbering or limiting the items of food

(4) *rasa-parityāga* In order to control the flesh, to get rid of drowsiness and sleep, to promote clearness of thought, abstaining from fatty and sweet substances is *rasa-parityāga* or relinquishing sweet essences

(5) *vivikta-saṃnyāsa* To have ones bed, in separate and vacant rooms or caves or on rocks free from insect pests is *vivikta-saṃnyāsa* or lonely bed The place must be free from insect pests in order that the person may have peace of mind, preparatory to meditation and separate beds of course to avoid temptations of the flesh

(6) *kāyakleśa* getting the body ensured to pain and suffering by standing in the sun, living under a tree and sleeping in the open in the winter cold, etc , is *kāyakleśa* or mortification of the body This will harden the body and make the person fit for the arduous task of religious life How is this *kāyakleśa* different from what is known as *pariśaha-jaya* or the victory over troubles? The latter means overcoming the suffering due to the natural environment, whereas the former is voluntary training of the body If it is voluntary why is it called outer *tapas*? Because it pertains mainly to physical objects

Next Inner *tapas* Because the object is mainly to control the mind These are called inner Tapas

(1) *prāyaścitta* is removing the evil ideas that are born of intoxication of worldliness

(2) *vinaya* is humility towards Gurus and masters

(3) *vaiyāvṛtya* Personal attendance and other kinds of service to Munis who are weary, sick or infirm

(4) *svādhyāya* is quickening of thoughts by concentration of attention

(5) *vyutsarga*, renouncing the belief that this body is mine, is Vyutsarga or isolation of self

(6) *dhyāna*, calm meditation on the self after controlling the vagaries of thought is Dhyāna

145

Meditation on self is shown to be the main condition of Nirjarā

जो संवरेण युक्तो अप्यद्वेषसाधनो हि अप्पाणं ।

मुणिक्रम भावि नियतं नाणं सो संघुणोति कम्मरय ॥१४५॥

[य. संवरेण युक्त. आत्मार्थप्रसाधको ह्यात्मानम् ।

जात्वा व्यापति नियतं ज्ञानं स संघुणोति कर्मरज ॥१४५॥]

145 Clinging to the ideal of self realisation, being fortified against Karmas through Samvara, the Yogin, who truly understands the words of the master, and meditates upon Self—Pure thought with controlled senses, will completely wash off the Karmic dust

COMMENTARY—The main condition for annihilating Karmas is stated here. The person is to be equipped with Samvara or fortification round the self against Karmas, desirable and undesirable. The springs of Parināma, *śubha* and *aśubha*, are to be completely blocked. Instead of diverting ones attention to environmental objects, thought is to be fixed on Self. This reflection upon the Self is to be made secure enough by controlling the senses. If a person under such circumstances meditates upon the Self, according to the instructions from the Masters, he is sure to attain purity of self by completely washing off the Karmic dust by the flood of Dhyāna.

Then the divine glory of the self will shine without interruption

146

The origin, nature and effect of meditation

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व जोगपरिकम्मो ।

तस्स सुहासुहड्हणो भ्माणमओ जायए अगणी ॥१४६॥

[यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा योगपरिकर्म ।

तस्य शुभाशुभदहनो ध्यानमयो जायते अग्निः ॥१४६॥]

145 In the person that has neither desire nor aversion, and that is free from ignorant attachment to sense pleasures and from the activity of thought, speech and body, there flames forth the fire of meditation that burns out all Karmas beneficial as well as baneful

COMMENTARY—Dhyāna or meditation is thought directed towards the pure self. This is the means of self realisation. Ignorance that stupifies the faculties of perception and will must be got rid of. There should be neither attachment nor hatred towards the objects of the environment. Then there should be unruffled peace, in thought, speech and body. Meditation attended by such circumstances manifests as the fire that destroys the rubbish heap of Karmas. It is this fire of meditation that reveals the sterling beauty of pure Self. This is Nirjarā.

Thus ends the Chapter on Nirjarā

CHAPTER ON BANDHA PADĀRTHA

147

The nature of Bandha or Karmic bondage is described

जं सुहृमसुहृमुदिणं भावं रसो करेदि जदि अप्पा ।
सो तेण हवदि बद्धो पोगलकम्मेण विविहेण ॥१४७॥

[य शुभमशुभमुदीर्णं भावं रसतः करोति पञ्चात्मा ।
स तेन भवति बद्धः पुद्गलकर्मणा विविधेन ॥१४७॥]

147 When Ātman out of desire, aversion and corruption of knowledge and will, experiences affective states pleasant and unpleasant, then because of the very same states the self gets bound by Karmic matter of various kinds

COMMENTARY—Bandha is of two kinds: Bhāva Bandha and Dravya Bandha. The former refers to the appropriate psychological conditions that bring about the actual bondage with Karmic molecules. The latter is Dravya Bandha. On account of desire the Ātman experiences happiness or misery. Such emotional states create in the Ātman a disposition peculiarly favourable for the Karmic molecules to settle in. This Psychological disposition is the intrinsic condition of bondage.

148

The two aspects of bondage, internal and external, are again described

जोगणिमित्तं ग्रहणं जोगो मणवयणकायसंभूदो ।
भावणिमित्तो बद्धो भावो रदिरागदोसमोहजुदो ॥१४८॥

[योगनिमित्तं ग्रहणं योगो मनोवचनकायसंभूतः ।
भावनिमित्तो बद्धो भावो रतिरागद्वेषमोहयुतः ॥१४८॥]

148 Combination of Karmic matter with Jīva is due to Yoga. Yoga is the action of mind, speech and body. The opportunity for combination is created by Bhāvas or the affective states and such affective states are due to desire, aversion and perverse cognition.

COMMENTARY—Here is described bondage both internal and external, Psychical and physical. The Karmic matter that flows towards the soul is the manifold Karmic Skandhas around the Jīva. This attraction of Skandhas is due to *yoga*, i.e., the Karma Skandhas get aggregated and intermixed with Jīva because of the activity of *yoga*, or of *mana-vacana-kāya*, mind, speech and body.

Bandha then is the state of being so bound by Karmic matter. This Karmic formation around the Jīva is occasioned by the Psychological dispositions known as *bhāva*. Bhāva is the emotional state of desire or aversion, or perverse cognition and will. All these states are brought about by Mohaniya, that fundamental Karma responsible for spiritual delusion. Yoga is the external condition of bondage since it brings about

directly the combination of Karmic matter with Jiva But the internal condition is the *bhāva* or the disposition of the self

149

Again the conditions of bondage from another point of view are described

हेतु चतुर्विध्यस्योऽष्टविकल्पस्तु कारणं भणितम् ।

तेषां हि यः रागादी तेसामभावे ण बद्धकृतिः ॥१४६॥

[हेतुश्चतुर्विकल्पोऽष्टविकल्पस्य कारणं भणितम् ।

तेषामपि च रागादयस्तेषामभावे न बध्यन्ते ॥१४६॥]

149 The eight kinds of Karmas are said to be caused by the four external conditions or Dravya Pratyayas But these conditions themselves are the result of desire, etc , or Bhāva Pratyayas Without these intrinsic conditions there will be no bondage

COMMENTARY—In some Philosophical works of Jainas, the eight Karmas, are traced to the four causal conditions *mithyātva*, *avirati*, *kaṣāya* and *yoga* Our author here shows that these four conditions themselves are the result of the Psychological disposition effected by the emotional states of desire, etc Hence he insists on recognising these Psychological states as the real and intrinsic condition of bondage Whereas the above four are only subsidiary and external conditions Without the ultimate condition of *rāga* there can certainly be no Karmic bondage The external conditions are called Dravya Pratyayas because they are directly associated with Karmic matter and the ultimate Psychological conditions are called Bhāva Pratyayas because they refer to the disposition of Ātman

The conditions of bondage are enumerated thus in *Tattvārtha-sūtra* Chapter VIII, Sūtra 1

मिथ्यादर्शनाविरतिप्रमादकषाययोगा बन्धहेतवः ॥

It is to be noted by that five conditions of bondage are enumerated here whereas the Gāthā mentions only four For the fifth and additional condition *pramāda* is also included in the above mentioned four

Mithyātva is the opposite of right faith or Samyag Darśana This Mithyātva may manifest in the form of belief in false doctrines and disbelief in the true one Avirati is the opposite of right conduct or Samyakcāritra This may manifest in an enthusiasm for the evil conduct and a hesitation for righteousness Kaṣāya refers to the grosser emotions such as anger, pride, deceit, etc , and *yoga* refers to the uncontrolled and useless activity of *mana-vacana-kāya* These are the four Dravya Pratyayas or external conditions generating the eight Karmas which are—

(1) *jñānāvaranīya*,

(2) *darśanāvaranīya*,

- (3) *mohanīya*,
- (4) *vedanīya*,
- (5) *antarāya*,
- (6) *āyuh*,
- (7) *nāma*,
- (8) and *gotra*

- (1) Jñānāvaraṇīya is the veil round the pure consciousness
- (2) Darśanāvaraṇīya is that which corrupts the faculty of perception and also of belief
- (3) Mohanīya is a sort of spiritual intoxication interfering with cognition and will
- (4) Vedanīya is the feeling of pleasure and pain
- (5) Antarāya is the frustration of the useful efforts of righteously minded persons
- (6) Āyuh determines the duration of life that a Jīva has in a particular state of existence
- (7) Nāma determines the generic and the specific characteristics of a Jīva, i.e. on account of this Nāma Karma a Jīva is born as a particular organism in a particular Gati
- (8) Gotra determines the value of life for example in a human being This Karma determines the birth of a Jīva in a higher status or in a lower status

These eight Karmas are of various sub-divisions which we need not enumerate in detail. These eight effects, though they are supposed to be due to the above four conditions, are ultimately due to Bhāvas Pratyayas or the disposition of the heart. The author wants to emphasize the fact that if the *bhāvas* or the Psychic dispositions are absent then even if the Dravya Pratyayas or the external conditions are present still, there will be no bondage of the eightfold kind, hence the intrinsic condition of bondage is Bhāva or Psychic.

Thus ends the chapter on Bandha Padārtha

CHAPTER ON MOKṢA PADĀRTHA

150-51

Mokṣa or emancipation is begun with the description of Bhāva Mokṣa or the inner perfection of the soul. This Bhāva Mokṣa leads to the annihilation of the four Ghātiyā Karmas. The very same Bhāva Mokṣa again is the great Samvara or the absolute obstruction to Karmas.

हेतुमभावे णियमा जायदि णाणिस्स आसवणिरोधो ।
 आसवभावेण विणा जायदि कम्मस्स दु णिरोधो ॥१५०॥
 कम्मस्साभावेण य सव्वण्ह सर्वलोगदरसो य ।
 पावदि इदियरहिद अवावाह सुहमणत्तं ॥१५१॥

[हेत्वभावे नियमाज्जायते ज्ञानिनः आस्रवनिरोधः ।
 आस्रवभावेन विना जायते कर्मणस्तु निरोधः ॥१५०॥
 कर्मणामभावेन च सर्वज्ञ सर्वलोकदर्शी च ।
 प्राप्नोतीन्द्रियरहितमव्याबाध सुखमनन्तम् ॥१५१॥]

150-51 If the causal condition of Karmas disappears in the case of wise man through the control of senses and thought, then the springs of Karmas get blocked. When the springs of Karmas thus get blocked, the Dravya Karmas get repulsed. When the Dravya Karmas completely disappear, then the person becomes all-knowing and all-perceiving, and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of life.

COMMENTARY—Through the instrumentality of the five Labdhis a Bhavyātmā obtains the three jewels. On account of this acquisition he is able to get rid of the four-fold condition of Karma, *mithyāiva*, *avirati*, *kasāya* and *yoga*, both in their subjective and objective aspects. When he gets rid of Dravya and Bhāva Pratyayas or Karmic adjuncts, then he attains the great Samvara or repulsiveness to Karmas. This Samvara leads to the annihilation of Karmic shackles. Thus ascends the ladder of higher life which leads to destruction of ignorance. This brings on the inner purity. Finally through second *śukla Dhyāna* or the great meditation, the Ghātiya Karmas get burnt away. Then the self rises to eternal wisdom, eternal perception, infinite bliss, and infinite power. This is *ananta-catuṣṭaya*, the four infinite qualities. This is Bhāva Mokṣa, the spiritual freedom. When this Bhāva Mokṣa is attained the inevitable destruction of Dravya Karmas follows. With the attainment of Bhāva Mokṣa the person becomes a Kevalin worshipped by men and Devas. He becomes really Paramātmā.

152

Then we have the description of Dhyāna or meditation which is the direct cause of repulsing and eradicating all Karmas.

दसणणासमग्ग भाणं णो अण्णदब्बसंजुत्तं ।
 जायदि णिज्जरहेद्दु सभावसहिदस्स माधुस्स ॥१५२॥
 [दर्शनज्ञानसमग्र ध्यानं नो अन्यद्व्यसयुक्तम् ।
 जायते निर्जराहेतुः स्वभावसहितस्य साधो ॥१५२॥]

152 The meditation that is completely determined by right belief, right knowledge and right conduct and that is not related to objects alien to the self becomes the cause of Nirjarā or annihilation of Karmas to the Yogi that is in the path of self realisation

COMMENTARY—The great meditation on the self is shown to be the condition of complete Nirjarā or the absolute annihilation of the existing Karmas. In the previous Gāthā, Bhāva Mokṣa was described. On account of this Bhāva Mokṣa the person becomes a Kevalī with the four infinite qualities equipped with the infinite perception and infinite knowledge. The self no more becomes attached to any other alien ideal. The only object of attraction and adoration is the perfect self-consciousness. When meditation thus manifests in self rapture because of self purity and self perception, then it leads to the eradication of the remaining Karmas, i.e., it is the causal condition of complete Nirjarā.

153

Dravya Mokṣa or the absolute emancipation is next described

जो सबरेण जुत्तो निज्जरमाणोस सव्वकम्मणि ।

ववगद्वेदाउस्सो मुयदि भव तेण सो मोक्खो ॥१५३॥

[य सबरेण युक्तो निर्जरन्नय सर्वकर्मणि ।

व्यपगतवेद्यायुक्तो मुञ्चति भव तेन स मोक्ष ॥१५३॥]

153 When a Jīva being rid of the four Ghātiya and being equipped with absolute repulsiveness to Karmas succeeds in eradicating the remaining Karmas, then he becomes freed from Vedaniya and Āyus and finally from Nāma and Gotra. This eradication of the latter four Karmas means absolute and complete Mokṣa or Dravya Mokṣa.

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā speaks of Dravya Mokṣa or the final and complete emancipation. After attaining Bhāva Mokṣa mentioned in the previous Gāthā, Jīva has to obtain absolute emancipation from Karmic or physical conditions for the attainment of Kevalajñāna is still associated with the bodily condition. The person is merely Sayogī Kevalī. No doubt he got rid of the four Ghātiya Karmas which lead to the corruption and degeneration of Ātman. Because they injure the soul they are called Ghātiya Karmas. These are Jñānāvaraṇiṇi, Darśanāvaraṇiṇi, Mohaniṇi and Antarāya. But still there are the other four Karmas known as Aghātiya Karmas. Vedaniya, Āyuh, Nāma and Gotra. These four also must be annihilated. When a Bhāva Mokṣa Jīva has the perfect Dhyāna, then Vedaniya and Āyuh first wither away and finally Nāma and Gotra also. Then the Mukta Jīva becomes Ayogī Kevalī or a Siddha. Ātman has attained its intrinsic spiritual purity and is absolutely free from any kind of association with the matter. This state is Dravya Mokṣa.

Thus ends Mokṣa Padārtha

This is the end of the second Book of the great work dealing with Sapta Tattva and Nava Padārthas

CŪLIKĀ

Next the Resume or the *cūlikā* dealing with Jina, the great Victor and the perfect Brahma who is the ideal of Mokṣa Padārtha. This Cūlikā supplements the ideas already mentioned about heaven and the path. The author indicates here, the importance of conduct leading to self realization. Self and self alone is the goal. Anything other than self as an ideal would lead away the self from the path. All these facts are emphasized in the Cūlikā

154

The intrinsic nature of Jīva is described, thus indicating the path to Mokṣa

जीवसहाय णाण अप्पडिह्वदंसण अणणमय ।

चरिय च तेसु णियदं अत्थित्तमणिदिय भणिय ॥१५४॥

[जीवस्वभावाद् ज्ञानमप्रतिहतवर्शनमनन्यमयम् ।

चारित्र्यं च तयोर्नियतमस्ति त्वमनिन्दितं मणितम् ॥१५४॥]

154 Unlimited perception and unlimited knowledge are inseparable from the nature of Jīva. Permanently associated with that nature, spotless conduct is the path to Mokṣa because it is the immediate antecedent.

COMMENTARY—The characteristic of Mokṣa is described here. Right conduct which is always associated with the intrinsic nature of self is the path to Mokṣa. The intrinsic nature of Jīva is existence which is inalienable from Jñāna and Darsana. Inalienability implies that the nature of Jīva manifests generically and specifically through knowledge and perception. The existence which is associated with such characteristics and which has the dialectic nature of activity is the intrinsic conduct of self. It is irreproachable because it is not influenced by either desire or aversion. That same conduct is the path to emancipation.

Conduct in Samsāra Jīva is of two kinds, intrinsic conduct and extrinsic self-determined or other determined. Self-determined conduct is that which is based upon the intrinsic nature of self. The other determined conduct is that which is due to the influence of non-self. The path then is related to self and is uninfluenced by non-self, hence it is the means to the realisation of self.

155

That Jewel or *ratnatraya* is internally distinguished as lower and higher, the lower aspect is associated with the ideal only indirectly whereas the higher is directly associated with it. One who has the lower jewel is known as *parasamayi* or the self that is deter-

mined by the other But the self which has the higher jewel is absolutely self conditioned and is called *svasamayi*

जीवो सहावणियवो अणियदगुणपज्जओध परसमओ ।

जदि कुणदि सगं समयं पव्वभस्सदि कम्मवधावो ॥१५५॥

[जीव स्वभावनिवृत अनियतगुणवर्षाणोऽय परसमय ।

यदि कुर्वते स्वक समयं प्रव्रज्यति कर्मबन्धात् ॥१५५॥]

155 The Jiva that is associated with the essential qualities is called *Svasamayi* or the self-determined, whereas that which is associated with accidental and unessential qualities and modes is called *Parasamayi* or the other determined The Jiva that has the former, i e , the essential nature as its ideal, is able to get itself freed from Karmic bondage

COMMENTARY—The *ratnatraya* which is self-determined has corresponding stages of development to the spiritual evolution of Jiva *abheda-ratnatraya* is certainly *svasamayi*, but the early stages of this *Ratnatraya* when compared to the last stage of perfection would be considered as *parasamayi* It is not even necessary to mention the fact that faith in alien deity, etc , is distinctly *parasamayi*, i e , when *Samyaktva* itself in its earlier stage requires to be transcended much more therefore *Mithyātva* But a person while still with Karmic bondage may have the thought 'I am Siddha', 'I am *Suddha*' i e I am the realised, I am the pure This contemplation is also called *abheda-ratnatraya*, the pure jewel by convention Such subtle distinctions in the nature of the path of Self-realisation can only be understood by the great Ones

156

Then the duality of the outer path or *parasamaya* and also the duality of the other-determined or *parasamayi*

जो परदब्बम्मि सुहं असुहं रागेण कुणदि जदि भावं ।

सो सगच्चरित्तभट्ठो परच्चरियच्चरो हवदि जीवो ॥१५६॥

[यः परद्वये शुभमशुभ रागेण करोति यदि भावम् ।

स स्वकचरित्रघ्नष्ट परच्चरित्तचरो भवति जीवः ॥१५६॥]

156 That Jiva which through desire for outer things experiences pleasurable or painful states loses his hold upon Self and gets bewildered and led by outer things He becomes the other determined

COMMENTARY—The author describes here the characteristics of the self that is still determined by the other According to this view even the traditional worship of Jaina orthodoxy would not escape this sweeping condemnation by the author All that would be merely *paracarita*, conduct determined by the other This other determined conduct

must be transcended by one who perceives the ideal of Self

157

Next the author points out that the other determined-conduct is only the means to bondage and not to Nirvāṇa

आसन्नवि ज्ञेण पुण्य पाप वा अप्पणोघ भावेण ।
सो तेण परचरितो हवदि त्ति जिणा परुवति ॥१५७॥
[आसन्नवि येन पुण्य पाप बात्मनोऽय भावेन ।
स तेन परचरित्र भवतीति जिना प्ररूपयन्ति ॥१५७॥]

157 On account of the pleasurable or the painful states of the Ātman there may flow in Punya Karma or Pāpa Karma Such an Ātman on account of such states becomes the other determined So say the Jinas

COMMENTARY—Conduct that is determined by outer things leads to bondage and blocks the way to liberation, for, the pleasurable mental states is the spring of Punya Karma and the painful mental state of Pāpa Karma, i.e., both merit and demerit in their subjective and objective aspects lead the soul to Karmic bondage Therefore if a Jiva experiences those mental states which form the springs of those Karma then for that very reason his conduct becomes other determined He therefore becomes the other determined one

158

Then the author describes the characteristics of the self-determined Jiva or the Puruṣottama

जो सव्वसगमुक्को णणमणो अप्पण सहावेण ।
जाणदि पस्सदि णियदं सो सगचरिय चरदि जीवो ॥१५८॥
[य सर्वसगमुक्त अनन्यमना आत्मान स्वभावेन ।
जानाति पश्यति नियत स स्वकचरित चरति जीव ॥१५८॥]

158 That Jiva which being free from relations to others, and from alien thoughts through its own intrinsic nature of perception and understanding, perceives and knows its own eternal nature to be such, is said to have conduct that is absolutely self-determined

COMMENTARY—Here is the description of conduct that is self determined First there should be no kind of relation to outward things through affective states On account of this freedom, thought is reflected upon Self The fundamental faculties of Jiva are perception and understanding If the self is perceived or intuited and under-

stood to be constituted by perception and knowledge that thought is purely self-determined. Jiva that has that thought alone is said to have absolute self realisation.

159.

Next the very same *svasamaya* is described in a different way

चरियं चरदि सगं सो जो परदव्यप्यभावरहिद्व्या ।
 वंसजणाणवियप्यं अदियप्यं चरदि अप्पावो ॥१५६॥
 [चरित चरति स्वक स घू परद्वयात्मभावरहितात्मा ।
 वसोनजानविकल्पमविकल्प चरत्यात्मन ॥१५६॥]

159 Whatever Yogindra being entirely free from affective states related to other things and firmly established in its own intrinsic nature, perceives himself to be identical with that which perceives and knows is said to have self-determined activity

COMMENTARY—Thus in order to instruct the disciple both according to Dravyārthika and Paryāyārthika Nayas the two paths are described Nisācaya Ratnatraya or the real jewel and Vyavahāra Ratnatraya or the relative jewel The real and the relative are related to one another as the ideal or end and the means to realise the same Thus the ultimate goal is the real jewel

160.

Next is the description of Vyavahāra Moksamārga or the relative path which is the means for the realisation of the ultimate end

धम्मादीसद्दहणं सम्मत्त जाणमंगपुब्बगदं ।
 वेट्ठा तवमिह चरिया व्यवहारो मोक्खमग्गो ति ॥१६०॥
 [धर्मादिबद्धान सम्यक्त्व ज्ञानमङ्गपूर्वगतम् ।
 वेष्टा तपति चर्या व्यवहारो मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१६०॥]

160 Belief in the Padārthas such as Dharma and in their respective value is Right belief Understanding the Scriptures which are divided into Angas and Pūrvas is Right knowledge Conduct according to the twelve kinds of Tapas is Right conduct These three from the Vyavahāra point of view form the path to Mokṣa

COMMENTARY—On account of the suppression or the partial eradication of the seven Karmas called *mūla-prakṛtis* there may appear to a man, perception of and belief in the several Padārthas and their values. Such a belief resulting from the apprehension of the nature of reality is called Vyavaharically the right belief It is right belief only Vyavaharically, because it is the means to emancipation and thus to the absolute and the real belief But this Vyavahāra Samyaktva should not be confounded with false belief which

is neither the means to Mokṣa nor is the instrument of the right belief

Angas and Pūrvas are the parts of Śrutas or the Scriptures Understanding these is considered to be right knowledge Vyavahārically It is only the means for obtaining the real knowledge of reality through direct apprehension This Vyavahāra knowledge is also distinct from false knowledge possessed by persons of alien faith

Again right conduct from the Vyavahāra point of view is life according to the twelve kinds of Tapas This Tāpasic self-control again cannot be associated with persons who are not enthusiastic about the ideal of self-realisation Thus Vyavahāra Ratnatraya is shown to be the means of Nīścaya Ratnatraya

[The seven *prakṛtis*, the twelve kinds of *tapas*, have been explained elsewhere and for Angas and Pūrvas the reader is referred to Weber's *History of Jaina Sacred Literature* and to the *Outlines of Jainism* by J L Jaini]

161

Next the description of Nīścaya Mokṣa Mārga or the real path to realise which the previous one the Vyavahāra Mokṣa Mārga, is the means

णिच्छयणयेण भणितो तिहि तेह समाहिदो हु जो अप्पा ।

ण कुणदि किंचि वि अण्ण ण मुयदि सो मोक्खमग्गो त्ति ॥१६१॥

[निश्चयनयेन भणितस्त्रिभिस्ते समाहितं खलु य आत्मा ।

न करोति किंचिदप्यन्यन् न मुञ्चति स मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१६१॥]

161 Whatever Ātmā through the three-fold jewel well-established in itself neither perceives alien things as its own, nor gives up its own intrinsic nature, that Ātmā is indeed called the absolute path to Salvation

COMMENTARY—Belief, knowledge and conduct so long as they are based upon other things besides self would only constitute the relative jewel But if the same three are based upon intrinsic nature of self then they would form the real jewel The former is the means of obtaining the latter

162

According to the principle that the thing and its qualities are not distinct, the Ātmā is described to be identical with the constitutive elements of perception, knowledge and conduct

जो चरदि णादि पेच्छदि अप्पाण अप्पणा अण्णमय ।

सो चारित्त णाण दसणमिदि णिच्छिदो होदि ॥१६२॥

[यश्चरति जानाति पश्यति आत्मानमात्मनानन्यमयम् ।

स चारित्रं ज्ञान दर्शनमिति निश्चितो भवति ॥१६२॥]

162 Whatever perceives its own self-identical nature, knows its own subjective and objective nature, and experiences its own immediate existence, is identical with the very activity of perception, knowledge and conduct

COMMENTARY—Cāritra, Jñāna and Darśana (conduct, knowledge, and perception) constitute the Ātman These are also the path to Nirvāṇa Hence the intrinsic nature and function of the Self are the real path, i.e. the real path is nothing but a real Self

163

The Samsārī Jivas do not as a matter of course all attain Mokṣha, only some of them are said to have that privilege

जेण विजाणदि सव्वं पेच्छदि सो तेण सोक्खमणुह्वदि ।
इदि त जाणदि भविओ अभव्वसत्तो ण सह्वदि ॥१६३॥
[येन विजानाति सर्वं परयति स तेन सोख्यमनुभवति ।
इति तज्जानाति मव्वोऽभव्यसत्त्वो न भव्वसे ॥१६३॥]

163 Because of the fact that the Self perceives and understands all things without limit it also enjoys infinite bliss This fact that infinite knowledge and infinite bliss are inseparable is understood only by the Bhavya The Abhavya cannot appreciate that, much less believe in it

COMMENTARY—All Samsārī Jivas are not fit to obtain the state of self-realisation Here happiness is the absence of any kind of hindrance to the intrinsic activity of the self Perception and understanding are the intrinsic nature of the self Hindrance to the nature of the self therefore would be a kind of obstruction to either perception or knowledge The perfected self is all knowing and all perceiving, i.e., has no limit to its nature of perception and understanding The absence of hindrance naturally manifests in its positive aspect as infinite bliss The logical consequence of Kevala Jñāna is Ananta Sukha This truth is appreciated and accepted only by the faithful The unfaithful ones are incapable of appreciating this truth Therefore the path to salvation is available only to the former Therefore only some of the Samsārī Jivas but not all are fit to walk the path to Mokṣa

164

Darsana, Jñāna and Cāritra when conditioned by other things than Self may in a way lead to bondage But if they are determined absolutely by the self then they form the direct antecedent of emancipation

दसणणाणचरित्ताणि मोक्खमग्गे त्ति सेविदब्बाणि ।
साधूहि इव भणिव तेहिं दु बधो व मोक्खो वा ॥१६४॥

[दर्शनज्ञानचारित्र्याणि मोक्षमार्ग इति सेवितव्यानि ।
साधुचरितं भणितं तंस्तु बन्धो वा मोक्षो वा ॥१६४॥]

164. Since Darśana, Jñāna and Cāritra constitute the Mokṣa Mārga, they are adored by the wise. If they are determined by non-self they may lead directly to bondage or indirectly to Mokṣa. But if they are determined by Self then they may lead to Mokṣa.

COMMENTARY—Intuition, knowledge and conduct produce effects according as they are determined by the associated things. If they are associated with external things, they may get associated with desire and aversion and thus may bring about Karmic bondage. But if they are associated with intrinsic and pure nature of the self, then they may directly and immediately bring about liberation. A king for example because of his defective instruments political and military may lead to the strengthening of the enemy instead of annihilating him, or for example, *ghee* which is by nature of soothing effects may when associated with fire aggravate the *heat*. Similar is the case with the three jewels.

165

Next the characteristic of Sūkṣma Parasamaya, or the subtle non-self or other determinedness

अण्णाणादो णाणी जदि मण्णदि सुद्धसंपओगादो ।
हवदि त्ति दुक्खमोक्ख परसमयरदो हवदि जीवो ॥१६५॥

[अज्ञानात् ज्ञानी यदि मन्यते शुद्धसंप्रयोगात् ।
भवतीति दुःखमोक्ष. परसमयरतो भवति जीवः ॥१६५॥]

165. If an Ātman through ignorance believes that through awe and reverence to Arahanta and others he may attain emancipation from misery then he is only the lover of non-self or Parasamaya.

COMMENTARY—Arahanta and Siddha are free from every kind of imperfection and are full of all good qualities. Love and devotion towards these may certainly be desirable but still by themselves they can never bring about Karmic liberation. The hope to obtain salvation only through devotion is Parasamaya. The person who has that hope is Parasamaya, the other determined one. The other determined means to be away from the ideal of self. When love and devotion to the perfect beings cannot take us nearer the goal, we need not even mention the utter uselessness of ignorant worship of alien deities with all the Samsāric paraphernalia. Thus the author emphasizes the fact that even the love and devotion towards the perfect beings form a subtle kind of obstacle in the way of self-realisation.

166

The above mentioned reverence and devotion as they some times lead to bondage, do not constitute the path to Mokṣa

अरहंतसिद्धचेदियपवयणगणणाणभतिसंपणो ।
बंधदि पुण्य बहुसो ण ह सो कम्मवत्तयं कुणदि ॥१६६॥

[अर्हत्सिद्धर्चयप्रवचनगणनानभतिसंपन्नः ।
बध्नाति पुण्य बहुशो न ह्यसु स कर्मक्षयं करोति ॥१६६॥]

166 The person who has reverence and devotion towards Arahanta, Siddha, their images, Sangha, and congregations will invariably get bondage with Puṇya karma, hence he can never achieve absolute annihilation of Karma

COMMENTARY—The author minimises the importance of popular form of religious devotion and worship. The traditional Jaina religion always emphasizes the value of faith and devotion towards the objects worthy of reverence. But our author views the popular faith from a higher point. From the true philosophical point of view such Bhakti will only lead to Puṇya-karma and its consequent divine happiness. But Puṇya-karma is still thralldom though the shackles are made of gold and Deva happiness is still Samsāri. Therefore Karmic annihilation cannot be achieved by the person who has such faith and devotion alone.

167

The main obstacle in the path of self-realisation or Svasamaya is said to be *rāga* or affection

जस्स हिये णुमस्सं वा परद्वब्धि विज्जदे रागो ।
सो ण विजाणदि समयं सगस्स सव्वागमधरो वि ॥१६७॥

[यस्य हृदयेऽणुमात्रो वा परद्वन्द्वे विद्यते रागः ।
स न विजानाति समयं स्वकस्य सर्वागमधरोऽपि ॥१६७॥]

167 If in the heart of a Yogin there is an iota of affection towards alien objects (even in an Arahanta) then, though he be well versed in all the Śāstras, he would be incapable of appreciating his true Self or Paramātman through immediate experience.

COMMENTARY—Devotion to external ideals may be useful up to a certain stage of development. The ideal of Vitarāga is distinctly related to self. Absolute freedom from attachment is the meaning of Vitarāga. Complete absence of *rāga* is certainly inconsistent with attachment and devotion to Arahanta or Siddha. So far as self is concerned

these ideal personalities are indeed external. The right ideal must be to attain perfect Siddha state oneself. This realisation of Siddha state cannot be reached by having attachment to external objects, hence the author emphasizes the importance of effort to transcend even this subtle kind of attraction however worthy the object of the ideal be, self and self alone must be the final and the ultimate ideal of spiritual evolution. To have Bhakti which is a subtle attraction and then to believe that somehow the final good will be Mokṣa is to forget the importance of self-effort towards self realisation. According to the author then the traditional religious reverence, is only a stepping stone for the higher spiritual goal. He who shrinks from transcending the traditional orthodoxy is unfit to live in the higher plane. He is infected with the delusion that what is only a means is an end in itself, that what is merely relative is the absolute, and that what is of temporary value has eternal value.

168

The author enumerates the train of several evils that may be generated by that little iota of affection, above referred to

धरिदु जस्स ण सक्क चित्तुब्भाम विणा दु अप्पाण ।
 रोधो तस्स ण विज्जदि सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स ॥१६८॥
 [धर्तुं यस्य न शक्यश्चित्तोद्भ्राम विना त्वात्मानम् ।
 रोधस्तस्य न विद्यते शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मण ॥१६८॥]

168 To whomsoever there is no ability to bear the turmoil of the mind apart from and independent of the pure contemplation of self to him there is no possibility of preventing the Karmas born of pleasure and pain.

COMMENTARY—There can be no devotion to Arahanta and others apart from an affective state, when there is affection the disturbance of the mind cannot be avoided. With the agitation of the heart the calm of the self is lost and if the calm of the self is disturbed, it is not possible to prevent the appearance of pleasure and pain, and there is no escape from happiness and misery there can be no emancipation from Samsāra. Affection however little is therefore the cause of this series of undesirable events.

169

One who has the ideal of Mokṣa must therefore completely eradicate every kind of desire from his heart

तम्हा णिब्बुदिकामो णिस्सगो णिम्ममो य हविय पुणो ।
 सिद्धेसु कुणदि भत्ति णिब्बाण तेण पप्पोदि ॥१६९॥

[तस्मान्निबुद्धसिक्कामो निःसङ्गो निर्ममश्च भूत्वा पुन ।
सिद्धेषु करोति भक्तिं निर्वाणं तेन प्राप्नोति ॥१६६॥]

169 Therefore he who aims at Nirvāna must not say "I love this, this is mine", Then he can very well be devoted to his own true self which is Siddha or the perfect one Through that same self-realisation he will attain Nirvāna

COMMENTARY—The great soul that understands the truth of the previous causal sequence from desire to turmoil of the mind, and from thence to Karma, and finally to Samsāra, struggles to escape from the attraction of the environment and from the idea of ownership of alien things When the relation of self to alien things either through attraction or owning is severed, then there is no possibility of desire springing up in the heart No desire means no spiritual discord, spiritual harmony repels Karmas, prevention of Karmas means disappearance of Samsāra Absence of Samsāra certainly implies its opposite Moksa, hence the person that longs for spiritual perfection and Karmic emancipation must never say "This I love This is mine "

170

The attitude of worship towards Arahanta and others, though it interferes with the immediate realisation of perfection is not altogether valueless, for it may ultimately lead to Nirvāna

सपयत्थं तित्थयरं अभिगदबुद्धिस्स सुत्तरोइस्स ।
दूरतरं णिव्वाणं संजमतवत्सपउत्तस्स ॥१७०॥
[सपयार्थं तीर्थकरमभिगतबुद्धेः सुवरोचिन ।
दूरतरं निर्वाणं संजमतवत्सप्रयुक्तस्य ॥१७०॥]

170 One may understand the true nature of Tirthankara, who is the basis of nine Padārthas One may have interest in and devotion to the Scripture One may have self control and penance With all these if one is not capable of realising his own true self, to him Nirvāna is beyond reach

COMMENTARY—Even though a person is well versed in Āgamas and well acquainted with the nature of reality, if he is ever much filled with devotion and worship to objective ideas, he will only secure the happiness of Svarga as the immediate fruit thereof Nirvāna or Mokṣa is very remote and he can obtain that only by a tedious process of spiritual development The immediate and direct antecedent of Mokṣa is the realisation of the true self, worship of and devotion to any other ideal however worthy it may be is only a circuitous path to reach the goal

171

Again the author emphasizes the fact that worship of the Arahanta and others cannot be the immediate antecedent of Mukti

अरहंतसिद्धचेदियपवयणभक्तो परेण नियमेण ।
जो कुणदि तवोकम्मं सो सुरलोगं समादियदि ॥१७१॥
[अहंत्सिद्धचेत्यप्रवचनमस्त परेण नियमेन ।
य. करोति तप कर्म स सुरलोक समावत्ते ॥१७१॥]

171 The person who has love and reverence towards Arahanta and Siddha, their representations and the divine Word or Āgama, however well he is engaged in the best form of Tapas so long as he is incapable of apprehending the true greatness of self on account of attachment to external ideals, will inevitably through his efforts enter only the world of the Devas

COMMENTARY—Whether now or hereafter the direct and immediate condition of Mokṣa is the apprehension of true self and not attachment to external ideals. The person who has not grasped the self through all his efforts associated with worship and reverence will only secure the happiness of Devas. This is merely a higher state of Samsāra and not Mokṣa

172

Then the author mentions the direct and immediate path to Mokṣa, thereby indicating that, that is the meaning of the present Work

तम्हा णिव्वुदिकामो राग सवत्थ कुणतु मा किञ्चि ।
सो तेण वीदरागो भविओ भवसायर तरदि ॥१७२॥
[तस्मान्निव्वुदिकामो राग सर्वत्र करोतु मा किञ्चित् ।
स तेन वीतरागो भव्यो भवसागर तरति ॥१७२॥]

172 Because of this truth that even the subtle attachment to external ideals hinders Nirvāna, let not the person who desires Mokṣa have any kind of attachment to things, living or non-living, desirable or undesirable, then he becomes the *vītarāga*, the non-attached. Thus will he be able to sail across the ocean of Samsāra

COMMENTARY—The essential ingredient of the direct and immediate path to Mokṣa is the state of Vitarāga or non-attachment. Attachment to alien persons and things deserving worship is something like burning sandal wood. It may smell sweet nevertheless it will burn. The subtle attachment to external ideals may lead to happiness but the

very happiness will scorch the soul, hence the great person, who longs for freedom from Saṃsāra must rid himself of any kind of attachment, must become a Vitarāga. Then will he be able to conquer the misery of Life and inherit the kingdom of Nirvāṇa.

This is the meaning of the above Sūtra and the same is the purport of the whole book, *Pañcāstikāya*, i.e., it is not only the *sūtra-tātparya* but also *śāstra-tātparya*. This aims to apprehend the nature of Jineśvara, the great victor, the all-knowing of infinite qualities and the Vitarāga or the non-attached.

It is called *prābhṛta* 'well filled with the meaning' because it treats about the nine Padārthas and thus describes the nature of the systems of reality. Since it deals with the Dravyas or the existences it is also called Dravyānuyoga. It clearly explains the five Astikāyas the six Dravyas, seven Tattvas, and the nine Padārthas. It also examines the nature of bondage and of the bound, of liberation and the liberated. Lastly in the Cūlikā or the appendix there is a clear distinction between the absolute path and relative path, and also the indication of the fact that non-attachment is the direct and immediate condition of Nirvāṇa. Non-attachment and perfect peace of the heart is the central doctrine emphasized by an embodied in this *Pañcāstikāya Prābhṛta*. This Vitarāgatva or the state of non-attachment is available only to that Bhavya or the right believer who appreciates the comparative merits of the two paths, relative and absolute, Vyavahāra and Nīścaya, but not to one who is incapable of appreciating the various aspects of truth and who clings to only a particular and fractional aspect as the whole truth, i.e. one who believes in Ekānta aspect of reality is incapable of appreciating the ideal of Vitarāga and the difference between the absolute path and the relative path. He is far away from the goal. The true believer will certainly understand the compatibility and the harmony between the two paths and thus will try to realise the ideal of non-attachment or Vitarāgatva as the immediate condition of Mokṣa.

173.

The author ends the Work indicating his object in this composition

मगप्यभावणह् पवयणभस्तिपचोदिहेण मया ।

भणियं पवयणसारं पञ्चत्थियसगहं सुत्तं ॥१७३॥

[मार्गप्रभावणार्थं प्रवचनमस्तिप्रचोदितेन मया ।

भणितं प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकायसग्रहं सुत्तम् ॥१७३॥]

173 For the purpose of explaining the Mokṣa Mārga, this work by the name of *Pañcāstikāya* containing the essentials of divine revelation is composed by me as actuated by Bhakti or devotion towards the divine Word

COMMENTARY—The author explains the purpose of this writing his work The Mokṣa Mārga or the path is revealed by Jina But Divine revelation or the Śāstra is elaborate and extensive In order to exhibit the path to the believers this short summary of the divine Word is written with the name of *Pañcāsūkāya Samgraha*

Thus ends Book II of *Pancāstikāya*

श्री

श्रीमत्-कुन्दकुन्दाचार्य-प्रणीतः

पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहः

श्रीमद्-अमृतचन्द्राचार्य-विरचित-तत्त्वप्रदीपिका-समेतः

सहजानन्दचैतन्यप्रकाशाय महीयसे ।
नमोऽनेकान्तविश्रान्तमहिम्ने परमात्मने ॥१॥
दुर्निवारनयानीकविरोधध्वंसनौषधिः ।
स्यात्कारजीविता जीयाज्जनेनी सिद्धान्तपद्धतिः ॥२॥
सम्यग्ज्ञानामलज्योतिर्जननी द्विनयाश्रया ।
अथात समयव्याख्या सक्षेपेणाभिधीयते ॥३॥
पञ्चास्तिकायषड्द्रव्यप्रकारेण प्ररूपणम् ।
पूर्वं मूलपदार्थानामिह सूत्रकृता कृतम् ॥४॥
जीवाजीवद्विपर्यायरूपाणां चित्रवर्त्मनाम् ।
ततो नवपदार्थानां व्यवस्था प्रतिपादिता ॥५॥
ततस्तत्त्वपरिज्ञानपूर्वेण त्रितयात्मना ।
प्रोक्ता मार्गेण कल्याणी मोक्षप्राप्तिरपश्चिमा ॥६॥

अथ सूत्रावतारः—

इदंसदबन्धियाणं तिहुअणहिदमधुरविसदवक्काणं ।
अन्तातीदगुणाणं णमो जिणाणं जिदभवाणं ॥१॥
इन्द्रशतवन्दितेभ्यस्त्रिभुवनहितमधुरविशदवाक्येभ्यः ।
अन्तातीतगुणेभ्यो नमो जिनेभ्यो जितभवेभ्यः ॥१॥

अथात्र 'नमो जिनेभ्य' इत्यनेन जिनभावनमस्काररूपमसाधारण शास्त्रस्यादौ मङ्गल-

मुपात्तम् । अनादिना सतानेन प्रवर्तमाना अनादिनैव सतानेन प्रवर्तमानैरिन्द्राणां शतैर्वन्दिता ये इत्यनेन सर्वदैव देवाधिदेवत्वात्तेषामेवासाधारणनमस्कारार्हत्वमुक्तम् । त्रिभुवनमूर्ध्वाधोमध्यलोकवर्ती समस्त एव जीवलोकस्तस्मै निर्व्याबाधविशुद्धात्मतत्त्वोपलम्भोपायाभिधायित्वाद्वितं, परमार्थ-रसिकजनमनोहारित्वान्मधुर, निरस्तममस्तशङ्कादिदोषास्पदत्वाद्विशद वाक्य दिव्यो ध्वनिर्येषा-मित्यनेन समस्तवस्तुयाथात्म्योपदेशित्वात्प्रेक्षावत्प्रतीक्ष्यत्वमाख्यातम् । अन्तमतीत क्षेत्रानवच्छिन्न कालानवच्छिन्नश्च परमचैतन्यशक्तिविलासलक्षणो गुणो येषामित्यनेन तु परमाद्भुतज्ञानातिशय-प्रकाशनादवाप्तज्ञानातिशयानामपि योगीन्द्राणां बन्धत्वमुदितम् । जितो भव आजवजवो यैरित्येन तु कृतकृत्यत्वप्रकटनात् एवान्येषामकृतकृत्यानां शरणमित्युपदिष्टम् । इति सर्वपदानां तात्पर्यम् ॥१॥

समणमुहुगदमट्टं चतुग्गदिणिवारणं सणिठ्वाणं ।

एसो पणमिय सिरसा समयमियं सुणह वोच्छामि ॥२॥

श्रमणमुखोद्गतार्थं चतुर्गतिनिवारणं सनिर्वाणम् ।

एष प्रणम्य शिरसा समयमिमं शृणुत वक्ष्यामि ॥२॥

समयो ह्यागमः । तस्य प्रणामपूर्वकमात्मनाभिधानमत्र प्रतिज्ञातम् । युज्यते हि स प्रणन्तुम-भिधातुं चाप्तोपदिष्टत्वे सति सफलत्वात् । तत्राप्तोपदिष्टत्वमस्य श्रमणमुखोद्गतार्थत्वात् । श्रमणा हि महाश्रमणा सर्वज्ञवीतरागा । अर्थं पुनरनेकशब्दसंबन्धेनाभिधीयमानो वस्तुतयैकोऽभिधेयः । सफलत्वं तु चतसृणां नारकतिर्यग्मनुष्यदेवत्वलक्षणानां गतीनां निवारणत्वात् पारतन्त्र्यनिवृत्ति-लक्षणस्य निर्वाणस्य शुद्धात्मतत्त्वोपलम्भरूपस्य परपरया कारणत्वात् स्वातन्त्र्यप्राप्तिलक्षणस्य च फलस्य सद्भावादिति ॥२॥

समवाओ पंचण्हं समओ त्ति जिणुत्तमेहि पणत्तं ।

सो चेव हवदि लोओ तत्तो अमिओ अलोओ खं ॥३॥

समवाद (समवायो वा) पञ्चानां समय इति जिणोत्तमं प्रज्ञप्तम् ।

स च एव भवति लोकस्ततो ऽमितो ऽलोकः खम् ॥३॥

अत्र शब्दज्ञानार्थरूपेण त्रिविधाभिधेयता समयशब्दस्य लोकालोकविभागश्चाभिहितः तत्र च पञ्चानामस्तिकायानां समो मध्यस्थो रागद्वेषाभ्यामनुपहतो वर्णपदवाक्यसनिवेशविशिष्टः पाठो बादः शब्दसमयः शब्दागम इति यावत् । तेषामेव मिथ्यादर्शनादयोच्छेदे सति सम्यग्वायः परिच्छेदो ज्ञानस-मयो ज्ञानागम इति यावत् । तेषामेवाभिधानप्रत्ययपरिच्छिन्नानां वस्तुरूपेण समवायः सघातोऽर्थसमयः सर्वपदार्थसार्थ इति यावत् । तदत्र ज्ञानसमयप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं शब्दसमयसंबन्धेनार्थसमयो ऽभिधातु-

मभिप्रेत । अथ तस्यैवार्थसमयस्य द्वैविध्यं लोकालोकविकल्पात् । स एव पञ्चास्तिकायसमवायो यावास्तावाँल्लोकस्ततः परमितोऽनन्तो ह्यलोकः, स तु नाभावमात्रं किन्तु तत्समवायातिरिक्तपरिमाण-मनन्तक्षेत्रं खमाकाशमिति ॥३॥

जीवा पुद्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा तहेव आगासं ।

अत्थित्तमिह य णियदा अणणमइया अणुमहंता ॥४॥

जीवाः पुद्गलकाया धर्माधर्मौ तथैव आकाशम् ।

अस्तित्वे च नियता अनन्यमया अणुमहान्तः ॥४॥

अत्र पञ्चास्तिकायानां विशेषसज्ञा सामान्यविशेषास्तित्वं कायत्वं चोक्तम् । तत्र जीवा पुद्गला धर्माधर्मौ आकाशमिति तेषां विशेषसज्ञा अन्वर्था प्रत्येया । सामान्यविशेषास्तित्वं च तेषामुत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यमय्या सामान्यविशेषसत्तायां नियतत्वाद् व्यवस्थितत्वादवसेयम् । अस्तित्वे नियतानामपि न तेषामन्यमयत्वम्, यतस्ते सर्वदैवानन्यमया आत्मनिर्वृत्ता । अनन्यमयत्वेऽपि तेषामस्तित्वनियतत्वं नयप्रयोगात् । द्वौ हि नयौ भगवता प्रणीतौ—द्रव्याधिकं पर्यायाधिकश्च । तत्र न खल्वेकनयायत्तादेशना किन्तु तदुभयायत्ता । ततः पर्यायाथदेशादस्तित्वे स्वतः कथंचिद्विन्नेऽपि व्यवस्थिता द्रव्याथदेशात्मव्यमेव सन्तः सतोऽनन्यमया भवन्तीति । कायत्वमपि तेषामणुमहत्त्वात् । अणवोऽत्र प्रदेशा मूर्तामूर्ताश्च निर्विभागाशास्तैर्महान्तोऽणुमहान्तः प्रदेशप्रचयात्मका इति सिद्धं तेषां कायत्वम् । अणुभ्यां महान्त इति व्युपत्त्या द्व्यणुकपुद्गलस्कन्धानामपि तथाविधत्वम् । अणवश्च महान्तश्च व्यक्तिशक्तिरूपाभ्यामिति परमाणूनामेकप्रदेशात्मकत्वेऽपि तत्सिद्धिः । व्यक्त्यपेक्षया शक्त्यपेक्षया च प्रदेशप्रचयात्मकस्य महत्त्वस्याभावात्कालाणूनामस्तित्वनियतत्वेऽप्यकायत्वमनेनैव साधितम् । अतएव तेषामस्तिकायप्रकरणे सतामप्यनुपादानमिति ॥४॥

जेसि अत्थि सहाओ गुणेहि सह पज्जएहि विविहेहि ।

ते होंति अत्थिकाया णिप्पणं जेहि तइलोककं ॥५॥

येषामस्ति स्वभावः गुणैः सह पर्ययेविविधैः ।

ते भवन्त्यस्तिकायाः निष्पन्नं यैस्त्रैलोक्यम् ॥५॥

अत्र पञ्चास्तिकायानामस्तित्वसंभवप्रकारं कायत्वसंभवप्रकारश्चोक्तः । अस्ति ह्यस्तिकायानां गुणैः पर्यायैश्च विविधैः सह स्वभावो आत्मभावोऽनन्यत्वम् । वस्तुनो विशेषा हि व्यतिरेकिणः पर्याया गुणास्तु त एवान्वयिनः । ततः एकेन पर्यायेण प्रलीयमानस्यान्येनोपजायमानस्यान्वयिना गुणेन ध्रौव्यं

४ P पुद्गल, धम्माहम्मा, आगास ।

५ P विविधेहि, तेलोककं ।

विभाणस्यैकस्याऽपि वस्तुन समुच्छेदोत्पादध्रौव्यलक्षणमस्तित्वमुपपद्यत एव । गुणपर्यायै सह सर्व-
धान्यत्वे त्वन्यो विनश्यत्यन्य प्रादुर्भवत्यन्यो ध्रुवत्वमालम्बत इति सर्वं विप्लवते । ततः साध्वस्तित्व-
सम्भवप्रकारकथनम् । कायत्वसम्भवप्रकारस्त्वयमुपदिश्यते । अवयविनो हि जीवपुद्गलधर्माधर्माकाश-
पदार्थास्तेषामवयवा अपि प्रदेशाख्या परस्परव्यतिरेकित्वात्पर्याया उच्यन्ते । तेषां तै सहानन्पत्वे
कायत्वसिद्धिरुपपत्तिमती । निरवयवस्यापि परिमाणो सावयवत्वशक्तिसद्भावात्
कायत्वसिद्धिरनपवादा । न चैतदाशङ्क्यम् पुद्गलादन्येषाममूर्तत्वादविभाज्यानां सावयवत्वकल्पन-
मन्याय्यम् । दृश्यत एवाविभाज्ये ऽपि विहायसीद घटाकाशमिदमघटाकाशमिति विभागकल्पनम् ।
यदि तत्र विभागो न कल्पेत तदा यदेव घटाकाश तदेवाघटाकाश स्यात् । न च तदिष्टम् । तत
कालाणुभ्यो ऽन्यत्र सर्वेषां कायत्वाख्य सावयवत्वमवसेयम् । त्रैलोक्यरूपेण निष्पन्नत्वमपि तेषामस्ति-
कायत्वसाधनपरमुपन्यस्तम् । तथा च—त्रयाणामूर्ध्वाधोमध्यलोकानामुत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यवन्तस्त-
द्विशेषात्मका भावा भवन्तस्तेषां मूलपदार्थानां गुणपर्याययोगपूर्वकमस्तित्व साधयन्ति । अनुमीयते च
धर्माधर्माकाशानां प्रत्येकमूर्ध्वाधोमध्यलोकविभागरूपेण परिणमनात्कायत्वाख्य सावयवत्वम् । जीवा-
नामपि प्रत्येकमूर्ध्वाधोमध्यलोकविभागरूपेण परिणमनाल्लोकपूरणावस्थाव्यवस्थितव्यक्ते सदा
सन्निहितशक्तेस्तदनुमीयत एव । पुद्गलानामप्यूर्ध्वाधोमध्यलोकविभागरूपपरिणतमहास्कन्धत्व-
प्राप्तिव्यक्तिशक्तियोगित्वात्तथाविधा सावयवत्वसिद्धिरस्त्येवेति ॥५॥

ते चेव अत्थिकाया तेकालियभावपरिणदा णिच्चा ।

गच्छति दवियभावं परियट्ठणालिगसजुत्ता ॥६॥

ते चैवास्तिकाया त्रैकालिकभावपरिणता नित्या ।

गच्छन्ति द्रव्यभाव परिवर्तनलिङ्गसयुक्ता ॥६॥

अत्र पञ्चास्तिकायानां कालस्य च द्रव्यत्वमुक्तम् । द्रव्याणि हि सहकर्मभूवा गुणपर्यायाणां
मनन्यतयाधारभूतानि भवन्ति । ततो वृत्तवर्तमानवर्तिग्यमाणानां भावानां पर्यायाणां स्वरूपेण
परिणतत्वादस्तिकायानां परिवर्तनलिगस्य कालस्य चास्ति द्रव्यत्वम् । न च तेषां भूतभवद्भ्रविष्यद्भा-
वात्मना परिणममानानामनित्यत्वम् यतस्ते भूतभवद्भ्रविष्यद्भावावस्थास्वपि प्रतिनियतस्वरूपा-
परित्यागान्नित्या एव । अत्र काल पुद्गलादिपरिवर्तनहेतुत्वात्पुद्गलादिपरिवर्तनगम्यमानपर्या-
यत्वाच्चास्तिकायेष्वन्तर्भावार्थं स परिवर्तनलिग इत्युक्त इति ॥६॥

अण्णोण्णं पविसंता वेत्ता ओगासमण्णमण्णस्स ।

मेलंता वि य णिच्चं सगं सभावं ण विजहंति ॥७॥

अन्योन्यं प्रविशन्ति ददत्यवकाशमन्योन्यस्य ।

मित्यपि च नित्य स्वक स्वभावं न विजहति ॥७॥

अत्र षण्णा द्रव्याणां परस्परमत्यन्तसकरे ऽपि प्रतिनियतस्वरूपादप्रच्यवनमुक्तम् । अत एव तेषां परिणामवस्वेऽपि प्राग्नित्यत्वमुक्तम् । अत एव च न तेषामेकत्वापत्तिर्न च जीवकर्मणोर्व्यवहारनया-
देशादेकत्वे ऽपि परस्परस्वरूपोपादानमिति ॥७॥

सत्ता सव्यपयत्था सविस्वरूपा अणंतपञ्जाया ।

भंगुत्पादधुवत्ता सप्पडिवक्खा हवदि एक्का ॥८॥

सत्ता सर्वपदार्था सविश्वरूपा अनन्तपर्याया ।

भङ्गोत्पादध्रौव्यात्मिका सप्रतिपक्षा भवत्येका ॥८॥

अत्रास्तित्वस्वरूपमुक्तम् । अस्तित्व हि सत्ता नाम सतो भावः सत्त्वम् । न सर्वथा नित्यतया सर्वथा क्षणिकतया वा विद्यमानमात्रं वस्तु । सर्वथा नित्यत्ववस्तुनस्तत्त्वतः क्रमभुवा भावानाम-
भावात्कुतो विकारवत्त्वम् । सर्वथा क्षणिकस्य च तत्त्वतः प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभावात् कुत एकसतानत्वम् । ततः प्रत्यभिज्ञानहेतुभूतेन केनचित्स्वरूपेण ध्रौव्यमालम्ब्यमानं काभ्याचित्क्रमप्रवृत्ताभ्यां स्वरूपाभ्यां प्रलीयमानमुपजायमानं चैककालमेव परमार्थतस्त्रितयीमवस्थां बिभ्राण वस्तु सदवबोध्यम् । अत एव सत्ताप्युत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मिकाऽवबोद्धव्या, भावभाववतो कथचिदेकस्वरूपत्वात् । सा च त्रिलक्षणस्य समस्तस्यापि वस्तुविस्तारस्य सादृश्यसूचकत्वादेका । सर्वपदार्थस्थिता च त्रिलक्षणस्य सदित्यभिधानस्य सदिति प्रत्ययस्य च सर्वपदार्थेषु तन्मूलस्यैवोपलम्भात् । सविश्वरूपा च विश्वस्य समस्तवस्तुविस्तार-
स्यापि रूपैस्त्रिलक्षणैः स्वभावं सह वर्तमानत्वात् । अनन्तपर्याया चानन्ताभिर्द्रव्यपर्यायव्यक्तिभिस्त्रि-
लक्षणाभिः परिगम्यमानत्वात् । एवभूतापि सा न खलु निरङ्कुशा किन्तु सप्रतिपक्षा । प्रतिपक्षो ह्यसत्ता सत्ताया, अत्रिलक्षणत्व त्रिलक्षणाया, अनेकत्वमेकस्या, एकपदार्थस्थितत्वं सर्वपदार्थस्थि-
ताया, एकरूपत्वं सविश्वरूपाया, एकपर्यायत्वमनन्तपर्यायाया इति । द्विविधा हि सत्तामहासत्ता-
वान्तरसत्ता च । तत्र सर्वपदार्थसार्थव्यापिनी सादृश्यास्तित्वसूचिका महासत्ता प्रोक्तैव । अन्या तु प्रतिनियतवस्तुवर्तिनी स्वरूपास्तित्वसूचिकाऽवान्तरसत्ता । तत्र महासत्तावान्तरसत्तारूपेणासत्ता-
वान्तरसत्ता च महासत्तारूपेणासत्तेत्यसत्ता सत्ताया । येन स्वरूपेणोत्पादस्तत्तथोत्पादैकलक्षणमेव, येन स्वरूपेणोच्छेदस्तत्तथोच्छेदैकलक्षणमेव, येन स्वरूपेण ध्रौव्यं तत्तथा ध्रौव्यैकलक्षणमेव, तत उत्पद्यमानोच्छिद्यमानावतिष्ठमानानां वस्तुन स्वरूपाणां प्रत्येकं त्रैलक्षण्याभावादत्रिलक्षणत्वं त्रिलक्षणाया । एकस्य वस्तुन स्वरूपसत्ता नान्यस्य वस्तुन स्वरूपसत्ता भवतीत्यनेकत्वमेकस्या । प्रतिनियतपदार्थस्थिताभिरेव सत्ताभिः पदार्थानां प्रतिनियमो भवतीत्येकपदार्थस्थितत्वं सर्वपदार्थ-
स्थिताया । प्रतिनियतैकरूपाभिरेव सत्ताभिः प्रतिनियतैकरूपत्वं वस्तूनां भवतीत्येकरूपत्वं सविश्व-

रूपाया । प्रतिपर्यायिनियताभिरेव सत्ताभि प्रतिनियतैकपर्यायाणामानन्त्य भवतीत्येकपर्यायित्वमनन्त-
पर्यायाया । इति सर्वमनवद्य सामान्यविशेषप्ररूपणप्रवणनयद्वयायत्तत्वात्तद्देशनाया ॥८॥

द्वियदि गच्छति तादं तादं सवभावपज्जयाइं जं ।

द्वियं त भणन्ते अणणभूदं तु सत्तादो ॥९॥

द्रवति गच्छति तांस्तान् सद्भावपर्यायान् यत् ।

द्रव्य तद् भणन्ति अनन्यभूतं तु सत्तात ॥९॥

अत्र सत्ताद्रव्ययोरर्थान्तरत्व प्रत्याख्यातम् । द्रवति गच्छति सामान्यरूपेण स्वरूपेण व्याप्नोति
तास्तान् क्रमभुव सहभुवश्च सद्भावपर्यायान् स्वभावविशेषानित्यनुगतार्थया निरुक्त्या द्रव्य व्याख्या-
तम् । द्रव्य च लक्ष्यलक्षणभावादिभ्य कथचिद्भेदे ऽपि वस्तुत सत्ताया अपृथग्भूतमेवेति मन्तव्यम् ।
ततो यत्पूर्वं सत्त्वममत्त्व त्रिलक्षणत्वमत्रिलक्षणत्वमेकत्वमनेकत्व सर्वपदार्थस्थितत्वमेकपदार्थस्थितत्व
विश्वरूपत्वमेकरूपत्वमनन्तपर्यायित्वमेकपर्यायित्व च प्रतिपादित सत्तायास्तत्सर्वं तदनर्थान्तरभूतस्य
द्रव्यस्यैव द्रष्टव्यम् । ततो न कश्चिदपि तेषु सत्ताविशेषो ऽवशिष्येत य सत्ता वस्तुतो द्रव्यात्पृथक्
व्यवस्थापयेदिति ॥९॥

दठवं सल्लक्षणयं उत्पादव्ययधुवत्तसंजुत्त ।

गुणपज्जयासयं वा जं तं भणन्ति सव्वण्ह ॥१०॥

द्रव्यं सल्लक्षणकं उत्पादव्ययध्रुवत्वसमुक्तम् ।

गुणपर्यायाश्रयं वा यत्तद् भणन्ति सर्वज्ञाः ॥१०॥

अत्र त्रेधा द्रव्यलक्षणमुक्तम् । सद्द्रव्यलक्षणम् । उक्तलक्षणाया सत्ताया अविशेषाद् द्रव्यस्य
सत्स्वरूपमेव लक्षणम् । न चानेकान्तात्मकस्य द्रव्यस्य सन्मात्रमेव स्व रूप यतो लक्ष्यलक्षणविभागा-
भाव इति । उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्याणि वा द्रव्यलक्षणम् । एकजात्यविरोधिनि क्रमभुवा भावाना सताने
पूर्वभावविनाश समुच्छेद, उत्तरभावप्रादुर्भावश्च समुत्पाद, पूर्वोत्तरभावोच्छेदोत्पादयोरपि
स्वजातेरपरित्यागो ध्रौव्यम् । तानि सामान्यादेशादभिन्नानि विशेषादेशादभिन्नानि युगपद्भावीनि
स्वभावभूतानि द्रव्यस्य लक्षण भवन्तीति । गुणपर्याया वा द्रव्यलक्षणम् । अनेकान्तात्मकस्य वस्तुनो
ऽन्ययिनो विशेषा गुणा व्यतिरेकिण पर्यायास्ते द्रव्ये यौगपद्येन क्रमेण च प्रवर्तमाना कथचिद्भिन्नाः
कथचिदभिन्ना स्वभावभूता द्रव्यलक्षणाभापद्यन्ते । त्रयाणामप्यमीषा द्रव्यलक्षणानामेकस्मिन्नभि-
हिते ऽन्यदुभयमर्थादेवापद्यते । सच्चेदुत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यवच्च गुणपर्यायवच्च । उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यवच्चेत्सच्च

९ P भणन्ति हि ।

१०. P सव्वण्ह ।

गुणपर्यायवच्च । गुणपर्यायवच्चेत्सच्चोत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यवच्चेति । सद्धि नित्यानित्यस्वभावत्वाद् ध्रुवत्वमुत्पादव्ययात्मकता च प्रथयति, ध्रुवत्वात्मकैर्गुणैरुत्पादव्ययात्मकं पर्यायैश्च सहैकत्व चाख्याति । उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्याणि तु नित्यानित्यस्वरूप परमार्थं सदावेदयन्ति, गुणपर्यायाश्चात्मलाभ-निबन्धनभूतान् प्रथयन्ति । गुणपर्यायास्त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकित्वाद् ध्रौव्योत्पत्तिविनाशान् सूचयन्ति, नित्यानित्यस्वभाव परमार्थं सच्चोपलक्षयन्तीति ॥१०॥

उप्पत्ती व विणासो दब्बस्स य णत्थि अत्थि सवभावो ।

विगमुप्पादध्रुवत्तं करेति तस्सेव पज्जया ॥११॥

उत्पत्तिर्वा विनाशो द्रव्यस्य च नास्त्यस्ति सद्भावः ।

विगमोत्पादध्रुवत्वं कुर्वन्ति तस्यैव पर्याया. ॥११॥

अत्रोभयनयाभ्यां द्रव्यलक्षणं प्रविभक्तम् । द्रव्यस्य हि सहक्रमप्रवृत्तगुणपर्यायसद्भावरूपस्य त्रिकालावस्थायिनो ज्ञादिनिधनस्य न समुच्छेदसमुदयौ युक्तौ । अथ तस्यैव पर्यायाणां सहप्रवृत्ति-भाजा केषाचित् ध्रौव्यसंभवे ऽप्यपरेषां क्रमप्रवृत्तिभाजा विनाशसंभवसंभावनमुपपन्नम् । ततो द्रव्यार्थार्पिणायामनुत्पादमनुच्छेदं सत्त्वभावमेव द्रव्यं, तदेव पर्यायार्थार्पिणायामनुत्पादं सोच्छेदं चाव-बोद्धव्यम् । सर्वमिदमनवद्यं च द्रव्यपर्यायाणामभेदात् ॥११॥

पज्जयविजुदं दब्ब दब्बविजुत्ता य पज्जया णत्थि ।

दोण्हं अणणभूवं भावं समणा परूवेति ॥१२॥

पर्यायवियुतं द्रव्यं द्रव्यवियुक्ताश्च पर्याया न सन्ति ।

द्वयोरनन्यभूतं भावं श्रमणां प्ररूपयन्ति ॥१२॥

अत्र द्रव्यपर्यायाणामभेदो निर्दिष्टः । दुग्धदधिनवनीतघृतादिवियुतगोरसवत्पर्यायवियुतं द्रव्यं नास्ति । गोरसवियुक्तदुग्धदधिनवनीतघृतादिवद्द्रव्यवियुक्ताः पर्याया न सन्ति । ततो द्रव्यस्य पर्यायाणां चादेशवशात्कथंचिद्भेदे ऽप्येकास्ति त्वनियतत्वादन्त्योन्याजहद्वृत्तीनां वस्तुत्वेनाभेद इति ॥१२॥

दब्बेण विणा ण गुणा गुणेहि दब्बं विणा ण संभवदि ।

अव्वदिरित्तो भावो दब्बगुणाणं हवदि तम्हा ॥१३॥

द्रव्येण विना न गुणा गुणैर्द्रव्यं विना न संभवति ।

अव्यतिरिक्तो भावो द्रव्यगुणानां भवति तस्मात् ॥१३॥

११ J वयमुत्पाद^० । P करति ।

१२ P परूवेति ।

अत्र द्रव्यगुणानामभेदो निर्दिष्टः । पुद्गलपृथग्भूतस्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णवद्द्रव्येण विना न गुणाः संभवन्ति । स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णपृथग्भूतपुद्गलवद्गुणैर्विना द्रव्यं न संभवति । ततो द्रव्यगुणानामप्यादेश-
वशात् कथंचिद्भेदेऽप्येकास्तित्वनियतत्वादन्योन्याजहद्वृत्तीनां वस्तुत्वेनाभेद इति ॥१३॥

सिय अत्थि णत्थि उहयं अव्वत्तव्व पुणो य तत्तिदयं ।

दव्वं खु सत्तभंगं आदेसवसेण संभवदि ॥१४॥

स्यादस्ति नास्त्युभयमवक्तव्यं पुनश्च तत्रितयम् ।

द्रव्यं खलु सप्तभङ्गमादेशवशेन संभवति ॥१४॥

अत्र द्रव्यस्यादेशवशेनोक्ता सप्तभङ्गी । स्यादस्ति द्रव्यं, स्यान्नास्ति द्रव्यं, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च द्रव्यं, स्यादवक्तव्यं द्रव्यं, स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यं, स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यं, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यमिति । अत्र सर्वथात्वनिषेधकोऽनेकान्तद्योतकः कथंचिदर्थे स्याच्छब्दो निपातः । तत्र स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैरादिष्टमस्ति द्रव्यं, परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैरादिष्टं नास्ति द्रव्यं, स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैः परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैश्च क्रमेणादिष्टमस्ति च नास्ति च द्रव्यं, स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्र-
कालभावैः परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैश्च युगपदादिष्टमवक्तव्यं द्रव्यं, स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैर्युगपत्स्वपरद्रव्य-
क्षेत्रकालभावैश्चादिष्टमस्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यं, परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैर्युगपत्स्वपरद्रव्यक्षेत्रकाल-
भावैश्चादिष्टं नास्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यं, स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैः परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैश्च युगपत्स्व-
परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैश्चादिष्टमस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यमिति । न चैतदनुपपन्नम्, सर्वस्य
वस्तुन स्वरूपादिना अशून्यत्वात्, पररूपादिना शून्यत्वात् । उभाभ्यामशून्यशून्यत्वात्, सहावाच्य-
त्वात्, भङ्गसयोगार्पणायामशून्यावाच्यत्वात्, शून्यावाच्यत्वात्, अशून्यशून्यावाच्यत्वाच्चेति ॥१४॥

भावस्स णत्थि णासो णत्थि अभावस्स चैव उप्पादो ।

गुणपज्जयेसु भावा उप्पादवए पकुव्वति ॥१५॥

भावस्य नास्ति नाशो नास्ति अभावस्य चैव उत्पादः ।

गुणपर्यायेषु भावा उत्पादव्ययान् प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥१५॥

अत्रासत्प्रादुर्भावत्वमुत्पादस्य सदुच्छेदत्व विगमस्य निषिद्धम् । भावस्य सतो हि द्रव्यस्य न द्रव्यत्वेन विनाशः, अभावस्यासतोऽन्यद्रव्यस्य न द्रव्यत्वेनोत्पादः । किन्तु भावाः सन्ति द्रव्याणि सदुच्छेदमसदुत्पादं चान्तरेणैव गुणपर्यायेषु विनाशमुत्पादं चारभन्ते । यथा हि धृतोत्पत्तौ गोरसस्य सतो न विनाशः न चापि गोरसव्यतिरिक्तस्यार्थान्तरस्यासत् उत्पादः किन्तु गोरसस्यैव सदुच्छेद-
मसदुत्पादं चानुपलभमानस्य स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णादिषु परिणामिषु गुणेषु पूर्वावस्थया विनश्यत्सूत्ररा-

वस्थया प्रादुर्भवत्सु नश्यति च नवनीतपर्यायो घृतपर्याय उत्पद्यते, तथा सर्वभावा-
नामपीति ॥१५॥

भावा जीवादीया जीवगुणा चैदणा य उवओगो ।

सुरणरणारयतिरिया जीवस्स य पज्जया बहुणा ॥१६॥

भावा जीवाद्या जीवगुणाश्चेतना घोपयोगः ।

सुरनरनारकतिर्यञ्चो जीवस्य च पर्याया बहवः ॥१६॥

अत्र भावगुणपर्याया प्रज्ञापिता । भावा हि जीवादय षट् पदार्था । तेषा गुणा पर्यायाश्च
प्रसिद्धा । तथापि जीवस्य वक्ष्यमाणोदाहरणप्रसिद्धयर्थमभिधीयन्ते । गुणा हि जीवस्य ज्ञानानुभूति-
लक्षणा शुद्धचेतना, कार्यानुभूतिलक्षणा कर्मफलानुभूतिलक्षणा चाशुद्धचेतना, चैतन्यानुविधायि-
परिणामलक्षण सविकल्पनिर्विकल्परूप शुद्धाशुद्धतया सकलविकलता दधानो द्वेधोपयोगश्च । पर्याया-
स्त्वगुरुलघुगुणहानिवृद्धिनिर्वृत्ता शुद्धा, सूत्रोपात्तास्तु सुरनारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्यलक्षणा परब्रह्मसबन्ध-
निर्वृत्तत्वादशुद्धाश्चेति ॥१६॥

मणुसत्तणेण णट्ठो देही देवो हवेदि इदरो वा ।

उभयत्थ जीवभावो ण णस्सदि ण जायदे अण्णो ॥१७॥

मनुष्यत्वेन नष्टो देही देवो भवतीतरो वा ।

उभयत्र जीवभावो न नश्यति न जायते ऽन्य ॥१७॥

इद भावनाशाभावोत्पादनिषेधोदाहरणम् । प्रतिसमयसम्भवदगुरुलघुगुणहानिवृद्धिनिर्वृत्तस्वभाव-
पर्यायसतन्यविच्छेदकेनैकेन सोपाधिना मनुष्यत्वलक्षणेन पर्यायेण विनश्यति जीवः, तथाविधेन देवत्व-
लक्षणेन नारकतिर्यक्त्वलक्षणेन वान्येन पर्यायेणोत्पद्यते । न च मनुष्यत्वेन नाशे जीवत्वेनापि
नश्यति, देवत्वादिनोत्पादे जीवत्वेनाप्युत्पद्यते, कितु सदुच्छेदमसद्गुत्पादमन्तरेणैव तथा विवर्तत
इति ॥१७॥

सो चेव जादि मरणं जादि ण णट्ठो ण चेव उत्पण्णो ।

उत्पण्णो य विणट्ठो देवो मणुसो त्ति पज्जाओ ॥१८॥

स च एव याति मरणं याति न नष्टो न चैवोत्पन्नः ।

उत्पन्नश्च विनष्टो देवो मनुष्य इति पर्यायः ॥१८॥

अत्र कथञ्चिद्द्रव्योत्पादवत्त्वे ऽपि द्रव्यस्य सदाविनष्टानुत्पन्नत्व व्यापितम् । यदेव पूर्वोत्तर-पर्यायबिम्बेकसपर्कापादितामुभयीमवस्थामात्मसात्कुर्वाणमुच्छिद्यमानमुत्पद्यमान च द्रव्यमालक्ष्यते, तदेव तथाविधोभयावस्थाव्यापिना प्रतिनियतैकवस्तुत्वनिबन्धनभूतेन स्वभावेनाविनष्टमनुत्पन्न वा वेद्यते । पर्यायास्तु तस्य पूर्वपूर्वपरिणामोपमर्दोत्तरोत्तरपरिणामोत्पादरूपा प्रणाशमभवधर्माणो ऽभिधीयन्ते । ते च वस्तुत्वेन द्रव्यादपृथग्भूता एवोक्ता । तत पर्यायै सहैकवस्तुवाज्जायमान म्रियमाणमपि जीवद्रव्य सर्वदानुत्पन्नाविनष्ट द्रष्टव्यम् । देवमनुष्यादिपर्यायास्तु क्रमवर्तित्वादुपस्थिताति-वाहितस्वसमया उत्पद्यन्ते विनश्यन्ति चेति ॥१८॥

एवं सतो विनाशो असतो जीवस्स णत्थि उत्पादो ।

तावदिओ जीवाणं देवो मणुसो स्ति गदिणामो ॥१९॥

एव सतो विनाशो ऽसतो जीवस्य नास्त्युत्पादः ।

तावज्जीवानां देवो मनुष्य इति गतिनाम ॥१९॥

अत्र सदसतोर्विनाशानुत्पादौ स्थितिपक्षत्वेनोपन्यस्तौ । यदि हि जीवो य एव म्रियते स एव जायते, य एव जायते स एव म्रियते, तदेव सतो विनाशो ऽसत उत्पादश्च नास्तीति व्यवतिष्ठते । यत्तु देवो जायते मनुष्यो म्रियते इति व्यपदिश्यते तदवधृतकालदेवमनुष्यत्वपर्यायनिर्वर्तकस्य देव-मनुष्यगतिनाम्नस्तन्मात्रत्वादविरुद्धम् । यथा हि महतो वेणुदण्डस्यैकस्य क्रमवृत्तीन्यनेकानि पर्वाण्या-त्मीयात्मीयप्रमाणावच्छिन्नत्वात् पर्वान्तरमगच्छन्ति स्वस्थानेषु भावभाज्जि परस्थानेष्वभावभाज्जि भवन्ति, वेणुदण्डस्तु सर्वेष्वपि पर्वस्थानेषु भावभागपि पर्वान्तरसबन्धेन पर्वान्तरसबन्धाभावादभाव-भागभवति, तथा निरवधित्रिकालावस्थायिनो जीवद्रव्यस्यैकस्य क्रमवृत्तयोऽनेके मनुष्यत्वादिपर्याया आत्मीयात्मीयप्रमाणावच्छिन्नत्वात् पर्यायान्तरमगच्छन्त स्वस्थानेषु भावभाज परस्थानेष्वभाव-भाजो भवन्ति, जीवद्रव्य तु सर्वपर्यायस्थानेषु भावभागपि पर्यायान्तरसबन्धेन पर्यायान्तरसबन्धा-भावादभावभागभवति ॥१९॥

णाणावरणादीया भावा जीवेण सुट्ठु अणुबद्धा ।

तेसिमभावं किञ्चा अभूदपुण्वो हवदि सिद्धो ॥२०॥

ज्ञानावरणाद्या भावा जीवेन सुण्ठु अनुबद्धाः ।

तेषामभावं कृत्वाभूतपूर्वो भवति सिद्धः ॥२०॥

अत्रात्यन्तासदुत्पादत्व सिद्धस्य निषिद्धम् । यथा स्तोककालान्वयिषु नामकर्मविशेषोदयनिर्वृत्तेषु

जीवस्य देवादिपर्यायिष्वेकस्मिन् स्वकारणनिवृत्तौ निवृत्तेऽभूतपूर्वं एव चान्यस्मिन्नुत्पन्ने नासदुत्पत्तिः , तथा दीर्घकालान्बयिनि ज्ञानावरणादिकर्मसामान्योदयनिवृत्तिससारित्वपर्याये भव्यस्य स्वकारण-निवृत्तौ निवृत्ते समुत्पन्ने चाभूतपूर्वं सिद्धत्वपर्याये नासदुत्पत्तिरिति । किं च—यथा द्राघीयसि वेणु-दण्डे व्यवहिताव्यवहितविचित्रचित्रकिर्मीरताखचितधस्तनार्धभागे एकान्तव्यवहितसुविशुद्धोर्ध्वार्ध-भागे ऽवतारिता दृष्टिः समन्ततो विचित्रचित्रकिर्मीरताव्याप्तिं पश्यन्ती समनुमिनोति तस्य सर्वत्रा-विशुद्धत्व, तथा क्वचिदपि जीवद्रव्ये व्यवहिताव्यवहितज्ञानावरणादिकर्मकिर्मीरताखचितबहुतरा-धस्तनभागे एकान्तव्यवहितसुविशुद्धबहुतरोर्ध्वभागे ऽवतारिता बुद्धिः समन्ततो ज्ञानावरणादिकर्म-किर्मीरताव्याप्तिं व्यवस्यन्ती समनुमिनोति तस्य सर्वत्राविशुद्धत्वम् । यथा च तत्र वेणुदण्डे व्याप्तिज्ञानाभासनिबन्धनविचित्रचित्रकिर्मीरतान्वयः , तथा च क्वचिज्जीवद्रव्ये ज्ञानावरणादिकर्म-किर्मीरतान्वयः । यथैव च तत्र वेणुदण्डे विचित्रचित्रकिर्मीरतान्वयाभावात्सुविशुद्धत्व, तथैव च क्वचिज्जीवद्रव्ये ज्ञानावरणादिकर्मकिर्मीरतान्वयाभावादाप्तागमसम्यगनुमानातीन्द्रियज्ञान-परिच्छिन्नात्सिद्धत्वमिति ॥२०॥

एवं भावमभावं भावाभावं अभावभावं च ।

गुणपञ्जयेहिं सहिबो संसरमाणो कुणदि जीवो ॥२१॥

एव भावमभाव भावाभावमभावभाव च ।

गुणपर्यये. सहितः संसरन् करोति जीवः ॥२१॥

जीवस्योत्पादव्ययसदुच्छेदासदुत्पादकर्तृत्वोपपत्त्युपसहारो ऽयम् । द्रव्यं हि सर्वदाविनष्टानुत्पन्न-माप्नातम् । ततो जीवद्रव्यस्य द्रव्यरूपेण नित्यत्वमुपन्यस्तम् । तस्यैव देवादिपर्यायरूपेण प्रादुर्भवतो भावकर्तृत्वमुक्तं , तस्यैव च मनुष्यादिपर्यायरूपेण व्ययतो ऽभावकर्तृत्वमाख्यातं , तस्यैव च सतो देवादिपर्यायस्योच्छेदमारभमाणस्य भावाभावकर्तृत्वमुदितं , तस्यैव चासत् पुनर्मनुष्यादिपर्याय-स्योत्पादमारभमाणस्याभावभावकर्तृत्वमभिहितम् । सर्वमिदमनवद्यं द्रव्यपर्यायाणामन्यतरगुण-मुख्यत्वेन व्याख्यानात् । तथा हि—यदा जीवः पर्यायगुणत्वेन द्रव्यमुख्यत्वेन विवक्ष्यते तदा नोत्पद्यते, न विनश्यति, न च क्रमवृत्त्यावर्तमानत्वात् सत्पर्यायजातमुच्छिनत्ति, नासदुत्पादयति । यदा तु द्रव्य-गुणत्वेन पर्यायमुख्यत्वेन विवक्ष्यते तदा प्रादुर्भवति, विनश्यति, सत्पर्यायजातमतिवाहितस्वकाल-मुच्छिनत्ति, असदुपस्थितस्वकालमुत्पादयति चेति । स खल्वयं प्रसादो ऽनेकान्तवादस्य यदीदृशो ऽपि विरोधो न विरोधः ॥२१॥ इति षड्द्रव्यसामान्यप्ररूपणा ।

जीवा पुद्गलकाया आयासं अत्थिकाइया सेसा ।

अमया अत्थित्तमया कारणभूदा हि लोगस्स ॥२२॥

जीवा पुद्गलकाया आकाशमस्तिकायो शेषो ।

अमया अस्तित्वमयाः कारणभूता हि लोकस्य ॥२२॥

अत्र सामान्येनोक्तलक्षणाना षण्णा द्रव्याणा मध्यात् पञ्चानामस्तिकायत्व व्यवस्थापितम् । अकृतत्वात् अस्तित्वमयत्वात् विचित्रात्मपरिणतिरूपस्य लोकस्य कारणत्वाच्चाभ्युपगम्यमानेषु षट्सु द्रव्येषु जीवपुद्गलाकाशधर्माधर्मा प्रदेशप्रचयात्मकत्वात् पञ्चास्तिकाया । न खलु कालस्तदभावादस्तिकाय इति सामर्थ्यादवसीयत इति ॥२२॥

सम्भावसम्भावाणं जीवाणं तह य पोगलाण च ।

परियट्ठणसंभूदो कालो णियमेण पणत्तो ॥२३॥

सद्भावस्वभावाना जीवाना तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।

परिवर्तनसंभूत कालो नियमेन प्रज्ञप्त ॥२३॥

अत्रास्तिकायत्वेनानुक्तस्यापि कालस्यार्थापन्नत्व द्योतितम् । इह हि जीवाना पुद्गलाना च सत्तास्वभावत्वादस्ति प्रतिक्षणमुत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यैकवृत्तिरूप परिणाम । स खलु सहकारिकारण-सद्भावे दृष्ट, गतिस्थित्यवगाहपरिणामवत् । यस्तु सहकारिकारण स काल । तत्परिणामान्यथानुपपत्तिगम्यमानत्वादननुक्तो ऽपि निश्चयकालो ऽस्तीति निश्चीयते । यस्तु निश्चयकालपर्यायरूपो व्यवहारकाल स जीवपुद्गलपरिणामेनाभिव्यज्यमानत्वात्तदायत्त एवाभिगम्यत एवेति ॥२३॥

ववगदपणवण्णरसो ववगददोगंधअट्ठफासो य ।

अगुरुलहुगो अमुत्तो वट्ठणलक्खो य कालो त्ति ॥२४॥

व्यपगतपञ्चवर्णरसो व्यपगतद्विगन्धाष्टस्पर्शश्च ।

अगुरुलघुको ऽमूर्तो वर्तनलक्षणश्च काल इति ॥२४॥

स्पष्टम् ॥२४॥

समओ णिमिसो कट्ठा कला य णाली तदो दिवारत्ती ।

मासोदुअयणसंवच्छरो त्ति कालो परायत्तो ॥२५॥

समयो निमिषः काष्ठा कला च णाली ततो दिवारान्नम् ।

मासत्वंयनसवत्सरमिति कालः परायतः ॥२५॥

अत्र व्यवहारकालस्य कथञ्चित्परायत्तत्वं द्योतितम् । परमाणुप्रचलनायत्तः समयः । नयनपुट-
घटनायत्तो निमिषः । तत्सख्याविशेषतः काष्ठा कला नाली च । गगनमणिगमनायत्तो दिवारात्र ।
तत्सख्याविशेषतः मासः, ऋतुः, अयनः, संवत्सरमिति । एवविधो हि व्यवहारकालः केवलकालपर्याय-
मात्रत्वेनावधारयितुमशक्यत्वात् परायत्त इत्युपमीयत इति ॥२५॥

णत्थि चिरं वा क्षिप्पं मत्तारहिं तु सा वि खलु मत्ता ।

पोग्गलद्वयेण विणा तम्हा कालो पडुच्चभवो ॥२६॥

नास्ति चिरं वा क्षिप्रं मात्रारहितं तु सापि खलु मात्रा ।

पुद्गलद्वयेण विना तस्मात्कालः प्रतीत्यभवः ॥२६॥

अत्र व्यवहारकालस्य कथञ्चित् परायत्तत्वे सदुपपत्तिरुक्ता । इह हि व्यवहारकाले निमिषसम-
यादौ अस्ति तावत् चिर इति क्षिप्र इति सप्रत्ययः । स खलु दीर्घह्रस्वकालनिबन्धनः प्रमाणमन्तरेण
न सभाव्यते । तदपि प्रमाणं पुद्गलद्रव्यपरिणाममन्तरेण नावधार्यते । ततः परपरिणामद्योत-
मानत्वाद्व्यवहारकालो निश्चयेनानन्याश्रितो ऽपि प्रतीत्यभव इत्यभिधीयते । तदत्रास्तिकायसामान्य-
प्ररूपणायामस्तिकायत्वाभावात्साक्षादनुपन्यस्यमानो ऽपि जीवपुद्गलपरिणामान्यथानुपपत्त्या
निश्चयरूपस्तत्परिणामायत्ततया व्यवहाररूपः कालो ऽस्तिकायपञ्चकवल्लोकरूपेण परिणत इति
खरतरदृष्टश्चाभ्युपगम्यत इति ॥२६॥

इति समयव्याख्यायामन्तर्नीतषड्द्रव्यपञ्चास्तिकायसामान्यव्याख्यानरूपः पीठबन्धः समाप्तः ॥

अथामीषामेव विशेषव्याख्यानम् । तत्र तावत् जीवद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यानम् ।

जीवो त्ति ह्वदि चेदा उवओगविसेसिदो प्हू कत्ता ।

भोत्ता य देहमेत्तो ण हि मुत्तो कम्मसंजुत्तो ॥२७॥

जीव इति भवति चेतयितोपयोगविशेषितः प्रभुः कर्ता ।

भोक्ता च देहमात्रो न हि मूर्तः कर्मसंयुक्तः ॥२७॥

अत्र संसारावस्थस्यात्मनः सोपाधिः निरुपाधिः च स्वरूपमुक्तम् । आत्मा हि निश्चयेन भावप्राण-
धारणाज्जीवः, व्यवहारेण द्रव्यप्राणधारणाज्जीवः । निश्चयेन चिदात्मकत्वात्, व्यवहारेण चिच्छक्ति-
युक्तत्वाच्चेतयिता । निश्चयेनापृथग्भूतेन, व्यवहारेण पृथग्भूतेन चैतन्यपरिणामलक्षणेनोपयोगेनोप-
लक्षितत्वादुपयोगविशेषितः । निश्चयेन भावकर्मणा, व्यवहारेण द्रव्यकर्मणामास्रवणबन्धनसवरण-
निर्जरणमोक्षणेषु स्वयमीशत्वात् प्रभुः । निश्चयेन पौद्गलिककर्मनिमित्तात्मपरिणामानां, व्यवहारे-

णात्मपरिणामनिमित्तपौद्गलिककर्मणा कर्तृत्वात्कर्ता । निश्चयेन शुभाशुभकर्मनिमित्तसुखदुःख-
परिणामानां, व्यवहारेण शुभाशुभकर्मसंपादितेष्टानिष्टाविषयाणां भोक्तृत्वाद्भोक्ता । निश्चयेन लोक-
मात्रोऽपि विशिष्टावगाहपरिणामशक्तियुक्तत्वान्नामकर्मनिर्वृत्तमणु महच्च शरीरमधितिष्ठन् व्यव-
हारेण देहमात्र । व्यवहारेण कर्मभिः सहैकत्वपरिणामान्मूर्तोऽपि निश्चयेन नीरूपस्वभावत्वान्न हि
मूर्त । निश्चयेन पुद्गलपरिणामानुरूपचैतन्यपरिणामात्मभिः, व्यवहारेण चैतन्यपरिणामानुरूप-
पुद्गलपरिणामात्मभिः कर्मभिः सयुक्तत्वात्कर्मसयुक्त इति ॥२७॥

कम्ममलविप्पमुक्को उड्ढं लोगस्स अंतमधिगंता ।

सो सव्वणाणवरिसो लहदि सुहमणिदियमणत्तं ॥२८॥

कर्ममलविप्रमुक्त ऊर्ध्वं लोकस्यान्तमधिगम्य ।

स सर्वज्ञानदर्शी लभते सुखमनिन्द्रियमनन्तम् ॥२८॥

अत्र मुक्तावस्थस्यात्मनो निरुपाधिस्वरूपमुक्तम् । आत्मा हि परद्रव्यत्वात्कर्मरजसा साकल्येन
यस्मिन्नेव क्षणे मुच्यते तस्मिन्नेवोर्ध्वगमनस्वभावत्वात्लोकान्तमधिगम्य परतो गतिहेतोरभावाद-
वस्थित केवलज्ञानदर्शनाभ्यां स्वरूपभूतत्वादमुक्तो जनन्तमतीन्द्रिय सुखमनुभवति । मुक्तस्य चास्य
भावप्राणधारणलक्षण जीवत्व, चिद्रूपलक्षण चेतयितृत्व, चित्परिणामलक्षण उपयोग, निर्वर्तित-
समस्ताधिकारशक्तिमात्र प्रभुत्व, समस्तवस्त्वसाधारणस्वरूपनिर्वर्तनमात्र कर्तृत्व, स्वरूपभूत-
स्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणसुखोपलम्भरूप भोक्तृत्व, अतीतानन्तरशरीरपरिमाणवगाहपरिणामरूप देहमात्रत्व,
उपाधिसबन्धविविक्तमात्यन्तिकममूर्तत्वम् । कर्मसयुक्तत्व तु द्रव्यभावकर्मविप्रमोक्षान्न भवत्येव ।
द्रव्यकर्माणि हि पुद्गलस्कन्धा भावकर्माणि तु चिद्विवर्ता । विवर्तन्ते हि चिच्छक्तिरनादिज्ञानावर-
णादिकर्मसंपर्ककूणितप्रचारा परिच्छेद्यस्य विश्वस्यैकदेशेषु क्रमेण व्याप्रियमाणा । यदा तु ज्ञाना-
वरणादिकर्मसंपर्कं प्रणश्यति तदा परिच्छेद्यस्य विश्वस्य सर्वदेशेषु युगपद्व्यापृता कथञ्चित्कौटस्थ-
मवाप्य विषयान्तरमनाप्नुवन्ती न विवर्तते । स खल्वेष निश्चित । सर्वज्ञसर्वदर्शित्वोपलम्भ । अयमेव
द्रव्यकर्मनिबन्धनभूतानां भावकर्मणा कर्तृत्वोच्छेद । अयमेव च विकारपूर्वकानुभवाभावादौपाधि-
कसुखदुःखपरिणामानां भोक्तृत्वोच्छेद । इदमेव चानादिविवर्तखेदविच्छित्तिमुस्थितानन्तचैतन्य-
स्यात्मन स्वतन्त्रस्वरूपानुभूतिलक्षणमुखस्य भोक्तृत्वमिति ॥२८॥

जादो सय स चेवा सव्वण्हू सव्वलोगवरिसो य ।

पप्पोदि सुहमणत्त अव्वाबाधं सगममुत्तं ॥२९॥

जातः स्वयं स चेतयिता सर्वज्ञ सर्वलोकदर्शी च ।

प्राप्नोति सुखमनन्तमव्याबाधं स्वकममूर्तम् ॥२९॥

इदं सिद्धस्य निरुपाधिज्ञानदर्शनसुखसमर्थनम् । आत्मा हि ज्ञानदर्शनसुखस्वभावः ससारावस्था-
यामनादिकर्मक्लेशसंकोचितात्मशक्तिः परद्रव्यसंपर्केण क्रमेण किञ्चित् किञ्चिज्जानाति पश्यति, पर-
प्रत्ययमूर्तसंबद्धमव्याबाधसान्तसुखमनुभवति च । यदा त्वस्य कर्मक्लेशा सामस्त्येन प्रणश्यन्ति,
तदाऽनर्गलासकुचितात्मशक्तिरसहायस्वयमेव युगपत्समग्रं जानाति पश्यति, स्वप्रत्ययममूर्तसंबद्ध-
मव्याबाधमनन्तसुखमनुभवति च । ततः सिद्धस्य समस्तस्वयमेव जानतः पश्यतः, सुखमनुभवतश्च
स्व, न परेण प्रयोजनमिति ॥२६॥

पारोहि चहुहि जीवदि जीविस्सदि जो हु जीविदो पुव्वं ।

सो जीवो पाणा पुण बलमिदियमाउ उस्सासो ॥३०॥

प्राणेश्चतुर्भिर्जीवति जीविष्यति यः खलु जीवितः पूर्वम् ।

स जीवः प्राणाः पुनर्बलमिन्द्रियमायुरुच्छ्वासः ॥३०॥

जीवत्वगुणव्याख्येयम् । इन्द्रियबलायुरुच्छ्वासलक्षणा हि प्राणा । तेषु चित्तामान्यान्वयिनो
भावप्राणा, पुद्गलसामान्यान्वयिनो द्रव्यप्राणा । तेषामुभयेषामपि त्रिष्वपि कालेष्वनवच्छिन्न-
सतानत्वेन धारणात्ससारिणो जीवत्वम् । मुक्तस्य तु केवलानामेव भावप्राणानां धारणात्तदव-
सेयमिति ॥३०॥

अगुरुलहुगा अणंता तेहिं अणंतेहिं परिणदा सव्वे ।

देसेहिं असखादा सिय लोगं सव्वमावण्णा ॥३१॥

केचित्तु अणावण्णा मिच्छादंसणकसायजोगजुदा ।

विजुदा य तेहिं बहुगा सिद्धा संसारिणो जीवा ॥३२॥

अगुरुलघुका अनन्तास्तेरनन्तैः परिणता सर्वे ।

देशैरसख्याताः स्याल्लोकं सर्वमापन्ना ॥३१॥

केचित्तु अनापन्ना मिथ्यादर्शनकषाययोगयुताः ।

विद्युताश्च तर्बहवः सिद्धाः संसारिणो जीवाः ॥३२॥

अत्र जीवानां स्वाभाविकप्रमाणमुक्तामुक्तविभागश्चोक्तः । जीवा ह्यविभागैकद्रव्यत्वाल्लोक-
प्रमाणैकप्रदेशाः । अगुरुलघवो गुणास्तु तेषामगुरुलघुत्वाभिधानस्य स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठत्वनिवन्धनस्य
स्वभावस्याविभागपरिच्छेदात् प्रतिसमयसम्भवत्स्थानपतितवृद्धिहानयोऽनन्ताः । प्रदेशास्तु अवि-
भागपरमाणुपरिच्छिन्नसूक्ष्मांशरूपा असंख्येयाः । एवविधेषु तेषु केचित्कथंचिल्लोकपूरणावस्था-

जेसि जीवसहाबो णत्थि अभावो य सव्वहा तस्स ।

ते होति भिण्णदेहा सिद्धा वचिगोयरमदीदा ॥३५॥

येषां जीवस्वभावो नास्त्यभावश्च सर्वथा तस्य ।

ते भवन्ति भिन्नदेहाः सिद्धा वागोचरमतीताः ॥३५॥

सिद्धानां जीवत्वदेहमात्रत्वव्यवस्थेयम् । सिद्धानां हि द्रव्यप्राणधारणात्मको मुख्यत्वेन जीवस्वभावो नास्ति । न च जीवस्वभावस्य सर्वथाभावो ऽस्ति भावप्राणधारणात्मकस्य जीवस्वभावस्य मुख्यत्वेन सद्भावात् । न च तेषां शरीरेण सह नीरक्षीरयोरिवैक्येन वृत्तिः, यतस्ते तत्संपर्कहेतुभूतकषाययोगविप्रयोगादतीतान्तरशरीरमात्रावगाहपरिणतत्वे ऽप्यत्यन्तभिन्नदेहाः । वाचा गोचरमतीतश्च तन्महिमा, यतस्ते लौकिकप्राणधारणमन्तरेण शरीरसबन्धमन्तरेण च परिप्राप्तनिरुपाधिस्वरूपा सततं प्रतपन्तीति ॥३५॥

ण कुदोचि वि उत्पण्णो जम्हा कज्जं ण तेण सो सिद्धो ।

उत्पादेवि ण किंचि वि कारणमवि तेण ण स होदि ॥३६॥

न कुतश्चिदप्युत्पन्नो यस्मात् कार्यं न तेन स सिद्धः ।

उत्पादयति न किंचिदपि कारणमपि तेन न स भवति ॥३६॥

सिद्धस्य कार्यकारणभावनिरासो ऽयम् । यथा ससारी जीवो भावकर्मरूपयात्मपरिणामसतत्या द्रव्यकर्मरूपया च पुद्गलपरिणामसतत्या कारणभूतया तेन तेन देवमनुष्यतिर्यग्गारकरूपेण कार्यभूत उत्पद्यते न तथा सिद्धरूपेणापीति । सिद्धो ह्युभयकर्मक्षये स्वयमुत्पद्यमानो नान्यतः कुतश्चिदुत्पद्यत इति । यथैव च स एव ससारी भावकर्मरूपामात्मपरिणामसतति द्रव्यकर्मरूपा च पुद्गलपरिणामसतति कार्यभूता कारणभूतत्वेन निर्वर्तयन् तानि तानि देवमनुष्यतिर्यग्गारकरूपाणि कार्याण्युत्पादयत्यात्मनो न तथा सिद्धरूपमपीति । सिद्धो ह्युभयकर्मक्षये स्वयमात्मानमुत्पादयन्नान्यत्किंचिदुत्पादयति ॥३६॥

सस्सदमध उच्छेदं भवमभवं च सुण्णमिदर च ।

विण्णणमविण्णणं ण वि जुज्जदि असदि सद्भावे ॥३७॥

शाश्वतमथोच्छेदो भव्यमभव्यं च शून्यमितरं च ।

विज्ञानमविज्ञानं नापि युज्यते असति सद्भावे ॥३७॥

अत्र जीवाभावो मुक्तिरिति निरस्तम् । द्रव्य द्रव्यतया शाश्वतमिति, नित्ये द्रव्ये पर्यायाणां प्रतिसमयमुच्छेद इति, द्रव्यस्य सर्वदा अभूतपर्यायै भाव्यमिति, द्रव्यस्य सर्वदा भूतपर्यायैरभाव्यमिति, द्रव्यमन्यद्रव्यैः सदा शून्यमिति, द्रव्यं स्वद्रव्येण सदाऽशून्यमिति, क्वचिज्जीवद्रव्ये ऽनन्तं ज्ञान

क्वचित्सान्तं ज्ञानमिति, क्वचिज्जीवद्रव्ये ऽनन्तं क्वचित्सान्तमज्ञानमिति—एतदन्यथानुपपद्यमानं भुक्तौ जीवस्य सद्भावमावेदयतीति ॥३७॥

कम्माणं फलमेवको एवको कज्ज तु णाणमध एवको ।

चेदयदि जीवरासी चेदगभावेण तिविहेण ॥३८॥

कर्मणा फलमेकः एकः कार्यं तु ज्ञानमर्थकः ।

चेतयति जीवराशिश्चेतकभावेन त्रिविधेन ॥३८॥

चेतयितृत्वगुणव्याख्येयम् । एके हि चेतयितारः प्रकृष्टतरमोहमलीमसेन प्रकृष्टतरज्ञानावरण-मुद्रितानुभावेन चेतकस्वभावेन प्रकृष्टतरवीर्यान्तरायावसादितकार्यकारणसामर्थ्या सुखदुःखरूप कर्मफलमेव प्राधान्येन चेतयन्ते । अन्ये तु प्रकृष्टतरमोहमलीमसेनापि प्रकृष्टज्ञानावरणमुद्रितानुभावेन चेतकस्वभावेन मनाग्वीर्यान्तरायक्षयोपशमासादितकार्यकारणसामर्थ्या सुखदुःखरूपकर्मफलानुभवनसवलितमपि कार्यमेव प्राधान्येन चेतयन्ते । अन्यतरे तु प्रक्षालितसकलमोहकलङ्केन समुच्छिन्नकृत्स्न-ज्ञानावरणतयात्यन्तमुन्मुद्रितसमस्तानुभावेन चेतकस्वभावेन समस्तवीर्यान्तरायक्षयासादितानन्त-वीर्या अपि निर्जीर्णकर्मफलत्वादत्यन्तकृतकृत्यत्वाच्च स्वतो ऽव्यतिरिक्तस्वाभाविकसुख ज्ञानमेव चेतयन्त इति ॥३८॥

सव्वे खलु कम्मफलं थावरकाया तसा हि कज्जजुदं ।

पाणित्तमदियकंता णाणं विदति ते जीवा ॥३९॥

सर्वे खलु कर्मफलं स्थावरकायास्त्रसा हि कार्ययुतम् ।

प्राणित्वमतिक्रान्ताः ज्ञानं विन्दन्ति ते जीवाः ॥३९॥

अत्र क. किं चेतयत इत्युक्तम् । चेतयन्ते अनुभवन्ति उपलभन्ते विन्दन्तीत्येकार्थाश्चेतनानुभूत्यु-पलब्धिवेदनानामेकार्थत्वात् । तत्र स्थावरा कर्मफलं चेतयन्ते, त्रसा कार्यं चेतयन्ते, केवलज्ञानिनो ज्ञानं चेतयन्त इति ॥३९॥

अथोपयोगगुणव्याख्यानम् ।

उवओगो खलु दुविहो णाणेण य वंसणेण संजुत्तो ।

जीवस्स सव्वकालं अणणभूद वियाणीहि ॥४०॥

उपयोग. खलु द्विविधो ज्ञानेन च दर्शनेन संयुक्तः ।

जीवस्य सर्वकालमनन्यभूतं विजानीहि ॥४०॥

आत्मनश्चैतन्यानुविधायी परिणाम उपयोग । सो ऽपि द्विविध — ज्ञानोपयोगो दर्शनोपयोगश्च । तत्र विशेषग्राहि ज्ञान, सामान्यग्राहि दर्शनम् । उपयोगश्च सर्वदा जीवादपृथग्भूत एव, एकास्ति त्व-निर्वृत्तत्वादिति ॥४०॥

आभिनिबोधिकधृतावधिमन-पर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानानि पञ्चभेदानि ।

कुमदिसुदविभंगाणि य तिष्ठि वि णार्णेहि संजुत्ते ॥४१॥

आभिनिबोधिकधृतावधिमन-पर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानानि पञ्चभेदानि ।

कुमलश्रुतविभङ्गानि च त्रीण्यपि ज्ञानैः संयुक्तानि ॥४१॥

ज्ञानोपयोगविशेषाणा नामस्वरूपाभिधानमेतत् । तत्राभिनिबोधिकज्ञान श्रुतज्ञानमवधिज्ञान मन पर्ययज्ञान केवलज्ञान कुमलज्ञान कुश्रुतज्ञान विभङ्गज्ञानमिति नामाभिधानम् । आत्मा ह्यनन्त-सर्वात्मप्रदेशव्यापिविशुद्धज्ञानसामान्यात्मा । स खल्वनादिज्ञानावरणकर्मविच्छन्नप्रदेश सन्, यत्तदा-वरणक्षयोपशमादिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियावलम्बाच्च मूर्तामूर्तद्रव्य विकल विशेषेणावबुध्यते तदाभिनिबोधिक-ज्ञानम्, यत्तदावरणक्षयोपशमादिन्द्रियावलम्बाच्च मूर्तामूर्तद्रव्य विकल विशेषेणावबुध्यते तत् श्रुत-ज्ञानम्, यत्तदावरणक्षयोपशमादेव मूर्तद्रव्य विकल विशेषेणावबुध्यते तदवधिज्ञानम्, यत्तदावरणक्षयो-पशमादेव परमनोगत मूर्तद्रव्य विकल विशेषेणावबुध्यते तन्मन पर्ययज्ञानम्, यत्सकलावरणात्यन्तक्षये केवल एव मूर्तामूर्तद्रव्य सकल विशेषेणावबुध्यते तत्स्वाभाविक केवलज्ञानम् । मिथ्यादर्शनोदयसह-चरितमाभिनिबोधिकज्ञानमेव कुमलज्ञानम्, मिथ्यादर्शनोदयसहचरित श्रुतज्ञानमेव कुश्रुतज्ञानम्, मिथ्यादर्शनोदयसहचरितमवधिज्ञानमेव विभङ्गज्ञानमिति स्वरूपाभिधानम् । इत्थ मतिज्ञानादि-ज्ञानोपयोगाष्टक व्याख्यातम् ॥४१॥

दंसणमवि चक्खुजुदं अचक्खुजुदमवि य ओहिणा सहियं ।

अणि धणमणंतविसयं केवलियं चावि पणत्तं ॥४२॥

दर्शनमपि चक्षुर्युतमचक्षुर्युतमपि चावधिना सहितम् ।

अनिधनमनन्तविषयं कैवल्यं चापि प्रज्ञप्तम् ॥४२॥

दर्शनोपयोगविशेषाणा नामस्वरूपाभिधानमेतत् । चक्षुर्दर्शनमचक्षुर्दर्शनमवधिदर्शन केवलदर्शन-मिति नामाभिधानम् । आत्मा ह्यनन्तसर्वात्मप्रदेशव्यापिविशुद्धदर्शनसामान्यात्मा । स खल्वनादि-दर्शनावरणकर्मविच्छन्नप्रदेश सन्, यत्तदावरणक्षयोपशमाच्चक्षुरिन्द्रियावलम्बाच्च मूर्तद्रव्य विकल सामान्येनावबुध्यते तच्चक्षुर्दर्शनम्, यत्तदावरणक्षयोपशमाच्चक्षुर्वजितेतरचतुरिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियाव-

लम्बाच्च मूर्तमूर्तद्रव्य विकल सामान्येनावबुध्यते तदचक्षुर्दर्शनम्, यत्तदावरणक्षयोपशमादेव मूर्तद्रव्य विकल सामान्येनावबुध्यते तदबधिदर्शनम्, यत्सकलावरणात्यन्तक्षये केवल एव मूर्तमूर्तद्रव्य सकल सामान्येनावबुध्यते तत्स्वाभाविक केवलदर्शनमिति स्वरूपाभिधानम् ॥५२॥

न विद्यप्यदि जाणादो जाणी जाणाणि ह्येति जेगाणि ।

तम्हा दु विस्सरूव भणियं दविय ति जाणीहि ॥४३॥

न विकल्प्यते ज्ञानात् ज्ञानी ज्ञानानि भवन्त्यनेकानि ।

तस्मात्तु विश्वरूप भणित द्रव्यमिति ज्ञानिभिः ॥४३॥

एकस्यात्मनो ज्ञेकज्ञानात्मकत्वसमर्थनमेतत् । न तावज्ज्ञानी ज्ञानात्पृथग्भवति, द्वयोरप्येकास्ति त्वनिर्वृत्तत्वेनैकद्रव्यत्वात्, द्वयोरप्यभिन्नप्रदेशत्वेनैकक्षेत्रत्वात्, द्वयोरप्येकसमयनिर्वृत्तत्वेनैककालत्वात्, द्वयोरप्येकस्वभावत्वेनैकभावत्वात् । न चैवमुच्यमाने ऽप्येकस्मिन्नात्मन्याभिनिबोधि-कादीन्यनेकानि ज्ञानानि विरुध्यन्ते, द्रव्यस्य विश्वरूपत्वात् । द्रव्य हि सहकमप्रवृत्तान्तगुणपर्याया-धारतयानन्तरूपत्वादेकमपि विश्वरूपमभिधीयत इति ॥४३॥

जदि ह्वदि दव्वमण्णं गुणदो य गुणा य दव्वदो अण्णे ।

दव्वार्णतियमधवा दव्वाभावं पकुव्वति ॥४४॥

यदि भवति द्रव्यमन्यद्गुणतश्च गुणाश्च द्रव्यतोऽन्ये ।

द्रव्यानन्त्यमथवा द्रव्याभाव प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥४४॥

द्रव्यस्य गुणेभ्यो भेदे, गुणानां च द्रव्याद्भेदे दोषोपन्यासो ऽयम् । गुणा हि क्वचिदाश्रिता । यत्राश्रितास्तद्द्रव्यम् । तच्चेदन्यद्गुणेभ्यः । पुनरपि गुणा क्वचिदाश्रिता । यत्राश्रितास्तद्द्रव्यम् । तदपि अन्यच्चेद्गुणेभ्यः । पुनरपि गुणा क्वचिदाश्रिता । यत्राश्रिता तद्द्रव्यम् तदप्यन्यदेव गुणेभ्यः एव द्रव्यस्य गुणेभ्यो भेदे भवति द्रव्यानन्त्यम् । द्रव्य हि गुणानां समुदायः । गुणाश्चेदन्ये समुदायात्, को नाम समुदायः । एव गुणानां द्रव्याद्भेदे भवति द्रव्याभाव इति ॥४४॥

अविभक्तमण्णस्त दव्वगुणाणं विभक्तमण्णस्त ।

जेच्छन्ति णिच्छयण्ह तव्विवरीद हि वा तेसि ॥४५॥

अविभक्तमनन्यत्वं द्रव्यगुणानां विभक्तमन्यत्वम् ।

नेच्छन्ति निश्चयज्ञास्तद्विवरीतं हि वा तेषाम् ॥४५॥

द्रव्यगुणानां स्वोचितानन्यत्वोक्तिरियम् । अविभक्तप्रदेशत्वलक्षणं द्रव्यगुणानामनन्यत्वमभ्युपगम्यते । विभक्तप्रदेशत्वलक्षणं त्वन्यत्वमनन्यत्वञ्च नाभ्युपगम्यते । तथा हि—यथैकस्य परमाणोरेकेनात्मप्रदेशेन सहाविभक्तत्वादनन्यत्वम्, तथैकस्य परमाणोस्तद्वर्तिना स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णादिगुणानां चाविभक्तप्रदेशत्वादनन्यत्वम् । यथा त्वत्यन्तविप्रकृष्टयोः सह्यविन्ध्ययोरत्यन्तसन्निकृष्टयोश्च मिश्रितयोस्तोयपयसोर्विभक्तप्रदेशत्वलक्षणमन्यत्वमनन्यत्वञ्च, न तथा द्रव्यगुणानां विभक्तप्रदेशत्वाभावादन्यत्वमनन्यत्वञ्चेति ॥४५॥

**व्यवदेसा संठाणा संखा विसया यं ह्येति ते बहुगा ।
ते तेसिमणणत्ते अण्णत्ते चावि विज्जन्ते ॥४६॥**

व्यपदेशाः सस्थानानि सख्या विषयाश्च भवन्ति ते बहुका ।
ते तेषामनन्यत्वे अन्यत्वे चापि विद्यन्ते ॥४६॥

व्यपदेशादीनामेकान्तेन द्रव्यगुणान्यत्वनिबन्धनत्वमत्र प्रत्याख्यातम् । यथा देवदत्तस्य गौरित्यन्यत्वे षष्ठीव्यपदेशः, तथा वृक्षस्य शाखा द्रव्यस्य गुणा इत्यनन्यत्वे ऽपि । यथा देवदत्तः फलमङ्कुशेन धनदत्ताय वृक्षाद्वाटिकायामवचिनोतीत्यन्यत्वे कारकव्यपदेशः, तथा मृत्तिका घटभावः स्वयं स्वेन स्वस्मै स्वस्मात् स्वस्मिन् करोतीत्यात्मात्मानमात्मनात्मने आत्मन आत्मनि जानातीत्यनन्यत्वेऽपि । यथा प्राशोर्देवदत्तस्य प्राशुर्गौरित्यन्यत्वे सस्थानं, तथा प्राशोर्वृक्षस्य प्राशुः शाखाभरो मूर्तद्रव्यस्य मूर्ता गुणा इत्यनन्यत्वेऽपि । यथैकस्य देवदत्तस्य दश गाव इत्यन्यत्वे सख्या, तथैकस्य वृक्षस्य दश शाखा एकस्य द्रव्यस्यानन्ता गुणा इत्यनन्यत्वेऽपि । यथा गोष्ठे गाव इत्यन्यत्वे विषयः, तथा वृक्षो शाखा द्रव्ये गुणा इत्यनन्यत्वे ऽपि । ततो न व्यपदेशादयो द्रव्यगुणानां वस्तुत्वेन भेदसाधयन्तीति ॥४६॥

**णाणं धणं च कुब्बदि धणिणं जह् णाणिणं च बुविधेहि ।
भण्णंति तह पुधत्तं एयत्तं चावि तच्चण्हू ॥४७॥**

ज्ञानं धनं च करोति धनिनं यथा ज्ञानिनं च द्विविधाम्याम् ।
भणन्ति तथा पृथक्त्वमेकत्वं चापि तत्त्वज्ञाः ॥४७॥

वस्तुत्वभेदाभेदोदाहरणमेतत् । यथा धनं भिन्नास्तित्वनिर्वृत्तं भिन्नास्तित्वनिर्वृत्तस्य, भिन्नसस्थानं भिन्नसस्थानस्य, भिन्नसख्यं भिन्नसख्यस्य, भिन्नविषयलब्धवृत्तिकं भिन्नविषयलब्धवृत्तिकस्य पुरुषस्य धनीति व्यपदेशः पृथक्त्वप्रकारेण कुरुते, यथा च ज्ञानमभिन्नास्तित्वनिर्वृत्तमभिन्नास्तित्वनिर्वृत्तस्याभिन्नसस्थानमभिन्नसस्थानस्याभिन्नसख्यमभिन्नसख्यस्याभिन्नविषयलब्धवृत्तिकमभिन्नविषयलब्ध-

वृत्तिकस्य पुरुषस्य ज्ञानीति व्यपदेशमेकत्वप्रकारेण कुरुते, तथान्यत्रापि । यत्र द्रव्यस्य भेदेन व्यप-
देशादिः तत्र पृथक्त्व, यत्राभेदेन तत्रैकत्वमिति ॥४७॥

णाणी णाणं च सदा अत्थंतरिदा दु अण्णमणस्स ।

दोण्हं अचेदणत्तं पसजदि सम्मं जिणावमद ॥४८॥

ज्ञानी ज्ञानं च सदाथान्तरिते त्वन्योन्यस्य ।

द्वयोरचेतनत्वं प्रसजति सम्यग् जिनावमतम् ॥४८॥

द्रव्यगुणानामर्थान्तरभूतत्वे दोषोऽयम् । ज्ञानी ज्ञानाद्यर्थान्तरभूतस्तदा स्वकरणाशमन्तरेण
परशुरहितदेवदत्तवत्करणव्यापारासमर्थत्वादचेतयमानोऽचेतन एव स्यात् । ज्ञानं च यदि ज्ञानिनो
ऽर्थान्तरभूतं तदा तत्कर्त्राशमन्तरेण देवदत्तरहितपरशुवत्तत्कर्तृत्वव्यापारासमर्थत्वादचेतयमानमचेतन-
मेव स्यात् । न च ज्ञानज्ञानिनोर्युतसिद्धयोऽस्योगेन चेतनत्वद्रव्यस्य निर्विशेषस्य गुणानां निराश्र-
याणां शून्यत्वादिति ॥४८॥

ण हि सो समवायादो अत्थंतरिदो दु णाणदो णाणी ।

अण्णाणि त्ति य वयण एगत्तपसाधग होदि ॥४९॥

न हि स समवायादर्थान्तरितस्तु ज्ञानतो ज्ञानी ।

अज्ञानीति च वचनमेकत्वप्रसाधकं भवति ॥४९॥

ज्ञानज्ञानिनो समवायसंबन्धनिरासोऽयम् । न खलु ज्ञानादर्थान्तरभूतं पुरुषो ज्ञानसमवायात्
ज्ञानी भवतीत्युपपन्नम् । स खलु ज्ञानसमवायात्पूर्वं किं ज्ञानी किमज्ञानी । यदि ज्ञानी तदा ज्ञान-
समवायो निष्फलः । अथाज्ञानी तदा किमज्ञानसमवायात्, किमज्ञानेन सहैकत्वात् । न तावदज्ञान-
समवायात्, अज्ञानिनो ह्यज्ञानसमवायो निष्फलः, ज्ञानित्वं तु ज्ञानसमवायाभावान्नास्त्येव । ततो
ऽज्ञानीति वचनमज्ञानेन सहैकत्वमवश्यं साधयत्येव । सिद्धे चैवमज्ञानेन सहैकत्वे ज्ञानेनापि सहैकत्व-
मवश्यं सिध्यतीति ॥४९॥

समवत्ती समवाओ अपुघब्भूदो य अजुदसिद्धो य ।

तम्हा दव्वगुणाणं अजुदा सिद्धि त्ति णिद्दिट्ठा ॥५०॥

समवर्तित्वं समवायः अपृथग्भूतत्वमयुतसिद्धत्वं च ।

तस्माद्द्रव्यगुणानाम् अयुता सिद्धिरिति निर्दिष्टा ॥५०॥

समवायस्य पदार्थान्तरत्वनिरासोऽयम् । द्रव्यगुणानामेकास्तित्वनिर्वृत्तत्वादनादिरनिधना

सहवृत्तिर्हि समवर्तित्वम्, स एव समवायो जंनानाम्, तदेव सज्ञादिभ्यो भेदे ऽपि वस्तुत्वेनाभेदाद-
पृथग्भूतत्वम्; तदेव युतसिद्धिनिबन्धनस्यास्तित्वान्तरस्याभावादयुतसिद्धत्वम् । ततो द्रव्यगुणानां
समवर्तित्वलक्षणसमवायभाजामयुतसिद्धिरेव, न पृथग्भूतत्वमिति ॥५०॥

वर्णरसगन्धकासा परमाणुप्ररूपिदा विसेर्सेहि ।

दब्बादो य अण्णो अण्णत्तपगासगा होंति ॥५१॥

वंसण्णणाणि तहा जीवणिबद्धाणि णण्णभूदाणि ।

ववदेसदो पुधत्तं कुब्बंति हि णो सभावादो ॥५२॥

वर्णरसगन्धस्पर्शाः परमाणुप्ररूपिता विशेषः ।

द्रव्याच्च अनन्याः अन्यत्वप्रकाशका भवन्ति ॥५१॥

दर्शनज्ञाने तथा जीवनिबद्धे अनन्यभूते ।

व्यपदेशतः पृथक्त्वं कुरुत हि नो स्वभावात् ॥५२॥

दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकार्थपुरस्सरो द्रव्यगुणानामनर्थान्तरत्वव्याख्योपसहारो ऽयम् । वर्णरसगन्ध-
स्पर्शा हि परमाणो प्ररूप्यन्ते, ते च परमाणोरविभक्तप्रदेशत्वेनानन्ये ऽपि सज्ञादिव्यपदेशनिबन्ध-
नैविशेषैरन्यत्व प्रकाशयन्ति । एव ज्ञानदर्शने अप्यात्मनि सबद्धे आत्मद्रव्यादविभक्तप्रदेशत्वेनानन्ये
ऽपि सज्ञादिव्यपदेशनिबन्धनैविशेषे पृथक्त्वमासादयत, स्वभावतस्तु नित्यमपृथक्त्वमेव बिभ्रत
॥५१-५२॥ इति उपयोगगुणव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ कर्तृत्वगुणव्याख्यानम् । तत्रादिगाथात्रयेण तदुपोद्घात —

जीवा अणाइणिहणा संता णंता य जीवभावादो ।

सब्भावदो अणंता पंचगगुणप्पधाणा य ॥५३॥

जीवा अनादिनिधना. सान्ता अनन्ताश्च जीवभावात् ।

सद्भावतो ऽनन्ता पञ्चाग्रगुणप्रधानाः च ॥५३॥

जीवा हि निश्चयेन परभावानामकरणात्स्वभावानां कर्तारो भविष्यन्ति । ताश्च कुर्वाणा किम-
नादिनिधना, किं सादिसनिधना किं साद्यनिधना, किं तदाकारेण परिणता, किमपरिणता
भविष्यन्तीत्याशङ्क्येदमुक्तम् । जीवा हि सहजचैतन्यलक्षणपारिणामिकभावेनानादिनिधना । त

५१ P विसेसाहि ।

५२ P जीवनिबद्धानि ।

५३ P प्यधाणा हि ।

एवौदयिकक्षायोपशमिकौपशमिकभावे सादिसनिधना । त एव क्षायिकभावेन साद्यनिधना । न च सादित्वात्सनिधनत्व क्षायिकभावस्याशङ्क्यम् । स खलूपाधिनिवृत्तौ प्रवर्तमानः सिद्धभाव इव सद्भाव एव जीवस्य, सद्भावेन चानन्ता एव जीवा प्रतिज्ञायन्ते । न च तेषामनादिनिधनसहजचैतन्यलक्षणैकभावानां सादिसनिधनानि साद्यनिधनानि भावान्तराणि नोपपद्यन्ते इति वक्तव्यम्, ते खल्वनादिकर्ममलीमसा पङ्क्तसंपृक्ततोयवत्तदाकारेण परिणतत्वात्पञ्चप्रधानगुणप्रधानत्वेनैवानुभूयन्ते इति ॥५३॥

एवं सतो विनाशो असतो जीवस्स होइ उत्पादो ।

इदि जिणवरं भणिइ अण्णोण्णविरुद्धमविरुद्धं ॥५४॥

एवं सतो विनाशो ऽसतो जीवस्य भवत्युत्पादः ।

इति जिनवरं भणितमन्योन्यविरुद्धमविरुद्धम् ॥५४॥

जीवस्य भाववशात्सादिसनिधनत्वे [अनादि] सादि-अनिधनत्वे च विरोधपरिहारो ऽयम् । एव हि पञ्चभिर्भावे स्वयं परिणममानस्यास्य जीवस्य कदाचिदौदयिकेनैकेन मनुष्यत्वादिलक्षणेन भावेन सतो विनाशस्तथापरेणौदयिकेनैव देवत्वादिलक्षणेन भावेन असत उत्पादो भवत्येव । एतच्च 'न सतो विनाशो नासत उत्पादः' इति पूर्वोक्तसूत्रेण सह विरुद्धमपि न विरुद्धम्, यतो जीवस्य द्रव्यार्थिकनयादेशेन न सत्प्रणाशो नासदुत्पादः, तस्यैव पर्यायार्थिकनयादेशेन सत्प्रणाशोऽसदुत्पादश्च । न चैतदनुपपन्नम्, नित्ये जले कल्लोलानामनित्यत्वदर्शनादिति ॥५४॥

णेरेइयतिरियमणुया देवा इदि णामसजुदा पयडी ।

कुव्वति सतो णासं असतो भावस्स उत्पादं ॥५५॥

नारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्या देवा इति नामसयुताः प्रकृतयः ।

कुर्वन्ति सतो नाशमसतो भावस्योत्पादम् ॥५५॥

जीवस्य सदसद्भावोच्छित्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तोपाधिप्रतिपादनमेतत् । यथा हि जलराशेर्जलराशित्वेनासदुत्पाद सदुच्छेद चाननुभवतश्चतुर्भ्यः ककुब्जभागेभ्यः क्रमेण वहमाना पवमाना कल्लोलानामसदुत्पाद सदुच्छेद च कुर्वन्ति, तथा जीवस्यापि जीवत्वेन सदुच्छेदमसदुत्पत्तिं चाननुभवतः क्रमेणोदीयमाना नारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्यदेवनामप्रकृतयः सदुच्छेदमसदुत्पादं च कुर्वन्तीति ॥५५॥

उदयेण उवसमेण य खयेण दुहिं मिस्सिदोहिं परिणामे ।

जुत्ता ते जीवगुणा बहुसु य अत्थेसु वित्थिण्णा ॥५६॥

५५. P प[ग]दी ।

५६. P उदण, परिणामो, वित्थिण्णा ।

उदयेनोपशमेन च क्षयेण द्वाभ्यां मिथिताभ्यां परिणामेन ।

युक्तास्ते जीवगुणा बहुषु चार्थेषु विस्तीर्णाः ॥५६॥

जीवस्य भावोदयवर्णनमेतत् । कर्मणा फलदानसमर्थतयोद्भूतिरुदयः, अनुद्भूतिरुपशमः, उद्भूत्यनुद्भूती क्षयोपशमः, अत्यन्तविश्लेष क्षयः, द्रव्यात्मलाभहेतुक परिणामः । तत्रोदयेन युक्त औदयिकः, उपशमेन युक्त औपशमिकः, क्षयोपशमेन युक्त क्षायोपशमिकः, क्षयेन युक्त क्षायिकः, परिणामेन युक्त पारिणामिकः । त एते पञ्च जीवगुणाः । तत्रोपाधिचतुर्विधत्वनिबन्धनाश्चत्वारः, स्वभावनिबन्धन एकः । एते चोपाधिभेदात्स्वरूपभेदाच्च भिद्यमाना बहुष्वर्थेषु विस्तार्यन्त इति ॥५६॥

कम्म वेदयमाणो जीवो भावं करेदि जारिसयं ।

सो तेण तस्स कत्ता हवदि त्ति य सासणे पढिदं ॥५७॥

कर्म वेदयमानो जीवो भावं करोति यावृशकम् ।

स तेन तस्य कर्ता भवतीति च शासने पठितम् ॥५७॥

जीवस्यौदयिकादिभावाना कर्तृत्वप्रकारोक्तिरियम् । जीवेन हि द्रव्यकर्म व्यवहारनयेनानुभूयते, तच्चानुभूयमान जीवभावाना निमित्तमात्रमुपवर्ण्यते । तस्मिन्निमित्तमात्रभूते जीवेन कर्तृभूतेनात्मनः कर्मभूतो भावः क्रियते । अमुना यो येन प्रकारेण जीवेन भावः क्रियते, स जीवस्तस्य भावस्य तेन प्रकारेण कर्ता भवतीति ॥५७॥

कम्मेण विणा उदयं जीवस्स ण विज्जदे उदसमं वा ।

खइयं खओवसमियं तम्हा भावं तु कम्मकदं ॥५८॥

कर्मणा विनोदयो जीवस्य न विद्यत उपशमो वा ।

क्षायिकः क्षायोपशमिकस्तस्माद्भावस्तु कर्मकृतः ॥५८॥

द्रव्यकर्मणा निमित्तमात्रत्वेनौदयिकादिभावकर्तृत्वमत्रोक्तम् । न खलु कर्मणा विना जीवस्योदयोपशमौ क्षयक्षायोपशमावपि विद्येते, ततः क्षायिकक्षायोपशमिकश्चौदयिकौपशमिकश्च भावः कर्मकृतोऽनुमन्तव्यः । पारिणामिकस्त्वनादिनिधनो निरुपाधिः स्वाभाविक एव । क्षायिकस्तु स्वभावव्यक्तिरूपत्वादनन्तो ऽपि कर्मणः क्षयेणोत्पद्यमानत्वात्सादिरिति कर्मकृत एवोक्तः । औपशमिकस्तु कर्मणामुपशमे समुत्पद्यमानत्वादनुपशमे समुच्छिद्यमानत्वात् कर्मकृत एवेति ।

अथवा उदयोपशमक्षयक्षयोपशमलक्षणाश्चतस्रो द्रव्यकर्मणामेवावस्थाः, न पुनः परिणामलक्षणैकावस्थस्य जीवस्य, ततः उदयादिसजातानामात्मनो भावाना निमित्तमात्रभूततथाविधावस्थत्वेन स्वयं परिणमनाद्द्रव्यकर्मापि व्यवहारनयेनात्मनो भावाना कर्तृत्वमापद्यत इति ॥५८॥

भावो यदि कम्मकदो अत्ता कम्मस्स होदि किध कत्ता ।

ण कुणदि अत्ता किञ्चि वि मुत्ता अण्णं सगं भावं ॥५६॥

भावो यदि कर्मकृत आत्मा कर्मणो भवति कथं कर्ता ।

न करोत्यात्मा किञ्चिदपि मुक्त्वान्यत् स्वकं भावम् ॥५६॥

जीवभावस्य कर्मकर्तृत्वे पूर्वपक्षोऽयम् । यदि खल्वौदयिकादिरूपो जीवस्य भावः कर्मणा क्रियते, तदा जीवस्तस्य कर्ता न भवति । न च जीवास्याकर्तृत्वमिष्यते । तत् पारिशेष्येण द्रव्यकर्मणः कर्तापद्यते । तत्तु कथम् । यतो निश्चयनयेनात्मा स्व भावमुज्झित्वा नान्यत्किमपि करोतीति ॥५६॥

भावो कम्मणिमित्तो कम्मं पुण भावकारणं हवदि ।

ण दु तेसिं खलु कत्ता ण विणा भूदा दु कत्तारं ॥६०॥

भावः कर्मनिमित्तः कर्म पुनर्भावकारणं भवति ।

न तु तेषां खलु कर्ता न विना भूतास्तु कर्तारम् ॥६०॥

पूर्वसूत्रोदितपूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्तोऽयम् । व्यवहारेण निमित्तमात्रत्वाज्जीवभावस्य कर्म कर्तृ, कर्मणोऽपि जीवभावः कर्ता, निश्चयेन तु न जीवभावानां कर्म कर्तृ, न कर्मणो जीवभावः । न च ते कर्तारमन्तरेण सभूयेते, यतो निश्चयेन जीवपरिणामानां जीवः कर्ता, कर्मपरिणामानां कर्म कर्तृ इति ॥६०॥

कुब्बं सगं सहावं अत्ता कत्ता सगस्स भावस्स ।

ण हि पोगलकम्माणं इदि जिणवयणं मुणेयव्वं ॥६१॥

कुर्वन् स्वकं स्वभावम् आत्मा कर्ता स्वकस्य भावस्य ।

न हि पुद्गलकर्मणामिति जिनवचनं ज्ञातव्यम् ॥६१॥

निश्चयेन जीवस्य स्वभावानां कर्तृत्वं पुद्गलकर्मणामकर्तृत्वं चागमेनोपदर्शितमत्र इति ॥६१॥

कम्मं पि सगं कुब्बदि सेण सहावेण सम्ममप्पाणं ।

जीवो वि य तारिसओ कम्मसहावेण भावेण ॥६२॥

कर्मापि स्वकं करोति स्वेन स्वभावेन सम्यगात्मानम् ।

जीवोऽपि च तादृशकः कर्मस्वभावेन भावेन ॥६२॥

अत्र निश्चयनयेनाभिन्नकारकत्वात्कर्मणो जीवस्य च स्वयं स्वरूपकर्तृत्वमुक्तम् । कर्म खलु कर्मत्वप्रवर्तमानपुद्गलस्कन्धरूपेण कर्तृतामनुविभ्राण, कर्मत्वगमनशक्तिरूपेण करणतामात्म-

सात्कुर्वन्, प्राप्यकर्मत्वपरिणामरूपेण कर्मता कलयत्, पूर्वभावव्यपाये ऽपि ध्रुवत्वालम्बनादुपात्ता-
पादानत्वम्, उपजायमानपरिणामरूपकर्मणाश्रीयमाणत्वादुपोढसंप्रदानत्वम्, आधीयमानपरिणामा-
धारत्वाद्गृहीताधिकरणत्व, स्वयमेव षट्कारकीरूपेण व्यवतिष्ठमान न कारकान्तरमपेक्षते । एव
जीवो ऽपि भावपर्यायेण प्रवर्तमानात्मद्रव्यरूपेण कर्तृतामनुबिभ्राणो, भावपर्यायगमनशक्तिरूपेण
करणतामात्मसात्कुर्वन्, प्राप्यभावपर्यायरूपेण कर्मता कलयन्, पूर्वभावपर्यायव्यपाये ऽपि ध्रुवत्वा-
लम्बनादुपात्तापादानत्व, उपजायमानभावपर्यायरूपकर्मणाश्रीयमाणत्वादुपोढसंप्रदानत्व, आधीय-
मानभावपर्यायाधारत्वाद्गृहीताधिकरणत्व., स्वयमेव षट्कारकीरूपेण व्यवतिष्ठमानो न कारकान्त-
रमपेक्षते । अतः कर्मण कर्तुर्नास्ति जीव कर्ता, जीवस्य कर्तुर्नास्ति कर्म कर्तुं निश्चयेनेति ॥६२॥

कम्मं कम्मं कुव्वदि जदि सो अप्पा करेदि अप्पाणं ।

किध तस्स फलं भुंजदि अप्पा कम्मं च देदि फलं ॥६३॥

कर्म कर्म करोति यदि स आत्मा करोत्यात्मानम् ।

कथ तस्य फलं भुङ्क्ते आत्मा कर्म च ददाति फलम् ॥६३॥

अथ सिद्धान्तसूत्राणि कर्मजीवयोरन्योन्याकर्तृत्वे ऽन्यदत्तफलान्योपभोगलक्षणदूषणपुर सर
पूर्वपक्षोज्यम् ॥६३॥

अथ सिद्धान्तसूत्राणि

ओगाढगाढणिचिदो पोगलकायेहिं सव्वदो लोगो ।

सुहुमेहिं बादरेहिं य णंताणंतेहिं विविधेहिं ॥६४॥

अवगाढगाढनिष्ठितः पुद्गलकायैः सर्वतो लोकः ।

सूक्ष्मेर्बादरैश्चानन्तानन्तैर्विविधैः ॥६४॥

कर्मयोग्यपुद्गला अञ्जनचूर्णपूर्णसमुद्गकन्यायेन सर्वलोकव्यापित्वाद्यत्रात्मा तत्रानानीता
एवावतिष्ठन्त इत्यत्रोक्तम् ॥६४॥

अत्ता कुणदि सभावं तत्थ गदा पोगला सभावेहिं ।

गच्छन्ति कम्मभावं अण्णण्णोगाहमवगाढा ॥६५॥

आत्मा करोति स्वभावं तत्र गताः पुद्गलाः स्वभावाः ।

गच्छन्ति कर्मभावमन्योन्यावगाहावगाढाः ॥६५॥

अन्याकृतकर्मसम्भूतिप्रकारोक्तिरियम् । आत्मा हि ससारावस्थाया पारिणामिकचैतन्यस्वभाव-
मपरित्यजन्नेवानादिबन्धनबद्धत्वादिनादिमोहरागद्वेषस्निग्धैरविशुद्धैरेव भावैर्विवर्तते । स खलु यत्र

६४ P विविधेहिं ।

६५ P सहाव, सहावेहिं ।

यदा मोहरूप द्वेषरूपं वा स्वस्य भावमारभते, तत्र तदा तमेव निमित्तीकृत्य जीवप्रदेशेषु परस्परावगा-
हेनानुप्रविष्टा स्वभावैरेव पुद्गला कर्मभावमापद्यन्ते इति ॥६५॥

जह पुगलदठवाणं बहुप्पयारोहि खंधणिव्वत्ती ।

अकदा परेहि विट्ठा तह कम्माणं वियाणाहि ॥६६॥

यथा पुद्गलद्रव्याणां बहुप्रकारं स्कन्धनिर्बृत्तिः ।

अकृता परेदृष्टा तथा कर्मणां विजानीहि ॥६६॥

अनन्यकृतत्व कर्मणा वैचित्र्यस्यात्रोक्तम् । यथा हि स्वयोग्यचन्द्रार्कप्रभोपलम्भे सध्याभ्रेन्द्र-
चापपरिवेषप्रभृतिभिर्बहुभिः प्रकारैः पुद्गलस्कन्धविकल्पा कर्त्रन्तरनिरपेक्षा एवोत्पद्यन्ते, तथा
स्वयोग्यजीवपरिणामोपलम्भे ज्ञानावरणप्रभृतिभिर्बहुभिः प्रकारैः कर्माण्यपि कर्त्रन्तरनिरपेक्षाण्ये-
वोत्पद्यन्ते इति ॥६६॥

जीवा पुगलकाया अण्णण्णोगादग्रहणपडिबद्धा ।

काले विजुज्जमाणा सुहदुक्खं देति भुजति ॥६७॥

जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः अन्योन्यावगादग्रहणप्रतिबद्धाः ।

काले वियुज्यमाना सुखदुःखं ददति भुञ्जन्ति ॥६७॥

निश्चयेन जीवकर्मणोश्चैककर्तृत्वे ऽपि व्यवहारेण कर्मदत्तफलोपलम्भो जीवस्य न विरुध्यत
इत्यत्रोक्तम् । जीवा हि मोहरागद्वेषस्निग्धत्वात्पुद्गलस्कन्धाश्च स्वभावस्निग्धत्वाद्बन्धावस्थाया
परमाणुद्वन्द्वानीवान्योन्यावगादग्रहणप्रतिबद्धत्वेनावतिष्ठन्ते । यदा तु ते परस्परं वियुज्यन्ते, तदोदित-
प्रच्यवमाना निश्चयेन सुखदुःखरूपात्मपरिणामाना व्यवहारेणैष्टानिष्टविषयाणां निमित्तमात्रत्वात्पुद्-
गलकायाः सुखदुःखरूपं फलं प्रयच्छन्ति । जीवाश्च निश्चयेन निमित्तमात्रभूतद्रव्यकर्मनिर्वर्तितसुख-
दुःखरूपात्मपरिणामाना व्यवहारेण द्रव्यकर्मोदयापादितेष्टानिष्टविषयाणां भोक्तृत्वात्तथाविधं फलं
भुञ्जन्ते इति । एतेन जीवस्य भोक्तृत्वगुणोऽपि व्याख्यातः ॥६७॥

तम्हा कम्मं कत्ता भावेण हि संजुदोध जीवस्स ।

भोत्ता दु हववि जीवो चेदगभावेण कम्मफलं ॥६८॥

तस्मात्कर्म कर्तृभावेन हि संयुतमथ जीवस्य ।

भोक्ता तु भवति जीवश्चेतकभावेन कर्मफलम् ॥६८॥

कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वव्याख्योपसहारोऽयम् । तत एतत् स्थितं निश्चयेनात्मनः कर्म कर्तृ, व्यवहारेण
जीवभावस्य, जीवोऽपि निश्चयेनात्मभावस्य कर्ता, व्यवहारेण कर्मण इति यथात्रोभयनयाभ्यां कर्म
कर्तृ, तथैकेनापि नयेन न भोक्तृ । कुत । चैतन्यपूर्वकानुभूतिसद्भावाभावात् । ततश्चेतनत्वात् केवलं

एव जीव कर्मफलभूताना कथञ्चिदात्मन सुखदुःखपरिणामाना कथञ्चिदिष्टानिष्टविषयाणा भोक्ता प्रसिद्ध इति ॥६८॥

एवं कत्ता भोक्ता होज्जं अप्पा सगेहि कम्मोहि ।

हिण्डदि पारमपारं संसार मोहसंछण्णो ॥६९॥

एवं कर्ता भोक्ता भवन्नात्मा स्वकैः कर्मभि ।

हिण्डते पारमपारं संसारं मोहसंछन्नः ॥६९॥

कर्मसंयुक्तत्वमुखेन प्रभुत्वगुणव्याख्यानमेतत् । एवमयमात्मा प्रकटितप्रभुत्वशक्ति स्वकैः कर्म-
भिर्गृहीतकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वाधिकारोऽनादिमोहावच्छिन्नत्वादुपजातविपरीताभिनिवेश प्रत्यस्तमितसम्य-
ग्ज्ञानज्योति सान्तमनन्त वा संसार परिभ्रमतीति ॥६९॥

उवसंतस्सीणमोहो मग्गं जिणभासिदेण समुवगदो ।

णाणाणुमग्गचारी णिव्वाणपुरं वजदि धीरो ॥७०॥

उपशान्तक्षीणमोहो मार्गं जिनभाषितेन समुपगतः ।

ज्ञानानुमार्गचारी निर्वाणपुरं व्रजति धीरः ॥७०॥

कर्मवियुक्तत्वमुखेन प्रभुत्वगुणव्याख्यानमेतत् । अयमेवात्मा यदि जिनाज्ञया मार्गमुपगम्योपशान्त-
क्षीणमोहत्वात्प्रहीणविपरीताभिनिवेश समुद्भिन्नसम्यग्ज्ञानज्योति कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वाधिकार परिस-
माप्य सम्यक्प्रकटितप्रभुत्वशक्तिज्ञानस्यैवानुमार्गेण चरति, तदा विशुद्धात्मतत्त्वोपलम्भरूपमपवर्गनगर
विगाहत इति ॥७०॥

अथ जीवविकल्पा उच्यन्ते ।

एको चेव महप्पा सो दुवियप्पो तिलक्खणो होदि ।

चदुच्चंकमणो भणिदो पंचग्गगुणप्पघाणो य ॥७१॥

छक्कापक्कमजुत्तो उवउत्तो सत्तभंगसब्भावो ।

अट्ठासओ णवट्ठो जीवो दसठाणगो भणिदो ॥७२॥

एक एव महात्मा स द्विविकल्पस्त्रिलक्षणो भवति ।

चतुश्चङ्क्रमणो भणितः पञ्चागुणप्रधानश्च ॥७१॥

षट्कापक्कमयुक्तः उपयुक्तः सप्तभङ्गसद्भावः ।

अष्टाश्रयो नवार्थो जीवो दशस्थानगो भणितः ॥७२॥

स खलु जीवो महात्मा नित्यचैतन्योपयुक्तत्वादेक एव, ज्ञानदर्शनभेदाद्विविकल्पः, कर्मफल-
कार्यज्ञानचेतनाभेदेन लक्ष्यमाणत्वात्त्रिलक्षण ध्रौव्योत्पादविनाशभेदेन वा, चतसृषु गतिषु चङ्क्रमण-
त्वाच्चतुश्चङ्क्रमण, पञ्चभिः परिणामिकौदयिकादिभिरग्नगुणैः प्रधानत्वात्पञ्चाग्नगुणप्रधान, चत-
सृषु दिक्षूर्ध्वमधश्चेति भवान्तरसक्रमणषट्केनापक्रमेण युक्तत्वात्षट्कापक्रमयुक्त, अस्तिनास्त्यादिभिः
सप्तभङ्गैः सद्भावो यस्येति सप्तभङ्गसद्भाव, अष्टानां कर्मणा गुणानां वा आश्रयत्वादष्टाश्रय, नव-
पदार्थरूपेण वर्तनान्नवार्थ, पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवनस्पतिसाधारणप्रत्येकद्वित्रिचतुः पञ्चेन्द्रियरूपेषु दशसु
स्थानेषु गतत्वादशस्थानग इति ॥७१-७२॥

पयडिद्विद्विअणुभागपदेसबर्धेहि सव्वदो मुक्को ।

उड्ढं गच्छदि सेसा विदिसावज्जं गदिं जंति ॥७३॥

प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभागप्रवेशबन्धः सर्वतो मुक्त ।

ऊर्ध्वं गच्छति शेषा विदिग्वर्जां गतिं यान्ति ॥७३॥

बद्धजीवस्य षड्गतयः कर्मनिमित्ताः । मुक्तस्याप्यूर्ध्वगतिरेका स्वाभाविकीत्यत्रोक्तम् ॥७३॥
इति जीवद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ।

अथ पुद्गलद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यानम् ।

खंधा य खंधवेसा खंधपवेसा य होति परमाणू ।

इदि ते चतुर्विक्कयप्पा पुग्गलकाया मुण्येव्वा ॥७४॥

स्कन्धाश्च स्कन्धवेशाः स्कन्धप्रवेशाश्च भवन्ति परमाणवः ।

इति ते चतुर्विकल्पाः पुद्गलकाया ज्ञातव्याः ॥७४॥

पुद्गलद्रव्यविकल्पादेशो ज्ञेयः । पुद्गलद्रव्याणि हि कदाचित्स्कन्धपर्यायिणः, कदाचित्स्कन्धदेश-
पर्यायिणः, कदाचित्स्कन्धप्रदेशपर्यायिणः, कदाचित्परमाणुत्वेनात्र तिष्ठन्ति । नान्या गतिरस्ति । इति
तेषां चतुर्विकल्पत्वमिति ॥७४॥

खंधं सयलसमत्थं तस्स दु अद्धं भणंति वेसो त्ति ।

अद्धद्धं च पवेसो परमाणू चेव अबिभागी ॥७५॥

स्कन्धः सकलसमस्तस्तस्य त्वर्थं भणन्ति वेसा इति ।

अर्धार्धं च प्रवेशः परमाणुश्चैवाविभागी ॥७५॥

पुद्गलद्रव्यविकल्पनिर्देशो ऽयम् । अनन्तानन्तपरमाण्वारब्धोऽप्येक स्कन्धो नाम पर्याय । तदर्ध-
स्कन्धदेशो नाम पर्याय । तदर्धार्ध स्कन्धप्रदेशो नाम पर्याय । एव भेदवशात् द्व्यणुकस्कन्धादनन्ता
स्कन्धप्रदेशपर्याया । निर्विभागेकप्रदेश स्कन्धस्यान्त्यो भेद परमाणुरेक । पुनरपि द्वयो परमाण्वो
सघातादेको द्व्यणुकस्कन्धपर्याय । एव सघातवशादनन्ता स्कन्धपर्याया । एव भेदसघाताभ्यामप्य-
नन्ता भवन्तीति ॥७५॥

बादरसुहुभगदाणं खंधाणं पुगलो त्ति व्यवहारो ।

ते होंति छप्पयारा तेलोक्कं ज्ञेहि णिप्पणं ॥७६॥

बादरसौक्ष्म्यगतानां स्कन्धानां पुद्गलः इति व्यवहारः ।

ते भवन्ति षट्प्रकारास्त्रैलोक्यं यैः निष्पन्नम् ॥७६॥

स्कन्धाना पुद्गलव्यवहारसमर्थनमेतत् । स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णगुणविशेषै षट्स्थानपतितवृद्धिहानिभि
पूरणगलनधर्मत्वात् स्कन्धव्यक्त्याविर्भावतिरोभावाभ्यामपि च पूरणगलनोपपत्ते परमाणव पुद्गला
इति निश्चीयन्ते । स्कन्धास्त्वनेकपुद्गलमयैकपर्यायत्वेन पुद्गलेभ्योऽनन्यत्वात्पुद्गला इति व्यवहृ-
यन्ते, तथैव च बादरसूक्ष्मत्वपरिणामविकल्पे षट्प्रकारतामापद्य त्रैलोक्यरूपेण निष्पद्य स्थितवन्त
इति । तथा हि—बादरबादरा, बादरा, बादरसूक्ष्मा, सूक्ष्मबादरा, सूक्ष्मा, सूक्ष्मसूक्ष्मा इति । तत्र
छिन्ना स्वय सधानासमर्था काष्ठपाषाणादयो बादरबादरा । छिन्ना स्वय सधानसमर्था क्षीरघृत-
तैलतोयरसप्रभृतयो बादरा । स्थूलोपलम्भा अपि छेतु छेतुमादातुमशक्या छायातपतमोज्योत्स्नादयो
बादरसूक्ष्मा । सूक्ष्मत्वे ऽपि स्थूलोपलम्भा स्पर्शरसगन्धशब्दा सूक्ष्मबादरा । सूक्ष्मत्वे ऽपि हि
करणानुपलम्भा कर्मवर्गणादय सूक्ष्मा । अत्यन्तसूक्ष्मा कर्मवर्गणाभ्यो ऽधो द्व्यणुकस्कन्धपर्यन्ता
सूक्ष्मसूक्ष्मा इति ॥७६॥

सब्बेसि खंधाणं जो अंतो तं वियाण परमाणू ।

सो सस्सदो असद्दो एक्को अबिभाणि मुत्तिभवो ॥७७॥

सर्बेषां स्कन्धानां यो ऽन्त्यस्तं विजानीहि परमाणुम् ।

स शाश्वतो ऽशब्दः एको ऽविभागी मूर्तिभवः ॥७७॥

परमाणुव्याख्येयम् । उक्ताना स्कन्धरूपपर्यायाणा यो ऽन्त्यो भेद सपरमाणु । स तु पुनर्विभागा-
भावादविभागी, निर्विभागेकप्रदेशत्वादेक, मूर्तद्रव्यत्वेन सदाप्यविनश्वरत्वान्नित्य, अनादिनिधन-
रूपादिपरिणामोत्पन्नत्वान्मूर्तिभव, रूपादिपरिणामोत्पन्नत्वे ऽपि शब्दस्य परमाणुगुणत्वाभावात्पुद्-
गलस्कन्धपर्यायत्वेन वक्ष्यमाणत्वाच्चाशब्दो निश्चीयत इति ॥७७॥

आदेसमेतमुत्तो धातुचतुष्कस्स कारण जो दु ।

सो णेओ परमाणू परिणामगुणो सयमसद्दो ॥७८॥

आदेशमात्रमूर्तः धातुचतुष्कस्य कारण यस्तु ।

स ज्ञेयः परमाणुः परिणामगुणः स्वयमशब्दः ॥७८॥

परमाणूना जात्यन्तरत्वनिरासो ऽयम् । परमाणोर्हि मूर्तत्वनिबन्धनभूता स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णा आदेश-
मात्रेणैव भिद्यन्ते, वस्तुतस्तु यथा तस्य स एव प्रदेश आदि, स एव मध्य, स एवान्त इति, एव
द्रव्यगुणयोरविभक्तप्रदेशत्वात् य एव परमाणो प्रदेश, स एव स्पर्शस्य, स एव रसस्य, स एव
गन्धस्य, स एव रूपस्येति । तत क्वचित्परमाणौ गन्धगुणे, क्वचित् गन्धरसगुणयो, क्वचित् गन्धरस-
रूपगुणेषु अपकृष्यमाणेषु तदविभक्तप्रदेश परमाणुरेव विनश्यतीति । न तदपकर्षो युक्त । तत
पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुरूपस्य धातुचतुष्कस्यैक एव परमाणु कारण परिणामवशात् । विचित्रो हि
परमाणो परिणामगुण क्वचित्कस्यचिद्गुणस्य व्यक्ताव्यक्तत्वेन विचित्रा परिणतिमादधाति । यथा
च तस्य परिणामवशाद् व्यक्तो गन्धादिगुणो ऽस्तीति प्रतिज्ञायते, न तथा शब्दो ऽप्यव्यक्तो ऽस्तीति
ज्ञातुं शक्यते तस्यैकप्रदेशस्यानेकप्रदेशात्मकेन शब्देन सहैकत्वविरोधादिति ॥७८॥

सद्दो खंघप्पभवो खंघो परमाणुसंगसंघादो ।

पुट्ठेसु तेसु जायदि सद्दो उत्पादगो णियदो ॥७९॥

शब्द स्कन्धप्रभवः स्कन्ध परमाणुसंगसंघातः ।

स्पृष्टेषु तेषु जायते शब्द उत्पादको नियतः ॥७९॥

शब्दस्य पुद्गलस्कन्धपर्यायत्वख्यापनमेतत् । इह हि बाह्यश्रवणेन्द्रियावलम्बितो भावेन्द्रिय-
परिच्छेद्यो ध्वनि शब्दः । स खलु स्वरूपेणानन्तरपरमाणूनामेकस्कन्धो नाम पर्यायः । बहिरङ्गसाधनी-
भूतमहास्कन्धेभ्य तथाविधपरिणामेन समुत्पद्यमानत्वात् स्कन्धप्रभवः, यतो हि परस्पराभिहितेषु
महास्कन्धेषु शब्दः समुपजायते । किं च स्वभावनिर्वृत्ताभिरेवानन्तरपरमाणुमयीभिः शब्दयोग्यवर्गणा-
भिरन्योन्यमनुप्रविश्य समन्ततो ऽभिव्याप्य पूरिते ऽपि सकले लोके यत्र यत्र बहिरङ्गकारणसामग्री
समुदेति तत्र तत्र ताः शब्दत्वेन स्वयं व्यपरिणमन्त इति शब्दस्य नियतमुत्पाद्यत्वात् स्कन्धप्रभवत्व-
मिति ॥७९॥

णिच्चो णाणवकासो ण सावकासो पदेसदो भेत्ता ।

खंधाणं पि य कत्ता पविहत्ता कालसंखाणं ॥८०॥

नित्यो नानवकाशो न सावकाशः प्रवेशतो भेत्ता ।

स्कन्धानामपि च कर्ता प्रविभक्ता कालसंख्यायाः ॥८०॥

परमाणोरेकदेशत्वख्यापनमेतत् । परमाणु स खल्वेकेन प्रदेशेन रूपादिगुणसामान्यभाजा सर्व-
दैवाविनश्वरत्वान्नित्य एकेन प्रदेशेन तदविभक्तवृत्तीना स्पर्शादिगुणानामवकाशदानान्नानवकाश ।
एकेन प्रदेशेन द्र्यादिप्रदेशाभावादात्मादिनात्ममध्येनात्मान्तेन न सावकाश । एकेन प्रदेशेन
स्कन्धाना भेदनिमित्तत्वात् स्कन्धाना भेत्ता । एकेन प्रदेशेन स्कन्धसघातनिमित्तत्वात् स्कन्धाना कर्ता ।
एकेन प्रदेशेनैकाकाशप्रदेशातिवर्तितद्वगतिपरिणामापन्नेन समयलक्षणकालविभागकरणात् कालस्य
प्रविभक्ता । एकेन प्रदेशेन तत्सूत्रितद्र्यादिभेदपूर्विकाया स्कन्धेषु द्रव्यसख्याया , एकेन प्रदेशेन तद-
वच्छिन्नैकाकाशप्रदेशपूर्विकाया क्षेत्रसख्याया , एकेन प्रदेशेनैकाकाशप्रदेशातिवर्तितद्वगति-
परिणामावच्छिन्नसमयपूर्विकाया कालसख्याया , एकेन प्रदेशेन तद्विबर्तितजघन्यवर्णादिभावावबोध-
पूर्विकाया भावसख्याया प्रविभागकरणात् प्रविभक्ता सख्याया अपीति ॥८०॥

एयरसवर्णगंधं दो फासं सहकारणमसहं ।

खंधंतरिदं द्रव्यं परमाणुं तं विद्याणाहि ॥८१॥

एकरसवर्णगन्धं द्विस्पर्शं शब्दकारणमशब्दम् ।

स्कन्धान्तरितं द्रव्यं परमाणुं तं विजानीहि ॥८१॥

परमाणुद्रव्ये गुणपर्यायवृत्तिप्ररूपणमेतत् । सर्वत्रापि परमाणौ रसवर्णगन्धस्पर्शा सहभूवो गुणा ।
ते च क्रमप्रवृत्तैस्तत्र स्वपर्यायैर्वर्तन्ते । तथा हि—पञ्चाना रसपर्यायाणामन्यतमेनैकेनैकदा रसो वर्तते ।
पञ्चाना वर्णपर्यायाणामन्यतमेनैकेनैकदा वर्णो वर्तते । उभयोर्गन्धपर्याययोरन्यतरेणैकेनैकदा गन्धो
वर्तते । चतुर्णां शीतस्निग्धशीतरूक्षोष्णस्निग्धोष्णरूक्षरूपाणां स्पर्शपर्यायद्वन्द्वानामन्यतमेनैकेनैकदा
स्पर्शो वर्तते । एवमयमुक्तगुणवृत्ति परमाणु शब्दस्कन्धपरिणतिशक्तिस्वभावात् शब्दकारणम् । एक-
प्रदेशत्वेन शब्दपर्यायपरिणतिवृत्त्यभावादशब्द । स्निग्धरूक्षत्वप्रत्ययबन्धवशादनेकपरमाण्वेकत्व-
परिणतिरूपस्कन्धान्तरितो ऽपि स्वभावमपरित्यजन्नुपात्तसख्यत्वादेक एव द्रव्यमिति ॥८१॥

उबभोज्जमिदिएहिं य इंदियकाया मणो य कम्माणि ।

जं हवदि मुत्तमण्णं तं सव्वं पुग्गलं जाणे ॥८२॥

उपभोग्यमिन्द्रियंश्चेन्द्रियकाया मनश्च कर्माणि ।

यद्भवति मूर्तमन्यत् तत्सर्वं पुद्गलं जानीयात् ॥८२॥

सकलपुद्गलविकल्पोपसहारो ऽयम् । इन्द्रियविषया स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णशब्दाश्च, द्रव्येन्द्रियाणि
स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षु श्रोत्राणि, काया औदारिकवैक्रियकाहारकर्तृजसकर्मणानि, द्रव्यमन, द्रव्य-
कर्माणि, नोकर्माणि, विचित्रपर्यायोत्पत्तिहेतवो ऽनन्ता अनन्ताणुवर्गणा , अनन्ता असख्येयाणुवर्गणा ,

अनन्ता. सख्येयाणुवर्गणा, द्वयणुकस्कन्धपर्यन्ता, परमाणवश्च, यदन्यदपि मूर्तं तत्सर्वं पुद्गल-
विकल्पत्वेनोपसहर्तव्यमिति ॥८२॥ इति पुद्गलद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ धर्माधर्मद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यानम् ।

धम्मत्थिकायमरसं अवण्णगंधं असह्मप्फासं ।

लोगोगाढं पुट्टं पिहलमसंखादियपदेसं ॥८३॥

धर्मास्तिकायो ऽरसो ऽवर्णगन्धो ऽशब्दो ऽस्पर्शः ।

लोकावगाढः स्पृष्टः पृथुलो ऽसंख्यातप्रदेशः ॥८३॥

धर्मस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । धर्मो हि स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णानामत्यन्ताभावादमूर्तस्वभावः । तत एव चा-
शब्दः । सकललोकाकाशाभिव्याप्यावस्थितत्वाल्लोकावगाढः । अयुतसिद्धप्रदेशत्वात् स्पृष्टः ।
स्वभावादेव सर्वतो विस्तृतत्वात्पृथुलः । निश्चयनयेनैकप्रदेशो ऽपि व्यवहारनयेनासंख्यातप्रदेशः
इति ॥८३॥

अगुरुलघुगेहि सया तेहि अणंतेहि परिणदं णिच्चं ।

गदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभूदं सयमकज्ज ॥८४॥

अगुरुलघुकैः सदा तैः अनन्तैः परिणतः नित्यः ।

गतिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतः स्वयमकार्यः ॥८४॥

धर्मस्यैवावशिष्टस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । अपि च धर्मः अगुरुलघुभिर्गुणैरगुरुलघुत्वाभिधानस्य
स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठत्वनिबन्धनस्य स्वभावस्याविभागपरिच्छेदैः प्रतिसमयसंभवत्षट्स्थानपतितवृद्धिहानिभि-
रनन्तैः सदा परिणतत्वादुत्पादव्ययवत्वेऽपि स्वरूपादप्रच्यवनान्नित्यः । गतिक्रियापरिणतानामुदासी-
नाविनाभूतसहायमात्रत्वात्कारणभूतः । स्वास्तित्वमात्रनिर्वृत्तत्वात् स्वयमकार्यः इति ॥८४॥

उदयं जह मच्छाणं गमणाणुगहकरं हवदि लोए ।

तह जीवपुग्गलाणं धम्मं दव्वं वियाणेहि ॥८५॥

उदकं यथा मत्स्यानां गमनानुग्रहकरं भवति लोके ।

तथा जीवपुग्गलानां धर्मं द्रव्यं विजानीहि ॥८५॥

८३ P लोगोगाढं ।

८४ P लहुगेहि सदा ।

८५ P जघ, धम्म-द्व्व ।

८६ P जाणिह, ०मधम्मक्ख, भूद दु ।

धर्मस्य गतिहेतुत्वे दृष्टान्तोऽयम् । यथोदक स्वयमगच्छदगमयच्च स्वयमेव गच्छता मत्स्यानामु-
दासीनाविनाभूतसहायकारणमात्रत्वेन गमनमनुगृह्णाति, तथा धर्मोऽपि स्वयमगच्छन् अगमयश्च
स्वयमेव गच्छता जीवपुद्गलानामुदासीनाविनाभूतसहायकारणमात्रत्वेन गमनमनुगृह्णाति
इति ॥८५॥

जह हवदि धम्मदब्बं तह तं जाणेह दब्बमधमक्खं ।

ठिदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभूदं तु पुढवीव ॥८६॥

यथा भवति धर्मद्रव्यं तथा तज्जानीहि द्रव्यमधर्माख्यम् ।

स्थितिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतं तु पृथिवीव ॥८६॥

अधर्मस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यथा धर्म प्रज्ञापितस्तथाधर्मोऽपि प्रज्ञापनीय । अयं तु विशेष । स
गतिक्रियायुक्तानामुदकवत्कारणभूत एष पुन स्थितिक्रियायुक्तानां पृथिवीवत्कारणभूत । यथा
पृथिवी स्वयं पूर्वमेव तिष्ठन्ती परमस्थापयन्ती च स्वयमेव तिष्ठतामश्वादीनामुदासीनाविनाभूत-
सहायकारणमात्रत्वेन स्थितिमनुगृह्णाति तथाधर्मोऽपि स्वयं पूर्वमेव तिष्ठन् परमस्थापयश्च
स्वयमेव तिष्ठता जीवपुद्गलानामुदासीनाविनाभूतसहायकारणमात्रत्वेन स्थितिमनु-
गृह्णातीति ॥८६॥

जादो अलोगलोगो जेसि सद्भावदो य गमणठिदी ।

दो वि य मया विभत्ता अविभत्ता लोयमेत्ता य ॥८७॥

जातमलोकलोक ययो सद्भावतश्च गमनस्थितौ ।

द्वावपि च मतौ विभक्तावविभक्तौ लोकमात्रौ च ॥८७॥

धर्माधर्मसद्भावे हेतूपन्यासोऽयम् । धर्माधर्मौ विद्येते, लोकालोकविभागान्यथानुपपत्ते ।
जीवादिसर्वपदार्थानामेकत्र वृत्तिरूपो लोक । शुद्धैकाकाशवृत्तिरूपोऽलोक । तत्र जीवपुद्गलौ स्वर-
सत एव गतितत्पूर्वस्थितिपरिणामापन्नौ । तयोर्यदि गतिपरिणाम तत्पूर्वस्थितिपरिणाम वा स्वयमनु-
भवतोर्बहिरङ्गहेतू धर्माधर्मौ न भवेताम्, तदा तयोर्निरर्गलगतिस्थितिपरिणामत्वादलोकेऽपि वृत्ति
केन दार्येत । ततो न लोकालोकविभाग सिध्येत् । धर्माधर्मयोस्तु जीवपुद्गलयोर्गतितत्पूर्वस्थित्योर्ब-
हिरङ्गहेतुत्वेन सद्भावे ऽभ्युपगम्यमाने लोकालोकविभागो जायत इति । किंच धर्माधर्मौ द्वावपि
परस्पर पृथग्भूतास्तित्वनिर्वृत्तत्वाद्विभक्तौ । एकक्षेत्रावगाढत्वादविभक्तौ । निष्क्रियत्वेन सकललोक-
वर्तिनोर्जीवपुद्गलयोर्गतिस्थित्युपग्रहकरणाल्लोकमात्राविति ॥८७॥

ण य गच्छदि धम्मत्थी गमणं ण करेदि अण्णदवियस्स ।

हवदि गबिस्स य पसरो जीवाणं पुग्गलाणं च ॥८८॥

न च गच्छति धर्मास्तिको गमन न करोत्यन्यद्व्यस्य ।

भवति गतेः च प्रसरो जीवाना पुद्गलाना च ॥८८॥

धर्माधर्मयोर्गतिस्थितिहेतुत्वे ऽयत्यन्तीदासीन्याख्यापनमेतत् । यथा हि गतिपरिणत प्रभञ्जनो वैजयन्तीना गतिपरिणामस्य हेतुकर्तावलोक्यते न तथा धर्म । स खलु निष्क्रियत्वात् न कदाचिदपि गतिपरिणाममेवापद्यते । कुतो ऽस्य सहकारित्वेन परेषा गतिपरिणामस्य हेतुकर्तृत्वम् । किंतु सलिलमिव मत्स्याना जीवपुद्गलानामाश्रयकारणमात्रत्वेनोदासीन एवासौ गते प्रसरो भवति । अपि च यथा गतिपूर्वस्थितिपरिणतस्तुरङ्गो ऽश्ववारस्य स्थितिपरिणामस्य हेतुकर्तावलोक्यते न तथा धर्म । स खलु निष्क्रियत्वात् न कदाचिदपि गतिपूर्वस्थितिपरिणाममेवापद्यते । कुतो ऽस्य सहस्यत्वेन परेषा गतिपूर्वस्थितिपरिणामस्य हेतुकर्तृत्वम् । किंतु पृथिवीवत्तुरङ्गस्य जीवपुद्गलानामाश्रयकारणमात्रत्वेनोदासीन एवासौ गतिपूर्वस्थिते प्रसरो भवतीति ॥८८॥

विज्जदि जेसिं गमण ठाणं पुण तेसिमेव संभवदि ।

ते सगपरिणामेहिं दु गमण ठाणं च कुव्वंति ॥८९॥

विद्यते येषां गमन स्थान पुनस्तेषामेव सभवति ।

ते स्वकपरिणामेस्तु गमन स्थान च कुर्वन्ति ॥८९॥

धर्माधर्मयोरौदासीन्ये हेतूपन्यासो ऽयम् । धर्म किल न जीवपुद्गलाना कदाचिद्गतिहेतुत्वमभ्यस्यति, न कदाचित्स्थितिहेतुत्वमधम । तौ हि परेषा गतिस्थित्योर्यदि मुख्यहेतु स्याता तदा येषा गतिस्तेषा गतिरेव न स्थिति, येषा स्थितिस्तेषा स्थितिरेव न गति । तत एकेषामपि गतिस्थितिदर्शनादनुमीयते न तौ तयोर्मुख्यहेतु । किंतु व्यवहारनयव्यवस्थापितौ उदासीनौ । कथमेव गतिस्थितिमता पदार्थाना गतिस्थिती भवत इति चेत्, सर्वे हि गतिस्थितिमन्त पदार्था स्वपरिणामैरेव निश्चयेन गतिस्थिती कुर्वन्तीति ॥८९॥ इति धर्माधर्मद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ आकाशद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यानम् ।

सर्व्वेसि जीवाणं सेसाणं तह य पुग्गलाणं च ।

जं देदि विवरमखिलं त लोए हवदि आगासं ॥९०॥

सर्व्वेषां जीवाना शेषाणा तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।

यद्ददाति विवरमखिल तल्लोके भवत्याकाशम् ॥९०॥

आकाशस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । पञ्चद्रव्यात्मके लोके सर्व्वेषा शेषद्रव्याणा यत्समस्तावकाशनिमित्त विशुद्धक्षेत्ररूप तदाकाशमिति ॥९०॥

जीवा पुद्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा य लोगदोणणा ।

तत्तो अणणमण्णं आयासं अंतवदिरित्तं ॥६१॥

जीवा पुद्गलकायाः धर्माधर्मौ च लोकतोऽनन्ये ।

ततोऽनन्यदन्यदाकाशमन्तव्यतिरिक्तम् ॥६१॥

लोकाद्बहिराकाशसूचनेयम् । जीवादीनि शेषद्रव्याण्यवधृतपरिमाणत्वात्लोकादनन्यान्येव ।
आकाश त्वनन्तत्वात्लोकादनन्यदन्यच्चेति ॥६१॥

आगासं अवगासं गमणट्टिविकारणेहि देदि जदि ।

उड्ढगदिप्पधाणा सिद्धा चिट्ठंति किध तत्थ ॥६२॥

आकाशमवकाशं गमनस्थितिकारणाभ्या ददाति यवि ।

ऊर्ध्वगतिप्रधाना सिद्धा तिष्ठन्ति कथ तत्र ॥६२॥

आकाशस्यावकाशकहेतुर्गतिस्थितिहेतुत्वशङ्काया दोषोपन्यासोऽयम् । यदि खल्वाकाशमव-
गाहिनामवगाहहेतुरिव गतिस्थितिमता गतिस्थितिहेतुरपि स्यात्, तदा सर्वोत्कृष्टस्वाभाविकोर्ध्वगति-
परिणता भगवन्त सिद्धा बहिरङ्गान्तरङ्गसाधनसामग्र्या सत्यामपि कुतस्तत्राकाशे तिष्ठन्ति
इति ॥६२॥

जम्हा उवरिट्ठाणं सिद्धाणं जिणवरेहि पण्णत्तं ।

तम्हा गमणट्ठाणं आयासे जाण णत्थि ति ॥६३॥

यस्मादुपरिस्थान सिद्धानां जिनवरं प्रज्ञप्तम् ।

तस्माद्गमनस्थानमाकाशे जानीहि नास्तीति ॥६३॥

स्थितिपक्षोपन्यासोऽयम् । यतो गत्वा भगवन्त सिद्धा लोकोपर्यवतिष्ठन्ते, ततो गतिस्थिति-
हेतुत्वमाकाशे नास्तीति निश्चेतव्यम् । लोकालोकावच्छेदकौ धर्माधर्मविव गतिस्थितिहेतु मन्त-
व्याविति ॥६३॥

जदि हवदि गमणहेदू आगासं ठाणकारणं तेसि ।

पसजवि अलोगहाणी लोगस्स य अंतपरिवुड्ढी ॥६४॥

यदि भवति गमनहेतुराकाश स्थानकारणं तेषाम् ।

प्रसजत्यलोकहानिलोकस्य चान्तपरिवृद्धिः ॥६४॥

आकाशस्य गतिस्थितिहेतुत्वाभावे हेतूपन्यासोऽयम् । आकाश गतिस्थितिहेतु लोकालोकसीम-
व्यवस्थायास्तथोपपत्तेः । यदि गतिस्थित्योराकाशमेव निमित्तमिष्येत, तदा तस्य सर्वत्र सद्भावा-

ज्जीवपुद्गलानां गतिस्थित्योर्नि सीमत्वात्प्रतिक्षणमलोको हीयते, पूर्वं पूर्वं व्यवस्थाप्यमानश्चान्तो लोकस्योत्तरोत्तरपरिवृद्ध्या विघटते । ततो न तत्र तद्धेतुरिति ॥६४॥

तस्माद् धम्माधम्मा गमणद्विदिकारणाणि णागासं ।

इदि जिणवरेहिं भणिदं लोगसहावं सुणंताणं ॥६५॥

तस्माद्धर्माधर्मौ गमनस्थितिकारणे नाकाशम् ।

इति जिनवरं भणितं लोकस्वभाव शृण्वताम् ॥६५॥

आकाशस्य गतिस्थितिहेतुत्वनिरासव्याख्योपसंहारो ज्यम् । धर्माधर्मविव गतिस्थितिकारणे नाकाशमिति ॥६५॥

धम्माधम्मागासा अपुधब्भूदा समानपरिमाणा ।

पुधगुवलद्धिविसेसा करेति एगत्तमणत्तं ॥६६॥

धर्माधर्माकाशान्यपृथग्भूतानि समानपरिमाणानि ।

पृथगुपलब्धिविशेषाणि कुर्वन्त्येकत्वमन्यत्वम् ॥६६॥

धर्माधर्मलोकाकाशानामवगाहवशादेकत्वे ऽपि वस्तुत्वेनान्यत्वमत्रोक्तम् । धर्माधर्मलोकाकाशानि हि समानपरिमाणत्वात्सहावस्थानमात्रेणैवैकत्वभाजिज । वस्तुतस्तु व्यवहारेण गतिस्थित्यवगाह-हेतुत्वरूपेण निश्चयेन विभक्तप्रदेशत्वरूपेण विशेषेण पृथगुपलभ्यमानेनान्यत्वभाज्येव भवन्तीति ॥६६॥ इति आकाशद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ चूलिका ।

आगासकालजीवा धम्माधम्मा य मुत्तिपरिहीणा ।

मुत्तं पुगलदव्वं जीवो खलु चेदणो तेसु ॥६७॥

आकाशकालजीवा धर्माधर्मौ च मूर्तिपरिहीणा ।

मूर्तं पुद्गलद्रव्यं जीव खलु चेतनस्तेषु ॥६७॥

अत्र द्रव्याणां मूर्तामूर्तत्व चेतनाचेतनत्व चोक्तम् । स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णसद्भावस्वभाव मूर्तम्, स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णाभावस्वभावममूर्तम् । चैतन्यसद्भावस्वभाव चेतन, चैतन्याभावस्वभावमचेतनम् । तत्रामूर्तमाकाशम्, अमूर्तं काल, अमूर्तं स्वरूपेण जीव पररूपावेशान्मूर्तो ऽपि, अमूर्तो धर्म, अमूर्तो ऽधर्म, मूर्तं पुद्गल एवैक इति । अचेतनमाकाश, अचेतन काल, अचेतनो धर्म, अचेतनो ऽधर्म, अचेतन पुद्गल, चेतनो जीव एवैक इति ॥६७॥

जीवा पुद्गलकाया सह सक्क्रिया हवन्ति न च सेसा ।

पुद्गलकरणा जीवा खंधा खलु कालकरणा वु ॥६८॥

जीवाः पुद्गलकाया सह सक्क्रिया भवन्ति न च शेषाः ।

पुद्गलकरणा जीवाः स्कन्धा खलु कालकरणास्तु ॥६८॥

अत्र सक्क्रियनिष्क्रियत्वमुक्तम् । प्रदेशान्तरप्राप्तिहेतुः परिस्पन्दनरूपपर्याय क्रिया । तत्र सक्क्रिया बहिरङ्गसाधनेन सहभूता जीवा, सक्क्रिया बहिरङ्गसाधनेन सहभूता पुद्गला । निष्क्रियमाकाशम्, निष्क्रियो धर्मः, निष्क्रियो धर्मः, निष्क्रिय कालः । जीवानां सक्क्रियत्वस्य बहिरङ्गसाधन कर्मनो-कर्मोपचयरूपा पुद्गला इति ते पुद्गलकरणा । तदभावान्निष्क्रियत्व सिद्धानाम् । पुद्गलानां सक्क्रियत्वस्य बहिरङ्गसाधन परिणामनिर्वर्तक काल इति ते कालकरणाः । न च कर्मादीनामिव कालस्याभावः । ततो न सिद्धानामिव निष्क्रियत्व पुद्गलानामिति ॥६८॥

जे खलु इन्द्रियगोष्ठ्या विसया जीवोहं होंति ते मुक्ता ।

सेसं हवदि अमुत्तं चित्तं उभयं समादियवि ॥६९॥

ये खलु इन्द्रियग्राह्या विषया जीवैर्भवन्ति ते मूर्ताः ।

शेष भवत्यमूर्तं चित्तमुभयं समाददाति ॥६९॥

मूर्तामूर्तलक्षणाख्यानमेतत् । इह हि जीवैः स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षुभिरिन्द्रियैस्तद्विषयभूता स्पर्श-रसगन्धवर्णस्वभावा अर्था गृह्यन्ते । श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण तु त एव तद्विषयहेतुभूतशब्दाकारपरिणता गृह्यन्ते । ते कदाचित्स्थूलस्कन्धत्वमापन्ना कदाचित्सूक्ष्मत्वमापन्ना कदाचित्परमाणुत्वमापन्ना इन्द्रियग्रहण-योग्यतासद्भावाद् गृह्यमाणा अगृह्यमाणा वा मूर्ता इत्युच्यन्ते । शेषमितरत् समस्तमप्यर्थजात स्पर्श-रसगन्धवर्णभावस्वभावमिन्द्रियग्रहणयोग्यताया अभावादमूर्तमित्युच्यते । चित्तग्रहणयोग्यतासद्भाव-भाग्भवति तदुभयमपि, चित्तं ह्यनियतविषयमप्राप्यकारि मतिश्रुतज्ञानसाधनीभूत मूर्तममूर्तं च समाद-दातीति ॥६९॥ इति चूलिका समाप्ता ।

अथ कालद्रव्यव्याख्यानम् ।

कालो परिणामभवो परिणामो द्रव्यकालसंभूदो ।

दोण्हं एस सहावो कालो खणभंगुरो नियदो ॥१००॥

कालः परिणामभवः परिणामो द्रव्यकालसंभूतः ।

द्वयोरेव स्वभावः कालः क्षणभङ्गुरो नियतः ॥१००॥

व्यवहारकालस्य निश्चयकालस्य च स्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । तत्र क्रमानुपासी समयस्थ पर्यायो व्यवहारकालः, तदाधारभूत द्रव्य निश्चयकालः । तत्र व्यवहारकालो निश्चयकालपर्यायरूपो अपि

जीवपुद्गलानां परिणामेनावच्छिद्यमानत्वात्तत्परिणामभव इत्युपगीयते, जीवपुद्गलानां परिणामस्तु बहिरङ्गनिमित्तभूतद्रव्यकालसद्भावे सति सभूतत्वाद्द्रव्यकालसभूत इत्यभिधीयते । तत्रेदं तात्पर्यम्— व्यवहारकालो जीवपुद्गलपरिणामेन निश्चीयते, निश्चयकालस्तु तत्परिणामान्यधानुपपत्त्येति । तत्र क्षणभङ्गी व्यवहारकालः सूक्ष्मपर्यायस्य तावन्मात्रत्वात्, नित्यो निश्चयकालः स्वगुणपर्यायाधार-द्रव्यत्वेन सर्वदेवाविनश्वरत्वादिति ॥१००॥

कालो न्ति य ववदेसो सबभावपरूवगो हवदि णिच्चो ।

उप्पण्णप्पद्धंसी अबरो दीहंतरट्ठाई ॥१०१॥

काल इति च व्यपदेशः. सद्भावप्ररूपको भवति नित्यः ।

उत्पन्नप्रध्वस्यपरो दीर्घान्तरस्थायी ॥१०१॥

नित्यक्षणीकत्वेन कालविभागख्यापनमेतत् । यो हि द्रव्यविशेष 'अयं कालः, अयं कालः' इति सदा व्यपदिश्यते स खलु स्वस्य सद्भावमावेदयन् भवति नित्यः । यस्तु पुनरुत्पन्नमात्र एव प्रध्वस्यते स खलु तस्यैव द्रव्यविशेषस्य समयाख्य पर्याय इति । स तूत्सगितक्षणभङ्गो ज्युपदिशितस्वसनानो नयबलादीर्घान्तरस्थाय्युपगीयमानो न दुष्यति, ततो न खत्वावलिकापत्योपमसागरोपमादिव्यवहारो विप्रतिपिध्यते । तदत्र निश्चयकालो नित्यः द्रव्यरूपत्वात्, व्यवहारकालः क्षणिकः पर्यायरूप-त्वादिति ॥१०१॥

एदे कालागासा धम्माधम्मा य पुग्गला जीवा ।

लभन्ति दव्वसणं कालस्स दु णत्थि कायत्तं ॥१०२॥

एते कालाकाशे धर्माधर्मौ च पुद्गला जीवाः ।

लभन्ते द्रव्यसज्ञा कालस्य तु नास्ति कायत्वम् ॥१०२॥

कालस्य द्रव्यास्तिकायत्वविधिप्रतिषेधविधानमेतत् । यथा खलु जीवपुद्गलधर्माधर्माकाशानि सकलद्रव्यलक्षणसद्भावाद्द्रव्यव्यपदेशभाजि भवन्ति, तथा कालोऽपि । इत्येव षड्द्रव्याणि । किंतु यथा जीवपुद्गलधर्माधर्माकाशानां द्रव्यादिप्रदेशलक्षणत्वमस्ति अस्तिकायत्वं न तथा लोकाकाश-प्रदेशमख्यानामपि कालाणानामेकप्रदेशत्वादस्त्यस्तिकायत्वम् । अत एव च पञ्चास्तिकायप्रकरणे न हीह मुख्यत्वेनोपन्यस्तः कालः । जीवपुद्गलपरिणामावच्छिद्यमानपर्यायत्वेन तत्परिणामान्यधानुप-पत्त्यानुमीयमानद्रव्यत्वेनात्रैवान्तर्भावितः ॥१०२॥ इति कालद्रव्यव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ।

एव पवयणसारं पंचत्थियसंगहं विद्याणिता ।

जो मुयदि रागदोसे सो गाहदि दुक्खपरिमोक्खं ॥१०३॥

एव प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहं विज्ञाय ।

यो मुञ्चति रागद्वेषौ स गाहते दुःखपरिमोक्षम् ॥१०३॥

तदवबोधफलपुरस्सर पञ्चास्तिकायव्याख्योपमहारो ज्यम् । न खलु कालकलितपञ्चास्ति-
कायेभ्यो ऽन्यत् किमपि सकलेनापि प्रवचनेन प्रतिपाद्यते । तत प्रवचनसार एवाय पञ्चास्तिकाय-
सग्रहः । यो हि नामामु समस्तवस्तुतत्त्वाभिधायिनमर्थतोऽर्थितयावबुध्यात्रैव जीवास्तिकायान्तर्गत-
मात्मान स्वरूपेणात्यन्तविशुद्धचैतन्यस्वभाव निश्चित्य परस्परकार्यकारणीभूतानादिरागद्वेषपरिणाम-
कर्मबन्धसततिसमारोपितस्वरूपविकार तदात्वे ऽनुभूयमानमवलोक्य तत्कालोन्मीलितविवेकज्योति
कर्मबन्धसततिप्रवर्तिका रागद्वेषपरिणतिमत्यस्यति, स खलु जीर्यमाणस्नेहो जघन्यस्नेहगुणाभिमुख-
परमाणुवद्भाविबन्धपराङ्मुख पूर्वबन्धात्प्रच्यवमानः शिखितप्तोदकदौस्थ्यानुकारिणी दुःखस्य
परिमोक्ष विगाहत इति ॥१०३॥

मुणिऊण एतदट्ट तदणुगमणुज्जदो णिहदमोहो ।

पसमियरागद्वोसो हवदि हदपरावरो जीवो ॥१०४॥

ज्ञात्वेतवर्थं तदनुगमनोद्यतो निहतमोहः ।

प्रशमितरागद्वेषो भवति हतपरापरो जीवः ॥१०४॥

दुःखविमोक्षकरणक्रमाख्यानमेतत् । एतस्य शास्त्रस्यार्थभूत शुद्धचैतन्यस्वभावमात्मान कश्चिज्जी-
वस्तावज्जानीते । ततस्तमेवानुगन्तुमुद्यमते । ततो ऽस्य क्षीयते दृष्टिमोहः । तत स्वरूपपरिचयादुन्म-
ज्जति ज्ञानज्योतिः । ततो रागद्वेषौ प्रशाम्यतः । तत उत्तर पूर्वश्च बन्धो विनश्यति । तत
पुनर्बन्धहेतुत्वाभावात् स्वरूपस्थो नित्यः प्रतपतीति ॥१०४॥

इति समयव्याख्यायामन्तर्नीतषड्द्रव्यपञ्चास्तिकायवर्णनं प्रथमं श्रुतस्कन्धः समाप्तः ॥१॥



॥ २ ॥

[II]

ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनेन
शुद्ध बुधानामिह तत्त्वमुक्तम् ।
पदार्थभङ्गेन कृतावतार
प्रकीर्त्यते संप्रति वर्त्म तस्य ॥७॥

अभिवन्दिऊण सिरसा अपुण्णभवकारण महावीरं ।
तेसि पयत्थभंगं मग्गं मोक्खस्स वोच्छामि ॥१०५॥
अभिवन्ध शिरसा अपुनर्भवकारणं महावीरम् ।
तेषां पदार्थभङ्गं मार्गं मोक्षस्य वक्ष्यामि ॥१०५॥

आप्तस्तुतिपुरस्सरा प्रतिज्ञेयम् । अमुना हि प्रवर्तमानमहाधर्मतीर्थस्य मूलकर्तृत्वेनापुनर्भव-
कारणस्य भगवत् परमभट्टारकमहादेवाधिदेवश्रीवर्धमानस्वामिन सिद्धिनिबन्धनभूता भावस्तु-
तिमासूत्र्य, कालकलितपञ्चास्तिकायाना पदार्थविकल्पो मोक्षस्य मार्गश्च वक्तव्यत्वेन प्रतिज्ञात
इति ॥१०५॥

सम्मत्तणाणजुत्तं चारित्तं रागदोसपरिहीणं ।
मोक्खस्स हवदि मग्गो भव्वाणं लद्धबुद्धीणं ॥१०६॥
सम्यक्त्वज्ञानयुक्तं चारित्रं रागद्वेषपरिहीणम् ।
मोक्षस्य भवति मार्गो भव्यानां लब्धबुद्धीनाम् ॥१०६॥

मोक्षमार्गस्यैव तावत्सूचनेयम् । सम्यक्त्वज्ञानयुक्तमेव नासम्यक्त्वज्ञानयुक्तम्, चारित्रमेव नाचा-
रित्रम्, रागद्वेषपरिहीणमेव न रागद्वेषपरिहीणम्, मोक्षस्यैव न भावतो बन्धस्य, मार्ग एव नामार्ग ,
भव्यानामेव नाभव्यानाम्, लब्धबुद्धीनामेव नालब्धबुद्धीनाम्, क्षीणकषायत्वे भवत्येव न कषायसहि-
तत्वे भवतीत्यष्टौ नियमो ऽत्र द्रष्टव्यः ॥१०६॥

सम्मत्तं सदृहणं भावाणं तेसिमधिगमो जाणं ।

चारित्तं समभावो विसयेसु विरुद्धमगाणं ॥१०७॥

सम्यक्त्वं श्रद्धानं भावानां तेषामधिगमो ज्ञानम् ।

चारित्रं समभावो विषयेषु विरुद्धमार्गाणाम् ॥१०७॥

सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणां सूचनेयम् । भावा. खलु कालकलितपञ्चास्तिकायविकल्परूपा नव पदार्थाः । तेषां मिथ्यादर्शनोदयापादिताश्रद्धानाभावस्वभाव भावान्तर श्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनं, शुद्ध-चैतन्यरूपात्मतत्त्वविनिश्चयबीजम् । तेषामेव . मिथ्यादर्शनोदयान्तीयानसंस्कारादि[व]स्वरूप-विपर्ययेणाध्यवसीयमानानां तन्निवृत्तौ समञ्जसाध्यवसायं सम्यग्ज्ञानं, मनाग्ज्ञानचेतनाप्रधानात्म-तत्त्वोपलम्भबीजम् । सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानसन्निधानादमार्गोभ्यः समग्रेभ्यः परिच्युत्य स्वतत्त्वे विशेषेण रूढमार्गाणां सतामिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियविषयभूतेष्वर्थेषु रागद्वेषपूर्वकविकाराभावान्निर्विकारावबोधस्व-भावः समभावश्चारित्रम्, तदात्वायतिरमणीयमनणीयसोऽपुनर्भवसौख्यस्यैकबीजम् । इत्येष त्रि-लक्षणो मोक्षमार्गः पुरस्तान्निश्चयव्यवहाराभ्यां व्याख्यास्यते । इह तु सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानयोर्विषयभूतानां नवपदार्थानामुपोद्घातहेतुत्वेन सूचितं इति ॥१०७॥

जीवाजीवा भावा पुण्णं पावं च आसवं तेसि ।

संवरणिज्जरब्धो मोक्खो य हवंति ते अट्ठा ॥१०८॥

जीवाजीवौ भावौ पुण्यं पापं चास्रवस्तयोः ।

संवरनिर्जरबन्धा मोक्षश्च भवन्ति ते अर्थाः ॥१०८॥

पदार्थानां नामस्वरूपाभिधानमेतत् । जीवः, अजीवः, पुण्यम्, पापम्, आस्रवः, संवरः, निर्जरा, बन्धः, मोक्ष इति नवपदार्थानां नामानि । तत्र चैतन्यलक्षणो जीवास्तिक एवेह जीवः । चैतन्याभाव-लक्षणोऽजीवः । स पञ्चधा पूर्वोक्त एव—पुद्गलास्तिकः, धर्मास्तिकः, अधर्मास्तिकः, आका-शास्तिकः, कालद्रव्यं चेति । इमौ हि जीवाजीवौ पृथग्भूतास्तित्वनिर्वृत्तत्वेन भिन्नस्वभावभूतौ मूल-पदार्थाः । जीवपुद्गलसंयोगपरिणामनिर्बृत्ताः सप्तान्ये पदार्थाः । शुभपरिणामो जीवस्य, तन्निमित्तं कर्मपरिणामः पुद्गलानां च पुण्यम् । अशुभपरिणामो जीवस्य, तन्निमित्तं कर्मपरिणामः पुद्गलानां च पापम् । मोहरागद्वेषपरिणामो जीवस्य, तन्निमित्तं कर्मपरिणामो योगद्वारेण प्रविशता पुद्गलानां चास्रवः । मोहरागद्वेषपरिणामनिरोधो जीवस्य, तन्निमित्तं कर्मपरिणामनिरोधो योगद्वारेण प्रवि-शता पुद्गलानां च संवरः । कर्मवीर्यशान्तनसमर्थो बहिरङ्गान्तरङ्गतपोऽबृंहितशुद्धोपयोगो जीवस्य, तदनुभावनीरसीभूतानामेकदेशसक्षयः समुपास्तकर्मपुद्गलानां च निर्जरा । मोहरागद्वेषस्निग्धपरिणामो

जीवस्य, तन्निमित्तेन कर्मन्वपरिणताना जीवेन सहान्योन्यसमूच्छेन पुद्गलाना च बन्ध ।
अत्यन्तशुद्धात्मोपलम्भो जीवस्य, जीवेन सहात्यन्तविश्लेष कर्मपुद्गलाना च मोक्ष
इति ॥१०८॥

अथ जीवपदार्थाना व्याख्यान प्रपञ्चयति ।

जीवा संसारत्वा णिवादा चेदणप्पगा दुविहा ।

उवओगलक्खणा वि य देहादेहप्पवीचारा ॥१०९॥

जीवाः संसारस्था निर्वृत्ता चेतनात्मका द्विविधाः ।

उपयोगलक्षणा अपि च देहादेहप्रवीचारा ॥१०९॥

जीवस्वरूपोद्देशो ऽयम् । जीवा हि द्विविधा, संसारस्था अशुद्धा निर्वृत्ता शुद्धाश्च । ते खलूभये
ऽपि चेतनस्वभावा, चेतनापरिणामलक्षणेनोपयोगेन लक्षणीया । तत्र संसारस्था देहप्रवीचारा,
निर्वृत्ता अदेहप्रवीचारा इति ॥१०९॥

पुढवी य उदगमगणी वाउ वणप्फदि जीवसंसिदा काया ।

देति खलु मोहबहुलं फासं बहुगा वि ते तेसि ॥११०॥

पृथिवी धोवकमग्निर्वायुर्बनस्पतिः जीवसंश्रिताः कायाः ।

वदति खलु मोहबहुलं स्पर्शं बहुका अपि ते तेषाम् ॥११०॥

पृथिवीकायिकादिपञ्चभेदोद्देशो ऽयम् । पृथिवीकाया, अप्काया, तेज काया, वायुकाया,
वनस्पतिकाया इत्येते पुद्गलपरिणामा बन्धवशाज्जीवानुसंश्रिता, अवान्तरजातिभेदाद्बहुका अपि
स्पर्शनेन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमभाजा जीवाना बहिरङ्गस्पर्शनेन्द्रियनिर्वृत्तिभूता कर्मफलचेतनाप्रधान-
त्वान्मोहबहुलमेव स्पर्शोपलम्भ संपादयन्तीति ॥११०॥

ति त्थावरतणुजोगा अणिलानलकाइया य तेसु तसा ।

मणपरिणामविरहिदा जीवा एइदिया णेया ॥१११॥

अथ. स्थावरतनुयोगा अनिलानलकायिकाश्च तेषु त्रयाः ।

मनःपरिणामविरहिता जीवा एकेन्द्रिया ज्ञेयाः ॥१११॥

एदे जीवणिकाया पंचविधा पुढविकाइयादीया ।

मणपरिणामविरहिदा जीवा एगेदिया भणिया ॥११२॥

एते जीवणिकाया पञ्चविधाः पृथिवीकायिकाद्याः ।

मनःपरिणामविरहिता जीवा एकेन्द्रिया भणिता ॥११२॥

पृथिवीकायिकादीना पञ्चानामेकेन्द्रियत्वनियमो ऽयम् । पृथिवीकायिकादयो हि जीवा स्पर्शनेन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमात् शेषेन्द्रियावरणोदये नोदन्द्रियावरणोदये च सत्येकेन्द्रिया अमनसो भवन्तीति ॥११२॥

अंडेसु पवडुंता गढभत्था माणुसा य मुच्छगया ।

जारिसया तारिसया जीवा एगेदिया णेया ॥११३॥

अण्डेषु प्रवर्धमाना गर्भस्था मानुषाश्च मूर्च्छां गताः ।

यादृशास्तादृशा जीवा एकेन्द्रिया ज्ञेया ॥११३॥

एकेन्द्रियाणां चैतन्यास्तित्वे दृष्टान्तोपन्यासो ऽयम् । अण्डान्तर्लीनानां, गर्भस्थानां, मूर्च्छितानां च बुद्धिपूर्वकव्यापारादर्शने ऽपि येन प्रकारेण जीवत्व निश्चीयते, तेन प्रकारेणैकेन्द्रियाणामपि, उभये-
पामपि बुद्धिपूर्वकव्यापारादर्शनस्य समानत्वादिति ॥११३॥

संबुक्कमादुवाहा संखा सिप्पी अपादगा य किमी ।

जाणंति रस फास जे ते बेइन्दिया जीवा ॥११४॥

शम्बूकमातृवाहा शङ्खा शुक्तयो ऽपादका च कृमयः ।

जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं ये ते द्वीन्द्रिया जीवा ॥११४॥

द्वीन्द्रियप्रकारसूचनेयम् । एते स्पर्शनरसनेन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमात् शेषेन्द्रियावरणोदये नोदन्द्रि-
यावरणोदये च सति स्पर्शरसयो परिच्छेत्तारो द्वीन्द्रिया अमनसो भवन्तीति ॥११४॥

जूगागुंभीमक्कुणपिपीलिया बिच्छिद्यादिया कीडा ।

जाणंति रसं फासं गंधं तेइन्दिया जीवा ॥११५॥

यूकाकुम्भीमत्कुणपिपीलिका वृश्चिकादयः कीटाः ।

जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं गन्धं त्रीन्द्रियाः जीवा ॥११५॥

श्रीन्द्रियप्रकारसूचनेयम् । एते स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणेंद्रियावरणक्षयोपशमात् शोषेन्द्रियावरणोदये नोइन्द्रियावरणोदये च सति स्पर्शरसगन्धाना परिच्छेत्तारस्त्रीन्द्रिया अमनसो भवन्तीति ॥११५॥

उद्दंसमसयमक्खियमधुकरभमरा पतंगमादीया ।

रूवं रसं च गंधं फासं पुण ते विजाणंति ॥११६॥

उद्दशमशकमक्षिकामधुकरीभ्रमरा पतङ्गाद्या ।

रूप रसं च गन्धं स्पर्शं पुनस्ते विजानन्ति ॥११६॥

चतुरिन्द्रियप्रकारसूचनेयम् । एते स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षुरिन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमात् श्रोत्रेन्द्रियावरणोदये नोइन्द्रियावरणोदये च सति स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णाना परिच्छेत्तारश्चतुरिन्द्रिया अमनसो भवन्तीति ॥११६॥

सुरणरणारयतिरिया वण्णरसप्फासगंधसद्दणू ।

जलचरथलचरखचरा बलिया पच्चंदिया जीवा ॥११७॥

सुरनरनारकतियञ्चो वणरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दजा ।

जलचरस्थलचरखचरा बलिन पञ्चेन्द्रिया जीवा ॥११७॥

पञ्चेन्द्रियप्रकारसूचनेयम् । अथ स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षु श्रोत्रेन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमात् नोइन्द्रियावरणोदये सति स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णशब्दाना परिच्छेत्तार पञ्चेन्द्रिया अमनस्का । केचित्तु नोइन्द्रियावरणस्यापि क्षयोपशमात् समनस्काश्च भवन्ति । तत्र देवमनुष्यनारका समनस्का एव, तिर्यञ्च उभयजातीया इति ॥११७॥

देवा चउण्णिकाया मणुया पुण कम्मभोगभूमिीया ।

तिरिया बहुप्पयारा णेरइया पुढविभेयगदा ॥११८॥

देवाश्चतुर्णिकाया मनुजा पुन कर्मभोगभूमिजा ।

तिर्यञ्च बहुप्रकारा नारका पृथिवीभेवगता ॥११८॥

इन्द्रियभेदेनोक्ताना जीवाना चतुर्गतिसंबन्धत्वेनोपसहारो ज्यम् । देवगतिनाम्नो देवायुषश्चोदयाद्देवा, ते च भवनवासिव्यन्तरज्योतिष्कवैमानिकनिकायभेदाच्चतुर्धा । मनुष्यगतिनाम्नो मनुष्यायुषश्च उदयान्मनुष्या । ते कर्मभोगभूमिजभेदात् द्वेधा । तिर्यग्गतिनाम्नस्तिर्यगायुषश्च उदयात्तिर्यञ्च । ते पृथिवीशम्ब्रुकयूकोद्दशजलचरोरगपक्षिसर्पचतुष्पदादिभेदादनेकधा । नरकगतिनाम्नो नरकायुषश्च उदयान्नारका । ते रत्नशर्कराबालुकापङ्कधूमतमोमहातमप्रभाभूमिजभेदात्सप्तधा ।

तत्र देवमनुष्यनारकाः पञ्चेन्द्रिया एव । तिर्यञ्चस्तु केचित्पञ्चेन्द्रियाः, केचिदेक-द्वि-त्रि-चतु-
रिन्द्रिया अपीति ॥११८॥

क्षीणे पुर्वणिबद्धे गदिणामे आउसे य ते वि खलु ।

पापुष्णंति य अण्णं गदिमाउस्सं सलेसवसा ॥११९॥

क्षीणे पूर्वनिबद्धे गतिनाम्नि आयुषि च ते ऽपि खलु ।

प्राप्नुवन्ति चान्यां गतिमायुष्कं स्वलेस्यावशात् ॥११९॥

गत्यायुर्नामोदयनिवृत्तत्वाद्देवत्वादीनामनात्मस्वभावत्वोद्द्योतनमेतत् । क्षीयते हि क्रमेणारब्ध-
फलो गतिनामविशेष आयुर्विशेषश्च जीवानाम् । एवमपि तेषां गत्यन्तरस्यायुरन्तरस्य च कषाया-
नुरञ्जिता योगप्रवृत्तिलेश्या भवति बीजम् । ततस्तदुचितमेव गत्यन्तरमायुरन्तरं च ते प्राप्नुवन्ति ।
एव क्षीणाक्षीणाभ्यामपि पुनः पुनर्नवीभूताभ्यां गतिनामायुः कर्मभ्यामनात्मस्वभावभूताभ्यामपि चिर-
मनुगम्यमानाः ससरन्त्यात्मानमचेतयमाना जीवा इति ॥११९॥

एदे जीवणिकाया देहप्पविचारमस्सिदा भणिदा ।

देहविहूणा सिद्धा भव्वा संसारिणो अभव्वा य ॥१२०॥

एते जीवणिकाया देहप्रवीचारमाश्रिता भणिताः ।

देहविहीनाः सिद्धाः भव्याः संसारिणो ऽभव्याश्च ॥१२०॥

उक्तजीवप्रपञ्चोपसंहारो ऽयम् । एते ह्युक्तप्रकाराः सर्वे संसारिणो देहप्रवीचाराः, अदेहप्रवी-
चारा भगवन्तः सिद्धा शुद्धा जीवाः । तत्र देहप्रवीचारत्वादेकप्रकारत्वे ऽपि संसारिणो द्विप्रकाराः
भव्या अभव्याश्च । ते शुद्धस्वरूपोपलम्भशक्तिसद्भावाः सद्भावाभ्यां पाच्यापाच्यमुद्गवदभिधीयन्तः
इति ॥१२०॥

ण हि इंदियाणि जीवा काया पुण छप्पयार पण्णत्ता ।

जं हवदि तेसु णाणं जीवो त्ति य तं परूवंति ॥१२१॥

न हीन्द्रियाणि जीवाः कायाः पुनः षट्प्रकाराः प्रज्ञप्ताः ।

यद्भवति तेषु ज्ञानं जीव इति च तत्प्ररूपयन्ति ॥१२१॥

व्यवहारजीवत्वैकान्तप्रतिपत्तिनिरासोऽयम् । य इमे एकेन्द्रियादयः पृथिवीकायिकादयश्चानादि-
जीवपुद्गलपरस्परावगाहमवलोक्य व्यवहारनयेन जीवप्राधान्याज्जीवा इति प्रज्ञाप्यन्ते । निश्चयनयेन

तेषु स्पर्शनादीन्द्रियाणि पृथिव्यादयश्च काया जीवलक्षणभूतचैतन्यस्वभावाभावाश्च जीवा भवन्तीति । तेष्वेव यत्स्वपरपरिच्छित्तिरूपेण प्रकाशमान ज्ञान तदेव गुणगुणिनो कथञ्चिदभेदाज्जीवत्वेन प्ररूप्यत इति ॥१२१॥

जाणदि पस्सदि सव्वं इच्छदि सुखं बिभेदि दुक्खादो ।

कुव्वदि हिदमहिदं वा भुज्जदि जीवो फलं तेसि ॥१२२॥

जानाति पश्यति सर्वमिच्छति सौख्यं बिभेति दुःखात् ।

करोति हितमहितं वा भुङ्गते जीव फलं तयोः ॥१२२॥

अन्यासाधारणजीवकार्यख्यापनमेतत् । चैतन्यस्वभावत्वात्कर्तृस्थाया क्रियाया जप्तेर्दृशेश्च जीव एव कर्ता, न तत्संबन्ध पुद्गल, यथाकाशादि । सुखाभिलाषक्रियाया दुःखोद्वेगक्रियाया, स्वसवेदित-हिताहितनिर्वर्तनक्रियायाश्च चैतन्यविवर्तरूपमकल्पप्रभवत्वात्स एव कर्ता, नान्य । शुभाशुभकर्मसफल-भूताया इष्टानिष्टविषयोपभोगक्रियायाश्च सुखदुःखस्वरूपस्वपरिणामक्रियाया इव स एव कर्ता, नान्य । एतेनासाधारणकार्यानुमेयत्व पुद्गलव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनो द्योतितमिति ॥१२२॥

एवमभिगम्म जीवं अण्णेहिं वि पज्जएहिं बहुणेहिं ।

अभिगच्छदु अज्जीवं णाणंतरिदेहिं लिणेहिं ॥१२३॥

एवमभिगम्य जीवमन्यैरपि पर्यायैर्बहुकं ।

अभिगच्छत्वजीव ज्ञानान्तरितैर्लिङ्गैः ॥१२३॥

जीवाजीवव्याख्योपसहारोपक्षोपसूचनेयम् । एवमनया दिशा व्यवहारनयेन कर्मग्रन्थप्रतिपादित-जीवगुणमार्गणास्थानादिप्रपञ्चितविचित्रविकल्परूपैः, निश्चयनयेन मोहरागद्वेषपरिणतिसपादितविश्व-रूपत्वात्कदाचिदशुद्धैः कदाचित्तदभावाच्छुद्धैश्चैतन्यविवर्तग्रन्थिरूपैर्बहुभिः पर्यायैर्जीवमधिगच्छेत् । अधिगम्य चैवमचैनन्यस्वभावत्वात् ज्ञानादर्थान्तरभूतैरित प्रपञ्च्यमानैर्लिङ्गैर्जीवसबद्धमसबद्धं वा स्वतो भेदबुद्धिप्रसिद्धयर्थमजीवमधिगच्छेदिति ॥१२३॥ इति जीवपदार्थव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ अजीवपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

आगासकालपुग्गलधम्ममाधम्मेसु णत्थि जीवगुणा ।

तेसि अचेदणत्तं भणिदं जीवस्स चेदणदा ॥१२४॥

आकाशकालपुद्गलधर्माधर्मेषु न सन्ति जीवगुणाः ।

तेषामचेतनत्वं भणितं जीवस्य चेतनता ॥१२४॥

आकाशादीनामेवाजीवत्वे हेतूपन्यासो ऽयम् । आकाशकालपुद्गलधर्माधर्मेषु चैतन्यविशेषरूपा

जीवगुणा नो विद्यन्ते, आकाशादीना तेषामचेतनत्वसामान्यत्वात् । अचेतनत्वसामान्य चाकाशादीना-
मेव, जीवस्यैव चेतनत्वसामान्यादिति ॥१२४॥

सुखदुःखजाणणा वा हितपरियम्भं च अहितभीरुत्तं ।
जस्स ण विज्जदि णिच्चं तं समणा वेत्ति अज्जीवं ॥१२५॥

सुखदुःखज्ञानं वा हितपरिकर्म चाहितभीरुत्वम् ।
यस्य न विद्यते नित्यं तं श्रमणा ब्रुवन्त्यजीवम् ॥१२५॥

आकाशादीनामचेतनत्वसामान्ये पुनरनुमीनमेतत् । सुखदुःखज्ञानस्य हितपरिकर्मणो ऽहितभी-
रुत्वस्य चेति चैतन्यविशेषाणां नित्यमनुपलब्धेरविद्यमानचैतन्यसामान्या एवाकाशादयो ऽजीवा
इति ॥१२५॥

संठाणा संघादा वर्णरसस्फासगंधसद्दा य ।
पोगलदव्वप्पभवा होंति गुणा पज्जया य बहू ॥१२६॥
अरसमरूपमगंधं अव्वत्तं चेदणागुणमसद् ।
जाण अलिगगहणं जीवमणिदिट्ठसंठाणं ॥१२७॥

संस्थानानि सघाताः वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दाश्च ।
पुद्गलद्रव्यप्रभवा भवन्ति गुणाः पर्यायाश्च बहवः ॥१२६॥
अरसमरूपमगन्धमव्यक्तं चेतनागुणमशब्दम् ।
जानीह्यालिङ्गग्रहणं जीवमनिर्दिष्टसंस्थानम् ॥१२७॥

जीवपुद्गलयो सयोगे ऽपि भेदनिबन्धनस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यत्खलु शरीरशरीरिसयोगे स्पर्शरस-
गन्धवर्णगुणत्वात्सशब्दत्वात्संस्थानसघातादिपर्यायपरिणतत्वाच्च इन्द्रियग्रहणयोग्यम्, तत्पुद्गलद्रव्यम् ।
यत्पुनरस्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णगुणत्वादशब्दत्वादिनिर्दिष्टसंस्थानत्वादव्यक्तत्वादपर्यायं परिणतत्वाच्च
नेन्द्रियग्रहणयोग्यम्, तच्चेतनागुणत्वात् रूपिभ्यो ऽरूपिभ्यश्च जीवेभ्यो विशिष्ट जीवद्रव्यम् । एवमिह
जीवाजीवयोर्वास्तत्रो भेदः सम्यग्ज्ञानिना मार्गप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रतिपादित इति ॥१२६-१२७॥ इति
अजीवपदार्थव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

उक्तौ मूलपदार्थौ । अथ सयोगपरिणामनिर्वृत्तेतरसप्तपदार्थानामुपोद्घातार्थं जीवपुद्गलकर्म-
चक्रमनुवर्ष्यते—

जी खलु संसारस्थो जीवो ततो वु होदि परिणामो ।
 परिणामादो कम्मं कम्मादो होदि गविसु गवी ॥१२८॥
 गविमधिगदस्स देहो देहादो इन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते ।
 तेहि वु विसयग्रहणं ततो रागो व दोसो वा ॥१२९॥
 जायदि जीवस्सेवं भावो संसारचक्रवालम्भि ।
 इदि जिणवरेहि भणिदो अणादिणिधणो सणिधणो वा ॥१३०॥

यः खलु संसारस्थो जीवस्ततस्तु भवति परिणाम ।
 परिणामात्कर्म कर्मणो भवति गतिषु गतिः ॥१२८॥
 गतिमधिगतस्य देहो देहादिन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते ।
 तैस्तु विषयग्रहणं ततो रागो वा द्वेषो वा ॥१२९॥
 जायते जीवस्यैव भावः संसारचक्रवाले ।
 इति जिनवरेभणितो ऽनादिनिधनः सनिधनो वा ॥१३०॥

इह हि संसारिणो जीवादनादिबन्धनोपाधिवशेन स्निग्ध परिणामो भवति । परिणामात्पुन पुद्गलपरिणामात्मक कर्म । कर्मणो नारकादिगतिषु गति । गत्यधिगमनादेह । देहादिन्द्रियाणि । इन्द्रियेभ्यो विषयग्रहणम् । विषयग्रहणाद्रागद्वेषौ । रागद्वेषाभ्या पुन स्निग्ध परिणाम । परिणामात्पुन पुद्गलपरिणामात्मक कर्म । कर्मण पुननारकादिगतिषु गति । गत्यधिगमनात्पुनर्देह । देहात्पुनरिन्द्रियाणि । इन्द्रियेभ्य पुनविषयग्रहणम् । विषयग्रहणान्पुन रागद्वेषौ । रागद्वेषाभ्या पुनरपि स्निग्ध परिणाम । एवमिदमन्योन्यकार्यकारणभूतजीवपुद्गलपरिणामात्मक कर्मजाल संसारचक्रे जीवस्यानाद्यनिधन अनादिसनिधन वा चक्रवत्परिवर्तते । तदत्र पुद्गलपरिणामनिमित्तो जीवपरिणामो जीवपरिणामनिमित्त पुद्गलपरिणामश्च वक्ष्यमाणपदार्थबीजत्वेन सप्रधारणीय इति ॥१२८-१३०॥

अथ पुण्यपापपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

मोहो रागो दोसो चित्तपसादो य जस्स भावम्भि ।
 विज्जदि तस्स सुहो वा असुहो वा होदि परिणामो ॥१३१॥
 मोहो रागो द्वेषश्चित्तप्रसादः वा यस्य भावे ।
 विद्यते तस्य शुभो वा अशुभो वा भवति परिणामः ॥१३१॥

पुण्यपापयोग्यभावस्वभावाख्यापनमेतत् । इह हि दर्शनमोहनीयविपाककलुषपरिणामता मोहः । विचित्रचारित्रमोहनीयविपाकप्रत्यये प्रीत्यप्रीती रागद्वेषौ । तस्यैव मन्दोदये विशुद्धपरिणामता

चित्तप्रसादपरिणाम । एवमिमे यस्य भावे भवन्ति, तस्यावश्य भवति शुभो ऽशुभो वा परिणाम । तत्र यत्र प्रशस्तरागश्चित्तप्रसादश्च तत्र शुभ परिणामः, यत्र तु मोहद्वेषावप्रशस्तरागश्च तत्राशुभ इति ॥१३१॥

सुहृपरिणामो पुण्यं असुहो पावं ति हवदि जीवस्स ।

दोह्लं पोगलमेत्तो भावो कम्मत्तणं पत्तो ॥१३२॥

शुभपरिणामः पुण्यमशुभः पापमिति भवति जीवस्य ।

द्वयोः पुद्गलमात्रो भावः कर्मत्व प्राप्तः ॥१३२॥

पुण्यपापस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । जीवस्य कर्तुं निश्चयकर्मतामापन्न शुभपरिणामो द्रव्यपुण्यस्य निमित्तमात्रत्वेन कारणीभूतत्वात्तदास्त्रवक्षणादूर्ध्वं भवति भावपुण्यम् । एव जीवस्य कर्तुनिश्चयकर्मतामापन्नो ऽशुभपरिणामो द्रव्यपापस्य निमित्तमात्रत्वेन कारणीभूतत्वात्तदास्त्रवक्षणादूर्ध्वं भावपापम् । पुद्गलस्य कर्तुनिश्चयकर्मतामापन्नो विशिष्टप्रकृतित्वपरिणामो जीवशुभपरिणामनिमित्तो द्रव्यपुण्यम् । पुद्गलस्य कर्तुनिश्चयकर्मतामापन्नो विशिष्टप्रकृतित्वपरिणामो जीवाशुभपरिणामनिमित्तो द्रव्यपापम् । एव व्यवहारनिश्चयाभ्यामात्मनो मूर्तममूर्तं च कर्म प्रज्ञापितमिति ॥१३२॥

जम्हा कम्मस्स फलं विसयं फासेहिं भुंजवे णियदं ।

जीवेण सुहं दुक्खं तम्हा कम्माणि मुत्ताणि ॥१३३॥

यस्मात्कर्मण फल विषय स्पर्शभुज्यते नियतम् ।

जीवेन सुखं दुःख तस्मात्कर्माणि मूर्तानि ॥१३३॥

मूर्तकर्मसमर्थनमेतत् । यतो हि कर्मणा फलभूत सुखदुःखहेतुविषयो मूर्तो मूर्तरिन्द्रियैर्जीवेन नियत भुज्यते, तत् कर्मणा मूर्तत्वमनुमीयते । तथा हि—मूर्तं कर्म, मूर्तसंबन्धेनानुभूयमानफलत्वादाखुविषवदिति ॥१३३॥

मुत्तो फासदि मुत्तं मुत्तो मुत्तेण बंधमणुहवदि ।

जीवो मुत्तिविरहिदो गाहवि ते तेहिं उग्गहदि ॥१३४॥

मूर्तः स्पृशति मूर्तं मूर्तो मूर्तेन बन्धमनुभवति ।

जीवो मूर्तिविरहितो गाहति तानि तैरवगाह्यते ॥१३४॥

मूर्तकर्मणोरमूर्तजीवमूर्तकर्मणोश्च बन्धप्रकारसूचनेयम् । इह हि ससारिणि जीवे ज्ञादिसंतानेन प्रवृत्तमास्ते मूर्तकर्म । तत्स्पर्शादिमत्त्वादागामि मूर्तकर्म स्पृशति, ततस्तन्मूर्तं तेन सह स्नेहगुण-

वशाद्बन्धमनुभवति । एष मूर्तयो कर्मणोर्बन्धप्रकारः । अथ निश्चयनयेनामूर्तो जीवो ज्ञादिमूर्तकर्म-
निमित्तरागादिपरिणामस्निग्धः सन् विशिष्टतया मूर्तानि कर्माण्यवगाहते, तत्परिणामनिमित्तलब्धात्म-
परिणामं मूर्तकर्मभिरपि विशिष्टतयावगाहते च । अयं त्वन्योन्यावगाहात्मको जीवमूर्तकर्मणोर्बन्ध-
प्रकारः । एवममूर्तस्यापि जीवस्य मूर्तेन पुण्यपापकर्मणा कथञ्चिद्बन्धो न विरुध्यते ॥१३४॥ इति
पुण्यपापपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

अथ आस्रवपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

रागो जस्स पसत्थो अणुकपासंसिदो य परिणामो ।

चित्तमिह गत्थि कलुस पुण्णं जीवस्स आसवदि ॥१३५॥

रागो यस्य प्रशस्तो ऽनुकम्पासंश्रितश्च परिणामः ।

चित्ते नास्ति कालुष्यं पुण्य जीवस्यास्रवति ॥१३५॥

पुण्यास्रवस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । प्रशस्तरागो ऽनुकम्पापरिणति चित्तस्याकलुषत्व चेति त्रयं शुभा-
भावाः द्रव्यपुण्यास्रवस्य निमित्तमात्रत्वेन कारणभूतत्वात्तदास्रवक्षणादूर्ध्वं भावपुण्यास्रवः । तन्निमित्तं
शुभकर्मपरिणामो योगद्वारेण प्रविशता पुद्गलानां द्रव्यपुण्यास्रव इति ॥१३५॥

अरहंतसिद्धसाधुसु भत्तो धम्मम्मि जा य खलु चेढा ।

अणुगमण पि गुरुणं पसत्थरागो त्ति वुच्चंति ॥१३६॥

अर्हत्सिद्धसाधुषु भक्तिर्धर्मे या च खलु चेष्टा ।

अनुगमनमपि गुरुणां प्रशस्तराग इति ब्रुवन्ति ॥१३६॥

प्रशस्तरागस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । अर्हत्सिद्धसाधुषु भक्तिः, धर्मे व्यवहारचारित्र्यानुष्ठाने वासना-
प्रधाना चेष्टा, गुरुणामाचार्यादीनां रसिकत्वेनानुगमनम्—एष प्रशस्तो रागः प्रशस्तविषयत्वात् ।
अयं हि स्थूललक्ष्यतया केवलभक्तिप्रधानस्याज्ञानिनो भवति । उपरितनभूमिकायामलब्धास्पदस्या-
स्थानरागनिषेधार्थं तीव्ररागज्वरविनोदार्थं वा कदाचिज्ज्ञानिनो ऽपि भवतीति ॥१३६॥

तिसिदं बुभुक्खिद वा दुहिव दट्ठण जो दु बुहिदमणो ।

पडिवज्जदि तं किवया तस्सेसा होदि अणुकंपा ॥१३७॥

तृषितं बुभुक्षितं वा दुःखितं वृष्ट्वा यस्तु दुःखितमनाः ।

प्रतिपद्यते तं कृपया तस्यैषा भवत्यनुकम्पा ॥१३७॥

अनुकम्पास्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । कच्चिदुदन्यादिदुःखप्लुतमवलोक्य करुणया तत्प्रतिचिकीर्षाकुलित-
चित्तत्वमज्ञानिनोऽनुकम्पा । ज्ञानिनस्त्वधस्तनभूमिकासु विहरमाणस्य जन्मार्णवनिमग्नजगदवलोक-
नान्मनाग्मन खेद इति ॥१३७॥

क्रोधो व जदा माणो माया लोभो व चित्तमासेज्ज ।

जीवस्स कुणदि खोह कलुसो त्ति य तं बुधा वेत्ति ॥१३८॥

क्रोधो वा यदा मानो माया लोभो वा चित्तमासाद्य ।

जीवस्य करोति क्षोभ कालुष्यमिति च तं बुधा ब्रुवन्ति ॥१३८॥

चित्तकलुषत्वस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । क्रोधमानमायालोभाना तीव्रोदये चित्तस्य क्षोभः कालुष्यम् ।
तेषामेव मन्दोदये तस्य प्रसादोऽकालुष्यम् । तत् कादाचित्कविशिष्टकषायक्षयोपशमे सत्यज्ञानिनो
भवति । कषायोदयानुवृत्तेरसमग्रव्यावर्तितोपयोगस्यावान्तरभूमिकासु कदाचित् ज्ञानिनोऽपि
भवतीति ॥१३८॥

चरिया पमादबहुला कालुस्सं लोलदा य विसयेसु ।

परपरितापपवादो पावस्स य आसव कुणदि ॥१३९॥

चर्या प्रमादबहुला कालुष्यं लोलता च विषयेषु ।

परपरितापपवादः पापस्य चास्त्रव करोति ॥१३९॥

पापास्त्रवस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । प्रमादबहुलचर्या परिणतिः, कालुष्यपरिणति, विषयलौक्यपरिणति,
परपरितापपरिणति, परापवादपरिणतिश्चेति पञ्चाशुभा भावा द्रव्यपापास्त्रवस्य निमित्तमात्रत्वेन
कारणभूतत्वात्तदास्त्रवक्षणादूर्ध्व भावपापास्त्रव । तन्निमित्तोऽशुभकर्मपरिणामो योगद्वारेण प्रविशता
पुद्गलानां द्रव्यपापास्त्रव इति ॥१३९॥

सण्णाओ य तिलेस्सा इन्द्रियवसदा य अट्टरुद्दाणि ।

णाणं च दुप्पउत्तं मोहो पावप्पदा होत्ति ॥१४०॥

संज्ञाश्च त्रिलेश्या इन्द्रियवशता चार्तरौद्रे ।

ज्ञानं च दुःप्रयुक्तं मोहः पापप्रदा भवन्ति ॥१४०॥

पापास्त्रवभूतभावप्रपञ्चाख्यानमेतत् । तीव्रमोहविपाकप्रभवा आहारभयमैश्वर्यपरिग्रहसंज्ञा,
तीव्रकषायोदयानुरञ्जितयोगप्रवृत्तिरूपा कृष्णनीलकापोतलेश्यास्तिस्रः, रागद्वेषोदयप्रकर्षादिन्द्रिया-

१३८ P खोभ ।

१३९ P विसएसु, परिदावयवाद्यो ।

१४० P तिलेसा ।

धीनत्वम्, रागद्वेषोद्वेकात्प्रियसयोगाप्रियवियोगवेदनामोक्षणनिदानाकाङ्क्षणरूपमार्तम्, कषायकूरा-
शयत्वाद्विसोऽस्त्यस्तेयविषयसरक्षणानन्दरूप रौद्रम्, नैष्कर्म्यं तु शुभकर्मणश्चान्यत्र दुष्टतया प्रयुक्त-
ज्ञानम्, सामान्येन दर्शनचारित्रमोहनीयोदयोपजनिताविवेकरूपो मोहः । एष भावपापास्त्रवप्रपञ्चो
द्रव्यपापास्त्रवप्रपञ्चप्रदो भवतीति ॥१४०॥ इति आस्त्रवपदार्थव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ सवरपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

इन्द्रियकषायसंज्ञा णिग्गहिदा जेहिं सुट्ठु मग्गम्मि ।

जावत्तावत्तेहिं पिहियं पावासवच्छिद्दं ॥१४१॥

इन्द्रियकषायसंज्ञा निगृहीता ये. सुष्ठु मार्गे ।

यावत्तावत्तेषां पिहित पापास्त्रवच्छिद्रम् ॥१४१॥

अनन्तरत्वात्पापस्यैव सवरव्याख्यानमेतत् । मार्गे हि सवरस्तन्निमित्तमिन्द्रियाणि कषाया सन्नाश्च
यावताशेन यावन्त वा काल निगृह्यन्ते तावताशेन तावन्त वा काल पापास्त्रवद्वार पिधीयते । इन्द्रिय-
कषायसंज्ञा भावपापास्त्रवो द्रव्यपापास्त्रवहेतु पूर्वमुक्तः । इह तन्निरोधो भावपापसवरो द्रव्यपाप-
सवरहेतुरवधारणीय इति ॥१४१॥

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व सव्वदव्वेसु ।

णासवदि सुहं असुहं समसुहदुक्खस्स भिक्खुस्स ॥१४२॥

यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा सर्वद्रव्येषु ।

नास्त्रवति शुभमशुभ समसुखदुःखस्य भिक्षोः ॥१४२॥

सामान्यसवरस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यस्य रागरूपो द्वेषरूपो मोहरूपो वा समग्रपरद्रव्येषु न हि विद्यते
भावः तस्य निर्विकारचैतन्यत्वात्समसुखदुःखस्य भिक्षोः शुभमशुभ च कर्म नास्त्रवति, कितु सन्नियत एव ।
तदत्र मोहरागद्वेषपरिणामनिरोधो भावसवरः । तन्निमित्तं शुभाशुभकर्मपरिणामनिरोधो योगद्वारेण
प्रविशता पुद्गलानां द्रव्यसवर इति ॥१४२॥

जस्स जदा खलु पुण्णं जोगे पावं च णत्थि विरदस्स ।

संवरणं तस्स तदा सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स ॥१४३॥

यस्य यदा खलु पुण्य योगे पापं च नास्ति विरतस्य ।

संवरणं तस्य तदा शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मणः ॥१४३॥

विशेषेण सवरस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यस्य श्लेष्मिनो विरतस्य सर्वतो निवृत्तस्य योगे वाङ्मन-
कायकर्मणि शुभपरिणामरूप पुण्यमशुभपरिणामरूप पाप च यदा न भवति तस्य तदा शुभाशुभभाव-
कृतस्य द्रव्यकर्मण सवर स्वकारणाभावात्प्रसिद्ध्यति । तदत्र शुभाशुभपरिणामनिरोधो भावपुण्य-
पापसवरो द्रव्यपुण्यपापसवरस्य हेतुः प्रधानो ऽवधारणीय इति ॥१४३॥ इति सवरपदार्थव्याख्यान
समाप्तम् ।

अथ निर्जरापदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

संवरजोगेहि जुदो तर्वेहि जो चिट्ठे बहुविहेहि ।

कम्माणं णिज्जरणं बहुगाणं कुणदि सो णियदं ॥१४४॥

संवरयोगाभ्यां युक्तस्तपोभिर्यश्चेष्टते बहुविधैः ।

कर्मणां निर्जरणं बहुकानां करोति स नियतम् ॥१४४॥

निर्जरास्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । शुभाशुभपरिणामनिरोध सवर, शुद्धोपयोगो योग । ताभ्या युक्त-
स्तपोभिरनशनावमौदर्यवृत्तिपरिसंख्यानरसपरित्यागविविक्तशय्यासनकायक्लेशादिभेदाद्बहिरङ्गं
प्रायश्चित्तविनयवैयावृत्यस्वाध्यायव्युत्सर्गध्यानभेदादन्तरङ्गं च बहुविधैर्यश्चेष्टते स खलु बहुना
कर्मणा निर्जरण करोति । तदत्र कर्मवीर्यशासनसमर्थो बहिरङ्गान्तरङ्गतपोभिर्बृंहित शुद्धोपयोगो
भावनिर्जरा, तदनुभावनीरसीभूतानामेकदेशसक्षय समुपात्तकर्मपुद्गलानां द्रव्यनिर्जरेति ॥१४४॥

जो संवरेण जुत्तो अप्पट्टपसाधगो हि अप्पाणं ।

मुणिऊण भादि णियदं णाणं सो संधुणोदि कम्मरयं ॥१४५॥

य संवरेण युक्तः आत्मार्थप्रसाधको ह्यात्मानम् ।

ज्ञात्वा ध्यायति नियत ज्ञानं स संधुनोति कर्मरज ॥१४५॥

मुख्यनिर्जराकारणोपन्यासो ऽयम् । यो हि संवरेण शुभाशुभपरिणामपरमनिरोधेन युक्त परि-
ज्ञातवस्तुस्वरूप परप्रयोजनेभ्यो व्यावृत्तबुद्धि केवल स्वप्रयोजनसाधनोदयोतमना आत्मानं स्वोप-
लम्भेनोपलभ्य गुणगुणितोर्वस्तुत्वेनाभेदात्तदेव ज्ञानं स्व स्वेनाविचलितमना सचेतयते स खलु
नितान्तनि स्नेह प्रहीणस्नेहाभ्यङ्गपरिष्वङ्गशुद्धस्फटिकस्तम्भवत् पूर्वोपात्त कर्मरजं संधुनोति ।
एतेन निर्जरामुख्यत्वे हेतुत्व ध्यानस्य द्योतितमिति ॥१४५॥

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व जोगपरिकम्मो ।

तस्स सुहासुहड्हणो भाणमओ जायए अगणी ॥१४६॥

यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा योगपरिकर्म ।

तस्य शुभाशुभबहूनां ध्यानमयो जायते अग्निः ॥१४६॥

ध्यानस्वरूपाभिधानमेतत् । शुद्धस्वरूपे ऽविचलितचैतन्यवृत्तिर्हि ध्यानम् । अथास्यात्मलाभ-
विधिरभिधीयते । यदा खलु योगी दर्शनचरित्रमोहनीयविपाक पुद्गलकर्मत्वात् कर्मसु सहृत्य, तद-
नुवृत्ते व्यावृत्त्योपयोगममुह्यन्तमरज्यन्तमद्विषन्त चान्यन्तशुद्ध एवात्मनि निष्कम्प निवेशयति, तदास्य
निष्क्रियचैतन्यरूपस्वरूपविश्रान्तस्य वाङ्मन कायानभावयत स्वकर्मस्वव्यापारयत सकलशुभा-
शुभकर्मन्धनदहनसमर्थत्वात् अग्निकल्प परमपुरुषार्थसिद्धयुपायभूत ध्यान जायते इति । तथा
चोक्तम्—

“अज्ज वि तिरयणसुद्धा अप्पा भाएवि लहइ इदत्त ।

लोयतियदेवत्त तत्थ चुआ णिव्वुदि जति” ।

“अतो णत्थि सुईण कालो थोओ वय च दुम्मेहा ।

त णवरि सिक्खियव्व ज जरमरणक्ख कुणइ” ॥१४६॥

इति निर्जरापदार्थव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ बन्धपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

जं सुहमसुहमुदिण्णं भावं रत्तो करेदि जदि अप्पा ।

सो तेण हवदि बद्धो पोगलकम्मेण विविहेण ॥१४७॥

यं शुभमशुभमुदीर्णं भाव रक्त करोति यद्यात्मा ।

स तेन भवति बद्ध पुद्गलकर्मणा विविधेन ॥१४७॥

बन्धस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यदि खल्वयमात्मा परोपाश्रयेणानादिरक्त कर्मोदयप्रभावत्वादुदीर्ण
शुभमशुभ वा भाव करोति, तदा स आत्मा तेन निमित्तभूतेन भावेन पुद्गलकर्मणा विविधेन बद्धो
भवति । तदत्र मोहरागद्वेषस्निग्ध शुभो अशुभो वा परिणामो जीवस्य भावबन्ध, तन्निमित्तेन शुभा-
शुभकर्मत्वपरिणताना जीवेन सहान्योन्यमूर्च्छेन पुद्गलाना द्रव्यबन्ध इति ॥१४७॥

जोगणिमित्तं ग्रहण जोगो मणवयणकायसंभूदो ।

भावणिमित्तो बद्धो भावो रतिरागदोसमोहजुदो ॥१४८॥

योगनिमित्तं ग्रहणं योगो मनोवचनकायसंभूतः ॥

भावनिमित्तो बन्धो भावो रतिरागद्वेषमोहयुतः ॥१४८॥

वहिरङ्गान्तरङ्गबन्धकारणाख्यानमेतत् । ग्रहणं हि कर्मपुद्गलाना जीवप्रदेशवर्तिकर्मस्कन्धा-
नुप्रवेशः । तत् खलु योगनिमित्तम् । योगो वाङ्मन कायकर्मवर्गणालम्बन आत्मप्रदेशपरिस्पन्दः ।
बन्धस्तु कर्मपुद्गलाना विशिष्टशक्तिपरिणामेनावस्थानम् । स पुनर्जीवभावनिमित्तः । जीवभाव

पुना रतिरागद्वेषमोहयुत, मोहनीयविपाकसंपादितविकार इत्यर्थं । तदत्र पुद्गलानां ग्रहणहेतु-
त्वाद्बहिरङ्गकारणयोग, विशिष्टशक्तिस्थितिहेतुत्वादन्तरङ्गकारणजीवभाव एवेति ॥१४८॥

हेतु चतुर्विध्यप्पो अट्टविद्यप्पस्स कारणं भणिदं ।

तेसिं पि य रागादी तेसिमभावे ण बज्झंति ॥१४९॥

हेतुश्चतुर्विकल्पो ऽष्टविकल्पस्य कारणं भणितम् ।

तेषामपि च रागादयस्तेषामभावे न बध्यन्ते ॥१४९॥

मिथ्यात्वादिद्रव्यपर्यायानामपि बहिरङ्गकारणद्योतनमेतत् । तत्रान्तरे किलाष्टविकल्पकर्म-
कारणत्वेन बन्धहेतुर्द्रव्यहेतुरुपश्चतुर्विकल्पः प्रोक्तः मिथ्यात्वासयमकषाययोगा इति । तेषामपि जीव-
भावभूता रागादयो बन्धहेतुत्वस्य हेतवः, यतो रागादिभावानामभावे द्रव्यमिथ्यात्वासयमकषाययोग-
सद्भावे ऽपि जीवान् बध्यन्ते । ततो रागादीनामन्तरङ्गत्वान्निश्चयेन बन्धहेतुत्वमवसेयमिति ॥१४९॥
इति बन्धपदार्थव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ।

अथ मोक्षपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

हेतुमभावे णियमा जायदि णाणिस्स आसवणिरोधो ।

आसवभावेण विणा जायदि कम्मस्स दु णिरोधो ॥१५०॥

कम्मस्साभावेण य सव्वण्हू सव्वलोगदरिसी य ।

पावदि इंदियरहिवं अवाबाहं सुहमणंतं ॥१५१॥

हेत्वभावे नियमाज्जायते ज्ञानिनः आस्रवनिरोधः ।

आस्रवभावेन विना जायते कर्मणस्तु निरोधः ॥१५०॥

कर्मणामभावेन च सर्वज्ञः सर्वलोकदर्शी च ।

प्राप्नोतीन्द्रियरहितमव्याबाधं सुखमनन्तम् ॥१५१॥

द्रव्यकर्ममोक्षहेतुपरमसवरूपेण भावमोक्षस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । आस्रवहेतुर्हि जीवस्य मोहराग-
द्वेषरूपो भावः । तदभावो भवति ज्ञानिनः । तदभावे भवत्यास्रवभावाभावः । आस्रवभावाभावे
भवति कर्मभावः । कर्मभावेन भवति सार्वज्ञः सर्वदर्शित्वमव्याबाधमिन्द्रियव्यापारातीतमनन्तसुखत्व-
चेति । स एष जीवन्मुक्तिनामा भावमोक्षः, कथमिति चेत् । भावः खल्वत्र विवक्षितः कर्मावृत्तचैतन्य-
स्य क्रमप्रवर्तमानज्ञप्तिक्रियारूपः । स खलु ससारिणो ऽनादिमोहनीयकर्मोदयानुवृत्तिवशादशुद्धो द्रव्य-

कर्मास्त्रिवहेतु । स तु ज्ञानिनो मोहरागद्वेषानुवृत्तिरूपेण प्रहीयते । ततोऽस्य आस्रवभावो निरुध्यते । ततो निरुद्धास्रवभावस्यास्य मोहक्षयेणात्यन्तनिर्विकारनयादिमुद्रितानन्तचैतन्यवीर्यस्य शुद्धज्ञप्तिक्रियारूपेणान्तर्मुहूर्तमतिवाह्य युगपज्ज्ञानदर्शनावरणान्तरायक्षयेण कथञ्चित् कूटस्थज्ञानत्वमवाप्य ज्ञप्तिक्रियारूपे क्रमप्रवृत्त्यभावाद्भावकर्म विनश्यति । तत कर्माभावे स हि भगवान्सर्वज्ञ सर्वदर्शी व्युपरतेन्द्रियव्यापाराव्याबाधानन्तसुखश्च नित्यमेवावतिष्ठते । इत्येष भावकर्ममोक्षप्रकारः द्रव्यकर्ममोक्षहेतु परमसवरप्रकारश्च ॥१५०-१५१॥

वंसज्जाणसमगं भाणं णो अण्णदव्वसंजुत्तं ।

जायदि णिज्जरहेद्दु सभावसहितस्स साधुस्स ॥१५२॥

दर्शनज्ञानसमग्रं ध्यानं नो अन्यद्रव्यसंयुक्तम् ।

जायते निर्जराहेतुः स्वभावसहितस्य साधोः ॥१५२॥

द्रव्यकर्ममोक्षहेतुपरमनिर्जराकारणध्यानाख्यानमेतत् । एवमस्य खलु भावमुक्तस्य भगवत केवलिनः स्वरूपतृप्तत्वाद्विश्रान्तसुखदुःखकर्मविपाककृतविक्रियस्य प्रक्षीणावरणत्वादनन्तज्ञानदर्शनसंपूर्णशुद्धज्ञानचेतनामयत्वादतीन्द्रियत्वात् चान्यद्रव्यसयोगवियुक्त शुद्धस्वरूपे ऽविचलितचैतन्यवृत्तिरूपत्वाकथञ्चिद्धान्यव्यपदेशार्हमात्मनः स्वरूपं पूर्वसंचितकर्मणा शक्तिशतन पतन वा विलोक्य निर्जराहेतुत्वेनोपवर्ण्यते इति ॥१५२॥

जो संवरेण जुत्तो णिज्जरमाणोध सव्वकम्मणि ।

ववगववेदाउस्सो मुयदि भवं तेण सो मोक्खो ॥१५३॥

यः संवरेण युक्तो निर्जरन्नथ सर्वकर्माणि ।

व्यपगतवेद्यायुक्तो मुञ्चति भवं तेन स मोक्षः ॥१५३॥

द्रव्यमोक्षस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । अथ खलु भगवत केवलिनो भावमोक्षे सति प्रसिद्धपरमसवरस्योत्तरकर्मसतती निरुद्धाया परमनिर्जराकारणध्यानप्रसिद्धौ सत्या पूर्वकर्मसतती कदाचित्स्वभावेनैव कदाचित्समुद्घातविधानेनायुः कर्मसमभूतस्थित्यामायुः कर्मनुसारेणैव निर्जीर्यमाणायामपुनर्भवाय तद्भवत्यागसमये वेदनीयायुर्नामगोत्ररूपाणां जीवेन सहात्यन्तविश्लेषः कर्मपुद्गलानां द्रव्यमोक्षः ॥१५३॥ इतिमोक्षपदार्थव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

समाप्तं च मोक्षमार्गाविषयवरूपसम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानविषयभूतनवपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ॥

अथ मोक्षमार्गप्रपञ्चसूचिका चूलिका ।

जीवसहायं णाणं अप्पडिहदं सणं अणणमयं ।

चरियं च तेसु णियदं अत्थित्तमर्णिदियं भणियं ॥१५४॥

जीवस्वभावं ज्ञानमप्रतिहतदर्शनमनन्यमयम् ।

चारित्र्यं च तयोनियतमस्तित्वमनिन्दितं भणितम् ॥१५४॥

मोक्षमार्गस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । जीवस्वभावनियत चरित मोक्षमार्ग । जीवस्वभावो हि ज्ञानदर्शने अनन्यमयत्वात् । अनन्यमयत्व च तयोर्विशेषस्यान्यच्चैतन्यस्वभावजीवनिर्वृत्तत्वात् । अथ तयोर्जीवस्वरूपभूतयोर्ज्ञानदर्शनयोर्यन्नियतमवस्थितमुत्पादव्ययघ्नौव्यरूपवृत्तिमयमस्तित्व रागादिपरिणत्यभावाद-निन्दित तच्चरितम् । तदेव मोक्षमार्ग इति । द्विविध हि किल ससारिषु चरितम्—स्वचरित परचरित च, स्वसमयपरसमयावित्यर्थ । तत्र स्वभावावस्थितास्तित्वस्वरूप स्वचरितम्, परभावावस्थितास्तित्वस्वरूप परचरितम् । तत्र यत्स्वभावावस्थितास्तित्वरूप परभावावस्थितास्तित्वव्यावृत्तत्वेनात्यन्तमनिन्दित तदत्र साक्षान्मोक्षमार्गत्वेनावधारणीयमिति ॥१५४॥

जीवो सहावणियदो अणियदगुणपज्जओध परसमओ ।

जदि कुणदि सगं समयं पढमस्सदि कम्मबन्धादो ॥१५५॥

जीवः स्वभावनियत अनियतगुणपर्यायोऽथ परसमय ।

यदि कुरुते स्वक समयं प्रभ्रश्यति कर्मबन्धात् ॥१५५॥

स्वसमयपरसमयोपादानव्युदासपुरस्सरकर्मक्षयद्वारेण जीवस्वभावनियतचरितस्य मोक्षमार्गत्वद्योतनमेतत् । ससारिणो हि जीवस्य ज्ञानदर्शनावस्थितत्वात् स्वभावनियतस्याप्यनादिमोहनीयोदयानुवृत्तिपरत्वेनोपरक्तोपयोगस्य सत समुपात्तभाववैश्वरूप्यत्वादनियतगुणपर्यायत्व परसमय परचरितमिति यावत् । तस्यैवानादिमोहनीयोदयानुवृत्तिपरत्वमपास्यात्यन्तशुद्धोपयोगस्य सत समुपात्तभावैक्यरूप्यत्वान्नियतगुणपर्यायत्व स्वसमय स्वचरितमिति यावत् । अथ खलु यदि कथंचनोद्भिन्नसम्यग्ज्ञानज्योतिर्जीव परसमय व्युदस्य स्वसमयमुपादत्ते तदा कर्मबन्धादवश्य भ्रश्यति । यतो हि जीवस्वभावनियत चरित मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१५५॥

जो परदव्वम्मि सुहं असुहं रागेण कुणदि जदि भावं ।

सो सगचरित्तभट्ठो परचरियचरो हवदि जीवो ॥१५६॥

यः परद्रव्ये शुभमशुभ रागेण करोति यदि भावम् ।

स स्वकचरित्रभ्रष्ट परचरितचरो भवति जीव ॥१५६॥

परचरितप्रवृत्तस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यो हि मोहनीयोदयानुवृत्तिवशाद्भज्यमानोपयोग सन् परद्रव्ये शुभमशुभ वा भावमादधाति, स स्वकचरित्रभ्रष्ट परचरित्रचर इत्युपगम्यते, यतो हि स्वद्रव्ये शुद्धोपयोगवृत्ति स्वचरितम्, परद्रव्ये सोपरागोपयोगवृत्ति परचरितमिति ॥१५६॥

आसवदि जेण पुण्णं पाव वा अप्पणोध भावेण ।

सो तेण परचरित्तो हवदि त्ति जिणा परूवन्ति ॥१५७॥

आस्रवति येन पुण्यं पापं वात्मनो ऽय भावेन ।

स तेन परचरित्र भवतीति जिना प्ररूपयन्ति ॥१५७॥

परचरितप्रवृत्तेर्बन्धहेतुत्वेन मोक्षमार्गत्वनिषेधनमेतत् । इह किल शुभोपरवतो भाव पुण्यास्रव, अशुभोपरक्त पापास्रव इति । तत्र पुण्य पाप वा येन भावेनास्रवति यस्य जीवस्य यदि स भावो भवति स जीवस्तदा तेन परचरित इति प्ररूप्यते । तत परचरितप्रवृत्तिर्बन्धमार्ग एव, न मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१५७॥

जो सव्वसंगमुक्को णण्णमणो अप्पणं सहावेण ।

जाणदि पस्सदि णियदं सो सगचरियं चरदि जीवो ॥१५८॥

यः सर्वसंगमुक्त अनन्यमना आत्मानं स्वभावेन ।

जानाति पश्यति नित्यं स स्वकचरितं चरति जीव ॥१५८॥

स्वचरितप्रवृत्तस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । य खलु निरुपरागोपयोगत्वात्सर्वसंगमुक्त परद्रव्यव्यावृत्तोपयोगत्वादनन्यमना आत्मानं स्वभावेन ज्ञानदर्शनरूपेण जानाति पश्यति नियतमवस्थितत्वेन, स खलु स्वकचरित चरति जीव । यतो हि दृशिज्ञप्तिस्वरूपे पुरुषे तन्मात्रत्वेन वर्तन स्वचरितमिति ॥१५८॥

चरियं चरदि सगं सो जो परदव्वप्पभावरहिदप्पा ।

दंसणणाणवियप्पं अवियप्पं चरदि अप्पादो ॥१५९॥

चरित चरति स्वक स य परद्रव्यात्मभावरहितात्मा ।

दर्शनज्ञानविकल्पमविकल्पं चरत्यात्मनः ॥१५९॥

शुद्धस्वचरितप्रवृत्तिपथप्रतिपादनमेतत् । यो हि योगीन्द्र समस्तमोहव्यूहबहिर्भूतत्वात्परद्रव्यस्वभावभावरहितात्मा सन्, स्वद्रव्यमेकमेवाभिमुख्येनानुवर्तमान स्वस्वभावभूत दर्शनज्ञानविकल्प-

मप्यात्मनो ऽविकल्पत्वेन चरति, स खलु स्वक चरित चरति । एव हि शुद्धद्रव्याश्रितमभिन्नसाध्य-
साधनभाव निश्चयनयमाश्रित्य मोक्षमार्गं प्ररूपणम् । यत्तु पूर्वमुद्दिष्ट तत्स्वपरप्रत्ययपर्यायाश्रित भिन्न-
साध्यसाधनभाव व्यवहारनयमाश्रित्य प्ररूपितम् । न चैतद्विप्रतिषिद्ध निश्चयव्यवहारयो साध्य-
साधनभावत्वात्सुवर्णसुवर्णपाषाणवत् । अत एवोभयनयायत्ता पारमेश्वरी तीर्थप्रवर्तनेति ॥१५६॥

धर्मादीसद्गुण सम्मत्त णाणमंगपुव्वगदं ।

चेट्ठा तवम्हि चरिया व्यवहारो मोक्खमग्गो त्ति ॥१६०॥

धर्मादिश्रद्धान सम्यक्त्वं ज्ञानमङ्गपूर्वगतम् ।

चेष्टा तपसि चर्या व्यवहारो मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१६०॥

निश्चयमोक्षमार्गसाधनभावेन पूर्वोद्दिष्टव्यवहारमोक्षमार्गनिर्देशो ऽयम् । सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञान-
चारित्राणि मोक्षमार्ग । तत्र धर्मादीना द्रव्यपदार्थविकल्पवता तत्त्वार्थश्रद्धानभावस्वभाव भावान्तर
श्रद्धानाख्य सम्यक्त्व, तत्त्वार्थश्रद्धाननिर्वृत्तौ सत्यामङ्गपूर्वगतार्थपरिच्छित्तिर्ज्ञानम्, आचारादिसूत्र-
प्रपञ्चितविचित्रयतिवृत्तसमस्तसमुदयरूपे तपसि चेष्टा चर्या—इत्येष स्वपरप्रत्ययपर्यायाश्रित
भिन्नसाध्यसाधनभाव व्यवहारनयमाश्रित्यानुगम्यमानो मोक्षमार्गं कार्तस्वरपाषाणापितदीप्तजात-
वेदोवत्समाहितान्तरङ्गस्य प्रतिपदमुपरितनशुद्धभूमिकासु परमरम्यासु विश्रान्तिमभिन्ना निष्पादयन्,
जात्यकार्तस्वरस्येव शुद्धजीवस्य कथचिद्भिन्नसाध्यसाधनभावाभावात्स्वय शुद्धस्वभावेन विपरिणम-
मानस्यापि, निश्चयमोक्षमार्गस्य साधनभावमापद्यत इति ॥१६०॥

णिच्छयणयेण भणिदो तिहि तेहि समाहिदो हु जो अप्पा ।

ण कुणदि किच्चि वि अण्णं ण मुयदि सो मोक्खमग्गो त्ति ॥१६१॥

निश्चयनयेन भणितस्त्रिभिस्तै समाहित खलु य. आत्मा ।

न करोति किंचिदप्यन्यन्न मुञ्चति स मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१६१॥

व्यवहारमोक्षमार्गसाध्यभावेन निश्चयमोक्षमार्गोपन्यासो ऽयम् । सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्रसमाहित
आत्मैव जीवस्वभावनियतचरित्रत्वान्निश्चयेन मोक्षमार्ग । अथ खलु कथचनानाद्यविद्याव्यपगमाद्
व्यवहारमोक्षमार्गमनुप्रपन्नो धर्मादितत्त्वार्थश्रद्धानाङ्गपूर्वगतार्थज्ञानातपश्चेष्टाना धर्मादितत्त्वार्थ-
श्रद्धानाङ्गपूर्वगतार्थज्ञानतपश्चेष्टाना च त्यागोपादानाय प्रारब्धविविक्तभावव्यापार, कुतश्चिदुपा-
देयत्यागे त्याज्योपादाने च पुन प्रवर्तितप्रतिविधानाभिप्राय, यस्मिन्यावति काले विशिष्टभावनासी-
ष्ठववशात्सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्रै स्वभावभूतै सममङ्गाङ्गभावपरिणत्या तत्समाहितो भूत्वा त्यागो-
पादानविकल्पशून्यत्वाद्विश्रान्तभावव्यापार मुनिष्प्रकम्प अयमात्मावतिष्ठते, तस्मिन् तावति काले
अयमेवात्मा जीवस्वभावनियतचरितत्वान्निश्चयेन मोक्षमार्ग इत्युच्यते । अतो निश्चयव्यवहारमोक्ष-
मार्गयो साध्यसाधनभावो नितरामुपपन्न इति ॥१६१॥

जो चरदि जादि पेच्छदि अप्पाणं अप्पणा अण्णमयं ।

सो चारित्तं जाणं दंसणमिदि णिच्छिदो होदि ॥१६२॥

यश्चरति जानाति पश्यति आत्मानमात्मनानन्यमयम् ।

स चारित्रं ज्ञानं दर्शनमिति निश्चितो भवति ॥१६२॥

आत्मनश्चारित्रज्ञानदर्शनत्वद्योतनमेतत् । य खल्वात्मानमात्ममयत्वादनन्यमयमात्मना चरति—
स्वभावनियतास्तित्वेनानुवर्तते, आत्मना जानाति—स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वेन चेतयते, आत्मना पश्यति—
याथातथ्येनावलोकयते, स खल्वात्मैव चारित्र ज्ञान दर्शनमिति कर्तृकर्मकरणानामभेदान्निश्चितो
भवति । अतश्चारित्रज्ञानदर्शनरूपत्वाज्जीवस्वभावनियतचरितत्वलक्षण निश्चयमोक्षमार्गत्वमात्मनो
नितरामुपपन्नमिति ॥१६२॥

जेण विजाणदि सव्वं पेच्छदि सो तेण सोक्खमणुहवदि ।

इदि तं जाणदि भविओ अभव्वसत्तो ण सद्दहदि ॥१६३॥

येन विजानाति सर्वं पश्यति स तेन सौख्यमनुभवति ।

इति तज्जानाति भव्यो ऽभव्यसत्त्वो न श्रद्धते ॥१६३॥

सर्वस्यात्मन ससारिणो मोक्षमार्गाह्वनिरासो ऽयम् । इह हि स्वभावप्रातिकूल्याभावहेतुक
सौख्यम् । आत्मनो हि दृशिज्ञप्ती स्वभाव । तयोर्विषयप्रतिबन्ध प्रातिकूल्यम् । मोक्षे खल्वात्मन
सर्वं विजानत पश्यतश्च तदभाव । ततस्तद्धेतुकस्यानाकुलत्वलक्षणस्य परमार्थसुखस्य मोक्षे ऽनुभूति-
रचलितास्ति । इत्येतद्भव्य एव भावतो विजानाति, तत स एव मोक्षमार्गाह्वं । नैतदभव्य श्रद्धते,
तत स मोक्षमार्गानह्वं एवेति । अत कतिपये एव ससारिणो मोक्षमार्गाह्वं न सर्वं
एवेति ॥१६३॥

दंसणणाणचरित्ताणि मोक्खमग्गो त्ति सेविदव्वानि ।

साधूहि इदं भणिदं तेहिं वु बंधो व मोक्खो वा ॥१६४॥

दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्ग इति सेवितव्यानि ।

साधुभिरिदं भणितं तैस्तु बन्धो वा मोक्षो वा ॥१६४॥

दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणां कथञ्चिद्बन्धहेतुत्वोपदर्शनेन जीवस्वभावे नियतचरितस्य साक्षान्मोक्षहेतुत्व-
द्योतनमेतत् । अमूनि हि दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि कियन्मात्रयापि परसमयप्रवृत्त्या सबलितानि कृशानु-

१६२ P अप्पणो, होति ।

१६३. P अभवियसत्तो ।

१६४ P साधूहि इदि

सवलितानीव घृतानि कथञ्चिद्विरुद्धकारणत्वरूढेर्बन्धकारणान्यपि भवन्ति । यदा तु समस्तपरसमय-
प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिरूपया स्वसमयप्रवृत्त्या समच्छन्ते, तदा निवृत्तकृशानुसवलनातीव घृतानि विरुद्धकार्य-
कारणभावाभावात्साक्षान्मोक्षकारणान्येव भवन्ति । ततः स्वसमयप्रवृत्तिनाम्नो जीवस्वभावनियत-
चरितस्य साक्षान्मोक्षमार्गत्वमुपपन्नमिति ॥१६४॥

अण्णाणादो णाणी जदि मण्णदि सुद्धसंपओगादो ।

हवदि त्ति दुक्खमोक्खं परसमयरदो हवदि जीवो ॥१६५॥

अज्ञानात् ज्ञानी यदि मन्यते शुद्धसंप्रयोगात् ।

भवतीति दुःखमोक्षः परसमयरतो भवति जीवः ॥१६५॥

सूक्ष्मपरसमयस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । अर्हदादिषु भगवत्सु सिद्धिसाधनीभूतेषु भक्तिभावानुरञ्जिता
चित्तवृत्तिरत्र शुद्धसंप्रयोगः । अथ खल्वज्ञानलवावेशाद्यदि यावत् ज्ञानवानपि ततः शुद्धसंप्रयोगान्मोक्षो
भवतीत्यभिप्रायेण खिद्यमानस्तत्र प्रवर्तते तदा तावत्सोऽपि रागलवसद्भावात्परसमयरत
इत्युपगीयते । अथ न किं पुनर्निरङ्कुशरागकलिकलङ्कितान्तरङ्गवृत्तिरितरो जन इति ॥१६५॥

अरहत्सिद्धचेदियपवयणमण्णाणभत्तिसंपण्णो ।

बंधदि पुण्णं बहुसो ण हु सो कम्मक्खयं कुणदि ॥१६६॥

अर्हत्सिद्धचेत्यप्रवचनगणज्ञानभक्तिसंपन्नः ।

बध्नाति पुण्यं बहुशो न खलु स कर्मक्षयं करोति ॥१६६॥

उक्तशुद्धसंप्रयोगस्य कथञ्चिद्वन्धहेतुत्वेन मोक्षमार्गत्वनिरासोऽयम् । अर्हदादिभक्तिसंपन्न
कथञ्चिच्छुद्धसंप्रयोगोऽपि सन् जीवो जीवद्रागलवत्वाच्छुभोपयोगतामजहत् बहुश पुण्यं बध्नाति,
न खलु सकलकर्मक्षयमारभते । ततः सर्वत्र रागकणिकापि परिहरणीया परसमयप्रवृत्तिनिबन्धनत्वा-
दिति ॥१६६॥

जस्स ह्रिदये णुमेत्तं वा परदग्गम्हि विज्जवे रागो ।

सो ण विजाणदि समयं सगस्स सग्वागमधरो वि ॥१६७॥

यस्य हृदये ऽणुमात्रो वा परद्रव्ये विद्यते रागः ।

स न विजानाति समयं स्वकस्य सर्वागमधरोऽपि ॥१६७॥

स्वसमयोपलम्भाभावस्य रागैकहेतुत्वद्योतनमेतत् । यस्य खलु रागरेणुकणिकापि जीवति हृदये
न नाम स समस्तसिद्धान्तसिन्धुपारगोऽपि निरुपररागशुद्धस्वरूप स्वसमयं चेतयते । ततः स्वसमय-
प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं पिञ्जनलग्नतूलन्यासन्यायमधिदधतार्हदादिविषयोऽपि क्रमेण रागरेणुरपसारणीय
इति ॥१६७॥

धरिवुं जस्स ण सक्कं चित्तुग्गमं विणा वु अप्पाणं ।

रोधो तस्स ण विज्जदि सुहासुहकवस्स कम्मस्स ॥१६८॥

धतुं यस्य न शक्यं चित्तोद्भ्रामं विना त्वात्मानम् ।

रोधस्तस्य न विद्यते शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मणः ॥१६८॥

रागलवमूलदोषपरपराख्यानमेतत् । इह खल्वहंदादिभक्तिरपि न रागानुवृत्तिमन्तरेण भवति । रागाद्यनुवृत्तौ च सत्या बुद्धिप्रसरमन्तरेणात्मा न त कथचनापि धारयितुं शक्यते । बुद्धिप्रसरे च सति शुभस्याशुभस्य वा कर्मणो न निरोधो ऽस्ति । ततो रागकलिविलासमूल एवायमनर्थसतान इति ॥१६८॥

तम्हा णिव्वुदिकामो णिस्संगो णिम्ममो य हविय पुणो ।

सिद्धे सु कुणवि भत्ति णिव्वाणं तेण पप्पोदि ॥१६९॥

तस्मान्निवृत्तिकामो निस्सङ्गो निर्ममश्च भूत्वा पुनः ।

सिद्धेषु करोति भक्तिं निर्वाणं तेन प्राप्नोति ॥१६९॥

रागकलिनि शेषीकरणस्य करणीयत्वाख्यानमेतत् । यतो रागाद्यनुवृत्तौ चित्तोद्भ्रान्तिः, चित्तोद्भ्रान्तौ कर्मबन्ध इत्युक्तम्, ततः खलु मोक्षार्थिना कर्मबन्धमूलचित्तोद्भ्रान्तिमूलभूता रागाद्यनुवृत्तिरेकान्तेन नि शेषीकरणीया । नि शेषिताया तस्या प्रसिद्धनैः सङ्ग्यनैर्मम्य शुद्धात्मद्रव्य-विश्रान्तिरूपा पारमाथिकी सिद्धभक्तिमनुविभ्राण प्रसिद्धम्बसमयप्रवृत्तिर्भवति । तेन कारणेन स एव नि शेषितकर्मबन्ध सिद्धिमवाप्नोतीति ॥१६९॥

सपयत्थं तित्थयर अभिगदबुद्धिस्स सुत्तरोइस्स ।

दूरतरं णिव्वाणं संजमतवसंपउत्तस्स ॥१७०॥

सपदार्थं तीर्थकरमभिगतबुद्धेः सूत्ररोचिनः ।

दूरतरं निर्वाणं सयमतपःसप्रयुक्तस्य ॥१७०॥

अहंदादिभक्तिरूपपरसमयप्रवृत्तेः साक्षान्मोक्षहेतुत्वाभावे ऽपि परपरया मोक्षहेतुत्वसद्भावद्योत-नमेतत् । य खलु मोक्षार्थमुद्यतमना समुपाजिताचिन्त्यसयमतपोभारो ऽप्यसभावितपरमवैराग्य-भूमिकाधिरोहणसमर्थप्रभुशक्ति पिञ्जनलग्नतूलन्यासन्यायेन नवपदार्थं सहाहंदादिचिह्नीरूपा परस-मयप्रवृत्तिं परित्यक्तुं नोत्सहते, स खलु न नाम साक्षान्मोक्ष लभते किन्तु सुरलोकादिक्लेशप्राप्तिरूपया परपरया तमवाप्नोति ॥१७०॥

अरहंतसिद्धचेदियपवयणभत्तो परेण नियमेण ।

जो कुणदि तवोकम्म सो सुरलोगं समादियदि ॥१७१॥

अर्हत्सिद्धचैत्यप्रवचनभक्तः परेण नियमेन ।

यः करोति तपःकर्म स सुरलोकं समावसे ॥१७१॥

अर्हदादिभक्तिमात्ररागजनितसाक्षान्मोक्षस्यान्तरायद्योतनमेतत् । य खल्वर्हदादिभक्तिविधेय-
बुद्धिः सन् परमसयमप्रधानमतितीव्र तपस्तप्यते, स तावन्मात्ररागकलिकलङ्कितस्वान्त साक्षान्मोक्ष-
स्यान्तरायीभूत विषयविषद्रुमामोदमोहितान्तरङ्ग स्वर्गलोक समासाद्य, सुचिर रागाङ्गारै पच्य-
मानोऽन्तस्ताम्यतीति ॥१७१॥

तम्हा णिव्वुदिकामो रागं सध्वत्थ कुणदु मा किंचि ।

सो तेण वीदरागो भविओ भवसायरं तरदि ॥१७२॥

तस्तान्निर्वृत्तिकामो रागं सर्वत्र करोतु मा किंचित् ।

स तेन वीतरागो भव्यो भवसागर तरति ॥१७२॥

साक्षान्मोक्षमार्गसारसूचनद्वारेण शास्त्रतात्पर्योपसहारो ऽयम् । साक्षान्मोक्षमार्गपुरस्सरो हि
वीतरागत्वम् । तत् खल्वर्हदादिगतमपि राग चन्दननगसगतमग्निमिव सुरलोकादिक्लेशप्राप्त्यात्यन्त-
मन्तर्दाहाय कल्पमानमाकलय्य साक्षान्मोक्षकामो महाजन समस्तविषयमपि रागमुत्सृज्यात्यन्तवीत-
रागो भूत्वा समुच्छलज्ज्वलद्दुःखसौख्यकल्लोल कर्माग्नितप्तकलकलोदभारप्राग्भारभयकर भव-
सागरमुत्तीर्य, शुद्धस्वरूपपरमामृतसमुद्रमध्यास्य सद्यो निर्वाति ॥

अल विस्तरेण । स्वस्ति साक्षान्मोक्षमार्गसारत्वेन शास्त्रतात्पर्यभूताय वीतरागत्वायेति । द्विविध
किल तात्पर्यम्—सूत्रतात्पर्यं शास्त्रतात्पर्यं चेति । तत्र सूत्रतात्पर्यं प्रतिसूत्रमेव प्रतिपादितम् । शास्त्र-
तात्पर्यं त्विदं प्रतिपाद्यते । अस्य खलु पारमेश्वरस्य शास्त्रस्य, सकलपुरुषार्थसारभूतमोक्षतत्त्वप्रतिपत्ति-
हेतोः पञ्चास्तिकायषड्द्रव्यस्वरूपप्रतिपादनेनोपदेशितसमस्तवस्तुस्वभावस्य, नवपदार्थप्रपञ्चसूचना-
विष्कृतबन्धमोक्षसबन्धबन्धमोक्षायतनबन्धमोक्षविकल्पस्य, सम्यगावेदितनिश्चयव्यवहाररूपमोक्ष-
मार्गस्य, साक्षान्मोक्षकारणभूतपरमवीतरागत्वविश्रान्तसमस्तहृदयस्य, परमार्थतो वीतरागत्वमेव
तात्पर्यमिति । तदिदं वीतरागत्वं व्यवहारनिश्चयाविरोधेनैवानुगम्यमानं भवति समीहितसिद्धये न
पुनरन्यथा । व्यवहारनयेन भिन्नसाध्यसाधनभावमवलम्ब्यानादिभेदवासितबुद्धयः सुखेनैवावतरन्ति
तीर्थं प्राथमिका । तथा हीदं श्रद्धेयमिदमश्रद्धेयमयं श्रद्धातेदं श्रद्धानमिदं ज्ञेयमिदमज्ञेयमयं ज्ञातेदं
ज्ञानमिदं चरणीयमिदमचरणीयमयं चरितेदं चरणमिति कर्तव्याकर्तव्यकर्तृकर्मविभागावलोकनोल्ल-
सितपेक्षलोत्साहा शनैःशनैर्मोहमल्लमुन्मूलयन्त, कदाचिदज्ञानान्मदप्रमादतन्त्रतया शिथिलितात्माधि-
कारस्यात्मनो न्याय्यपथप्रवर्तनाय प्रयुक्तप्रचण्डदण्डनीतयः, पुनः पुनः दोषानुसारेण दत्तप्रायश्चित्ता
सततोद्यता सन्तो ऽथ तस्यैवात्मनो भिन्नविषयश्रद्धानज्ञानचारित्रैरधिरोप्यमाणसंस्कारस्य भिन्न-
साध्यसाधनभावस्य रजकशिलातलस्फाल्यमानविमलसलिलाप्लुतविहितोषपरिष्वङ्गमलिनवासस इव

मनाङ्मनाग्विशुद्धिमधिगम्य निश्चयनयस्य भिन्नसाध्यसाधनभावाभावादर्शनज्ञानचारित्रसमाहितत्व-
रूपे विश्रान्तसकलक्रियाकाण्डाडम्बरनिस्तरङ्गपरमचैतन्यशालिनि निर्भरानन्दमालिनि भगवत्यात्मनि
विश्रान्तिमासूत्रयन्त क्रमेण समुपजातसमरसीभावा परमवीतरागभावमधिगम्य, साक्षान्मोक्षमनु-
भवन्तीति ॥

अथ ये तु केवलव्यवहारावलम्बिनस्ते खलु भिन्नसाध्यसाधनभावावलोकनेनानवरत नितरां
खिद्यमाना मुहुर्मुहुर्धर्मादिश्रद्धानरूपाध्यवसायानुस्यूतचेतस प्रभूतश्रुतसस्काराधिरोपितविचित्रविकल्प-
जालकल्माषितचैतन्यवृत्तय, समस्तयतिवृत्तसमुदायरूपतप प्रवृत्तिरूपकर्मकाण्डोडुमराचलिता, कदा-
चित्किचिद्रोचमाना, कदाचित् किञ्चिद्विकल्पयन्त, कदाचित्किञ्चिदाचरन्त, दर्शनाचरणाय कदा-
चित्प्रशाम्यन्त, कदाचित्सविज्रमाना, कदाचिदनुकम्पमाना, कदाचिदास्तिव्यमुद्वहन्त, शङ्काकाङ्-
क्षाविक्रित्सामूढदृष्टिताना व्युत्थापननिरोधाय नित्यबद्धपरिकरा, उपबृंहणस्थितिकरणवात्सल्य-
प्रभावना भावयमाना वारवारमभिवर्धितोत्साहा, ज्ञानाचरणाय स्वाध्यायकालमवलोकयन्तो, बहुधा
विनय प्रपञ्चयन्त, प्रविहितदुर्धरोपघाना, सुष्ठु बहुमानमातन्वन्तो निह्नुवापत्ति नितरा निवार-
यन्तोऽर्थव्यञ्जनतदुभयशुद्धौ नितान्तसावधाना, चारित्राचरणाय हिंसानृतस्तेयाब्रह्मपरिग्रहसमस्त-
विरतिरूपेषु पञ्चमहाव्रतेषु तन्निष्ठवृत्तय, सम्यग्योगनिग्रहलक्षणासु गुप्तिषु नितान्त गृहीतोद्योगा,
ईर्याभार्षणादाननिक्षेपोत्सर्गरूपासु समितिष्वत्यन्तनिवेशितप्रयत्ना, तपआचरणायानशनावमौदर्य-
वृत्तिपरिसंख्यानरसपरित्यागविविक्तशय्यासनकायक्लेशेष्वभीक्षणमुत्सहमाना, प्रायश्चित्तविनयवैया-
वृत्त्यव्युत्सर्गस्वाध्यायध्यानपरिकराङ्कुशितस्वान्ता, वीर्याचरणाय कर्मकाण्डे सर्वशक्त्या व्याप्रिय-
माणा, कर्मचेतनाप्रधानत्वाद्दूरनिवारिताशुभकर्मप्रवृत्तयो ऽपि समुपात्तशुभकर्मप्रवृत्तय, सकल-
क्रियाकाण्डाडम्बरोत्तीर्णदर्शनज्ञानचारित्रैक्यपरिणतिरूपा ज्ञानचेतना मनागप्यसभावयन्त,
प्रभूतपुण्यभारमन्थरितचित्तवृत्तय, सुरलोकादिक्लेशप्राप्तिपरपरया सुचिर ससारसागरे भ्रमन्तीति ।
उक्तं च—“चरणकरणप्पहाणा ससमयपरमत्थमुक्कवावारा ।

चरणकरणस्स सार णिच्छयसुद्ध ण जाणति” ॥

येऽत्र केवलनिश्चयावलम्बिन सकलक्रियाकर्मकाण्डाडम्बरविरक्तबुद्धयो ऽर्धमीलितविलोचन-
पुटा किमपि स्वबुद्ध्यावलोक्य यथासुखमासते, ते खल्ववधीरितभिन्नसाध्यसाधनभावा अभिन्न-
साध्यसाधनभावमलभमाना अन्तराल एव प्रमादकादम्बरीमदभरालसचेतसो मत्ता इव, मूर्च्छिता
इव, सुषुप्ता इव, प्रभूतघृतसितोपलपायसासादितसौहित्या इव, समुल्वणबलसज्जनितजाड्या इव,
दारुणमनोभ्रशविहितमोहा इव, मुद्रितविशिष्टचैतन्या वनस्पतय इव, मौनीन्द्री कर्मचेतना पुण्यबन्ध-
भयेनानवलम्बमाना अनासादितपरमनैष्कर्म्यरूपज्ञानचेतनाविश्रान्तयो व्यक्ताव्यक्तप्रमादतन्त्रा
अरमागतकर्मफलचेतनाप्रधानप्रवृत्तयो वनस्पतय इव केवल पापमेव बध्नन्ति । उक्तं च—

“णिच्छयमालम्बता णिच्छयदो णिच्छय अयाणता ।

णासति चरणकरण बाहरिचरणालसा केई” ॥

ये तु पुनरपुनर्भवाय नित्यविहितोद्योगमहाभागा भगवन्तो निश्चयव्यवहारयोरन्यतरानवलम्बने-
नात्यन्तमध्यस्थीभूता शुद्धचैतन्यरूपात्मतत्त्वविश्रान्तिविरचनोन्मुखा प्रमादोदयानुवृत्तिनिवर्तिका
क्रियाकाण्डपरिणति माहात्म्यान्निवारयन्तो ऽत्यन्तमुदासीना यथाशक्त्यात्मानमात्मनात्मनि सचेतय-
माना नित्योपयुक्ता निवसन्ति, ते खलु स्वतत्त्वविश्रान्त्यनुसारेण क्रमेण कर्माणि सन्यसन्तो ऽत्यन्त-
निष्प्रमादा नितान्तनिष्कम्पमूर्तयो वनस्पतिभिरुपमीयमाना अपि दूरनिरस्तकर्मफलानुभूतयः कर्मानु-
भूतिनिरस्तुका केवलज्ञानानुभूतिसमुपजाततात्त्विकानन्दनिर्भरतरास्तरसा ससारसमुद्रमुत्तीर्य शब्द-
ब्रह्मफलस्य शाश्वतस्य भोक्तारो भवन्तीति ॥१७२॥

मग्न्यभावणट्ठं पवयणभस्तिप्पचोदिदेण मया ।

भणियं पवयणसारं पंचत्थियसंगहं सुत्तं ॥१७३॥

मार्गप्रभावनाथं प्रवचनभक्तिप्रचोदितेन मया ।

भणितं प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकसग्रहं सूत्रम् ॥१७३॥

कर्तुं प्रतिज्ञानिव्यूढिसूचिका समापनेयम् । मार्गो हि परमवैराग्यकरणप्रवणा पारमेश्वरी पर-
माज्ञा, तस्या प्रभावनं प्रख्यापनद्वारेण प्रकृष्टपरिणतिद्वारेण वा समुद्घोतनम्, तदर्थमेव परमाग-
मानुरागवेगप्रचलितमनसा सक्षेपतः समस्तवस्तुतत्त्वसूचकत्वादतिविस्तृतस्यापि प्रवचनस्य सारभूत
पञ्चास्तिकायसग्रहाभिधानं भगवत्सर्वज्ञोपज्ञत्वात् सूत्रमिदमभिहितं मयेति । अथैव शास्त्रकार
प्रारब्धस्यान्तमुपगम्यात्यन्तं कृतकृत्यो भूत्वा परमनैष्कर्म्यरूपे शुद्धस्वरूपे विश्रान्त इति श्रद्धी-
यते ॥१७३॥

इति समयव्याख्याया नवपदार्थपुरस्सरमोक्षमार्गप्रपञ्चवर्णनो द्वितीय श्रुतस्कन्ध समाप्तः ॥


स्वशक्तिससूचितवस्तुतत्त्वं-

व्याख्या कृतेय समयस्य शब्दे ।

स्वरूपगुप्तस्य न किञ्चिदस्ति

कर्तव्यमेवामृतचन्द्रसूरे ॥

इति पञ्चास्तिकायसग्रहाभिधानस्य समयस्य व्याख्या समाप्ता ।



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